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JOHANNIS WYCLIF

DE ENTE LIBRORUM DUORUM

EXCERPTA:

LIBRI I. TRACTATUS TERTIUS ET QUARTUS.
LIBRI II. TRACTATUS PRIMUS ET TERTIUS;
ET FRAGMENTUM DE ANNIHILATIONE.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MS. B. 16, 2. TR. COLL., CAMBRIDGE

BY

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INTRODUCTION.

The reader will naturally ask why, of all the works of Wyclif hitherto published, this one alone is fragmentary; and a few words of explanation are required. Wyclif's great philosophical "Summa Intellectualium", called also "De Ente", containing no fewer than twelve tractates of considerable length, was transcribed in 1889—1890 by the late Mr. Austin for the Wyclif Society; I must also notice the very helpful labour of Mr. Bullock, who had previously transcribed a few of the first tractates, and whose readings are in some cases better than Mr. Austin's. It was the intention of the Wyclif Society to give to the world the whole of our author's philosophical work; and since then *De Ente Praedicamentali*, *De Compositione Hominis*, *Questiones Logicae et Philosophicae*, three volumes of *Logica*, and two of *Miscellanea Philosophica*, — in all seven volumes — have been published. But from 1890 to 1905 — the time that I took to edit only five out of these seven volumes — fifteen years have elapsed; and so far as it is possible to make any approximate calculation, if we take the whole of *De Ente* as filling only eight volumes of about the same size, it would not, at this rate of publishing, be finished before twenty-four years. This was somewhat alarming to myself, who am already somewhat stricken in years, and must look forwards to another quarter of a century as to an improbable length of life: whilst other men, far more important to the Society, felt that this question concerned them not less than me.

It was therefore decided to wind up, so to speak, the editing of Wyclif's philosophy by publishing in one last volume all that is of considerable importance and originality in his great *Summa*; and it is for this that I have been working during the last three or four years.

I can scarce hope to have quite succeeded in making a good selection where it was naturally so difficult to choose well on the mere inspection of the crude unpunctuated manuscript, which even now and in print is not unfrequently quite unintelligible, and of course had then many other unintelligible passages besides. I however think that all my readers, whether they approve of the selections from the first book or not, will think that my choice of the tractates in the second book was good. They throw a good deal of light, hitherto wanting, upon Wyclif's philosophical basis for his theory of Predestination and Foreknowledge. The choice, moreover, was not completely mine. Mr. Matthew very rightly advised me to include in my selections that part of the sixth tractate of Book II "*De Potentia, etc.*", which relates to Annihilation, and consequently to Wyclif's first and (so to speak) orthodox position concerning the annihilation of bread in the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

Since I have mentioned orthodoxy here, may I be permitted a few lines of personal explanation now, at the close of my long work on Wyclif? People have asked me many a time how I, nominally a Catholic, could aid in publishing the works of one so contrary to Catholicism as Wyclif is universally considered to be; and they readily supposed that I was indeed a Catholic only in name. They mistook; and though I have sincerely — and I hope successfully — tried to edit Wyclif with perfect impartiality from first to last, I have no sympathy with those of his doctrines that contradict the teaching of my Church. The facts are briefly as follows. When I was offered the position of editor of Wyclif's Latin works, I consulted a clergyman of my faith in London. He told me that a translation into the vernacular would be forbidden, but that a mere edition of the Latin text was quite another thing. I have since had reason to doubt whether his ruling was technically right; but there is no doubt whatever that it was right practically, and that I at any rate, as a layman asking counsel, was right in accepting it. "Qui s'excuse s'accuse"; but this is rather a justification than an excuse, and I have long felt that I owed a short statement of the facts for such Catholic and High Church friends as I may have unwillingly pained.

I.

The Manuscript; authenticity and date of the work.

It will be seen, on perusing the various excerpts, where their places are to be found in the Trinity MS. This is a splendid-looking codex; but as it is very fully described by Dr. Loserth in Vol. I of Wyclif's *Sermones* (Int. pp. XXXV—XXXVII) and also by Shirley in his catalogue (Introduction) I need say no more about it, merely corroborating as strongly as I possibly can the following remark of Loserth's: "Regular, if not altogether beautiful, as the handwriting is. the text is faulty, full of more or less serious blunders; so that it cannot be said to be well preserved on the whole in this MS. Sometimes we find such gross mistakes that we are led to doubt whether the scribe understood the meaning of the text." *Doubt,* in my own opinion, is a word scarce strong enough. Take, for example, the nonsense made (p. 17, l. 20) by *anime* for *esse,* and *credimus* for *credens,* by *quod non sint* for *quod sint* (p. 47, l. 25); by *intelligendo intelligit* instead of *intendendo intelligit* (p. 58, l. 1, 2). — these are only a few blunders gleaned quite at random — and then try to believe, if you can, that the scribe knew the sense of what he was writing!

This being the case, it is all the more unfortunate for our work that of all the tractates selected, we have no other MSS. to help us in the correction of the text. I noted the fact myself when making my choice, but I did not think myself justified in choosing a tractate merely because the text was easier and less corrupt; I was sure, besides, that if I thought fit to choose a tractate more important, though harder to understand, my readers would be indulgent.

There is no doubt whatever as to the authenticity of the whole of *De Ente.* Shirley tells us that the Trinity MS. bears Wyclif's name; a fact of comparatively rare occurrence, as is very well known. The work, moreover, evidently forms a whole, one tractate serving as the foundation of the other, — the tractate on Divine Volitions, for example, referring to the preceding tractates on Divine Intellections and Divine knowledge; — it is a string of arguments and deductions from first to last. Any proof, then, of a part, serves to prove the whole beyond any manner of reasonable doubt. Now Walden (Doctr. Fid. I, c. 6) quotes Bk. I, tr. 6: and in the same work (I. cc. 1, 2 and 4) he quotes the Tractate *De Ideis* (Bk. II, 5).

Again, Bale gives the *incipit* of the Tractate *De Universalibus* (I, 5) though he mistakes the title. On the whole, few of Wyclif's works have such strong external testimony in their favour. As to the internal testimony, it is obvious to every student of Wyclif both in the style, the doctrines, and the arguments used to support them. They are less apparent, perhaps, in this work, since I have omitted those parts in which our author repeats himself most; for instance, *De Universalibus, De Tempore, De Trinitate* and *De Ideis:* but still enough of them will be found. There are also here and there allusions to his other works; compare, for instance, his peculiar doctrine of temporal indivisible moments as existing *things*, here (p. 134, l. 4) and in *Logica* (Vol. III, p. 162).

Concerning the date of the work, there must of course be a good deal of uncertainty. The tone of these tractates is evidently anterior to that of the works written after 1367. On page 126,[1] I make a supposition which seems not quite improbable; and if it be true, it would fix the date at some time not long before Wyclif's disappointment regarding his benefice. According to Harris (*De Benedicta Incarnatione,* Introduction, IX) Wyclif was already Doctor of Divinity when he wrote *De Incarnatione,* which belongs therefore to the four years immediately preceding 1367, since the date of his doctorate was about 1363. Now, as Shirley tells us, Wyclif (in ff. 23—45 of his *De Universalibus* — *not* the tractate I have edited among the *Miscellanea,* but the one which remains unpublished) quotes from *De Incarnatione;* and as he makes frequent allusions here to the doctrines expounded in *Logica*, that work must have been of a yet earlier date. This must suffice for the very loose determination of time with which we generally have to put up for almost all Wyclif's books. I had hoped to get some closer indication from the concluding chapters on annihilation; but I have been disappointed. He seems to have got hardly, if at all, beyond the position of *De Incarnatione.*

In conclusion — and this is no mere empty form of courtesy — I wish to thank Mr. Matthew most heartily for his kind help, continued throughout the revision of this work; and it would be most ungrateful on my part to forget or undervalue the friendly encouragement of the respected Founder of the Wyclif Society, Dr. Furnivall.

[1] See also note, p. 269.

II.

Analysis of the various Excerpta.

(1). First Book, Third Tractate.

In the preceding treatises, Wyclif has been establishing his theory of Universal Being, as we have already met with it many a time in his works, though perhaps somewhat more fully here. It is *true* that anything we speak of is a being, and that truth is common to all things, both to God and to creatures: Universal Entity thus — as conceived by our author — being something common to all, we have this, just as God has it. Wyclif conceives it to be a predicate common to various subjects; in one case, *that which* has being is God; in the other, this *that which* is a creature. The difference between them would consist in the manner in which they possess this predicate: infinitely on the one hand, finitely on the other.

But here come a good many difficulties, and Wyclif devotes both this treatise and the following one to answering them. In the first place, *(Chapter 1)* it is pointed out that Animal can be neither a man nor a brute, since it is common to both. For the same reason, Being, though it really exists according to Wyclif, can be neither God nor a creature. Yet Augustine says distinctly that "Whatever exists must either be God or else a created thing". How then can there be such a thing as Real Universal Being?

This argument, says Wyclif, is a mere fallacy. What is *To exist?* Not necessarily *To be something substantial:* for we surely say that privations, affirmations, negations, all exist. It is in this wide sense that he maintains the existence of Universal Being — real, but with a reality of its own, not that of substance or accident, God or creature. Let us take the instant of beginning of any substance: this implies that — at the very next instant — this being exists substantially; also that — at the very instant before — it did not thus exist. Then how does it exist at the instant of beginning? We say it has ideal, though real, entity, which is not yet substantial. Some deny all such entity; some admit it, and call it substantial; some admit its existence, but deny its entity: and some give vague or self-contradictory answers (pp. 1—3).

Wyclif's doctrine, it is again objected, implies an infinite multitude of truths, caused by God, yet co-eternal with Him; this is denied by St. Thomas, who asserts that every eternal truth is identical with God; and it has been condemned by the Church (p. 3).

To this Wyclif replies, denying first of all that the multitude in question is really infinite, since God knows what and how many they are. Then, as to their eternity: since God eternally knows and rejoices in them, they must be the eternal objects of His knowledge and joy: but they are not without beginning, since their origin is God; and since He is what they tend towards, they are not without end. They are indeed not God, but (1) they are eternal though not *as* He is; (2) they have no existence — except when creation takes place — that is distinct from His; — and (3) they are dependent upon Him in being. To deny any of these three propositions would be an error justly to be condemned; and no doubt it was against such errors that the condemnation was issued. Wyclif ends the chapter by quoting Augustine and Anselm in his favour (pp. 3—8).

As very often happens, the answers to objections seem to reduce our author's position to the general opinion of Schoolmen, whilst his exposition appears to be widely different therefrom. We must here notice two or three points to which he clings, even in his answer. To the question: "What is a possible being, an ideal being, viewed in itself?" Aquinas would answer: "It is God's essence, *quà* imitable by creation; *and it is nothing else.*" But Wyclif would say: "It is that indeed; but *besides that, it is something really caused* by Him (p. 7, l. 3)." If he gave up that point, he would have to give up the whole of his Realism. At the same time, he certainly does not mean by "causation" what is usually meant. I cannot now identify the passages, but I remember distinctly to have several times come across an expression of Wyclif, calling the Word and the Spirit (in the Holy Trinity) *caused* Persons. But he everywhere says that the Persons are really identical with the Divine Essence, and only notionally distinct; this meaning therefore would not suffice for the reality of his Ideal World. Possibly (though it is with hesitation that I put forth this hypothesis) in speaking of causation he refers to the time when these ideals are realised. Everything that was or is to be *is* in eternal time *(in tempore eterno)*. Wyclif *is* in the first 2000 years after Christ, in the first 20.000 years, in the first 200.000.

And so also if we count backwards. Whatever takes place *will* everlastingly *be* 'having taken place at such and such a time'; and *was* everlastingly 'about to take place at such and such a time'. And these are eternal truths, caused in time: i. e. at the moment when the fact takes place; yet it is eternally true that they are caused. Such may be the meaning of Wyclif; but if so, it is not a wonder that he was misunderstood. No Kantian subtlety could be more subtle: and great subtlety is obscurity for most minds, and very naturally disliked by them.

Chapter II. Another objection runs thus. If all truths be caused by God, they are loved by Him. But *A commits a sin* is therefore a fact caused by God, who therefore must love this fact. — Wyclif, reserving for future examination (Book I, Third Tractate) the question whether and how God can be said to will or to love sin, points out that to will a fact which happens to be the commission of sin, is not the same as *to will sin*. Sin is a non-entity (which, however, has positive effects on the soul); whereas every fact, every truth, is entity. — Are then these truths useless from all eternity, since the creatures, their subjects, exist only in time, and only then make them useful? Or are these truths infinitely good, since they are as necessary as God Himself? If so, they are identical with God (pp. 8—10). Here the chapter ends abruptly; but the MS. has a marginal note, stating that there is no answer to this argument; or perhaps *Omittitur pro responsione ad argumentum* may mean that the nineteen lines left blank at the top of 10^{ba} should be filled up with the answer.

Chapter III. To the question: Can Death, Sin, and Falsehood be true, and consequently entitative things? Wyclif replies in the affirmative. There is no getting out of this. But there are three sorts of truth. A proposition may simply exist as a collection of words. It may besides have meaning. And thirdly the meaning may correspond to the thing meant. This third kind of truth is lacking when the proposition is false; the second kind is also absent sometimes, but the first never. Even in the so-called insoluble propositions, the subject, copula, and predicate exist, each word meaning itself and no more: so that the sentence: *What I now write is a falsehood* is deprived of any but the first kind of truth. Wyclif here makes a digression concerning these 'Insolubles', which we may pass over as having been already and much more thoroughly treated in *Logica;* and returning, he points out that God alone is supreme truth;

all creatures come short of Him because they do not exist eternally; some besides are subject to change, and some also fall short by inordinate love of things temporal. This is sin or transgression, which Wyclif has already (p. 14, l. 38) compared to insoluble propositions, no doubt because, as sinners fall short of truth not only in their temporal and changeable existence, but also in their inordinate love of things temporal, so do these propositions fail in meaning as much as any proposition can. Creatures are true in so far as they are conformable to God's Word; true then in their essence, but false as to such perfections as they might have and have not. Now the primary entity of sin is a deficiency, and the secondary consists in the punishment which it entails: false in its essence, it is true in what flows therefrom. Thus we can say that everything is in some sense true, and also just: and everything but God is in some sense false and unjust. This answers the objection, as regards truth, for even a lie is true in some sense. As to sin, Wyclif chooses to say that God wills it as a good thing: taking *sin* of course together with its punishment, which is just and holy (pp. 10—23).

Wyclif concludes this chapter by clearing up three points which seem to make against his doctrine. 1. A man whom God foreknows as about to die in sin, since he will not remain in the truth, has all his life tainted by this want of perseverance: this is always a defect in him, though not a sin. 2. Privations are not entities in themselves, but wants of entity; their whole entity depends upon the good for which God allows them to exist. 3. It is not true that a proposition is impossible, if supposed only to signify itself. Nothing real otherwise corresponds to the meaning of the proposition; true: but still there is something thinkable, and we can conceive this represented by subject, copula and predicate (pp. 23—26).

Chapter IV (pp. 26—29) need not be analyzed, since it contains only a statement of objections, and the tractate ends, even before they are all given. Yet I may here at least render one of the arguments — the first one — a little more intelligible. Wyclif's theory was that a true universal proposition, such as *Every man exists* (i. e. Every being that was, is, or is to be, a man, exists at some time or other in eternal duration) has real existence in the things themselves, so long as the things exist. But if so, since we may amplify the sense of the verb *to be*, the proposition has real existence eternally, in the same way that the 19th century was the time in which the Crimean war was a fact. —

Thereupon Wyclif's adversaries would say: *Every man exists* implies *No man is not-existing;* a universal negation. Now every universal proposition is made up of singulars: *the man A exists, the man B, the man C* . . . . and so on. This is impossible in the case of negations; for then these very singulars would be made up of universals! For *A is not non-existent* becomes by direct conversion: *No non-existing thing is A:* which is indeed universal; and then you have: *No non-existing thing is B, no non-existing thing is C* . . . . and so forth, to make up the compound negative. Therefore the theory that universals are based on singulars is false. — I think Wyclif could have answered this sophism very easily. It takes only one step further to get to the singulars of a negative proposition. For *No non-existing thing is A* is made up of the propositions: *The non-existing thing* α *is not A, the non-existing thing* β *is not A, the non-existing thing* γ *is not A,* . . . . and so on, the whole series of Greek letters standing for 'All not-existing things'.

(2). First Book, Fourth Tractate.

Chapter I is devoted to answering the objection: "If Universals are real things, then man, as animated, is really identical with the animated being, *ass,*" two things identical with a third being identical with each other. We may omit the part of Wyclif's reply that deals with it in particular: of course he has only to say that man is not identical with *all that is* animated, and in that case alone would *man* be identical with *ass*. But his general answer is striking, for it is an attack upon the state of mind of men capable of such objections. They are quite plunged in matter, and unable to grasp the concept of Real Universals; just as the Christian religion has been greatly corrupted by love for things temporal. The One in Many and the mystery of the Trinity are parallel ideas, not to be conceived by rude minds. We must love our neighbour, since God commands us: but how? as a unit of the Universal, Humanity; because he is a man, and not for any more particular reason. And the want of this universal love — or love of the Universal — is the source of all sin and wickedness. Wyclif here turns aside to make a short practical application of this to those men who only seek, in promoting any one to an ecclesiastical dignity, that he should be connected with them for some reason of private interest (p. 31); a passage which ought

perhaps to be read together with the other, already noticed, on p. 126. — If it be said that one may deny the Universals and yet have charity for all men, Wyclif affirms that the denial is only apparent, not real: *Impossibile est hominem caritative diligere, nisi in re ponat sentenciam de universalibus.* We get here a glimpse of that fiery and uncompromising nature, for whom all men belonged two camps only — that of the wicked, who were against him, and of the good who were in his favour, whether they knew it or not! Such outbursts as this, rare in these early writings, become much more frequent as we follow our author in his career (pp. 29—33).

Chapter II is missing, all but a few lines.

Chapter IV in its present state contains merely the answers to a certain number of objections which are missing. Whether all the answers are here or whether some have been lost, together with the objections, it is impossible to say; but we find here two answers given to questions that are (so at least I suppose) as follows. (1) If the Real Universal is identical with its singulars, it does all that they do, and is at the same time sitting down and standing up, langhing and weeping, etc.: which is absurd. (2) We must also in that case admit that the Universal moves about with its singulars, and in the same directions: i. e. down, to right and to left, etc. at the same time: which is also an absurdity.

To these Wyclif answers: (1) There is a profound distinction to be drawn between habitudinal and accidental predicates. The former are predicated universally, as belonging to the whole class; the latter belong only to the singulars of the class. *To be able to laugh,* or *to walk,* or *to speak*, is true of all men; *to laugh*, *to walk*, *to speak,* are predicates true of individual men only. When a man sits down, humanity may be said to sit down, but only to the extent of one human singular that sits. This, however, is an abuse of terms, and Wyclif dislikes it. Properly the Universals do not receive or lose accidental predicates.

(2) The Universal may acquire a new site if one of its singulars happen to be where it was not before. But properly its singular, and not itself, happens to be thus in movement. Suppose the whole universe should move; God is in the world: would God change His place? The Soul, Time, the Universals, and God, are within our bodies, and yet do not move when the body moves. Sin is a change which can be attributed only to persons, not to humanity; and though the Fathers ascribe original sin to humanity, this is not properly an act, but a formal defect (pp. 34—37).

Chapter IV. Plato held the doctrine of Universals *distinct* from their singulars. But then we could not say, "A *is* a man" (meaning the universal Man, distinct from all individuals). It would follow therefore that Universal and Singular are not distinct, but one and the same. But on the other hand, this would (1) confuse Vitality, Animality, Humanity; all these would be one, for every singular would be all the universals it belonged to. (2) It would entail numberless contradictions. For example: man is identical with *soul*: therefore with the Indivisible; but identical too with *body*: therefore with the Divisible. (3) It would imply that the Containing (i. e. the Universal) is no greater than that which is contained within it (i. e. the Singular). — Wyclif replies, *first* in general, pointing out that the Universal is indeed its singular, but not formally; i. e. not *quà* singular; and likewise the singular is its universal but not *quà* universal. And after noting six kinds of possible differences, he goes on to answer the objections one by one. (1) The man A is identical with Humanity, but only with Humanity as it is in him, not as a class; and again, he is identical with animality, yet not as a genus, not even as it is in all men, but only as existing in him. — "But then", it is said, "you simply deny that the singular is identical with its Universal." — "I do not", replies Wyclif. "I merely take a distinction." (2) Man is really and truly identical with the Divisible and the Indivisible, but from different standpoints — considered either as a material or as an immaterial being. But besides this, the argument is in bad form. For by a like reasoning we might say: *Man* is identical with *animal*; *animal* is identical with *capable of braying:* therefore . . . . . Or: *man* is a *body;* a body is *of any size, great or small:* therefore . . . . The conclusion may be true in certain cases (material identity); but for a logical consequence, it ought to be true in every case (formal identity). (3) In one sense the Universal contains its singulars, in another it is contained in each of them; inseparably, if it is essential, separably, if accidental; and in both cases requiring a singular in order to exist. Here Wyclif makes a digression as to the meaning of Aristotle, saying that "Universal Animal is either nothing, or posterior to its singulars;" and "Let the Universals rejoice, for they are prodigies." Wyclif tries to prove that the Philosopher only meant to deny the individuality of the Universals; but he himself, saying that they are substances, means something absolutely different (pp. 37—42).

Chapter V. Here comes the difficulty which is examined elsewhere by Wyclif, and which was indeed a great objection against his theory. Is a Universal, taken together with one of its singulars, *one* being, or *two*? In Logica, Vol. II. Ch. II. pp. 48—54, he gives his answer, which is much the same as here. They are two realities, distinct one from the other; yet as one *is* the other, they do not form a number. See what I have said in the Introduction, Log. Vol. II. XV—XVII. Then indeed I was in doubt whether the text was not corrupt, the answer seemed to me so amazing. The Universal Phoenix and its singular "*non sunt duo fenices, quia tunc essent duo singularia;*" (ib. p. 53, l. 16) and yet "*omne universale substancie et eiusdem singulare sunt duo distincta realiter.*" But in the present tractate, he says (p. 47, l. 12): *Omne inferius et quodlibet suum superius distinguuntur et sunt distincta . . . . Sunt quotlibet distincta* (l. 9—11), *cum singulare sit unum, ut* (probably a mistake for *et*) *universale quotlibet alia individua . . . . Nec* (l. 17—18) *ista sunt formaliter ista duo . . . . sed sunt istud.* Let us then admit, as Wyclif's conviction, given in two tractates, that the Universal and its singular were separate realities, but could not be counted together, because one was the other: *cum unum eorum sit reliquum* (l. 15). The reason seems weighty enough.

On the other hand, it would appear that this standpoint was not found possible to maintain against the attacks, ever more and more violent, which (as we learn) were made upon Wyclif's philosophical system. He held it from the time he wrote *Logica* to that of the present fourth treatise; but already in the very next — the Vth — Tractate *(De Universalibus)*, he has considerably modified and corrected his position. We already find the opening of his IXth Chapter, "Consequens est videre *quomodo universalia ponunt in numerum,*" showing him about to inquire into the *how* of what he had hitherto denied. As this tractate is not to be published by the Wyclif Society it may be as well to give here briefly, and quoting from Wyclif himself, the new position which our author was so soon afterwards to take up. [Chap. IX is from f. 24 *b a* to f. 26 *a b* of the Trinity MS.] The principal objection is that two men mean an infinite multitude. For let there be A and B; then there is C, the Universal that results from their collection *(homo tercius aggregatus)*. Then, from the collection of A, B, and C, there would result D, the collective man that stands for these three. And so on with-

out end. — Wyclif, in reply, admits at last that the Universal, A *or* B together with the singulars, A *and* B, would make three; but no more *(positis petro et paulo, duobus simplicibus hominibus, ponuntur eo ipso tres homines, sed non plures)*. It is of no use; you can talk and repeat your sophistical calculations as much as you like, but that will not multiply the two men *(voces et calculi vani sophistici replicantur, sed non propterea homines multiplicantur)*. But why then does Wyclif say that A *and* B, together with the corresponding universal (A *or* B), make *three* *(quare .... ponitur tercius homo aggregatus)?* Because every singular multitude presupposes simple singulars, forming the basis or roots of that multitude *(homines simplices, radices talis multitudinis)*. Now if you take A, B, and C (which is A *or* B), you cannot again create a Universal out of these, precisely because C is not a singular. But then. can we count C at all? Yes, if we take *number* in its widest sense: that by which any multitude whatever can be counted *(forma qua multitudo quelibet numeratur)*. And then we must admit that singulars. together with their species (or Universals) form a number. *(Hic oportet concedere quod, extendendo nomen numeri, omne singulare et sua species ponunt in numerum)*. But I think I have quoted enough from this tractate (which in all probability will remain inedited for a very considerable lapse of time) to show Wyclif's change of front on a point which was of the greatest importance in his theory. At the time he wrote our tractate, however, he was so far from prepared to change his mind, that he considers the contrary evident (*Patet ergo quod nullum inferius ponit in numerum cum suo superiori*, p. 44, l. 33); and though he knows of the wide sense that some have given to number, which indeed cuts short many a difficulty, he thinks it more philosophical and more conformable to the Church,[1] to reject it *(Ego autem elegi conformiter philosophis et ecclesie . . . quod solum illa ponunt in numero, quorum nullum est reliquum*, p. 46, ll. 33 — 35). The tractate closes with some remarks upon such Universals as can have but one singular — as v. g. the world (meaning all that exists), or the Phoenix, admitting the fable as possibly true.

[1] *To the Church.* Because it had been forbidden to say that the Divine Essence, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, make four; the Divine Essence not being really distinct from the Persons.

(3). Second Book, First Tractate.

The two tractates which I have chosen from the second book of *De Ente* are closely connected with each other, and deal with a part of Wyclif's doctrine which is but sparingly, if at all, dealt with anywhere else. Before I undertake the detailed analysis of these tractates, I may give the substance of our author's theory in few words.

To every possible creature — and here we must remember that in Wyclif's sense, *possible* means a creature that is or was or will be at some time or other: the *might-but-never-will-be* is excluded from his Possible — to every one, then, corresponds an act of God, by which He knows this creature; and to every act of the same, there corresponds also an act of God's cognition. These acts Wyclif calls God's *intellection*. Now since every creature and every act of every creature, past, present or future, is also willed by God, it follows likewise that to every intellection of God there corresponds a *volition* of God. So far all seems plain sailing, and every one will admit these intellections and volitions. When Wyclif speaks of them, too, as eternal, as unchangeable, etc. there is no difficulty. But he posits them as *acts*, i. e. as relations having God for one term, and for the other a temporal being. Though eternal, they are therefore contingent; therefore *not necessary*, therefore not identical with God's Essence, and certainly not with the creature; yet certainly existing, and as certainly dependent upon God's essence on one hand, and on the other — such intellections and volitions at least as would never have existed save for the free-will of man — dependent also upon the thoughts and resolves of the creature. It is clear that this very subtle theory involves a great many difficult and most intricate problems; but I may now let Wyclif speak for himself.

Chapter I. After a few remarks concerning the so-called intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of Deity, Wyclif proceeds to prove that God has cognition of all things intelligible. His proof is clear enough. Since God is the most perfect being conceivable, His intelligence must extend as far as we can conceive it extending; and that is, to all beings that are possible (pp. 46—50). Our author confirms this view by quotations from the Bible, and illustrates it by supposing the sun endowed with the power of seeing: it would see everything in the world, wherever its

light penetrated (pp. 51—52). God's dominion and government of things requires that He should know them; and if He did not know us and our acts, why should we pray to Him? Thus all things, both universal and singular, are present to the mind of God (pp. 52—53). The intelligibility of things implies intelligence, and none can know all things save an Infinite Mind (p. 53). Thereupon follows a long passage, passing all things in review, from pure primordial matter to Supreme Spirit; the lowest is incapable of thought, the highest is Thought itself (p. 54). The Divine Cognition must be *actual;* no creature can be thought more perfect in any respect than God is; none therefore can know actually what God does not know (p. 55). It must be distinct; and in Him, 'capable of intellection' implies the act itself. We first intend to think of something, and then we think; in God this is one act (pp. 55—58).

This proof is very good, and as Wyclif himself says, because all philosophers and theologians agree on this point, there is no need to insist upon it (*quia . . . tam philosophi quam theologi . . . in illam consenciunt, non oportet plus insistere in illam probandum,* p. 53.) But note that he says nothing about the supposition that these acts of intellection are distinct both from God's essence and from the things known; in fact, this only comes out in the answers to certain arguments, and at the end of the tractate (*raciones formales distinguntur. Que quidem raciones sunt res racivnis externe, etc.,* p. 112). And this is pointed out more clearly still by the analogy which Wyclif readily admits between the Divine Intellection and Volition, as afterwards seen.

Chapter II. One objection to this theory is: Why make a distinction between God's essence and His intellection? If you do, you may as well make one between it and His immensity or eternity. Of course, whenever we can speak of one thing from different standpoints, we make a distinction between these standpoints. But the idea of Wyclif's *raciones formales*, which are distinct in God, means more than this. It means two entities — relative if you will — of which one is not the other. *God knowing A, which is not B,* is not *God knowing B, which is not A;* just as *a man standing up* is not *the same man sitting down.* Wyclif thus supposes a world of Divine acts which are not God, yet belong to God; somewhat as the sun's rays are not the sun. — The answer is: Between God's essence and His immensity there is no *real* distinction, but *there is one* between His essence and His relations (p. 59, l. 1;

. . . *est distinccio realis*); the words underlined show how our author completes his doctrine in his answer to objections. The obvious defect of this method is, here as in other places, that a theory may be found such as will answer objections, and yet have no proof in its favour, or at most an incomplete proof given (as it were) parenthetically. As a matter of fact, no one would have thought of attacking Wyclif for the demonstration in the preceding chapter: he has proved only what every one admits. The attack bears upon what he has not mentioned, viz. the real distinction between God and His acts of cognition of the creatures.

Another difficulty consists in the fact that St. Anselm, together with all modern Doctors, holds that God affirms Himself and the creatures *by One and the same Word*. And this is clearly the usual view of things, contradicted by Wyclif's special theory. All Catholic theologians hold that the one comprehensive act of God's Mind is sufficient to grasp Infinite perfection; *a fortiori*, to grasp an infinite multitude of finite objects. How? this is a mystery. *We* look upon God knowing A as different from God knowing B, just as we think of His justice as distinct from His mercy; but our thoughts go wrong, because we are unable to realize the Infinite: and therefore, though we are forced to think thus by the very nature of our mind, we do not err, because we know that this is an incorrect expression of the reality. Such is the standpoint of Anselm and modern theology (*ille tenet quod sic, et faciunt moderni doctores communiter*, p. 58). The fact that this is a difficulty which can be urged against our author shows us his position, indirectly indeed, but with sufficient and unmistakable distinctness. Wyclif's answer is less clear, partly because the text is corrupt, as I point out in a foot-note. He distinguishes between the Word of God — the second person of the Most Holy Trinity (who is an absolute reality), and these acts of God's intellection, that are relations between Him and His creatures (p. 59). It is the second Person of the Trinity who produces these acts; and therefore, God knowing himself by His Word, knows all creatures by His Word too. This does not prevent the existence of infinite relations which are really distinct from God, to use Scholastic language, *distinctione reali minori*.

A few words about these two sorts of real distinction, *major* and *minor*, may be not out of place here. Two persons are really distinct. Not only can we think of them apart from each other, but one *is not* the other. But one and the same person is or may be really distinct

from himself. It is impossible for me to be at the same time angry and pleased with the same person, to right and to left of the same tree. If so, then I, as and when angry, cannot possibly be identical with myself, as and when pleased. There is some sort of entitative change between the *me* that was to the right and the *me* that is to the left of this tree. The first difference (between a person and a person, a thing and a thing), is called *Real*, and *Major*. The other, — that between one mode and another of the same person or thing, — is called *Real* but *Minor*. Then comes the distinction called *formalis a natura rei;* notional, but based on a real distinction. Thus one and the same being, man, is animated and reasonable. What is animated is reasonable, and what is reasonable is animated; but the one element proceeds from the body, the other from the soul; and body and soul are really distinct. We then have a distinction *rationis ratiocinatae*, or *notionalis cum fundamento in re:* the same person is rich and beautiful, but his beauty is not his wealth. Our mind has abstracted one separately from the other, and we can truly say that a man's wealth is in itself something quite irrelevant to his beauty. Then comes at last the distinction *rationis ratiocinantis,* or *notionalis sine fundamento in re;* in which it is our own mind that makes the distinction, entirely and absolutely. Such is, v. g. the distinction between x and $\sqrt{x^2}$, between $\frac{2}{3}$ and $\frac{6}{9}$, or 10×10 and 100: most useful for, and even necessary to, our processes of reasoning, but in themselves meaning absolutely the same thing. Such is again the distinction between God's justice and His love and His mercy and His vindictiveness; we cannot properly grasp the idea of an Infinite Being, so we break Him up into attributes which to our mode of thinking are different and almost incompatible, but which, when we fall back upon the demonstrated truth of absolute simplicity in the Infinite One, we know to have no *fundamentum in re*, and to be only necessary forms that we must use if we would think about God at all. We need a smoked glass to look at the sun; we see its orb, and cannot help seeing it, blood-red; yet we know that it is not of that hue. And Science, both natural and exact, teems with expedients of this sort, by which our mind employs a known and determined falsity for the better attainment of some truth difficult of access. — Such are the principal Scholastic distinctions, which may, I think, be of use to students of this book and of Mediaeval theology in general.

The third argument holds that, in this theory, our acts of knowledge would be but relations between ourselves and the things known. Wyclif adds *ad sensum equivocum* (p. 58) which I do not very well understand; he is somewhat given to stating objections summarily. They were no doubt well known in Oxford at his time; but we have to find out their drift as we can by his answers, and they are sometimes (as here) insufficient. The reply is, that an intellectual act is not a mere external relation in man, but an action which forms in him a modification, an accident which is other than the substance of his soul. But in God we can have no accidents, no modifications: and therefore these 'intellections' can bear no name but that of relations. So far is clear from the passage quoted; let me now state what I fancy *ad sensum equivocum* means. *Being* was divided by Scholastics into *real* and *fictive*. All the ten categories of Being deal with real things: that is, with that the absence of which occasions a change in that from which it can be supposed absent. As, for instance, take the proposition: the train A is approaching the station B. Let this cease to be true: there is no consequent change in the station. But the train, in this case, would have either to stop or to return. There must therefore be a change *in the train;* and this is expressed by saying that the train *really* moves towards the station, and that the station only *apparently* moves towards the train. With this reality, then, Substance, Quantity, Quality, Action, Passion, Quandality, Position, Whereabouts, and Relation (of some sort) deal. But there is yet one sort of Relation, called by Aristotle Belonging (or Vestment). A coat, a carriage, a house, a piece of lands are belongings; and this is clearly a merely notional relation. However much I may lose *extrinsically* if an earthquake swallows up all my estate, or the bank in which my fortune is deposited happens to break, it is evident that I, *as a being and in myself*, lose nothing whatever. This is then a relation indeed, but a relation in another sense from the former; *ad sensum equivocum*. Wyclif admits these relations in God, which are His intellections, but do not modify Him; in man they are acts of thought which, according as they are present or absent, really modify the thinking principle. Such is the explanation that I offer, although with a good deal of diffidence and hesitation.


Chapter III to V deal with Wyclif's answers to the various difficulties connected with and arising from the question 'Whether the Think-

able alone is the object of man's thought'. But before we proceed to the detailed analysis of each chapter, we may first inquire: *(a)* What this question has to do with the present subject — God's intellective acts; *(b)* How it contains sources of perplexity for every philosophical system whatever: and *(c)* under what special difficulties Wyclif's system seems to labour.

(a) If the object of human thought extend beyond the Thinkable, we must say that it has (or may have) the Unthinkable for its object. But in that case — since to every act of every man's mind there corresponds a Divine act of Intellection — there will be a Divine act of which the object is Nothing. For the Unthinkable is unintelligible, whilst Being, Thing, and Intelligible, imply each other. Man likewise may err: and there would be a Divine act of error. If man can think of an absurdity — a being greater than God, for example — then God must have in His mind the idea of a being greater than Himself. Obviously the connection is very close.

(b) That the object of thought is the Thinkable, and nothing else, appears true even at first sight. Yet, self-evident as it is, it is surrounded with difficulties which I shall now point out: remembering, however, Newman's saying (*Apologia*, Ch. V): that 'ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt'. All of them, various as they may be, spring from one main source: the proposition that 'All we can think of is thinkable' is in apparent conflict with that other generally admitted axiom, that 'to every positive idea we can find a corresponding negative one, differing therefrom only in logical quality'. If we can think of *man*, we can think of *not man*: if we can affirm that every animated being is living, we can also say that nothing not living is animated.

This may be perfectly well expressed, according to Euler's mode of representing propositions, by the following diagram in which A, the lesser circle, comprises all animated beings, whilst not-A *(a)*, occupying the rest of the infinite surface *minus* that circle, stands for all things not animated. Again, B, the outer circle, stands for all living things (not excepting A, or things animated); whereas not-B (or *b*) represents all that does not live. We see at once that the space *a* cannot possibly coincide with the interior circle A (i. e., No non-living thing is animated) precisely because A is within B (i. e. Every animated being is living). So far, all is plain.



But let us now bring in the idea of the Thinkable; is it possible to represent it by a circle? If so, the space outside will stand for the Unthinkable, just as in the preceding cases. But notice that we do (as a matter of fact) think of what this space stands for, when we make it stand for that: i. e. we are thinking of the Unthinkable, and therefore any point or part must be *inside*, not *outside* the circle. — But, it may be answered, we do not think of the Unthinkable directly, only as a negation of the Thinkable, and the circle may be taken to represent only what we think of directly and without negation. — Good; but then this circle will not stand for the whole of man's field of thought .... *all* that is Thinkable in *any* way. Suppose the circle represents what is in any way thinkable; then outside it we shall have .... what? *That which is in no way thinkable.* And — somehow, and in some way — we *are* thinking of it. How then, can we, without self-contradiction, put it outside the circle? Surely any limit to the field of thought is an absurdity.


Let us then take it the other way about. Say that the idea of the Thinkable is to be represented by infinite space, not by any circle, however vast. This means, in plain English, that the idea in question has no negative; that when you speak of '*What is not thinkable in any way*' you mean nothing; that no idea attaches to the words; and in short, you deny the axiom that 'to every positive idea we can find a corresponding negative, differing therefrom only in logical quality'.

Such is the difficulty which, upon the very threshold of Metaphysic, rises up to confront every thinker: a difficulty clearly seen long before Plato and Aristotle, and likely to endure as long as man is man — either till his mode of thinking is essentially different from what it is, or till he gives up thinking altogether. It were unfair to say that there is no answer to this difficulty. Spencer and Positivists would get out of it by calling all such ideas 'pseudo-ideas'; which is simply setting Metaphysic aside.[1] The Sceptic, more logical (if we can use such a term here) seeing that such ideas are the groundwork of all thought, would proclaim that all science is doubtful, because based on self-contradiction. And Dogmatists of every school have their answer ready; I give here the one I think the best.

[1] At the same time, trying to prove — and of course by means of Metaphysical arguments — that they have the right to do so.

It holds that the axiom allotting a negative to every positive idea, both positive and negative being alike in all save logical quality (and therefore, note, one being the *true logical contradictory* of the other) is admissible only when we have to do with generic and specific ideas; but that when we have once gone beyond the widest genus, we may still have an idea including this genus vaguely, whilst it includes at the same time all possible negations of itself, though with different meanings. That these meanings are — must be — different, it will not be hard to show. It is true that I cannot think of what is unthinkable in every way. It is also true — reflecting upon the fact that *what is unthinkable* has just become the predicate of an evident proposition — that I do think of what is unthinkable in every way. Now two truths do not contradict each other. Therefore, since the two propositions are contradictory in outward form, *what is unthinkable in every way* must be taken in two different senses in these two propositions. If not, there is no such science as Logic; nor is there indeed any certitude in any science whatever. And this suffices us, without pointing out more particularly what the different senses are.

To make this somewhat clearer, let us take the following diagram of circles, A within B, within C, within D. Let A = diamond, B = mineral, C = ponderable, D = imaginable; and then *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* will respectively stand for the negatives of each of these. The part of the circle B which is B *a* contains all minerals that are not diamonds; C *b a* contains all ponderable matter that is not mineral, i. e. all plants and animals; D *c b a* will contain all that is imaginable, yet not ponderable matter, that is, ether as we conceive it, and any other hypothetical fluid possible, assumed to account for gravitation.



Outside this we have the *Unimaginable, a b c d*, and its sphere is without limit. But since we are able to think of the Unimaginable, and even to reason upon it (as v. g. in the case of $\sqrt{-1}$) and we of course think of A, B, C, and D — then can we not find a fifth circle, T = thinkable, comprising all these and also some part

of the Unimaginable itself? or must T be represented by the whole infinite surface containing these circles, together with all the surrounding space? The first hypothesis is inadmissible, seeing that even '*What is unthinkable in any way*' may be thought of — as an absurdity indeed — just as we have the idea of a round square. T must therefore be, not a generic idea, represented by a circle, but a transcendental one, for which the whole of space stands; and *t* is impossible, since it would be beyond the circumference of an infinite circle. Either all our ideas are, so to speak, tainted with imagination and things material (like A, B, and C, and D) or they do not fall under the denomination of generic and specific ideas. This, true of the Thinkable, is true also of such notions as Being, the True, the One. the Good, the Beautiful, the Real; and possibly of a great many others. This fact that our thoughts are somehow able to go beyond our imagination, is a proof both of the strength and of the weakness of the human mind. That it transcends imaginable extension, or matter, is certain; but the very way in which it thus transcends it is an impenetrable mystery, as seemingly near to self-contradiction as the deepest arcana of supernatural religion.

(c) It is beyond doubt therefore, that whether we try to face this difficulty, as is done by Dogmatists, or yield to it with the partisans of Scepticism (avowed or implicit), or take up the Positivist position and decline to look into the matter at all — we are in each case surrounded by problems of the gravest import. But why has Wyclif here applied himself so specially to solve them that he even seems to be going out of his way to do so? Because, as I think I shall be able to show, his system exposed him in a peculiar manner to difficulties of the nature that I have just pointed out; and his adversaries no doubt did not spare him. I have already alluded to his opinion that whatever is, was, or will be, exists in eternity, and that nothing save this is a being, or intelligible (which amounts to the same): thus excluding from the area of Being the Pure Possible, the *Might Be*, which at no time either was or is to be in existence, and restricting it to the *Has Been*, the *Is Now*, and the *Shall Be*. (*Aliqui . . . . cum quibus ego, dicunt quod omne quod est, fuit vel erit, est in eternitate; et utraque via* — here he alludes to another theory, somewhat similar to his own -- *negat quod Intelligibile communius est:* p. 61, ll. 35—37; p. 62, l. 1). In this way Wyclif makes of Being, as has already been shown, a definite generic term, restricting its signifi-

cation to a certain fixed number of individuals. Of course the question at once arises: 'Is Edward V's first-born legitimate son a pure non-entity? You may answer, perhaps, that he is so in himself, but that the act of the man who thinks of him is a fact and a reality. But then, it is urged, is a man who thinks of this son of Edward V, thinking of *nothing?* And in any case, what is the object that God knows, in His eternal thought touching that act? If it be said that the non-entity of the object is a defect in the act; then either this defect, being known, is in God's intellection; or else He knows man's act without knowing its object: either conclusion is absurd.

Having now shown the main purpose of the following three chapters, I may be allowed to analyze them more succinctly than usual.

Chapter III. The object of the intellect is the Intelligible: that is, Being. Whatever is intelligible must exist — at least in the mind, as an *ens rationis.* But Wyclif excludes this order of being, as we have already noticed: nothing can exist which is not seen by God to exist at some time or other; which eternal sight is its real and eternal entity. Man's sight of such an object gives it no real entity at all. And now (pp. 62—63) comes a paragraph which seems flatly to contradict this view: Wyclif sees that in such a sense it is impossible to elude the inference that *Intelligible* has a wider meaning than Being (*cum omne esse sit intelligibile et non e contra,* pp. 62, ll. 16, 17). He, therefore, thinks it advisable to widen the sense of Being, according to the theory which he has just excluded (*probabile ... videtur michi ampliare ens, ut dicit prima responsio,* p. 62, ll. 20, 21). Existence will not then be synonymous with entity, for the latter will be predicated of all that is thinkable, and it is evidently common to all possible and consequently to all thinkable things: '*patet quod semper est commune ad omne possibile, et per consequens ad omne intelligibile*' (p. 63, ll. 14—16). Wyclif would therefore, it seems, contradict himself from one page to another. — But if we look more closely, we shall see that we must understand his 'ampliation of being' in this sense: that *Being, Possible* (note his expression; 'omne possibile *vere esse*', p. 63, l. 5) and *Intelligible,* mean the same. He therefore would not say: Edward V's son is not a being, *though* possible and thinkable; but: Edward V's son, *because* not a being, is impossible and unthinkable. What actually can be (or do) anything has power; what is actually thought is thinkable; and thus, if a thing was never thought about, it would not be thinkable in

any way. In reality then, Wyclif — if I mistake not — instead of widening the meaning of entity, restricts that of the Thinkable and the Possible Edward V's son, then, would be unthinkable, save if some man thought of him; then he would be the actual object of a man's thought, existing at some instant of time therefore, and consequently eternally present to God's mind: but there would be no separate intellection of God concerning Edward V's son as a separate entity. This I take to be the only way to explain our author, though there are, I admit, some words in this paragraph that do not agree well with this sense.

"But we are able to think not only of the Thinkable, but of the Unthinkable and the Absurd"; thus runs the next objection. It follows that the first object of our intellect is not the Thinkable, but common both to itself and to its negative. The Universal, in Wyclif's theory, is in our mind before the singulars; and the more Universal, before the less Universal. Thus *Animal,* comprising *Man* and *Not-man*, is more the object of our thoughts than either of the two. And thus there must be some unknown object of thought, prior both to the Thinkable and to its negation (pp. 63, 64). This is easily solved if, as has been pointed out, we say that Thinkable is not a generic term, and therefore does not exclude its negation, so that we can truly say that we somehow think of the Unthinkable, and give a meaning to what has none in itself. This conclusion does not satisfy Wyclif, who points out in two pages (pp. 64, 65) certain difficulties that accompany it. One of these is curious. *By A is meant a term such that, if you know its meaning, you are an ass.* — Now A is either with meaning or without. If it has meaning and you know it, you are in a bad case. But if you maintain that, even though it be unmeaning, you know what it means, your case is just as bad. Therefore A is a term of which you must confess that you do not know its meaning. The dilemma is not wanting in a certain Mediaeval wit; but of course it can be taken the other way about. If A has no meaning, even though I know it to have none, nothing follows. Though of course the point may be urged, if one cares.

The third difficulty, or rather series of difficulties, may be called a special case of the former. Admitting that we have an idea of God as the Infinite, can we have the idea of 'One greater than God?' Suppose we have, does its object exist in fact or not? If the former, it is at once God, than whom nothing is greater, and (of course) not God. If the latter,

it s at once greater — on account of its meaning — and less; since it does not exist, and God does. Other objections follow (pp. 65—70).

Chapter IV. Wyclif begins by dealing with the last series of objections, no doubt because the solution of the others depends upon the solution of these. He first enumerates various answers and different theories underlying each. (1) "Nothing is intelligible save what is able to exist" would cut short the difficulty, but is open to grave objections, especially to this one: "How can you exclude any *idea* from the Intelligible, if you are obliged to have it in your mind in the very act of excluding it?" (pp. 70—73). (2) "We can think of the Unintelligible, but not believe it to be true." Thus a being greater than God may be in our minds, but not together with the assertion that it is possible. But as a matter of fact, men do believe absurd things to be possible (pp. 73—78). (3) According to Scotus, "We can think of anything whatever, but our mind cannot think certain combinations of ideas without self-contradiction." This is an inadequate answer, since the fact of being thought implies that the thing *is*, even though it *is* an absurdity (pp. 78, 79).

Wyclif's own opinion is that nothing is thinkable save that which *is*. But he admits that a thing is thinkable in two different ways. We can think of the words that mean it; or we can think of it in itself. In the first sense we can think, v. g. *God's non-existence;* in the second we cannot. Thus our thinking act either merely apprehends the words as signs of things, or goes beyond them to the objects meant. In the first sense we may admit that "A being better tban God" is thought by us. But we cannot think of the object meant, for the contradiction included in these words prevents that. When then we say we think of the Self-Contradictory, we mean that, thinking at the same time of objects which are each intelligible, but contradict each other, there arises in our mind, striving to make one object out of them, and failing, a certain sense of useless effort, which is also thinkable: this we mean when we say that an idea is unintelligible (*nihil potest intelligere unintelligibile . . . nec potest signum complexum . . . significare quod non potest esse . . . sed movet creaturam ad . . . cogitandum aliquo modo*, p. 81). Thus, in the idea of a *round square*, we have simultaneously the idea of *round*, that of *square*, the effort to think that one is the other, and the complete failure of this effort. All these are objects of our thought and knowledge. When therefore we say that *A round square is impossible*, we simply mean that the

combination of the two ideas is beyond our power; and the further argument: "Then, since it *is* something impossible, it has some sort of existence in itself", falls to the ground; for this experience of unavailing effort has indeed entity as a psychological fact, but as nothing more, though my mind is deceived (p. 82, l. 11; *putat errore deceptus*) and takes it for a real object (pp. 79—84). And following up this doctrine, Wyclif answers various objections enumerated in Chap. III, and several others besides (pp. 84—94).[1]

The whole of this disquisition is conducted, as no one can hesitate to admit, with great subtlety and acumen. Yet — though the answer is, a I believe, based on truth, — Wyclif's adversaries might, I fancy, have considered him to be inconsistent as a Realist. "Because," they might say, "in certain cases the terms which we combine fail to have any objective meaning, you say that they mean this failure, and are mere subjective phenomena. Why should we not also affirm that when we combine them and find a special objective meaning in their combination, this success is also a merely subjective phenomenon? Then there would be no Universals, no possibles, no entities, but the harmonious groupings in our minds of more or less like or unlike singulars. But I only give this objection — which no doubt Wyclif might have answered triumphantly -- to point out the bearing of this question upon his main theory.

Chapter V sums up certain important corollaries to the doctrine already expounded. (1) There is no falsity whatever in God. He knows false propositions without assenting to them; He concurs in our acts of error without forcing us to err. Whether, possible beings which never exist being in reality impossible, God knows them, is a difficulty to be solved in the next tractate *(De Scientia Dei)*. (2) Both knowledge and volition extend in man to Universal Being; in the former case, to Being *quà* True; in the latter, to Being *quà* Good; and Truth and Goodness differ in the different senses of Being. There is nothing that we cannot think and consequently will — at least *will to think of it:* but this need not be actual distinct thought or volition; when I think of Being, I think of everything that is, was, or will be. Though assent to a proposition

[1] I desire here to make a correction to my side-notes on p. 89, which I failed to make at the time. Towards the middle of the page there is the phrase: '*as one spelling words he does not understand*'. Mr. Matthew very kindly pointed ou that it should run thus: '*as one spelling unconsciously as he reads*'.

known to be absurd is impossible, still some propositions seem absurd and are not; contradiction obtains only in the assertion that the *same* thing is and is not at the same time and in the same sense. (3) Wyclif's theory reconciles Augustine's idea of truth with that of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas. Augustine says we find, not make, truth; and St. Thomas expressly admits that truth is in the things themselves, and we do not produce it (which the tenets of Nominalists would seem to deny). When Aristotle says, Truth is in the mind, he means the truth of a proposition which depends on that which is in the things themselves. I say, for instance *This orange is ripe.* My utterance may be true (truth in the mind), but only if the orange be truly ripe (truth in reality, or in things). And this truth in things was also admitted by Aristotle (— *sic scribit* . . . — "*unumquodque sic se habet ut sit, ita ad veritatem*, p. 108, l. 36, p. 109, l. 1). — Here, by the by, we may note how Realists came to their exaggerated inferences. Truth is in things, and it is the reality of things. That this orange is really ripe now, is a fact independent of my mind. But this fact was eternally true, as *about to be*, and will be eternally true as *having been*. Therefore *this reality is eternal.* Moderate Realists admit the argument, but refer the reality to the entity of God, the Eternal Cause of all, in Whom they all exist; exaggerated Realists suppose that the very same entity is a temporal thing and an everlasting reality, and they confuse between Logical and Metaphysical truth. — Wyclif concludes the chapter by an inference from St. Thomas, who admits the eternity of these truths in the Divine Mind. If these can exist, there is no absurdity in supposing them, like the Persons in the Trinity, formally distinct from Him, since they are many, and for the same reason distinct from one another (pp. 94—112). But I think St. Thomas would have replied: In so far as they are distinct they are mere idealities, beings formed by our mind; in so far as they are real, their reality is identical with that of God. As real, not many; as many, not real; yet from different points of view, they are both.

(3). Second Book, Third Tractate.

Chapter I. Wyclif begins by distinguishing between God's Will, taken to mean either His Essence, *quà* willing what shall take place, or the effects of this will, or the relation between the two. It is with this

last that he intends to deal throughout the tractate. Then follow the divisions: God's Will, taken *intrinsically*, and the same as *signified;* the latter divided into *precepts*, *prohibitions, counsels, examples,* and *threats* (pp. 113, 114).

It is beyond all doubt that God's will is always done; Scripture shows that it is irresistible; so does reason, for Manichaeism and the hypothesis of a mutable God are both absurd. This is generally admitted; see St. Thomas (S. Th. pars I^a, qu. XIX, art. 6). But St. Thomas adduces a couple of distinctions: (1) God's *absolute* and His *relative* will; (2) His will *antecedent* to all happenings whatever, and His will, *consequent* upon certain happenings: and he says: What God wills, either absolutely or consequently, never fails to take place; not so, what He wills relatively or antecedently. Suppose a great chess-player pitted against a poor adversary. His *absolute* will to beat him, *consequent* on whatever the other does, will, we may be assured, be fulfilled. But suppose he intends, at a certain point in the game, to give him mate in four moves; this intention may be frustrated by a random move of his opponent; this is his will, fulfilled or not fulfilled *relatively* to the way his adversary plays and formed *antecedently* thereto. Now these are distinctions that Wyclif, though he alludes to consequent and antecedent will later, does not take into account here; and thus quite naturally, strange as it may seem, he tells us (pp. 115, 116) that when in the Lord's Prayer we say "Thy Will be done", we must not pray to *obtain* this, but merely praise God that His Will is fulfilled; just as in "Glory *be* to the Father . . ." we merely affirm His glory. Here, of course, St. Thomas would bring in his distinctions, as above noted. — Wyclif now draws seven important corollaries from this principle. (1) The volition of the object that God wills is eternal, though the object belongs to time. (2) This volition, though eternal, is contingent when its objects are contingent beings, or such as exist. (3) It is determined by God's knowledge (or intellection), and depends on His sight of the creature, as acting thus or thus. God sees this or that act of A; therefore He wills it to take place. (4) All things past or future — i. e. non-existing in themselves now, — exist in God's eternity (*in tempore sempiterno* p. 117, l. 21). For, as a battle that is to take place some time this year, may be said to take place this year, and (not less truly) in the twentieth century, because we can rightly *extend* the present from one indivisible instant to a year

or any given length of time: so we have a right to extend this idea of presence to eternity. And indeed, if the relation is eternal, if the thing is eternally willed, it must somehow have eternal existence (pp. 115—118).

At this point comes the objection that God's will is that all men should be saved; yet, as a fact, all are not. Our author's answer sounds very hard, very Calvinistic. *All men* means either *all the elect;* or *all conditions of men;* or that God provides means to save all men; or that their salvation being the desire of His Saints, it is in a sense His own. This, however, is Augustine's exposition, and it is well known that the 'Doctor of Grace' now and then expresses himself with a rigour that has not been followed by the Church in later days: great as was his authority, neither he nor any other Doctor — not even the Popes in such writings as are not clearly dogmatic definitions — is held to be infallible. The view now generally adopted is that of St. John Damascenus, also quoted by Wyclif, but in few words: it is equivalent to the distinctions already given above, and our author, whilst he admits that some of these answers may be right, takes care to add that God's will can in no wise be frustrated, for this would contradict some of His attributes in any case. This is perhaps a protest against the supposition of Damascenus that God's will, considered antecedently to the merits or demerits of His creatures, may not be fulfilled. Wyclif looks like a Determinist here; but we shall see later that he admits free-will to the full, even so fully that (he says) God's volitions are determined thereby (pp. 118, 119).

(5) All creatures are made by their nature to obey God's commands; so sin consists, not in the *not doing* God's will (which is always done) but in the *not intending* to do it. (6) We may then meritoriously intend what, as a matter of fact, is not God's will; and a sinful intention may occur together with an act that God wills to take place. When our will intends to submit itself to God, even should our nature rebel, we do not sin. (7) God's volitions are the necessary causes of the Universals, and the contingent causes of existing things, and serve to direct God's working in the world: they all are good, even His will to punish sin, which is just. We must therefore submit to them in all things, and desire nothing absolutely, but only if it be God's will; approving everything that takes place, even every evil, except sin. A 'foreknown' or reprobate

may, however, rightly desire to be saved, because he does not know that he is a castaway. But we must never under any circumstances desire sin, and should be very cautious how we wish for things temporal, which may lead us towards it (pp. 119—126).

In *Chapter II,* Wyclif, after stating several objections (pp. 127—128), after the fashion of Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica,* affirms that these Divine volitions must necessarily have a cause. This follows as a matter of course, if we suppose them to be in any way distinct from God. The rest of the chapter is taken up with the answers to the objections already given. But before analysing them, let me repeat the remark in the note to p. 129. A Cause, in the usual Scholastic terminology, is whatever concurs to produce another being distinct from itself, which therefore *comes into existence on account of it.* A Principle is that by which anything that exists has its existence, the latter therefore *existing on account of it.* 'To be caused' can in this sense only be said of creatures, or of beings in every way distinct from God. 'To have a principle', on the contrary, can be said of God and of creatures too. God is His own Principle; whereas nothing can cause itself. Now, as I point out in the note, it is evident that Wyclif here, while he uses the word Cause, means Principle all the time.

(1) It is objected that in Wyclif's system the idea of the Contingent — what may either be or not be — must disappear, since God's volitions are the necessary effect of a cause. The answer is that, though indeed everything that is caused must possess a complete cause, sufficient to determine its existence necessarily, yet this does not destroy the idea of the Contingent. For one thing can determine another in different ways. The world, as capable of creation, determined God's volition to create it; and again God's volition determined the world to be created. One is the final, the other the efficient cause; and each, as caused, is contingent upon the other. This search for the cause of God's will was rebuked by St. Paul, comparing man to a potter's vessel: but he spoke to ignorant presumptuous men, who accused God of man's damnation; whereas we say that no one is damned unless he has deserved damnation, that every one can be saved with God's grace, and that this is given him, if he but do what in him lies (pp. 128—132).

(2) But adversaries urge that God's will can have no cause: for any cause of it, if not God Himself, must itself be caused, and so on for ever; unless we admit the impossible hypothesis of a being that is

at once the effect and the cause of another. — Wyclif answers, as before, that one thing can be the cause and the effect of another, if the manner be different in each case. Thus God, as willing the existence of such and such a human act, produced it; and the act, as determined to be such and such by man's free-will, determines God's will to produce it. The object determines the quality of the volition, but the volition determines the existence of the object; as, v. g. the ideal beauty of an edifice thought of by an architect decides him to build it. So at least I understand Wyclif's answer. Here he incidentally replies to Aristotle's argument to prove the eternity of the world. God's will that the world shall exist is eternal, but that does not mean that it must exist everlastingly. It might have meant that, and then the world would have existed from eternity. Wyclif is therefore of opinion, with St. Thomas and certain other famous Schoolmen, that the arguments of the majority of Christian philosophers to prove that an eternal world is impossible, are quite valueless (pp. 132—134).

(3) The third objection is that this theory makes God to produce His volitions according to the will of His creatures. For example — if a man should choose at a certain instant evil rather than good, God foreseeing this from all eternity has the eternal volition of the realisation of this man's sinful act: it follows that God's will is not free, but dependent on that of man. Wyclif replies that these volitions are indeed not supremely free; but then they are not identical with the Deity, they are but relational entities between Him and His creatures. And besides, it is false to suppose that necessity and liberty are contradictory in God; they are attributes of His Being, and both are infinite in Him. At this place occurs a short digression. Our author has been so far in agreement with Bradwardine, the *Doctor profundus*, some of whose doctrines were condemned by the University of Paris, confirmed by Pope Clement VI (see Henrion, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, l. XLIV, p. 578); but here he takes care, as he does in the rest of this tractate, to show in what points he differs from Bradwardine, whose tenets he admits to have been justly condemned: *propter talia multa racionaliter dampnatus est error* (p. 253, l. 12). Bradwardine rightly makes a distinction between the relational volitions of God, and that Will which is His very Essence; but he seems to suppose not only the former, but the latter also, to be determined by creatures. This is a manifest impossibility; and besides, these volitions are, in Bradwardine's theory, not mere relations, but — so to speak —

everlasting absolute essences[1] in God's substance; with many other corollaries 'which ought rather to be denied' (*quorum opposita sunt satis probabilia;* end of ch. II). This very faint form of disapproval will be understood, if we consider that Wyclif is here parting company with one for whom he has the greatest respect and to whom he owes many of his own views (pp. 134—136).

Chapter III. In this and in the succeeding chapters as far as the ninth exclusively, the divergency between our author's system and that of Bradwardine is pointed out more clearly. The two principal points at issue are: *a)* the definition of what Free-will is; and *b)* the conception of God's volitions as absolute entities or as relations. Chapter III brings forward and defends Wyclif's definition of Freewill, and Bradwardine's is attacked in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, certain preliminary points are proved, to serve as a basis for the refutation of Bradwardine's arguments, in Chapters VI to IX.

The question of Free-will is, I need not say, an impenetrable mystery which troubled the minds of Christians even so far back as the days of St. Paul; and no doubt, for a man who wants to throw off God's yoke with a pretty appearance of right upon his side, few are more convenient, and few supply him with a better pretext. But what is Free-will? There are two very different definitions. Wyclif, with Anselm, calls it 'the faculty by which an intellectual nature willingly cleaves to rectitude or righteousness (*potestas nature racionalis voluntarie servandi rectitudinem vel iusticiam*, pp. 137, l. 4) Bradwardine, on the contrary, calls free-will (p. 153, l. 2 *and seq.*) "an active faculty which, even when all pre-requisites for acting are present, is still able to act or not to act", and *a fortiori* to choose between one out of two contrary alternatives. Now both these definitions, as is obvious, labour under great difficulties. To the former it might be objected that from its standpoint sin is not an act of free-will; and its adherents are forced to admit that at least there is a defect of freedom in every sinful act. Which seems contrary to our experience. To the latter the following objection would come pat: "What can that faculty be, which, when everything that makes it act is present,

[1] The text (p. 136, l. 21) has *essencie.* But I am inclined to think this a mistake for *accidencia.* In both cases, Bradwardine's idea of God would be heterodox; though *accidencia* would be less so.

may yet not produce its act? Why, the very nature of a faculty is to produce a given act when *nothing* prevents it." Partisans of the latter definition, however, might retort: "We are not free *before* the pre-requisites are all posited, since then it is impossible to act. After the act is produced, we are not free *not to have produced it.* If then we are not free at the instant when all conditions are fulfilled, we never are free, and free-will must be denied. — This third Chapter deals principally with the former definition, given by Anselm.

All beings are able to do what is right; brutes and inanimate things do so by nature, and without knowing what they do; reasonable beings know what is right, and therefore are able to do right by choice. This choice of right action is possible both in God and in His creatures; but in God it is such that nothing can prevent it; in intelligent creatures it exists, but may be prevented, more or less; and it is in this sense only that free-will can be said to wax or wane, as it does, — even to nothing. The difficulty in choosing to act aright is the source of wrong choice and consequently of sin. God is therefore supremely free; created beings, because sin is not an impossibility to them, enjoy less liberty: and perfect freedom is the same thing as perfect necessity. Sin is what is most contrary to liberty (*peccata, que videntur maxime contraria libertati*); yet it too must be to some extent the result of free-will. And all intelligent beings are thus free; even the damned cannot desire evil for its own sake, but at least apparent good, and therefore some appearance of righteousness and justice: the fact that this good is not real, and yet desired, is the defect in their will — free by nature, but enslaved by sin. Thus, to the question Whether free-will can admit of degrees? we reply that in its essence it cannot, being the capacity to love what is in some sense right and good; the contrary defect — the capacity to prefer what is less to what is more worthy of love — does admit of degrees, which often hinder the will from acting, sometimes even (so to speak) forcing it to act in a certain way; so that the Apostle's words, "making me captive under the law of sin", are literally true (pp. 137—142).

The rest of the chapter is taken up with answers to objections. (1) This theory would go to deny free-will altogether, and consequently sin. — No, for the senses do not force us to sin in each particular case, but in the long run; under certain conditions, we cannot help it, and it is a necessity, but only a moral necessity. Each temptation, however,

violent, can be resisted *separately;* if we imagine the external influences which dispose us to sin increasing indefinitely, there comes a moment, it is true, when we are not free, because not accountable for our actions; but in such a case there is no sin at all. Nothing can separate a man from God except his own will; though if he be in sin, the devil can easily prevent him from rising out of it. God never abandons one that is united to Him, unless as a just punishment; and this, to be just, must be preceded by some fault that has caused Him to withdraw His grace. God dwells in the soul, and even if the Tempter had infinite might, he could not expel God; unless indeed the soul sided with the Tempter. (2) When everything necessary for the act to take place has been posited, Wyclif admits that the act *must* absolutely follow; which is contrary to free-will. If he says that it need not follow, then you have a complete cause which produces no effect; or (as I put it in the side-notes) this nullity is indeed an effect, though a negative one, for which there is no cause. — Our author, as may be guessed, prefers the first alternative and thus looks like a modern Determinist: though this choice of his is not contrary to his own definition of Free Will, but to Bradwardine's. To say: God chose to produce the world because He chose, is inadmissible, but: He produced the world because He chose, is right. And here Wyclif shows us very markedly that he understands by Free-Will something quite different from 'a possibility of choice between two contradictories', since he says on p. 148, l. 11 (see also p. 149, l. 37) that the Holy Spirit is produced freely, i. e. necessarily; for Wyclif says that supreme necessity is supreme freedom. Nor can we in any case say that God's acts are in the power of man's will, since this very power is given him by God. And it is not true to admit that if a fact which depends on another be also dependent on us, that other fact must also be thus dependent. (3) Wyclif is accused of excluding the aforesaid 'possibility of choice between alternatives'. And here I must correct my side-note to the last paragraph on p. 149. I had read (ll. 29, 30) "est *ea* maior *qua* potest in contradictoria" intending to correct the text; "*no liberty is greater than that by which one chooses between contradictories*"; but I fortunately overlooked it. I now think the text is right. Our author answers thus: This power of choice, existing in man, does not make his free-will greater than any other, but it is a true sign that he has free-will (*sic posse est signum libertatis*). The Blessed have the same possi-

bility of choice (since it is part of their human nature) as sinful man on earth; but whereas here we often pass from the possibility to the actuality of sin, we shall never do so in Heaven; only this actual passage is bondage rather than freedom. We must not suppose that liberty implies inclination towards evil; bliss, taking away that inclination altogether, leaves intact the abstract possibility of choice (pp. 142—152). I suppose that this should be understood as follows: there are a great many sins — take, v. g. cannibalism, — which the average man has not the slightest inclination to commit, and is sure never to commit; such is the state of the Blessed with regard to all sin. Yet, speaking in the abstract, any man may desire to eat human flesh, nay, may even satisfy that desire, — *if he choose.*

Chapter IV. Bradwardine supports his definition of Free-Will, pointing out that nothing created can necessitate an act of any man's will, and God alone can be the cause of His own volitions; He, being infinitely above all creatures, cannot need them in His acts; nay, He performs them even in spite of the creature's opposition, and ordains man's will to be subject to His power. This argument tends to maintain the 'liberty of choice', not only of human, but of Divine volitions; whereas Wyclif, supposing the latter to be determined by human will, freely choosing one side or the other, was forced to take the other definition of free-will in the case of the former (pp. 152, 153).

Wyclif (1) refutes Bradwardine, and (2) answers the arguments which may be brought against his own theory. (1) Aristotle's *dictum* of a faculty called free, because it can act in contrary directions, does not define freedom properly, since brutes and things inanimate do this. Our superiority to brutes is in this, that whereas they, unless they are hindered, do in the present all that they intend to do, we can now intend an act which we put off to the future. As to Bradwardine's definition, a power capable of not acting when everything that makes for acting is present — that is, which does not act, though nothing makes for not acting — is a contradiction in terms. God's acts, whether internal or internal, cannot possibly be the result of choice: His internal acts, because absolutely necessary; His external acts, because they must be as their object is. If Lucifer chooses to fall, God *cannot but* let him fall; say that he chooses to stand, God *must* make him stand Otherwise, how could Lucifer choose? Now *cannot but* and *must* are contrary to free-will, not

in Wyclif's sense, but in Bradwardine's. This definition is yet more at fault as concerns creatures: we find everywhere freedom where there is no choice at all. The *Doctor Profundus* seems to deny freedom to creatures, granting it to the eternal volitions of the Deity; but his theory is full of absurdities. The definition may indeed mean that a given entity, if free, can act in one sense *or else* in another. But this would be true of everything absolutely, at the indivisible instant when it *begins* to act; we can say either that it acts or does not; for this instant can with equal truth be called the last instant of non-action or the first of action: just as the instant of a man's death is the last of his life or the first of his *being dead*. Again, to prove that one being cannot necessitate another's act, it does not suffice to prove that nothing can cöerce another by its natural power. A man may in a sense be compelled to sin, but only if he has first abandoned God. Yet even this compulsion can be resisted; or if it cannot, it is because the man does not choose to resist: which is his own fault (pp. 153—160).

(2) *(a)* Original sin, says Bradwardine, is not the act of the sinner who incurs its guilt. — To some extent it is, since it implies a defect in the act of *our* conception, which is consequently *our* defect. — From p. 160 to 164, the doctrine given is, so far as I can see, quite on the ordinary lines of orthodoxy; I may therefore state here what the Church's doctrine of original sin is. Wyclif calls it a legal flaw, and by it man certainly lost his title to the inheritance of bliss. But we must consider the possibility of God creating men — reasonable animated beings, with the contrary tendencies of reason and deliberate acts on one hand, and on the other the sudden and unreflecting animal impulses to flee pain and seek pleasure. Had He chosen to create them thus, there would have been the same conflicts between duty and passion, the same tendencies towards vice — different in different natures — as there are now. But would there have been original *sin?* No, for these propensities would not have been the result of sin. Adam was raised to a superior state — called to eternal bliss in the Vision of God, absolute master of all his passions, which could not move one jot unless he chose them to move, endowed with immortality. If he had kept these gifts, which were not due to his nature, he would have handed them down to his posterity; but, losing them for himself, he lost them at the same time and by the same law for all his descendants, to whom nothing was left

but the pure gifts of nature. We are therefore in the condition of the sons of a nobleman who has forfeited his estates by treason; as it would have been not unjust that his estates, had he been faithful, should go to his sons, though they did not deserve to possess them, so it is not unjust that after his forfeiture they should be deprived of them, though they did not commit any crime themselves. — The main point is that the tendency towards sin of our imperfect nature is the just consequence of a sin committed.

(b) Is God the author of man's consent to sin? It would seem so, since He concurs in the act by which sin takes place, but Wyclif, who will deal with this question more at length in another chapter, here simply states that God is not the author of what is wrong in sin.

(c) If every sin is the punishment of a previous abandonment of God, whose and what was the first sin? It was of course the sin of Lucifer; but the answer is by no means satisfactory here, and Wyclif returns to it in Chapters IX and X. Here he simply says that Lucifer first omitted to love God as he ought, and then his mind being blinded as a punishment thereof, his will became positively wicked. This omission, he says, was caused by an inherent defect in Lucifer's will, which necessitated itself. But then the question recurs: Either the omission was a sin, or it was not. If not, how could it originate sin? and at any rate, dereliction of duty must be wrong. If a sin, this was caused (as Wyclif has said) by an abandonment of God; and that could only take place as a punishment for some previous sin. It cannot be said that here or elsewhere Wyclif — nor indeed any other writer on the subject — has attained satisfactory results: as might be expected, considering what very meagre positive data as to the nature of the Being in question are supplied by Holy Writ.

Chapter V. Here Wyclif proceeds to overhaul some of Bradwardine's arguments for the necessity of future events, taking care to put in evidence the points of difference between the latter's system and his own (p. 165). This was imperative, for the resemblances are so striking, and he agrees with the *Doctor Profundus* on so many points, that many must have thought him a mere copyist, or an adherent who differed from his master only in details: and we must remember, too, that Bradwardine's theory had been condemned. Wyclif, first of all, rejects the idea of God's volitions, taken as separate, eternal, and absolute entities; in

his view they are mere relations between God and the creatures; *real* indeed, but with the thinnest of all possible real entity. Every act of every rational creature causes a volition in God. He cannot force our wills by His own, nor make them conformable thereto without our free consent, which He respects more than the creatures do; and this is because He is Almighty and they are not. For though man can, by the exercise of such liberty, make this or that volition of God never to have been and never to be in the future, this is quite a different thing from changing His will. Any comparison between His volitions and those of men must necessarily fail. Man is master of his own will; God is not; but this does not imply less freedom on His part. For God's will is God Himself, and He is absolute freedom; we cannot say properly that any one is master of himself. There has been in this matter a great abuse of the terms 'power' and 'mastery'. Their senses are strictly limited: if we extend them too far, we shall find that God has no power over sin, nor over the things He has absolutely willed to be. Properly, though man can be the cause why God eternally wills thus or thus, he cannot be said to have power over these eternal volitions (pp. 166—171). Here follows a long disquisition on the various significations of the word 'power'; and whether God is eternally just, in the same way as he has eternally power which he exerts only in time. The important point to notice is the 'Dubitacio' (p. 171) whether a rational creature does not lose the powers which belonged to it, when it falls into mortal sin. Wyclif's answer in the negative is noticeable; but so too is the fact of the 'Dubitacio' itself. We see that our author has not yet passed the Rubicon; but he seems to be thinking of passing it; at least the idea which he was later to emphasize with such force, that *All rights, even to the possession of anything temporal whatever, are lost by mortal sin*, was germing in his mind. His denial, too, seems weak; and the reason he gives (*quod nimis confunderet politicam,* p. 171, ll. 22, 23) is rather flimsy, when we think that the 'Dubitacio' strikes at the roots of the Church as an organization. This passage apart, there is little to analyze until the end of the chapter (pp. 171—174).

Chapter VI. Wyclif continues to point out what he disapproves in Bradwardine's theory and arguments. The latter says (I.) that if God's volition causes man's, it is prior thereto. Wyclif says: Yes — in duration, infinitely so. In its nature also, it is prior, in so far as God is one term

of this relation; but in so far as man is the other term, it is not prior (p. 174). — Again (II.) the opinion held by Wyclif — that man's choice determines God's volition, — would, according to Bradwardine, render man more free than God. It would indeed in his conception of a volition as of an absolute entity; but not if this is a mere relation. God's external volitions may be determined, but this does not render His Nature dependent upon man (pp. 174, 175). — (III.) This determination seems to impose a certain necessity upon the Divine Will. The difficulty is here more serious. It is certain that in the case of these volitions, God is neither acting by natural necessity, nor coërced by man's choice; whatever necessity there may be in these His volitions, He is Himself their source. God's volitions take place on account of the possibility of this or that alternative; it is good, and He chooses it as such. But the very possibility, *quà* good, proceeds from Him, and necessitates His act. Yet He is freely necessitated, as a man who has freely made a vow is bound thereby (pp. 175, 176). — But (IV.) does not man somehow prevent God from acting in this or that way? If I choose to lay down my pen now, shall I not have made it impossible for God not to realize my choice, and to make me *not laying down my pen* at this instant? Wyclif replies that this is so, but under the supposition that God has first and freely chosen to create me as I am: and every existing being has hypothetical necessity (pp. 176, 177). — (V.) The next is a very feeble objection: this dependency of Divine upon human volition would make God change with every change of every creature. But all God's volitions are eternal and immutable; His freedom means that if it had pleased Him so, He might never have produced them, since nothing forced Him to create (pp. 177, 178). — (VI.) God's volition that, for instance, a certain man shall exist, may be prior to (i. e. independent of) any human will. If so, all God's acts of will are in the same category, and prior to the corresponding human volitions; for what belongs to the nature itself of any member of a class must belong to the whole class. Wyclif replies, *first*, that this is only absolutely true of what is absolutely essential to the member, *quà* member of this class; and *second*, that these acts of God are not classifiable at all. We must not confound that Will which is God Himself with the acts that are mere relations with His creatures. My will is to run; God concurs in this will of mine, therefore He wills that I run, and the fact takes place. His volition is in itself, and as dependent

on mine, a mere abstract entity: but having the Infinite for subject, it is eternal, immutable, and so on (pp. 178—180). — (VII.) Christ's acts were dictated by God's will; other men dictate their will to God; and the servant has more freedom than his Lord: which is absurd. — Wyclif admits that Christ's human will obeyed that of God; but He obeyed by His free choice, like any other man, and could only not rebel because He had not the least mind to do so (pp. 180, 181). — The rest of the chapter consists in the refutation of an argument against Christ's infallibility. If what Christ foretold was absolutely true, Peter could not help denying Him; if not, Christ was able both to err and to deceive. After giving the various answers of other schools of theology, Wyclif says that "*If Christ foretold anything, that thing must take place*". This is absolutely true, as a nexus; but the condition — *Christ foretelling this or that,* and the conditioned, *this or that taking place* are contingent, and the former depends upon the latter; Christ seeing in His Divine Eternity the contingent future fact which He announces. Wyclif here exults over the ease with which his theory solves a difficulty great in the eyes of many, and over the close relationship which the whole of this question bears to Predestination and to God's promise: *if God makes any promise, He will keep it*" (pp. 181—188).

Chapter VII. — (VIII.) For a creature to determine what God shall will, amounts to this: the Temporal causes the Eternal. — The answer, by analogy with God's intellection, runs thus. God's knowledge of a future fact is eternal, yet it does not make that future fact to be true, but only to be known as such; and if that fact did not take place, this eternal knowledge would never have existed. In the same way, to will a thing does not cause it; *the thing itself, done or not done, causes God to will it or not* (pp. 188—190). — Then is not God's Providence denied? — No, for He follows the creature's will, acting as He has ordained that it shall act. — What of God's Omnipotence? — He is unable to determine the realisation of a given volition of mine, otherwise than according to my will. Yes, but to determine this *realisation of my volition against my will* would be a contradiction in terms: and to achieve a self-contradiction is no part of Omnipotence. God's volition, as regards my damnation, either exists or does not. If He has it, I cannot change it; if He has it not, I cannot make Him to have it. *But I can make Him never to have had it; or I can make Him to have had it from all eter-*

nity. We must, however, not misunderstand the word here; it is only meant as the determination which the act receives from its object (pp. 190—193). — We have hitherto enumerated eight arguments, taken from Bradwardine, numbered according to the text. The next is given in the MS. as the tenth; but it is impossible to say whether one argument has been omitted in the present MS. (which would thus have a considerable gap on p. 193, between lines 16 and 17), or whether the arguments are wrongly numbered. (X.) Human volition is a gift of God; if so, man cannot determine God to produce it in him. Why otherwise should we pray for a good will? and how could God's grace be free? — Wyclif here points out the seemingly successive steps in the whole process. First, God moves the creature to act (one way or another as it may choose), ready to concur in this action: the action follows, God willing that it shall take place with a volition consequent upon its nature, good or evil. These, however, are not really successive, but simultaneous: their priority or posteriority is of nature (*prior natura*, p. 194, l. 18). To explain this, not temporal, but natural priority, let us take an example given, I believe, by St. Augustine. In the syllable *be*, is *b* or *e* first in time? Neither, for *b* cannot be pronounced at all without *e*. But *b* is first as to nature, since it determines the *way* in which we utter the vowel *e*. — From this explanation, we see that the argument fails, for it takes man's volition as a gift, i. e. as something apart from him. This volition is but the man himself, as modified by his act of will, which is influenced by God's premotion: and on account of this influence of God, prayer is a good thing. It is true that man's operation precedes God's coöperation *in nature*, since the latter presupposes the former: but the latter is not on that account less necessary for merit; and Wyclif utterly rejects Pelagianism (pp. 193—196).

Chapter VIII concludes this series of arguments. — (XI.) Lucifer wished only to be God's equal; but Wyclif's theory goes further; it sets our will over that of God which is bent one way or another according as we choose. — Here the distinction recurs between God's essential will and that which is only a relation between Him and His creatures. And the word *bent* is singularly ill chosen, since, though meaning a change of form, it is applied to a volition which is eternal and unchangeable. It is precisely this very perfection of immutability that requires a temporal cause to determine it, when its effect takes place in time.

There are those who understand by *time* only the present moment; these must admit that God's volitions change: probably this is only a form of speech, but at any rate, our author repudiates it, and rejects their definition of time (pp. 196—200). — No further arguments need be adduced for refutation. All objections that can be made proceed either (1) from the supposition that God's cognitions and volitions are absolute entities; or (2) from the assumption that God's liberty consists in His being able to do all that man can do; or (3) from logical fallacies, and the abuse of relational terms. All these have been already refuted. Bradwardine, intent on refuting Pelagianism, seems (though it is not quite clear) to make of God's volitions absolute realities, whence it would follow, as Wyclif believes, that all things are unavoidably necessary, and Free-will would be impossible (pp. 200—202).

Chapter IX. We now come upon a new subject of inquiry: whether to every act of God's cognition there corresponds an act of His volition. This is answered by pointing out that no substance, no act, can be totally evil in its nature; and if good, it is the object of the Divine Will. But then, how can anything be said to be evil? By accident. Homicide is an act good in itself; but if it *happens* to be done by one who has not the right to slay, or to one that does not deserve to be slain, it becomes evil. And the evil consists in these circumstances being known, and yet not preventing the will from accomplishing the act. If any act could be necessarily evil, it would be the act of an evil will; but even that has always some good thing for object, real or apparent (pp. 202—206). — This leads to a discussion on the fall of Lucifer, a favourite question with Mediaeval Schoolmen, and one that is not by any means so idle as may be supposed. For if there is already a great difficulty in solving the question, How could Adam fall? it is far greater in the case of Lucifer. Adam had no passions in revolt, his mind was perfectly reasonable, and saw as well as the greatest of Saints the justice of obeying an Infinite Being on whom he depended absolutely; moreover, his will had no tendency whatever towards evil, as ours has; nor could it fall little by little, as ours can, by slight faults of omission and negligence. Yet he fell. Now the lowest of all angels was far superior to Adam in knowledge, knowing all human science in one flash of thought, and ineffable mysteries of a higher world that we cannot so much as dream; and at the summit of a hierarchy of angelic beings, each as much

above the other as the lowest angel is above man, stood the first of angels, — Lucifer, whose knowledge of God was all but a Beatific Vision. It is almost impossible for us to think of any reason for his fall which does not imply either a nature already perverted and depraved to the uttermost — and this of course is inadmissible[1] — or a degree of crass ignorance and desire of what was impossible to him, which even we human beings see clearly to be foolish and absurd. It is, if I mistake not, thought by many Roman Catholic theologians that Lucifer fell because he had hoped and desired that the Eternal Word would unite itself hypostatically to his own nature — the first of created beings — instead of assuming ours, which being partly material is in the lowest rank, since nothing can be more entitatively imperfect than Matter. This would indeed avoid the absurdity of his wishing to become God by nature — which is no doubt unthinkable. But then this wish was only wrong because absolute, and not elicited in submission to God's will. Now even we mortals know that to submit to God's will is the first duty of a creature: if we rebel, it is because we find it hard to bend our sinful and rebellious: wills to His. Now Lucifer's will was not created sinful nor rebellious! how then did it become so? — Wyclif affirms that this Angel's mighty mind, not blinded by sin, could not desire the impossible; and decides, with S. Anselm (De Casu Diaboli) that what he desired was possible, but inordinately wished for. Scotus, on the contrary, maintains that Lucifer simply wished to be God. It is possible he says, to wish even for what we know to be unpossible. Wyclif denies this in the case of what is absolutely unthinkable, as *for a creature to desire to become au uncreated being;* what we cannot think we cannot desire. Scotus will have it that this is not true. As a fact, the damned hate God, wish His annihilation; this annihilation of God would mean that He never has been, that nothing exists or ever has existed: all this is absolutely inconceivable, and therefore Lucifer might possibly have desired to be God. Wyclif here expounds four different senses of *hatred;* personal hatred of God is not possible, but indirect hatred

[1] For though Christ says: The Devil was a murderer *from* the beginning, He does not say: A murderer *at* the beginning; or in the words of St. Thomas, Lucifer was created good, but fell immediately after the first (angelic) instant of his creation, which may have lasted ages as we count them, but was spent in only one great first thought, the second thought being his revolt.

is. Scotus says we may wish for something impossible conditionally, "if it were possible"; but our author concludes the chapter by showing that in any case Lucifer's wish aimed at something that was possible, and therefore (returning to the main point, i. e. that no act is or can be essentially evil) something that he might rightly desire (pp. 206—211). The difficulty, I need not say, remains, whichever point of view we take. If what Lucifer desired was absolutely absurd, he could not desire it. If the desire was of something possible, how came it to be wrong? St. Thomas (Sum. Th. 1ª Pars. qu. LXIII, art. 3. "*Utrum diabolus appetierit esse ut Deius*) says that Lucifer desired the highest felicity to which he could naturally attain, either scorning supernatural beatitude or desiring to attain it without Divine grace. But why should he scorn beatitude or despise grace, save as a consequence of the sin of pride, that was in him already? Evidently this is no answer, and it must remain a mystery — the mystery of free-will in regions that the utmost effort of the human mind can scarcely reach.

Chapter X. What is the cause of evil in an act which cannot be evil by nature? One is an inclination towards what is wrong, and acts made under its influence are always sins: thence such acts — v. g. adultery, theft, etc. — are said to be always wrong; but this is because we couple the physical act with the inclination to which the will has yielded; whereas, setting aside the evil propensity, no act is evil in itself. The first sin must have been an aberration in the will of an Angel. He, according to Anselm, first desired something which he did not possess, then desired it wrongly, without due submission to God's will, thus implicitly setting himself above God. But what was that "something" that Lucifer desired? Was it to be united to the Divine Nature? or to become a God to himself? or to be confirmed in grace sooner than his Creator would allow? Whatever it might be, there was a want of conformity to God's will, and in that all unrighteousness consists. The act itself was not essentially evil. Had his wish been granted, it would have been good; but the fact of its being contrary to God's will made it a sin — the first of all, the exemplar of all others. Wyclif here returns to sin in man, caused by an inordinate desire for pleasure, wealth or glory; in so far as these turn us away from God, they are sinful (pp. 211—221).

Chapter XI. Whether God is pleased with sin (*si deus complacenter vult peccata* p. 221, ll. 24, 25). The question sounds more than strange

to any Theist, and the answer, given in the affirmative, would lead many to place him amongst the most dangerous heretics. Here, however, we must note two points. As we shall see, Wyclif holds all the while most tenaciously to his view that God only permits the fact of sin for the good by which He intends to counteract it, and that, the fact of sin including this good result, He is in so far pleased with it, and no farther. With these restrictions, our author may be said to affirm what is not untrue in itself. But why lay such stress upon an expression that may so easily be misunderstood? St. Thomas (Sum. Th. 3ª Pars, qu. XVI, art. 8) says: "We ought not to use the same language as heretics, lest we should seem to favour their errors." And even in our days, a Liberal who should say that Tariff Reform has its good points, or a Unionist who should declare Home Rule to be just — even should they explain what they meant by Tariff Reform and Home Rule in a most orthodox sense — would certainly incur the displeasure of their respective parties. Wyclif (if one who has long studied his doctrines may be permitted to criticise them so far) is perhaps too fond of using terms which seem to convey a meaning quite contrary to what he really intends, and to the usual sense of words; and I think it likely that amongst the many heresies for which he was condemned at the Council of Constance, some at least had this origin, and no other.

There is yet another point of interest which I should like to notice here. It may be that Wyclif uses this somewhat startling language, not from love of paradox, but because in his times the right and most convenient formula had not yet been hit upon. Remark that though Wyclif often makes the distinction between the *esse primum* and the *esse secundum* of sin, he nowhere alludes to the *moral entity* of human acts; nor (though here I speak under correction) is the theory of the three orders of entity, *physical, logical and moral,* alluded to anywhere in St. Thomas, so far as I know[1]: though the doctrines from which this theory naturally proceeds are of course to be found in his works. The theory then must, I suppose, have sprung into existence at a later period. It is now generally taught by Catholic theologians, and briefly stated, is

[1] I have found only the division between *ens reale* et *ens rationis* in the *Summa Theologica*. Still, this work makes up but a few out of the many volumes written by Aquinas.

as follows. Entity is whatever is an object of thought. If the object, besides having existence in our thoughts, has existence independent of them, i. e. in the outside world, it is a *physical entity;* and all such depends upon God for its existence. If not, it is a non-physical entity, as, v. g. any proposition, such as *I ought to choose A, I ought not to choose B which excludes A.* If then it is complete (like the former propositions) by the fact of being in my mind, it is purely logical. If not, and if, in order to be, it requires the decision of my will, choosing between two things either according to the 'ought' of the above propositions or in defiance thereof, it is moral entity, either right or wrong. The fact that I choose B, while my mind tells me that I ought to choose A, is what we call *being wrong;* the other choice would be right; *right* and *wrong* are entities that depend upon the will. These presuppose the logical entities of the two above-mentioned propositions, but they are not identical therewith. Again, these logical entities may be true or false, absurd, possible, probable or certain; they depend upon the existence of the physical act of a thinker; but they differ from that act. Now though God gives all that is entitative in the physical act by which our mind enunciates a proposition, or chooses between it and its contrary, it is we who are (in a sense) the creators of the logical world of entities which depend upon our mind alone; and still more, if this were possible, of the world of moral entities that our volitions produce. God knows these, as He knows all. But it is our fault, not His, if we fall into error. Though the error is a failing within our mind, still it is physically as perfect an act as the enunciation of a true proposition. And likewise, if we choose what is wrong, the act of the will is physically as perfect as if we had chosen what is right. God has therefore nothing to do with moral evil, just as He has nothing to do with our mistakes in reasoning. It is clear that this theory gives us a solution to the question 'Does God delight in sin? which at the same time respects His dominion over all that is really anything in our world, and avoids being so ill-sounding as Wyclif's answer. Sin is a moral entity or perhaps rather non-entity; God has not produced it, nor willed it in any way, nor can He take any delight in it. The physical act is indeed produced by His concurrence; but this is an entity of an entirely different order. And as our judgments are based upon the physical world, when they agree therewith, they are true by the truth which God gives us the power of

attaining; He therefore is the Author of logical truth, but not of logical falsity, since there is no judgment necessarily false; and the same is true of moral goodness and evil.

This chapter, of which a part is wanting, begins by an enumeration of the different senses in which the word *sin* is taken, and distinguishes between sin, as a lack of actual righteousness, and sin as a lack of actual grace. This lays Wyclif open to attack; for where righteousness is wanting, one cannot be in a state of grace. He replies that the two are connected, but are not the same. *Grace* may be understood very loosely; righteousness is followed by grace, and its lack by the privation thereof. When the soul departs, the body is no longer capable of laughter; but 'soul' and 'capable of laughter' are two different ideas. The lack of justice is really sin, the privation of grace is its punishment only, and therefore has a certain goodness in it: not every privation is absolutely evil. It is not true that if sin is merely a privation, all sins are equal; for they differ according to the moral goodness of which they deprive us (pp. 221—229). The end of this chapter, which is wanting, no doubt points to Wyclif's conclusion, already known to us; that God views with complacency the *esse secundum* of sin, but not its *esse primum*. Modern theologians as I have pointed out, would prefer to distinguish between the physical act which contains sin, and sin itself.

Chapter XIII is so mutilated that it is useless to attempt to analyse it. One sentence, however, cannot pass without remark: "God eternally intended to damn each of the 'foreknown' for the beauty of the universe!" Of course, our author means, and it is of the essence of his system that he should mean, "in prevision of the sins that each of then commits and of which he will not repent"; but this passage (coming indeed after a quotation from Augustine that does not err on the side of gentleness) sounds exceedingly harsh. So does the end of the chapter: 'God,' says Wyclif, 'necessitates the happening of all sins' (*deus omnia peccata necessitabit ad* esse, p. 233, l. 8), although, if pressed in argument, he would have been sure to add, as he does elsewhere, '*non inevitabiliter*'. I put in a footnote on p. 231, that Wyclif foreshadowed Calvin's doctrine of reprobation. In reality, it is only his language which foreshadows it, since the power of a free choice between contraries is maintained very strongly by him, whenever he deals with the matter; whereas, on the contrary, Calvin's 'irresistible grace' is (so for as I can see) incompatible with a free choice.

Chapter XIV. In how many ways can God be said to will what is evil? (1) By choosing to create beings and acts which may become evil; (2) by choosing to punish them therefor; (3) by permitting its existence; (4) by creating those that He knows will abuse their liberty, and sin; (5) by deciding that the fact of evil shall take place; and (6) by willing sin as sin, and as an ideal of perfection. The last meaning of the words is evidently an absurdity; but the five others are not. In general, we should avoid saying, *God wishes me to sin*, though these words may be rightly understood. To will a happening does not necessarily mean to will what may be wrong in the thing that happens. It follows as a consequence, that God wills *this wrong thing,* but not *because* it is wrong. Peter Lombard and Bradwardine contradict each other here; both express themselves amiss (pp. 233—241). The rest of the chapter (pp. 241—246) deals with objections to Wyclif's theory, that confuse between the entity of sin as an act, and its malice or want of entity. Why does God forbid such sins as He intends shall come to pass? Because, if He did not, they would be sins no longer. He hates sin *as sin* even while He permits it (and consequently sees it with pleasure) to take place as a fact.

Chapter XV. Wyclif proceeds to show that Bradwardine does not get over the difficulty so well as himself. There exists indeed a sort of unwilling will, as when a merchant heaves his goods overboard to save the ship, and Bradwardine tries to turn it to account. But it cannot be applied to God, who is eternally free and unforced in any way. God's will ought, in the theory of the Doctor Profundus, to have sin as its direct object, desired as such. To say that He does not approve it, because you can only approve persons, not abstractions, such as sin, — seems to be a most weak subterfuge. To say that sin's deformity does not exist for God, only for creatures, would make Him love evil and good alike. Nothing can be evil, which is not such in God's eyes. Grosseteste and St. Thomas both side here with Augustine, saying that God is not the author of sin: which He would be, if He intended it as He intends all other things. And if this were true, no one could be damned justly, and the heretical doctrine that man ought to sin, since God has chosen that sin shall exist for the good of the world, would no longer be heretical, but quite orthodox. Bradwardine indeed denies that God is the author of evil, since He can have neither merit nor demerit. Yes,

but (according to him) if God were not in fault, who would be? God would certainly be the main cause of man's guilt. These errors have been justly condemned by a council held in Paris, which should be considered respectfully. It is true that the proposition: "God makes sin to be," which Wyclif upholds, was also condemned as ill-sounding; but it ought to be properly understood. Here Wyclif enters into some explanations of Scripture texts, quoted against him, points out how Augustine maintains free-will, so that God is not the author of sin, and shows that St. Paul himself had been misunderstood by some in this matter, and believed to have said that we ought to do evil that good may come: an error which is too prevalent, in practice at least, in the Church of our modern times (pp. 246—257).

Chapter XVI. Bradwardine says: "God wills that the man X shall sin; Wyclif denies this, but affirms: "God wills the fact of the man X's sin." What difference is there between this, save one of mere words? None, it would seem; for (1) Wyclif says expressly that God does not will sin as it is in its essence; now in its essence it must have some goodness; and sin, if taken apart from all goodness, is precisely sin *quà* sinful; (2) If sin is, sin is good, and God is its Author; (3) He wills it as being the cause of something good; but the cause of anything good must also be a good thing; (4) If God's will is that sin be sin, He wills it as such; but since He wills it to take place, He cannot will that sin be anything but sin (pp. 257—258). — Here Wyclif answers the objections at length, using pretty nearly the same distinctions as have already been set forth (pp. 258—272). We need only note the curious case of one of the elect seeing a future sin of his own in a vision: ought he, or ought he not, to acquiesce in God's will that this sin shall take place? Wyclif says that either *Yes* or *No* is allowable here. He may acquiesce in the fact, but not in the wickedness, of his sin; or if one cannot acquiesce in the fact without taking pleasure in the wickedness, he should not acquiesce at all (pp. 261—262). The same should be said, if one's future damnation were revealed (p. 263). Here comes a curious consequence. A damned soul ought to conform its will to God's; but if it did so, it would accept its damnation, which would be a state of mind incompatible with that of a damned soul (pp. 264—266). Has a lost soul any obligation towards God? No. Then is it freer than another? No, for it is the slave of sin (p. 267). There is also an interesting

passage on abuses in the Church (pp. 269), concerning which I have thrown out a conjecture in a footnote, which however has not a sufficient foundation to bear repetition here.

Chapter XVII. Here Wyclif is principally concerned with showing the difference between (as we should say now) the physical entity of an act, and its moral entity or want of entity. Should God refuse His concourse to a physical act because it was evil in the intention of the doer, natural law would be violated. That a hand should strike or a sword cut, proceeds from an activity which may well not be evil, save for the disposition of the subject that produces these acts: and any act — since any one may be elicited without sin, proceeds from God as an efficient cause. The very same action — meditation, for instance, — may conceivably be meritorious up to a certain time, and a mortal sin afterwards. Richard of Armagh is not of this opinion and attacks it violently, saying that it would make God more guilty than His creature. But Grosseteste, (whose doctrine would here seem to be identical with Wyclif's) points out that God's concourse does not by any means compel the creature's act; and sinners are inexcusable, if they try to shift their responsibility upon Him. Man is left free; and besides he is aided by God's present grace and the threat of His punishments. Can God hate and love at the same time — love an act sufficiently to concur in its production, whilst hating it and forbidding it under penalty of sin? Yes, He can, but from different standpoints (pp. 272 — 277).

Chapter XVII continues Richard of Armagh's arguments, and Wyclif's replies to them, thus concluding the tractate. — After all, in this theory, God determines that a wicked deed shall be done. This would make him the Author of it. Forbidding it to be done, He violates His own precept. — Not so; God is only the Author of that which He approves *in itself.* And how, and to whom, can God be guilty? To do evil, is to act against God's will: it were absurd to say that God can act so. It is not at all the same thing to forbid sin, and to prevent its taking place. If it were, God's commands would become mere statements of facts, not imperatives, as they are. And to whom do these commands extend? to God Himself, forbidding His concourse? That were absurd. It is beyond doubt that God commands things which He intends shall not take place; others are forbidden, yet He intends to let them take place, and to punish the disobedience which gives rise to

them: some are commanded, and will occur, thus giving rise to merit (pp. 277—281).

"But if a man knowingly causes evil, he is guilty: how then can the same act be good in God?" — Because it is not the same act. We cannot compare God and the creature thus. What is coöperation? It is the sustaining a creature in existence, and since existence implies action, in its action as well. It is merely God pervading the entity of a creature, and rendering it capable of free deliberate activity. When a creature causes sin, it consents to the evil of sin, and therefore does wrong: God never consents to this evil and cannot be blamed for His coöperation, any more than for maintaining the sinner's existence (pp. 281—283).

"At any rate, a sinner may justly say: What I am doing is God's will, and part of the Divine Plan." — This were blasphemy on his lips; yet to the right-minded the permission to sin shows forth God's power, mercy, patience and goodness; and also His Providence, bringing good out of evil. On the other hand, were God to refuse His concourse to sin, there could be no merit in doing good. Just as God gives temporal gifts equally to the good and the bad, so He holds out a helping hand to all alike, coöperating with our acts, be they good or evil, as we choose. True, this doctrine is too readily misunderstood by the wicked. Far from impelling any one towards sin, God employs every suasion to hinder him: but if the man *will* sin, He is not going to withdraw His coöperation. You say you cannot help sinning: this is not admissible. You say it is hard to resist: the difficulty proceeds from sin in the past — original or actual — and is never invincible; we have therefore no right to accuse God as did Job's wife (pp. 283—286).

(4). Second Book, Sixth Tractate: Chapters concerning Annihilation.

It did not enter into my first plan to include any part of the Sixth Tractate "De Potentia productiva Dei ad extra", in the present volume of *Excerpta*. Mr. Matthew suggested that I should publish chapters XII—XIV, which deal with the question of the possibility of annihilation, and I took up his suggestion the more eagerly because I hoped to find Wyclif's first position as regards Transubstantiation more clearly defined here than anywhere else; or, if he had already shifted

his ground, to perceive some indications of the change. With regard to this hope, as I have already said, I have been disappointed. Wyclif, in three lines only, ventures with a good deal of courage to adduce the Holy Eucharist as an example that the substance of bread is not annihilated, because the elements (or accidents) remain (pp. 289, ll. 36—38). Reading between the lines, you may indeed see that, either consciously or unconsciously, he denies that the substance disappears. He says, "*substancia .... non adnichilatur .... licet ipsa corrumpatur secundum totam formam.*" Evidently the reasoning seems to be, "If something of the bread (i. e. its tasle, colour, form, etc.) really remains, you cannot say that it is annihilated". And this would content most readers. But the substance of the bread is precisely that which does *not* appear, but is the substratum of the appearances: is the whole of that destroyed by consecration? Wyclif says, "The whole *form* is destroyed". *Form* is that which determines a substance to be, v. g. rather bread than anything else. But what then of the *matter?* He says nothing about it; and that, is the great difficulty which formed the first 'rift within the lute' between him and the faith of his first years. His system makes it impossible for him to admit that matter is destroyed: annihilation is for Wyclif an absurdity, as we shall see. I confess, however, that there are certain passages in which our author seems to speak otherwise; for instance, on p. 314, he says with Richard of Armagh, "God can annihilate, if He chooses" (*potest annichilare, si voluerit,* l. 24). But even this can be explained by the context; and it certainly looks, from other passages, as if God could no more annihilate matter than He can annihilate the distance between two points in space; these He surely could not, even if He would.

We need not go into the arguments which Wyclif sets forth in favour of the possibility of annihilation; these are answered in the sequel, as the arguments to the contrary are brought forward one by one. But it is as well to see first what sort of possibility it was that Wyclif denied.

It is a general opinion amongst theologians that God, *absolutely* speaking, has as great power to annihilate as He has to create; that creatures being contingent, i. e. indifferent in themselves to existence or to non-existence, the idea of the annihilation of a creature is not self-contradictory, and therefore not beyond God's omnipotence. But if we consider this omnipotence *as it is,* regulated by His All-Wisdom, it is certain that God never will nor can choose to apply it to such an

end as annihilation: and so, in a sense, we may speak of annihilation as an impossibility. Now the arguments of Wyclif on the present subject are somewhat confusing. Some of them merely go to prove the ordinary view; but again others would certainly tend to show that annihilation is absurd in itself, as will shortly appear see. Yet Wyclif, when he attacks the idea of God being able to annihilate, attacks it precisely because of the contingency that, if able, He might *really* do so: a contingency which, so far as I know, very few Schoolmen, if any, ever admitted. See St. Thomas, on this point, Sum. Th. 1[a] Pars, qu. CIV. "*Utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur*"; an article which is very instructive. And in the third part of the Summa, Aquinas denies that the Eucharistic bread is annihilated, since all its accidents and outward appearances remain undestroyed, and since Christ's Body comes instead of the substance which is no more — one substance in place of another: *Transubstantiation.* But it is precisely this idea, this vanishing of a substance once in existence, which — call it annihilation or what you will, — contradicted Wyclif's system of Realism, and which, by its conflict therewith, was destined later to work havoc with his Catholic principles.

After the arguments on behalf of annihilation, given on pp. 287, 288, Wyclif enumerates the reasons against it. Annihilation, if nothing, cannot be admitted. But is is nothing: neither anything in God, nor in the creature. An act which has non-being for its object is inconceivable in God, with whom it would be identical. Inconceivable too in the creature, for 'to be annihilated' cannot be a positive created quality. Nor can it be either a privation or a negation, for all these would require an existing subject. It follows (and this is the reasoning of St. Augustine) that *annihilation is absurd* (pp. 288, 289).

God could not annihilate any substance without annihilating the whole world of substances. Why? Because (in Wyclif's theory) the Universal, Substance, is an essential part of every singular substance. The annihilation of this Universal in one would make it disappear from all, and consequently annihilate the whole universe.[1] In the Eucharist, only

[1] I think that I have somewhere else among Wyclif's works seen the following strictly logical development of the same argument. If the Universal, Substance, be destroyed, the Universal, Being, which is an essential part of it, must be destroyed also. Then if all singular beings perish along with it, God perishes too; so that annihilation of any atom in the universe would mean the annihilation of God!

the form disappears, but the matter remains; *that which* was bread becomes the body of Christ (here, as elsewhere, I add a little to the text, in order, as I hope, to make Wyclif's meaning clearer). Besides, not only the existing Universal, Substance, would be destroyed, if one substance could be annihilated, but the Divine Idea of Substance would perish likewise. This Idea is (in Wyclif's theory) the eternal truth that certain given substances will exist, exist now, or have existed. Now you cannot conceive this truth annihilated, even in its realisation of the temporal and present existence of the said beings; if you could, you could also annihilate their *having existed,* or their *being about to exist.* Creation is the production of something real out of mere intellectual entity; annihilation would be its opposite. Try to conceive anything annihilated; you cannot help thinking of its having really existed, which is something in the actual world of facts, and not the mere intelligibility to which annihilation should make it revert. There are many accidents and phenomena in this wor'd of ours — time, motion, space, etc. — that cannot be thought as annihilated; how much less then can we conceive the annihilation of a substance? All these reasonings go to prove that the very idea is self-contradictory, as it certainly does contradict Wyclif's system. He ends by admitting that much of what he says here is very likely to be denied by men of other opinions. This is a tacit admission of what I have pointed out: that these arguments are valid, if — and only if — his theory be considered true. In that case alone is the annihilation of a being once created an utter absurdity (pp. 289—293).

Chapter XIII. The foregoing arguments are based upon Wyclif's peculiar views, and affirm that annihilation is unthinkable. Those to come proceed mainly to show the results that would take place, if annihilation actually occurred; these therefore do not in reality militate against the generally received doctrine that I have already mentioned.

If any one part of the world could be annihilated, no other would be safe. But this were against the justice and the wisdom and the goodness of God. Against His justice: it would inflict unmerited injury on the rest of the universe; for no part is useless, and therefore all would suffer. God's Omnipotence is bound here by an indispensable eternal law — that of justice. It is said, to maintain the opposite view, that animals in Paradise would have died, and therefore suffered as undeserved an injury as a being annihilated. But since it is natural for

animals to die, how can they be said to be injured by suffering death? This was no punishment for them; punishment can only be inflicted as a sequel to sin committed, and in order to set right what is wrong. Now annihilation is a punishment, and a most unjust one. For if it be inflicted on the sinner himself, he suffers nothing, not even the loss of existence, which he does not feel. A revelation of future annihilation is impossible; if made, it would punish, but then the punishment would be in the revelation itself, not in the annihilation! If it be inflicted on any other but the sinner himself, the former would not deserve to lose his existence, and the loss of it would therefore be unjust. Suppose all men, good and bad, reduced to non-existence after death: the better a man is, the more flagrant the injustice would be (pp. 293—300).

It is against God's wisdom. The only reason why God should annihilate a being would be to show His power. But this could not be done, since no proof of it can possibly be given. Disappearance does not necessarily mean non-existence. It would be no action of God, but His failure to act in maintaining a given creature; such a failure would be mere spite or weakness, unless the creature was of no use; whereas no being whose existence it has pleased God to create can be called useless. God can create because He chooses, and His choice makes the thing created good, and His act infinitely wise. But to say He can annihilate if He chooses, is not sufficient here. There must be some reason for it on the part of the creature or of God; and there is none (pp. 300—309).

Chapter XIV. It is against God's goodness. Its possibility would destroy hope in this world, bliss in the next, and God's eternal promises, made in Holy Writ, would no longer be sure. Yet we must be absolutely sure of these; if we could doubt them, we should be able to think that God is neither faithful nor good. If a being has existed in the past, it must exist for ever. There is a natural tendency, on the part of everything that exists, to continue its existence; for being cannot possibly tend towards non-being. Now, having created this natural tendency, God ordained that it should be fulfilled; for it were contrary to His goodness to frustrate the tendency which He Himself put into the nature of things. To say that bodies subject to decay cannot exist for ever, is no objection. They themselves will not exist, but the matter of which they are made will; and this suffices to obviate annihilation. The objection that many

natural tendencies are of no avail, may be simply denied, though it is true that we do not always know to what end they have been given us. Of course the axiom that a natural tendency is never in vain bears upon the future, not the past; and the fact that beings cannot tend to have been *from* all eternity has no weight here. God's nature, being infinitely good, allows Him to create, but not to annihilate, since He thus would wantonly harm a creature made by Him. Where would be the rewards and the punishments promised and threatened by Scripture, if we were annihilated? And what would become of our hope in and fear of the same, if such an end could come about? It is unseemly to cavil with Holy Writ; and most certainly some sort of punishment and reward is promised, which annihilation would render impossible. The Bible teaches us the fullest trust in God, and nowhere more distinctly than in the Gospel: but such a doctrine, under cover of extolling His Omnipotence, would destroy all trust in Him. The holy Doctors besides, Chrysostom and Anselm in particular, use language that proves the impossibility of annihilation; so does Grosseteste. The hypothesis that would only condemn sinners to annihilation, is absurd: no distinction can be made between them and the Saints; and moreover, for them it would be no punishment. God's justice and goodness render it impossible for Him to annihilate; He could so, if He would, since He is Almighty; but He cannot have the will to break His own eternal laws. Even Avicenna admits that there are such laws of nature, which cannot be set aside (pp. 309 to end).

This analysis, as also that of the other *Excerpta,* is necessarily very brief and incomplete; and they can give but a vague idea of the tractates in question. However, I have taken care to give the fullest side-notes, to which I would refer the reader in case of any obscurity occasioned through want of space in the present Introduction.

DE ENTE LIBRI PRIMI

TRACTATUS TERCIUS

PURGANS ERRORES CIRCA VERITATES IN COMMUNI.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

Consequens est purgare errores circa instancias quibus decepti putant infringere veritates superius declaratas.

Primo quidem instant aliqui per propria principia ficta, et deducenda ad oppositum eorum putant concludere sustinenti huiusmodi veritates.

From the foregoing tractates it would seem to follows that Universal Being is neither God nor a creature; which Augustine denies.

Dicunt enim primo sequi quod non omne ens sit substancia vel accidens positivum, nec omne ens creator vel creatura; quod reputant inconveniens, cum beatus Augustinus in De Questionibus veteris et nove legis, cap. 122°, dicit quod "quicquid est aut deus aut creatura est".

This is merely begging the question. Privations, collective entities, defects, silence, chastity, bliss, damnation, are universally

Set sic petentes principium adverterent ad principia aliena. Quis, queso, naturalis philosophus negaret privacionem forme esse principium generabilis in materia, cum materia prima habet tot privaciones ad quot formas est in potencia? Et concordat logicus cum methaphisico, ponens privacionem et habitum opponi privative,

4. Cap. p^m *in marg.* MS. 7. þi^a obieccio *in marg.* MS.; *after* principia *a gap* MS. 16. Responsis *in marg.* MS.

2. The Tractate begins on leaf 9 b^a of MS. Trinity College, Cambridge B. 16. 10. *Dicunt enim.* In the first two tractates of *De Ente,* Wyclif has (as in other tractates already published) set himself to prove that there exists a real Universal which he calls Entity. His adversaries brought forward the objection that since both God and the Creatures are singulars, this really existing Entity can neither be one nor the other. 16. *Set.* The copyist having carefully followed the peculiarities of spelling in the MS., I have only corrected them when they darken the sense.

admitted to exist; yet they are neither substances nor accidents (and therefore neither Creator nor creatures). Affirmations and negations are also admitted as really existing in things; matter, before it has any form, has the potentiality to receive that form.

et multas maneries privacionum. Aut quis moralis negaret patriam vel regnum, civitatem, vicum, domum vel familiam, cum maior pars tam artificialium quam naturalium nec sit substancia nec accidens, set unum ex substanciis aggregatum, ut patet de predictis, de pannis, libris, et ceteris instrumentis, et cumulis corporum? Et non dubium quin circa ista contingit esse vicia, defectus, absencias et privaciones multas, que nec sunt substancie nec accidencia positiva. Quis eciam religiosus non apostatans negaret ecclesiam, claustrum, conventum, ordinem vel habitum, famem, sitim, paupertatem, silencium, cum castitate, obediencia et ceteris que religiosi in ingressu ordinis profitentur? Aut quis theologus audet negare mundum [et] ecclesiam, sive militantem, sive triumphantem, cum suis sacramentis et aliis aggregatis? Nec licet theologo negare omnia puncta mundi, omnia dampna dampnatorum, cum multis maneriebus mortuorum, aut paces vel requies beatorum, cum quotlibet aliis, quorum nullum est substancia nel accidens positivum? Et non dubium quin, illis positis, ponuntur affirmaciones et negaciones de possibili preterito et futuro; ut ad hoc quod quis dampnificetur oportet quod natus sit habere commodum. Nec hoc sufficit, set oportet quod pro tempore quo natus est habere talem, careat illo. Et sic non sufficit ad generacionem compositi quod fuit materia et forma, quia hoc stat (secundum opiniones philosophorum) cum eternitate compositi; set requiritur prima carencia forme in materia; quibus tribus habitis, sequitur generacio. Et sine dubio illa carencia dicit subiectum pro aliqua mensura sui non habens et natum habere formam. Et sic breviter dicitur negacio per quotlibet formas positivas et privativas: ut motus (secundum commentatorem) componitur, i. e. principiatur, ex multis affirmacionibus et multis negacionibus. Nec ad incepcionem sufficit existencia incipientis, sed oportet cum *esse* eius in instanti temporis precedere *non esse* eius in instante proximo precedenti. Discuciant ergo adversantes veritati si aggregata predicta sint substancia

Beginning implies not only the truth of a thing's existing at a given instant, but also of its non-existence the instant before. Must we either deny collective entities, or assert that a

12. cum *pro* et MS. 14. et *deest* MS. 30. habere *pro* habens MS.

33. *Principiatur.* The 'Commentator' is Averrhoës. See *Miscellanea Philosophica* p. 39, note, in which I have endeavoured to explain the sense of the words *principiatur* (in *Miscellanea*, *Componitur*) *ex multis affirmacionibus* etc.

vel accidencia, vel si licet negare omnia illa esse; et sic de privacionibus supradictis.

Unde quinque sunt abusus in responsionibus talium, abhominabile cuilibet zelanti veritates: quarum prima negat aliquod tale esse: 2ª concedit quodlibet tale esse substanciam, vel genus aliquod positivum; 3ª, quod talia sunt, set non sunt encia; 4ª ponit pro multis fundamentalibus . . . . distincta; et quandoque examinatus . . . . incidit in aliquam trium viarum precedencium, redarguens sibi ipsi. Et quinta obstat timide, discuciendo ac garulando vagis sermonibus impertinentibus ad quesita. Tot enim modis et talibus permittit deus doctrinam salubrem et bonum ordinem in communicacione doctrinali hominum retardari: cum communitas resilit naturaliter abhorrens abusus predictos et omnia contraria veritati. Unde 3º Esdre 4to dicitur: *Veritas magna et forcior pre omnibus;* et paucis interpositis sequitur: *Benedictus deus veritatis; et omnes populi clamaverunt et dixerunt: magna est veritas et prevalet.*

III. Esd. IV, 35, 40, 41

Secundo instatur per hoc quod sequitur infinitas esse veritates coeternas deo a parte ante et a parte post; et cum deus causat illas, ut prius dictum est, sequitur quod deus eternaliter sit causans; et cum ille ad aliquid deserviunt deo ad principiandum creaturas, videtur quod nichil sufficit deus per se facere, set ydee concreatrices iuvant eum ad perficiendum quodlibet opus suum: unde, propter tales evidencias, dicit sanctus Thomas in libro suo *De Veritate*, quod omnis veritas eterna sit deus; et Parisiis dampnatum est quod sint multe veritates coeterne cum deo.

9 bʰ Set | ad istud dicitur quod omnes veritates eterne causate a deo non sunt simpliciter infinite, cum deus finit omnes illas, sciens que et quot sunt. Talia tamen

collection is a substance or an accident?

Some answer, denying all such entities; some admit them, and say they are substances; some say they exist, but are not beings; some give various answers, often self-contradictory; and others evade the question.

But all these answers are disliked by most men; and the truth must prevail.

Another objection is that the theory of an infinite multitude of truths eternally created, without which God can do nothing, makes him depend on them; which has been condemned; and St. Thomas says that no such truth is distinct from God.

To answer this, note first that the multitude of these truths,

7, 8. fundamentis *and a gap* MS. 8. intinng *after* examinatus MS. 16. Magna est veritas MS. 18. et dixerunt *deest* MS. 20. 2ª obieccio *in marg.* MS. 22. nec *pro* sequitur MS. 23. deus *pro* causans MS. 29. þisig *pro* Parisiis MS. 31. Responsio *in marg.* MS.

8. The gap should, I think, be filled with some such word as *responsa*. I have left another gap before *incidit*, being unable to make anything of the abbreviated word given. The meaning, however, is clear enough. 21. *A parte . . . post.* There, is v. g. a truth coeternal with God; *A does not exist*, a parte ante, i. e. *from* all eternity, until the moment when A begins to exist; and then the truth: *A exists*, is coeternal with God *to* all eternity *a parte post*. But there are truths coeternal both ways.

being definitely known by God, is not absolutely infinite, but only infinite to created beings, as, v. g. the sands of the sea.

dicuntur nobis infinita, quia nescimus adequare numerum, ut arena maris, multitudo punctorum linee pedalis, et sic de similibus: ut patet ex signifacione vocabuli, 3° Phis. Cap. De Infinito. Et sic sepe utor isto termino, *infinitum.*

Second, that the word *eternal* may mean either a very long time, or without end or without beginning, or both, or without beginning and end understood as causes, efficient and final. The fourth sense may be true of created truths, the fifth is true of God alone.

Ulterius notandum quod *eternum* accipitur multipliciter; aliquando durans per multa secula dicitur eternum, ut montes dicuntur eterni Ps. 75; *et colles eterni* Gen. 49. 2° modo accipitur pro eterno a parte post, ut Matth. 25° dicitur *supplicium eternum.* 3° modo, pro eterno a parte ante, ut 1. Paralip. 16. *Benedictus dominus deus Israel ab eterno et usque in eternum.* 4° accipitur pro eterno a parte ante et a parte post, ut Psalm 116 dicitur quod *veritas domini manet in eternum.* Et quamvis hoc verificatur de filio, non tamen obest huic quod verificatur de veritate secunda, quia de illa dicitur quod *deus custodit veritatem in seculum,* Psalm 145°. 5to et ultimo propriissime dicitur eternum quod est simpliciter sine principio vel fine, extendendo principium ad inicium et causam, ac finem ad terminum et causam; et sic repugnat aliquid esse eternum preter deum.

Ps. LXXV, 5. Gen. XLIX, 26. Matth. XXV, 46. Paral. XVI, 36. Ps. CXVI, 2. Ps. CXLV, 7.

Now the Lordship of God began with time and creation. Lordship implies an intelligent being as Lord and a being capable of acting in his service; so that God is the Lord of all creatures and of all that belongs to them. Truths coeternal with God are not in this category; He is the God of all truth in eternity, and the Lord of truth in time. *Theos*, has in Greek eight

Istis premissis, patet tercio (supposito inicio mundi) quod deus incepit esse dominus, ut deducit Augustinus 5. *De Trinitate* Cap. finali, Pro quo notandum quod ad fundandum dominium proprie dictum, oportet naturam racionalem esse dominantem et naturam absolutam esse servientem, que potest agere et pati ut debet; et sic primo et principaliter dominatur deus omnibus substanciis creatis et consequenter accidentibus eorum, de quanto faciunt id ad quod creata sunt. Ideo oportet omnes creaturas servire deo; non autem sic de veritatibus eternis a parte ante. Ideo solum inter creatorem et creaturam est dominium. Videtur tamen michi quod deus eternaliter a parte ante sit deus veritatis et in tempore dominus veritatis. Nam *Theos* grece (secundum) Lyncelniensis, Dicto 109°, dicitur octo modis; quorum

4. e termino *in marg.* MS. 17. Psalm. 146 MS. 18. ɕimtᵖ MS. 30. id *deest* MS.

15. *De filio,* i. e. God the Son, the Word (or Truth) of God. 35. *In tempore.* Because eternal truths are things independent of the minds of men; but God is the Lord of all creatures, and consequently of truth, as it exists in time and in human mind. 37. *Lyncolniensis.* Grosseteste.

significations, each of which refers to causation, but not to creation. God eternally sees these truths,

quilibet connotat habitudinem dei ad causatum sed non ad creaturam. Ideo, quamvis sit nomen quattuor litterarum, non tamen est nomen deum magnum tetragramaton, scilicet quod secundum Hebraeos significat divinam essenciam pure, sine aliqua posterioritatis connotacione. *Theos* enim in una significacione idem est quod *videre*, et in alia idem est quod *letari;* in tercia vero, idem est quod *firmare.* Cum ergo deus eternaliter sit deus, sicut eternaliter videt veritatem, sic non inconsonum est dicere quod eternaliter sit deus veritatis. Ad Hebr. 4to dicitur (Hebr. IV, 13.) *Omnia autem nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ad quem nobis sermo.* Sufficit ergo, ad hoc quod prima natura sit deus alicuius, quod illud sit distinctum ab illa, et ipsa videat velit et firmet rem cuius est deus. Cum eternaliter videt . . . . et multe veritates sunt coeterne a parte ante cum deo, set creature non, racionabiliter dicitur deus veritatis et non sic dominus creature.

rejoices in them,

Quantum ad secundam significacionem, convenit primam essenciam eternaliter esse deum veritatis, quia eternaliter delectatur in illis sibi coexistentibus; unde, Prov. 8, dicitur de sapiencia increata que est prima veritas (ut patet Ro. 11). (Prov. VIII, 22.) *Dominus possedit me in inicio viarum [suarum] antequam quicquam faceret;* et sequitur, paucis interpositis, (Id. 30, 31.) *Delectabar per singulos dies ludens [coram] eo omni tempore, ludens in orbe terrarum.* Nec dubium quin illa Sapiencia, sicut iam est *plena veritatis* (Jo. I, 14.) (ut dicitur Jo. 1°) sic fuit eternaliter, quia aliter esset vacuitas in deo infinita. Vie autem domini sunt leges

11. munda *(sic!)* MS. 15. *after* videt *a gap* MS. 23. suarum *deest* MS. 24. ludens *deest* MS.

1. *Non ad creaturam.* Note how distinctly Wyclif states his doctrine of Real Universals here. Every one would admit that causation does not necessarily mean creation; a sculptor causes but does not create a statue. But these eternal truths have an existence which is not identical with God's; they owe it to God, and yet, since they did not come into being in time, they are not created things. I doubt whether any one before Wyclif had the idea of beings absolutely increate, yet caused by God and dependent upon Him. The orthodox Scholastic view is of course that these eternal truths are *in se* identical with God, but different *objectively*. St. Thomas says (S. Theol. p. I, qu. XV, art. 2) that they are only *God seeing His own essence as imitable in infinitely various ways.* 15. The gap may be filled by a repetition . . . *vult et firmat omnes veritates.* 22. Ro. 11. No doubt Wyclif alludes to Rom. XI, 33—36.

eterne per quas ascenditur in deum, ut patet Psalm. 118: *omnes vie tue veritas.* [Ps. CXVIII, 151.] Et de eternitate legum patet per beatum Augustinum in libro suo *Unde malum*, 13° et 24°; et in libro *De immortalitate anime*, 2°; *De libero arbitrio*, et multis aliis locis. Illudit ergo sapiencia increata in orbem terrarum, quando secundum raciones exemplares eternas ordinat eternaliter singulas partes mundi, ut ostendit Boecius primo *Artis metrice* sue. Non ergo dubium quin deus eternaliter letatur in veritatibus que eternaliter sunt in circuitu suo, ut innuitur Psalm 88°. [Ps. LXXXVIII, 9.] Quod autem eternaliter firmat veritatem, patet ex hoc quod *veritas domini manet in eternum*, ut patet, Psalm 116. [Ps. CXVI, 2.] Patet igitur quod deus custodit veritates quotlibet usque in seculum; et sic non incepit esse deus, sed dominus veritatis. Nec ille veritates eterne deserviunt deo, sed faciunt vel causant ut placet deo; ut post dicetur.

and maintains them.

These truths, though they do not actively serve God, yet make Him to be pleased.

Ulterius, quo ad dictum sancti Thome et Lyncolniensis in libris suis de veritate, patet quod intendunt, sicut et quicunque alii probabiliter sapientes in ista materia, quod nulla talis veritas, quamvis sit eterna a parte ante, dicit aliquam essenciam vel naturam sic eternam, nisi solum deum. Unde in predicacione secundum causam concedunt doctores quod quelibet talis veritas est deus, sicut scriptura vocat deum illuminacionem, resurreccionem, et quotlibet talia; cum sit omnia in omnibus. Et tamen, loquendo formaliter, non dubium quin distinguntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet per Augustinum *de ydeis 83um questionum* | questione 46a. [10a] Nec est michi verissimile quod tam venerabilis cetus doctorum Parisiensium dampnaret dictum articulum, nisi secundum sensum falsum et causam racionalem.

As to St. Thomas' and Grosseteste's opinion, it merely means that these truths imply the existence of no other nature or essence than God's. And therefore, by calling them identical with God, they mean that God causes them, as v. g. the Scripture calls God *illumination*. But formally speaking, they are certainly distinct from each other and from God.

Potest autem sensus quadruplex falsus assignari. Primus, quia aliqua veritas sit simpliciter eterna, sine principio vel fine, que non sit deus. 2°, quod veritates eterne dicant essenciam, naturam, vel substanciam eternam, que non sit deus. Tunc enim haberent veritates

If the Council of Paris condemned any such doctrine, it must have been either because these truths were said to be absolutely eternal; or to imply an eternal entity other than God's,

8. Arsmetrice MS.

22. *Aliquam essenciam.* It may be as well to remind the reader that in Wyclif's theory a distinction very like that of the Three Divine Persons is applied to all these *eternal truths*. They have no essence of their own, apart from God; and yet they are *not* God, and one is not the other.

esse existere eternum in genere. Vel 3°, cum ille veritates sint deo coeterne, posset credi quod nulla illarum sit a deo causata, sicut non est creata vel effecta. Et quilibet horum sensuum est inpossibilis, et per consequens erroneus et merito exstirpandus. Quarto quod aggregatum ex actu anime et veritate rei sit eternum (vide hoc libro 2°, Tractatu primo Cap. 4[to]). Cum ergo communitas hominum . . . . et specialiter non nutritorum in extensione equivoca entis supradicti, sit prona ad eliciendum aliquem horum quatuor sensuum per posicionem veritatum eternarum, expediens fuit prohibere locuciones huiusmodi, quousque sensus fuerit famose expositus: quod sepe utiliter factum est, ut patet predicacionibus concessis de Cristo secundum ambas naturas.

or to be uncaused; or that the mental act of knowing a thing to be true was eternal. Most men are likely to understand the doctrine so; and it was justly forbidden, so long as its sense was not cleared up.

Utrum autem dicti doctores sic senserint, vel non, non contendo. Set iste sensus patet per Lyncolniensem in tractatu suo *de Libero Arbitrio* fuisse de mente Augustini; et sine dubio idem sensit Anselmus, et (ut credo) sanctus Thomas cum aliis.

I do not maintain that the aforesaid Doctors were of this opinion, yet I think it probable that they were of the mind of St. Augustine.

Unde, secundo *soliloquiorum* 2° decertat racio cum homine per modum dialogi isti modo: Hic esto, ut interroganti caute firmeque respondeas. *Et homo:* Istic sum.

In the *Soliloquia*, we have *Reason* convincing *Man* that there must be eternal truths.

Et *racio*. Si manebit semper mundus iste, verum est mundum esse mansurum?

Et *homo:* Quis hoc dubitet?

Et *racio*. Quid si non manebit? nonne ita verum est non esse mansurum?

Homo. Nec resisto.

Racio. Quid cum interierit, si interiturus est, nonne id erit verum, mundum interiisse? Nam quamdiu verum est mundum non occidisse, non occidit. Repugnat ergo ut mundus occiderit, et verum non sit mundum occidisse.

Homo. Et illud quis negat?

Racio. Verum autem non potest esse, si veritas non sit.

Homo. Iam paulo ante hoc concessi.

Racio. Nullo modo ergo occidit veritas.

Et Anselmus Monologicon 18°. "Cogitet qui potest, quando incepit aut quando non fuit hoc verum, quod futurum erat aliquid, aut quando desinet, et non erit

St. Anselm says, that we cannot think of the truth *This is to be* before a fact takes place, as having a

8. *a gap before* et MS. 14. concessus MS.

beginning; nor of the truth, *This has been*, as ever coming to an end after the fact has taken place. Grosseteste, after proving the absolute necessity of some truth, proves that many truths are eternal.

hoc verum quod preteritum erit aliquid. Quod si neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest. Inpossibile est vel cogitare quod veritas principium aut finem habeat." Et idem dicit in *De Veritate*, Cao. 1° et 10°. Lyncolniensis eciam in libro suo *De Veritate* dicit sic. "Cum autem veritas sequatur ad omnia, eciam ad suum contrarium (quia, si falsum est, verum est falsum esse, eciam contra regulas logicorum [ut] *ad omnem negacionem sequatur veritas affirmacionis*, insuper ad sui ipsius destruccionem: quia sequitur quod, si nulla veritas est, veritas est). Est ergo inexstinguibilis lux veritas." Et post docet Lyncolniensis quomodo multe sunt veritates eterne, quamvis nullam ponat essenciam distinctam a deo esse sic eternam.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

It is objected that if God causes all future truths, He must love them; now He cannot love sin that is to take place; besides certain truths are such that to love them sounds absurd. But all truth is worthy of love in some sort. A man is said to love his enemy hanged, i. e. the fact of his being hanged.

Item, ex posicione veritatum sequitur quod omnis veritas est diligenda a deo et a creatura; et per consequens futuriciones eterne peccatorum essent amate a deo, sicut causantur ab eo, cum non superest alia causa earum. Videtur eciam imperfecta locucio quod "diligo te hominem sedere".

Set huic dicitur quod omnis veritas ordinata est
quodammodo diligenda. Unde Psa. 50 dicit Psalmista Ps. L, 8
de deo: *In veritate dilexisti*. Et consequenter precipit
nobis diligere veritatem, quia Zachae. 8. scribitur: *Veri-* Zach.
tatem tantum et pacem diligite; hec dicit dominus exer- VIII,
cituum. Sic enim in communi modo loquendi dicitur 19, 20
quod homo diligit inimicum in fovea vel suspensum; quod indubie intelligitur quod deligit ipsum esse in fovea vel suspensum.

Augustine, reconciling the doctrine of universal love with hatred of sinners, inculcated in Scripture, says: the latter must be taken figuratively as hatred of sin.

Unde Augustinus, 3° *De Doctrina* 16°, dissolvens apparenciam scripture, qua precipitur odire peccatorem, et alibi precipitur quemlibet diligere, sic scribit: "Scriptum est; Da misericordiam et ne suscipias peccatorem. Posterior pars huius sentencie videtur vetare benificenciam." Et respondet sic: "Intelligas figurative, positum pro peccato peccatorem, ac si intenderet preceptum quod homo non acceptet quod aliquis sit pec-

9. ut *deest* MS. 16. Cap. 2m *in marg.; I goes to bottom of col.* MS.
26, 27. pacem et veritatem diligite ait dominus omnipotens MS.

10a[b] cator." Unde in libro *de Quantitate* | *anime*, cap. 34 paulo ante finem, sic scribit: "Non viciis oppressos set vicia; neque peccantes, sed ipsa peccata odimus." Et patet plane quod Augustinus vult distinguere peccatum a substancia et qualitate. Unde in *De Natura et Gracia*, 20, sic scribit: "Peccata quippe, a quibus dicit evangelium salvum faciendum populum Cristi, substancie non sunt; et tamen (quia prodest disputare, si firmissima fides precedat) credamus primo scripturis dei nimis naturam humanam peccato viciatam; et — cum peccatum iam didicimus non esse substanciam — inquiramus quomodo illud fieri potuit." Et respondet sic: "Nonne attenditur, ut alia omittam, eciam *non manducare* non esse substanciam (a substancia quippe receditur non manducando, quoniam cibus substancia est) et tamen substancia corporis, si omnino abstinetur a cibo, ita languescit, ita valitudinis inequalitate corumpitur, ita exhauritur viribus, ita lassitudine debilitatur et frangitur, ut, si aliquo modo perduret in vita, vix possit ad eum cibum revocari, unde abstinendo viciata est. Sic non est substancia peccatum, set substancia est deus summaque substancia, et solus verus racionabilis creature cibus, a quo per inobedienciam recedendo et per infirmitatem non valendo capere quod debuit et gaudere, infirmatur spiritualiter." Audi quid dicit Psalmista: "*Percussus ut* Ps. CI, 5 *fenum et aruit cor meum quia oblitus sum comedere panem meum.*" Ecce quam plane Augustinus vult peccatum distingui ab ente positivo et causari a negacione signata per complexum. Unde *Enchiridion* 14°: "Verbis uti ad fallaciam, non ad quos instituta sunt, peccatum est." Et in *De natura boni* 36°, describendo malum, dicit: "Malum est, in malo uti bono."

He very clearly distinguishes sin from substance and from quality, showing how, though a non-entity, it can act upon the soul.

As not-eating is not a substance, only the remotion of food, yet if we do not eat, our body becomes extenuated and extremely weakened;

so by sin, though it is a mere remotion from God, our soul's food, we are spiritually weakened.

Here he distinguishes clearly between positive entities, and negations.

Utrum autem deus vult peccata et suas futuriciones secundum quid, scilicet, propter bonum quod facit ex eis, tangetur postmodum; quia, si sic vult illa, tunc de tanto amat illa. Si odit peccata talia simpliciter, non volendo illa esse, tunc non amat ea. Set de hoc dicetur post, quod deus diligit omnia peccata secundum *esse* secundarium et non secundum *esse* primum i. e. quod aliquid peccet.

We shall see later that God wills those sins that are to come to pass, in so far as He will bring forth good therefrom; and therefore He loves them in so far. That is, He loves them in their secondary entity only.

Conceditur eciam quod locucio est perfecta qua dicitur hominem amare se bene valere, eo gaudere de hoc

It is quite right to say that a man loves to

4. Augustinus *in marg.* MS.

be in good health, etc.; else no truth could be remembered, feared or hoped; we could not sorrow for past sins, nor look forward to future bliss. Loving God, we love the truth *That God exists.*

quod evasit periculum, et timere de futuricione periculi. Nec aliter esset dare veritatem memoratam, formidatam, speratam, vel affectatam; ut, Hoc reminiscor quod peccavi, de quo doleo; hoc timeo quod peccabo, pro cuius opposito oro; hoc spero quod beatificabor. Et certum est quod tales veritates intelligunt antiqui esse obiecta potenciarum anime. Quante ergo diligo deum, tante diligo ipsum esse; quia tam bonum est ipsum esse quam bonus ipse est. Ex quo patet, cum ipsum esse sit summe bonum, quod sit ipsemet deus. Et ita conceditur de aliis quibuscunque. De dileccione vero veritatum patet in *De vera religione* 87°, ut tactum est, et tangetur *De Universalibus;* et 10 *Confess.* 14°.

Another objection is that these truths, existing from all eternity, were from all eternity useless, since creatures exist only in time, and they only then began to be of use. On the other hand, since some of these truths are such that if they were not true, God would not exist, they are infinitely good, and therefore are God. Or rather, one eternal truth is in God, since in Him there is no multiplicity.

Idem videtur quod ille veritates eterne sint eternaliter frustratorie et inutiles, quia in eternitate nec deserviunt deo, nec sibi proficiunt, nec creaturis; cum tunc eternaliter essent creature. Solum ergo ponerentur in officio quando sunt cum creaturis. Et tunc videntur modicum valere, cum non possunt agere nec in alio genere causandi causare. Immo videtur quod sint infinitum bone, quia in quantum alicuius carencia foret peior, est ipsa melior, ut assumit Anselmus *Cur Deus Homo* . . . . Set in infinitum mala foret carencia huiusmodi veritatum, cum multe sunt que, si non essent, deus non esset: ergo et ille sunt infinitum bone, et per consequens essent deus. Et ultra, cum omne commune tribus personis non multiplicatur in deo, sequitur quod sicut in deo est tantum una sapiencia, una bonitas, et cet, sic in deo esset tantum una veritas eterna.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

Again, since Being is Truth, and sin, falsehood, etc. are beings, they are truths.

The devil, contrary to Scripture, remaining in sin, would remain in the

| *Item, cum omne ens sit veritas,* et peccatum, falsitas, 10[ba]
vanitas, et talia detestanda et ficta sint encia, videtur quod sunt veritates: quod videtur contradicere Scripture; quia sic diabolus, stando in peccato, stetit in veritate. Faciendo eciam mendacium, fraudem vel ficticiam, facit quis veritatem; et per consequens nemo possit loqui nisi veritatem, nec facere nisi iusticiam, cum diffinitive veritas sit rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis: ut diffinit

22. *After* Homo *a gap* MS. 29. Omittitur pro responsione ad argumentum *in marg.* MS. *Next chapter begins, line 19, 10ba.* 30. Cap. 3m *in marg.; large initial* I MS. 33. obieccio *in marg.* MS.

Anselmus in libro suo *De Veritate* Cao. 11°. Unde ergo diceretur homo falsus? Numquid propter veritatem? aut in quantum est falsus, est verus? Numquid in quantum est falsidicus, est veridicus?

truth; no one could say what was not true, and falsehood would be unmeaning.

Hic dicitur concedendo conclusionem; sicut enim mors Cristi fuit vera mors, ut ponit Augustinus in dialogo *Ad Felicianum* et *Enchiridion*, 29° et infra, innuens hoc esse de substancia fidei, ita peccatum primi hominis est verum peccatum; et sic de aliis quibuscunque, que quantum habent de entitate, tantum habent de veritate. Nec esset quelibet mors hominis iusta, ut innuit Augustinus in *De Quantitate Anime* 24 nisi esset vera. De falsitate eciam patet idem. Nam falsitas extra signum non est possibilis. Sicut ergo non est possibile aliquam maliciam esse, nisi fundatam in bono, quia pure privaciones non possunt esse; sic inpossibile est falsitatem esse, nisi in signo vero: quod quidem signum est vera res. Et ita falsitas talis est defectus corespondencie signi ad suum signatum. Sicut ergo verum (vel veritas) est quod *hoc signum est falsum*, vel deficit a suo signato, sic ista falsitas, cum sit idem, est veritas, vel verum; quia iuxta regulam prius dictam, "si concretum per se dicitur de concreto, et abstractum de abstracto". Set signum deficiens a suo signato per se est verum; ideo ille defectus qui est falsitas, est veritas.

Here we admit the conclusion. Death and sin must be *true* death and *true* sin; and in so far, they must have entity.

There can be no falsehood, except it be signified somehow; and the sign is a true thing; just as there can be no evil unless in something good.

Thus falsehood is a lack of correspondence between the sign and the thing signified. And this lack of correspondence, which truly exists, is therefore a truth.

Ex quo patet quod proposicio vera, propter corespondenciam eius ad suum primarie signatum, est vera triplici veritate: Una, que est eius entitas et per consequens ipsum signum; secunda que est veritas primarie significata extra signum; et tercia, que est sibi accidentalis, cum sit relacio adequacionis signi ad suum significatum. Que relacio est *ipsum esse verum*, cum sit ade-

Every true proposition is true in three ways: (1) as existing: (2) as having a certain meaning; (3) as having a meaning which corresponds to

5. Responsio *in marg.* MS. 18. et *pro* est MS. 32. defeccio *pro* relacio MS.

23. *De abstracto.* Supply *per se dicitu:*. The sense is: If you can *essentially* (per se) predicate a concrete term of another concrete term, you can also predicate the corresponding abstract term of the corresponding abstract term, each to each. 'All sentient beings live ∴ all sensation is life.' But if this were merely an accidental predication, we could not conclude thus. Suppose that all chemists *happened* to be shortsighted, it would not follow that all knowledge of chemistry implied shortness of sight. 32. *Relacio.* In the absence of other MSS. to guide me, I hope I shall not be considered as taking undue liberties with the text, when it is evidently wrong.

the thing meant. Falsehood is the lack of this correspondence, and can properly only affect the third of these ways.

quacio vel corespondencia eius ad suum significatum. Et illa adequacio est *istud signum habere primarie significatum.* Et falsitas iste veritati opposita est privacio veritatis signate; et neutra illarum potest esse reliqua, nec simul inesse eidem singulari, cum sint privative opposita. Veritati vero, primo et secundo modo dicte, nichil opponitur, nisi forte, ampliando *esse* ad *esse intelligibile*, dicatur quod falsitas sit privacio existencie non date rei. Et patet quod quot modis contingit rem deficere a veritate vel realitate, tot modis contingit rem esse falsam; et per consequens, cum omnis carencia vel privacio sit falsitas, patet quod omnis peccator est falsus.

A sign is true or false in three ways. Firstly, as it is a being: and as such, it must be true.

Signum autem tripliciter dicitur esse verum, corespondenter ad triplicem modum significandi, et tripliciter esse falsum. Primo modo, omne ens in quantum huiusmodi est verum, ut patet 2° Metaphisice 4°; tantum habet ens de veritate sicut de entitate. Nec mirum, cum omne ens representat se ipsum, ut omne sensibile significat suas partes, gracia sui ipsius primarie et principaliter in ista manerie significacionis representandi.

Secondly, as representing its cause (smoke, a sign of fire); and thus all creatures represent their Creator, and are true signs thereof. Thirdly, as conventionally standing for something else. Any proposition is true, if what it stands for exists in any way, either merely possible, or actual, and independent of the proposition that stands for it.

In secunda manerie representat quamlibet eius causam extrinsecam, ut fumus ignem; et sic quelibet creatura representat primarie deum, et sic quidlibet est naturaliter verum propter suum *esse* et suam duplicem primariam representanciam. Tercio modo significat signum ex inposicione humana, cui modo significandi gramatici et logici principaliter attendunt. Et sic est proposicio vera, si primarium significatum suum quomodolibet habet *esse*. Quod contingit tripliciter in genere: vel quod habeat *esse* ad minimum intelligibile, vel quod habeat *esse* actuale, vel tercio quod habeat *esse* actuale extra signum, independens ab eo. Et sic usus est Aristoteles proposicione vera in *predicamentis* cao. *De substancia.* Exemplum primi: filius meus est. Exemplum secundi; hec proposicio movetur, ipsa demonstrata. Exemplum tercii; deus est.

13. verum a:cĩ. 3·℮ *in marg.* MS. 17. veritate *pro* entitate MS. 20. 2 *in marg.* MS. 25. 3 *in marg.* MS.

34. *Exemplum.* If I say, *My son exists*, it is true even if I have none, unless this son be an impossibility. If I have written down *This proposition moves,* on a paper which I move, the thing signified is true, and actual, but not dependent on the proposition itself as moving.

Et sic contingit proposicionem tripliciter in genere esse falsam. Primo modo, si representat aliquo modo primarie, et non est signatum primarium sibi corespondens, eciam secundum *esse intelligibile;* et esse sic falsum est simpliciter inpossibile. 2° modo, quando proposicioni deficit primarie signatum secundum *esse* actuale, licet non secundum *esse* possibile; ut: hic filius meus est. Et 3° modo, si deficit proposicioni signatum primarium 10b extra proposicionem et eius causanciam, ut | vocata insolubilia.

Ex istis patet quod non sequitur: *hec proposicio est falsa, ergo primarie significat sicut non est;* quia si bene discuciatur, non est possibile aliquod signam representare vel signare sicut non est, ut patebit posterius. Quelibet ergo proposicio vel significat primarie significatum quod est secundum *esse* intelligibile, vel si non habet ex institucione significatum primarium, significat modo primario cui non potest veritas extra corespondere; ut quelibet proposicio vocata simpliciter inpossibilis. Nam hec: *homo est asinus*, non potest significare *hominem esse asinum;* set significat *hominem* et *asinum*, et sic quod homo est asinus, et non potest esse quod homo sit asinus; et ita necessitas qua necesse est neminem esse asinum est causa quare signum tale est impossibile.

Nec discrepat hoc dictum a communi sentencia, sed realius et conformius ad scripturam et sanctos doctores loquitur, concedens omne ens esse verum. Pueri tamen non vocant verum nisi proposicionem quali ipsi utuntur disputando, sicut filiae Loth non putarunt superesse hominem preter patrem: ideo commiserunt incestum propter speciem salvandam. Non igitur decet perfectum methaphisicum sic loqui, set vere concedere omne falsum esse verum sine repugnancia.

Unde generaliter, omnia vocata insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa, cum verum et falsum equivoce intellecta non opponuntur contrarie, nec contradictorie, set limitata ad sensus oppositos sunt opposita privative, ut

Falsehood is of three sorts of which the first — the lack of any possible thing for which a proposition stands — is simply impossible. If the thing signified does not actually exist, we have the second kind of falsehood, and the third, if the proposition signified nothing but itself. Therefore a false proposition does not and cannot lack all correspondence between sign and thing signified. If we say: *A man is an ass*, we merely mean *man*, *ass* and an evidently impossible identification of the two; thus evident impossibility proceeds from the nature of the two ideas joined. This does not contradict the opinion usually received, and at the same time it is more in harmony with Scripture and the Fathers. It is childish to suppose that no propositions can be true save in the sense in which they are used for arguing. We say then that so-called

1. falsum acci^ur 3ter *in marg.* MS. 2. 1 *in marg.* MS. 5. 2 *in marg.* MS. 6. solum MS. 8. 3 *in marg.* MS.

7. *Hic filius meus.* Wyclif has chosen the same example as above, to show that the same proposition may be true in one sense, and false in another. 35. *Insolubilia.* See Wyclif's Logica Vol. II, Introduction XL—XLVI, and 182—227.

insoluble propositions are both true and false in different senses, referring to the doctrine that every proposition is truly itself and, as an entity, a true image of God. As to the third kind of truth, they are again both false, (since they have no objective conventional meaning save themselves).

in communi casu quo ponitur Socrate sic dicere: *Socrates dicit falsum.* Vel: *Hoc signum est falsum:* quod signum sit *a;* patet quod *a* est verum. Nec facio vim quod proposicio sit vera res et vera proposicio, cum repugnat proposicionem esse, nisi representet primarie veritatem, quia se et deum, ut patet ex dictis. Et si queratur utrum sit verum aut falsum quo ad significacionem terciam ex inposicione, dicitur quod est tam verum quam falsum; falsum quidem, quia ipsum (sicut et quodlibet aliud signum) natum est ex inposicione habere veritatem extra ipsum, independentem ab illo signo. Et scrutetur homo veritatem talis vocati insolubilis secundum inposiciones et casus communes, et non inveniet in alico angulo mundi huiusmodi veritatem. Ideo propter carenciam aut vacuitatem a tali corespondencia veritatis racionabiliter dicitur signum falsum, sicut et talia: *Hec proposicio movetur*, demonstrando signum motum, et *Hec proposicio est*, demonstrando seipsam; et sic de similibus. Ideo vere dicit Aristoteles, in *Predicamentis*, Ca^{o} *de Substancia*, quod in eo quod res est vel non est est oratio vera vel falsa, et non per mutacionem factam in proposicione; intelligens indubie per rem veritatem distinctam ab oracione et suis accidencibus. Unde proposicio dicitur ethimologice, quia *pro alio posicio.* Habito ergo quod *a sit falsum* isto modo, propter carenciam corespondencie huiusmodi veritatis, consequens est quod pro alico instanti nature et eodem instanti temporis sit verum, quia signat primarie se esse falsum: quod est falsitas vel privacio veritatis in ipsa.

and true (since it is true that they are thus false, and all falsehood is grounded on truth).

Et habet privacionem in ipso, ideo est verum, cum habet veritatem quam primarie signat, et sic manet continue simul verum et falsum, falsum propter carenciam veritatis extra ipsum pro qua poneretur, et verum pro habitu illius privacionis quam habet in se. Et sic omne peccatum est falsissima res mundi quo ad *esse* primum, et vera res propter penam et bonum inde consequens ex ordinancia dei, ut patebit li^{o} 2° Tracta^{u} 3° Ca^{o} 16°.

The essence both of sin and of these insolubles is this form of falsehood.

Omnia igitur peccata, vel vocata insolubilia, fundantur in falsitate.

If a proposition only stands for itself, and *is* itself, can it be false?

Et si ponatur quod nulla proposicio sit falsa que primarie significat sicut est, et quod illa signa sic primarie significent; dicitur quod casus tales sunt inpossi-

28. unum *pro* verum MS. 37. patet MS.

biles, quia inpossibile est quod signum tale sit cum datis paribus, nisi deficiat a veritate extra ipsum. Et si inponatur iste terminus: *falsum ad solum primarie significandum signum artificiale ex inposicione signans primarie sicut non actualiter est*, patet quod casus est inpossibilis, cum omnis res naturaliter significat se et deum. Quod si ponatur quod quilibet talis terminus solum primarie ex inposicione humana sic significet, admitto casum; set propter talem casum non est veritas inpertinens neganda quando proponitur, sicut patet scientibus obligaciones.

I reply that there can be none such; for a conventional sign must have some signification besides its own entity, and the existence of God which it naturally implies.

If we make a convention that the sign shall stand only for itself, this is legitimate, but only so far as the convention extends.

Ex isto patet quod vocata insolubilia negativa sunt profundius falsa quam ista affirmativa; ut, posito quod Petrus dicat sic: *ego non dico verum*, patet quod valde falsum dicit, cum eo ipso quod est, dicit se et deum, et per consequens verum, eciam si nunc non dicit vocaliter aliquid preter illud signum aut partes eius; tamen aliquo tempore dicit verum. Et si ponatur quod nunquam dicat aliquam proposicionem preter istam vel partes eius, sic primarie ex imposicione signando, patet quod ipsum est manifeste falsum, cum dicit vocaliter oracionem que in quantum est, est verum, etiam pars eius (que est hoc; *dico verum*) est satis vera. Et si fiat talis limitacio in casu posito; *ego non dico primarie et*
11 aª *totaliter* | *oracionem que secundum inposicionem est vera, propter corespondenciam veritatis actualis primarie signate* (et sit tota illa proposicio *a*); dicitur quod *a* est falsum in casu posito, et Petrus dicit falsum; sicut et quicunque dicit quod *nichil dico* vel *sum periurus*. Non tamen aliquis sic dicens dicit falsum quin cum hoc dicit verum, cum omne ens est verum. Et si queratur utrum *a* habet veritatem actualem quam ex posicione humana significat, dicitur quod non. Pro quo notandum quod nullum signum representat se naturaliter ex inposicione humanitus, sed divinitus instituta. Nam omnino superfluum esset instituere signum ad representandum illud quod oportet signum significare, si quicquam significat, unde homo discerit tale verbum: *volo quod signum*

It is evident that such 'insolubles', when negative, are falser than when affirmative; since the latter affirms a truth that can only fail in the third sense, and the latter denies a truth that must be present in the second and first.

But in every case, there is in these propositions truth mingled with falsehood.

And this primary truth belongs to propositions naturally, and quite independently of any convention; the convention, whether made or not, cannot affect their primary truth.

37. et *pro* si MS.

8. *Admitto casum.* This is an allusion to the Exercise of Obligations (see Logica I, Introduction) in which the respondent was bound to admit certain propositions, and afterwards to answer others propounded, so as not to contradict himself.

significet se ipsum vel aliud quod pure naturaliter significat, non ex eo sequitur quod illud se significat ex institucione humana.

Before we can know what the conventional meaning of any proposition is, we must first know some truth other than the proposition itself.

Et ex isto patet quod oportet pre-intelligere veritatem extra proposicionem, antequam intelligatur illam significare proporcionaliter ex institucione hominis; ut intelligendo istam proporcionaliter: *homo est asinus*, prius naturaliter intelligo *hominem et asinum esse* quam intelligo ipsam sic significare, *homo est asinus*. Non ergo pocius est hec proposicio significans ex inposicione hominis: *hec proposicio est*, demonstrando se ipsam, quam est hec: *Bellis est*, vel quecunque res sensibilis coniuncta huic transcendenti, *Est*.

This is vaguely indicated in every theory of the Insolubles as yet put forth; though these are marred with various errors.

Et istam sentenciam sompniarunt omnes probabiliter intromittentes de insolubilibus, licet alii sine colore dixerunt quod non est dare intencionem universalem corespondentem talis secunde inposicionis; alii, quod nunquam pars supponit pro toto cuius est pars, et alii, quod non sit possibile vocatum insolubile sic pure primarie significare in casibus communibus: que omnia sunt satis inprobabilia. Patet ergo quod tota difficultas stat in restriccione, abusione, vel equivocacione significacionis terminorum, quando de vocatis insolubilibus agitur, vel aliter quod ad tantum gravetur difficultas casus quousque inpossibile inplicetur. Cum ergo oportet ad significanciam complexi ex institucione humana quod singula incomplexa eius partes significent ex institucione humana; ac iste terminus: *hec proposicio est*, non habet in casu posito significanciam ex institucione humana.

The sentence: *This proposition exists* has no meaning in the conventions of human language.

Solution of particular difficulties.

Et ex isto patet responsio ad aliquos casus vocatos insolubiles; ut, posito quod quilibet dicens verum et solum talis pertransibit pontem, et Petrus dicat quod non pertransibit pontem, patet quod Petrus pertransibit pontem, cum verum dicit. Et conformiter, posito quod Linus dominus concedat Petro et Paulo servis suis plenam libertatem, Petro sub ista condicione quod primus homo cui obviaverit sit liber, et Paulo, sub ista condicione quod primus homo cui obviaverit sit servus, et obvient primo

12. Bell3 MS. 29. est *deest* MS.

31. See Logica II, Introd. pp. XLII, XLIII, and XLV, in which he very same examples are given

pro *b* instanti Petrus et Paulus: et tunc currunt argumenta hinc et inde ad utramque partem contradiccionis. In isto casu dico quod uterque est liber pro *b* instanti, cum ista non repugnant: *iste est liber* et tamen *est servus*, eo quod nemo potest esse, nisi sit tam liber quam servus. Nec ex condicione adiecta a domino coactivo plus libertatur quam per ante; videtur tamen michi quod de iure uterque libertaretur in casu posito. In isto tamen casu, sicut et in similibus, posset tante gravari casus quousque fuerit inpossibilis; sic ergo per realem responsionem secundum significacionem propriam terminorum potest castigari verbalis logicus quod non delectabitur multum instare in veritate signorum artificialium, sed pocius in veritate signata, que habet maiorem constanciam et utilitatem noticie. Quale, queso, gaudium esset theologo vel philosopho scire utrum tale signum sit verum iuxta significacionem ab inposicione termini coaptatam? Delectabilius esset et brevius querere de veritate signata, non faciendo mencionem de signis huiusmodi. Ulterius, quoad casum positum de servitute civili, non est causa theologo; quia forte titulus civilis sine titulo Dei non dat iusticiam. Nec talis impleccio condicionis plus eximit a servitute quam per ante. Unde, practizato casu posito, videndum est que pars debet probare, altera respondente, et pars quecunque probans concludet alteri.

In one sense God and all entities are true; in another, a life led according to the Divine Law is also true;

Redeundo ergo ad proposicionem, patet quod veritas quandoque sumitur antonomastice pro Deo, quandoque analogice pro qualibet entitate, et quandoque dicitur iusticia accidentalis qua creatura racionalis vivit secundum legis ordinem; et ista vocatur veritas vite, quando creatura intellectualis active implet in vita presenti secundum divinam beneplacitum, universaliter servando iusticiam. Et ista significacio dicitur exemplariter respectu duarum priorum, cum a priori veritate exemplatur que-

11. racionem (?) *pro* responsionem MS.

5. *Tam liber.* I suppose that Wyclif's meaning is that every man is free in one sense and serves in another. But as he points out further, this case might be urged by restricting the meaning of *liber* and *servus*, so as to be very inconvenient to the respondent. 8. *Uterque.* Because, as is said in Logica, *leges Anglie favent libertati.* If there is a doubt whether the men are free or slaves, they should both be set free.

In a third sense, truth is a moral virtue, between two contrary vices — boasting, for instance, of qualities that one has not, and denying qualities that one has — so that a man is truthful in his life, words and deeds.

libet veritas posterior in natura. Quandoque autem contrahitur veritas ad virtutem moralem, secundum quam homo dicitur veridicus: de qua 4° | Ethicorum 14°. 11 a[b] Nam pompantem, simulando de se gloriosa et non existencia, vocat philosophus iactatorem. Ille autem qui incongrue negat existencia de ipso, *eyron* nominatur, et uterque istorum falsidicus; et sequitur in textu philosophi: "Medius autem *Antichastos* qui, existens verax in vita et sermone, existencia confitens esse circa ipsum, et neque maiora neque minora". Et sic, ut dicit philosophus, verax potest dici in vita, verbo et opere. Tercia autem veritas est commendata specialiter in Scriptura, que est exemplata a prima veritate, que est sic plena et per se veritas; quia inpossibile est esse aliquam mensuram temporis vel nature pro qua sibi deficiat

God is infinitely and absolutely true; all other truth has an admixture of falsehood.

quevis perfeccio. Ideo est pura veritas sine omni carencia defectiva. Omnia autem alia oportet deficere et esse quodammodo imperfecta. Ideo vere dicit Joh. 1° Ca° quod deus est *plenus gracie et veritatis*, cum non sit possibile quod aliqua veritas sibi deficiat. Omnes autem alie veritates citra ipsam sunt quodammodo false et vane, set ultimate peccatum. Jo. I, 14

There are three species of vanity; vanity of existence, of deficiency, and of transgression.

Ideo, ut supra tetigi, aliqua est vanitas existencie, et illa est in omni creatura. Ad Rom. 8: *Vanitati subiecta est omnis creatura.* 2ª est vanitas deficiencie, ut sublunaria: unde Ecc[es] Primo: *Vidi cuncta que fiunt sub sole, et ecce universa vanitas;* quia Sap. 7 dicitur: *Transeunt omnia velut umbra.* 3ª est vanitas culpe, de qua Psalm 30°: *Odisti observantes vanitates superuacue:* et ista sunt quodammodo veritates, cum sint secundum quid Deo conformia. Rom. VIII, 20 Eccl. I, 14 Ps. XXX, 7

The vanity of every creature is in this, that at some time or other it is non-existent.

Conceditur ergo quod sicut verum est omnem creaturam quodammodo esse vanam, de quanto est aliqua mensura pro qua deficiendo non est, ut patet de Eternitate; sic in qualibet creatura est vera vanitas; que sicut est entitas, sic et veritas. Alia autem sublunaria

Sublunary things, besides,

14. quod *pro* quia MS. 20. Vanitas 3[x] *in marg.* MS. 22. ulti[te] MS. 23. 1 *in marg.* MS. 25. 2 *in marg.* MS. 28. 3 *in marg.* MS. 31. a *in marg.* MS.

6. *Eyron.* The Scholastics, following Aristotle, understood *irony* in a sense quite different from the modern sense. St Thomas (S. Theol. 2ª 2ªᵉ, qu. 113, art. 1), asks *Utrum ironia sit peccatum?* and concludes that it is a sin. 27. *Sap. 7.* There is no such text; but Sap. V, 9, we find: *Transierunt omnia illa tanquam umbra.* 34. *De Eternitate.* I cannot tell whether Wyclif here gives us the title of a book. When he does so,

sunt 2° modo vana, quia, cum sint coruptibilia, pro magna mensura temporis non sunt. 3° vero modo dicitur vanitas inordinata affeccio rebus temporalibus, ut diffuse declarat Augustinus in *De vera religione* (58° et infra); et sic fundatur in animo et non directe in rebus extra.

cease to exist, and are vain in the second sense.
The third sense is applied to inordinate love of things temporal.

De falsitate vero concedit Augustinus *primo Soliloquiorum* (Ultimo) quod omne falsum est verum, set non econtra; et ideo 2° *Soliloquiorum*, Capitulis 5, 7, 11 et 15 *De Trinitate* 21° sic scribit: "Nemo enim falsa novit, cum falsa esse novit; quod si novit, verum novit. Unde est enim quod illa falsa sint?" Et idem patet infra, 36°. Et idem concedit Anselmus *De Virtute*, Cap° 2°. Et raciones eorum ostendunt satis istam conclusionem, per hoc quod falsitas signi est forma privativa, qua ipsum est formaliter falsum, et per consequens vera privacio, et sic veritas.

Augustine admits that all false things are true;
so does Anselm.

Set pro intellectu Scripture notandum secundum Lyncolniensem, in libro suo *De Veritate*, quod omnis veritas est adequacio vel conformitas sermonis ad rem quam significat; et cum verior sit illa res, verbum, sermo, diccio, vel locucio, que intus silet, quam que foris sonat, verius erit adequacio verbi vel diccionis mentis ad rem veritas quam adequacio signi sensibilis ad rem signatam. Cum ergo Deus neccessario eternaliter dicit se, patet quod verbum suum, diccio, vel locucio qua dicit se, sit non solum adequatum vel conforme, set ipsa summa adequacio vel conformitas in abstracto; et per consequens prima veritas. Ipsa ergo locucio, cum sit tanta quanta Deus potest dicere se, nec sibi accidentalis, patet quod sit penitus idem; et ita summa veritas. Et cum deus non solum dicit se, set omnia alia, cuiuslibet alterius rei modus essendi conformiter ad verbum eternum ipsam dicens, est eius veritas. Et ita, secundum Anselmum, modus essendi rei ut esse debet est rectitudo, et eius veritas; et sic, ut vere dicit, vel formaliter vel causaliter omne verum est veritate increata verum. Quandocunque enim unum convenit anologice multis, est dare aliquid cui inest secundum excellenciam:

Note that truth is the conformity between the word and that which it signifies; and if the word be purely mental, its truth is superior to that of the spoken word.
God's eternal Word is therefore the supreme truth.

Every creature is true, as it is conformable to that Word, and in so far, eternally true, but merely by analogy with God's Word.

1. b *in marg.* MS. 2. c *in marg.* MS. 20. verius MS.

without naming the author, it is generally one of his own works. But there is no such title in Shirley's Catalogue. If (as supposed in the marginal notes) he simply means that no creature can be eternal, he runs counter to the Thomists, who admit the eternity of a creature as a possibility, but not as a fact.

Ut sanitas in animali causat sanitatem in signo. Cum ergo verbum et veritas conveniunt anologice Deo et creature (ut patet post) relinquitur quod secundum excellenciam Deo conveniant. Summa ergo conveniencia, similitudo, vel conformitas verbi divini ad suum principium est summa veritas; et omnis alia entitas, de quanto directe se habet ut primus intellectus intelligit, de tanto est veritas.

As one and the same face may be many times reflected in a glass, so many truths result from the Supreme Truth as its images. And this holds, not only for true things and caused realities, but also for truths in the minds of men.

Ideo dicit glossa super illud Psi 11mi *Diminute sunt veritates a filiis hominum*, quod, sicut ab una facie resultant multe similitudines in speculo, sic ab una prima veritate resultant multe veritates, et omnes sunt similitudines vel imitaciones prime veritatis. Nec solum a prima veritate causaliter est omnis veritas secunda, set omnis veritatis innotescencia intellectui creato est ab | eadem veritate; et de tanto dicitur lux. Ideo vere dicit Anselmus quod sicut eodem tempore mensurantur omnia temporalia, sic eadem veritate vera sunt omnia; hoc tamen non obstante quin, sicut quelibet pars mundi habet suam privatam periodum, sic quodlibet verum causatum ad extra habet suam propriam veritatem, que est conformitas eius ad intellectum divinum. Scriptura autem dat esse veritatem, que est iusticia, rectitudo vel perfeccio 2a, quando natura iuste agit, ut debet: et a tali veritate declinatur in mendacium, declinando a tali accidentali iusticia in peccatum vel iniquitatem que, ut sic, est mendacium; veritas ergo de qua loquitur Scriptura est iusticia ad quam gracia consequitur.

Ps. XI, 1

11 ba

But the word *truth* is used in Scripture to mean rectitude, of action; and *lie* to mean any departure therefrom.

Truth being conformity, when a thing is as it should be, it is true; and therefore sin, vanity, &c. are false.

Et istam sentenciam dicit Augustinus in *De vera Religione*, 62 et 63, ubi plane sentenciat quod veritas est adequacio vel imitacio unius principii, quia principium verum dicit, ostendit, vel presentat. Et cum omnis talis imitacio sit conformitas, patet quod nichil est sic verum, nisi quod est ut debet; et per consequens peccata, vanitates, fallacie, vel quomodocunque aliter vocentur, sunt falsitates: quia defectus rectitudinum vel imitacionis ad primum principium. Et ita secundum Lyncolniensem, creature, quo ad *esse* primum et essenciam, sunt vere; et quo ad perfeccionem secundam sunt false de quante deficiunt a rectitudine. Privaciones vero predicte quo ad *esse* primum sunt false, cum non

Grosseteste says that all creatures are true in their essence, but may be false as to their secondary perfection. But sin is false in its essence,

17. Anselmus *in marg.* MS. 23. omni *pro* esse MS. 29. Augustinus *in marg.* MS. 31. quod *pro* quia MS. 33. mutacio MS.

debent sic esse; et quo ad *esse* secundum sunt vere, de quanto puniuntur ut debent puniri, et proficiunt ut debent proficere. Sic ergo diligunt homines vanitatem et querunt mendacium, per hoc quod *diminute sunt veritates*, et rectitudines perfeccionis secunde *a filiis hominum;* et huius causa potissima est defectus amoris veritatis communis, et affectus ad veritates coruptibiles ac privatas; ut patet in *De Vera Religione*. Debet enim affectus principalius diligere veritates priores in natura, et consequenter posteriores. Et ita omne peccatum formaliter dictum est defectus voluntarius a summa essencia, ut diffinit Augustinus in *De Vera Religione* 73°. Gravis est ergo ille corde, cuius mens infigitur principaliter in creaturis, et non elevatur ad principaliter amandum veritatem increatam. Talis enim principaliter diligit vanitatem, cum omnes creature sint vane, et querit quod ille sacient mentem; et vere, si hoc promitterent, mentirentur. Sed quia peccator querit ut sic faciant, et ille non possunt hoc dicere, ideo est anxiatus, per se frustratus in questu rei ubi non poterit inveniri; ac si grave moveretur in vacuo. Ideo in circuitu impii ambulant tanquam pulvis, motu vertiginis circumductus.

Ps. IV. 3

since it is as it should not be; and true secondarily, in so far as it is punished. Affection towards particular truths and want of love for Universal Truth is the great cause of sin and vanity: for thereby the right order of things is reversed.

The sinner becomes heavy of heart, seeking in creatures what it is against the truth of their nature to promise him, and what he never can find in them.

Patet ergo quod oportet diabolum et omnem creaturam stare in veritate quo ad *esse* primum, quamvis deficiat a veritate et conformitate ad primum principium quo ad *esse* secundum; et ita nichil extra deum stat simpliciter in veritate sine falsitate, que est peccatum, nisi illud quod est sine modo indebito vel inordinato. Ut autem planius intelligam me ipsum in dicto isto, considero primo quomodo quelibet res dicit essencialiter seipsum, et quidlibet aliud a Deo dicit Deum, et econtra. Nam *dicere* idem est quod ostendere, manifestare, notare, demonstrare, vel quomodocunque aliter vocetur actus ille. Deus ergo, cum semper noscit omnem rem, semper dicit sibi ipsi omnem rem; et quidlibet citra Deum dicit, innuit, vel significat Deum et quotlibet alias veritates. Non enim est racio quare urina dicit sanitatem, fumus ignem, et sic de aliis signis naturalibus, quin per idem omne causatum dicit suam essencialem causam. Nec est illud "dicere" vel "loqui" inproprium, cum inpossibile sit substanciam racionalem dicere quicquam ad extra sine duplicitate, nisi illud quod dicit, dicat vel

So far as regards his primordial essence, the devil, like every other creature must abide in truth; but as regards rectitude of action, only those abide in truth — i. e. have no sin — that conform to eternal truth. To be clearer: everything implies (or signifies) itself; every creature implies God, as the sign implies the thing signified.

Dicere, meaning *to imply*, is rightly used here; for as

7. affectum MS. 15. facient MS.

there is no speech without mind, so all creatures proceeding from the mind of God, speak of Him. Every being, whether a positive reality or a defect, is in some sense true; and the devil abode for a while in truth, though he afterwards ceased to abide therein.

loquatur sibi mens vel cogitacio sua intrinseca, ut docet Augustinus *Super Johannem, Omel.* 1. Ideo verbum, diccio, vel locucio vocalis, non est huiusmodi, nisi quia similitudo vere locucionis vel verbi intrinseci. Ideo certum est quod a verbo vel cogitacione dei procedunt omnes creature, sicut a cogitacione hominis procedunt omnia que facit a proposito. Cum ergo omne ens sit conforme illi verbo, vel secundum *esse* primum (ut omnis creatura) vel secundum *esse* secundum (ut omnis defectus) patet quod omnis entitas est veritas; et ita diabolus stetit ad tempus in veritate, ut credo, quamvis semper deficit a perpetua continuitate observacionis recti ordinis; quam perpetuitatem semper debuit habuisse, et sic nunquam plene stetit in veritate sibi debita, cum semper debuit esse in rectitudine perpetua, sicut debet quelibet creatura racionalis nisi sit | deobligata per graciam. 11b[b]
Et sic forte intellexit Augustinus 11° *Super Gen. ad litteram* 13, ubi videtur dicere bonos confirmatos et malos obstinatos in primo instanti temporis; quia indubie illi habuerunt perfeccionem secundam, et alii defectum a perfeccione perpetua, quandocunque fuerunt.

We can admit that sin is just (referring to its punishment) or deny it. A thing may be called just in four different senses. Thus the just may be unjust, if we do not mean the same,

Ulterius conceditur quod omne peccatum vel vanitas est iustum quo ad *esse* secundum; vel (iuxta alios) falsitates huiusmodi non sunt iuste, quamvis de illis faciat Deus iusticiam; homo autem, quamvis patitur iustam vindictam, non tamen proprie facit eam, sed deus, qui non potest sinere peccatum esse sine decore vindicte: ut patet 3° *De Libero Arbitrio.* Et ita si inveniuntur auctores dicere quod omne verum est iustum, dicitur quod quadrupliciter dicitur aliquid iustum; vel per se, ut iusticia in abstracto; vel subiective, secundum iusticiam sibi accidentem, ut homo; vel effective ut leges facientes hominem iustum, et opera procedencia ab habitu iusticie; vel quarto diceret aliquis quod res dicitur iusta, quia est materia vel signum iusticie; ut urina dicitur sana. Set equivocando concederetur quod iustum est iniustum.

30. quintupliciter MS.

23. *Iustum.* We must remember that it is an axiom of theology that God would not permit evil, if He could not make any good come of it. From this standpoint Wyclif can and does say that sin is just, i. e in its good consequences: punishment, atonement, &c. But he also admits that this may be denied from a different standpoint.

Si autem equivocetur in predicacione secundum causam, concedendo peccata esse iusta, patet quod non est difficultas in re; sicut non est difficultas, sive homo concedat peccata esse veritates, de quanto conformantur diccioni eterne secundum *esse* secundum, vel negare illas esse veritates de quanto non conformantur cogitacioni Dei secundum *esse* primum. Et conformiter non est vis, sive dicatur deus causare et velle peccata, scilicet quoad *esse* secundum, id est, puniciones eorum, sive hoc negetur, referendo ad *esse* primum. Ego autem elegi concedere quod deus vult peccata, de quanto vult ipsa proficere et esse bona; ut patet 2° Li^o Tractatu 3° Cap^o 14 usque ad finem.

just as what is true essentially may be false in its secondary entity.

The objection is worthless: we have a right either to deny or to admit that God wills sin (meaning sin together with punishment). And I choose the latter alternative.

Set obicitur tripliciter, per hoc quod iuxta dicta quilibet prescitus in quantacunque sanctitate vite existens staret continue in falsitate; quod videtur falsum, cum tunc deus esset auctor falsitatis et peccati quod diabolus et quilibet alius prescitus habuit in primo instanti sui *esse*.

Three difficulties: I. According to this doctrine, no 'foreknown', though living in sanctity, could be said to abide in truth; and God would be the Author of sin.

Hic dicitur quod prima conclusio est concedenda. Nam in quantacunque sanctitate vite existens fuerit prescitus secundum presentem iusticiam, adhuc deficit sibi gracia predestinacionis et per consequens amor Dei ad beatitudinem; et ille defectus est falsitas, set non culpa. Nec deus est auctor culpe, vel alicuius, nisi illius cuius *esse* primum placet sibi. Non ergo peccat creatura mortaliter actualiter in primo instanti *esse* sui, quia ad tale peccatum requiritur discursus post mocionem intellectus, et 3° inordinata adhesio voluntatis. Ideo racionabiliter dampnarunt Parisienses articulum ponentem angelum peccasse in primo instanti sui *esse*. Nec miretur homo quod dico vitam defecturam propter casum sequentem, quia perfeccio secunda cuiuscunque vite creature racionalis consistit in successione, que tota est

I admit the first conclusion. He that has not the grace of predestination lacks perseverance in truth, and this is a defect (though not a sin) throughout his life.

The primal essence of sin not pleasing God, He is not the Author thereof.

No one can sin at the first moment of his existence, as the council of Paris rightly maintains.

27. moraliter MS.

32. *Defecturam*. In Wyclif's theory, whatever *is to be* at a certain moment, really exists at *any* moment, though now as a future thing, now as a thing that has been. The fact, therefore, that A will one day be damned, is true even at the moment when A is leading a saintly life, and as such is, in Wyclif's language, a defect in his entity. But the quotation from Ecclesiastes on the next page is taken in a somewhat peculiar sense. Theologians usually explain it to assert our inability to be absolutely sure that we are *at the present moment* in God's grace.

deo prius; et per consequens est peior aut melior propter partes preteritas et futuras, sicût motus est velocior aut tardior propter partes preteritas et futuras. Ideo dicit Ecclesiastes *quod nescit homo utrum amore* Eccl. IX, 1 *vel odio sit dignus,* quia ignorat exitum vite sue.

II. Does the goodness of falsity depend on its entity, or conversely?

Secundo dubitatur si peccatum vel falsitas sit prius bonum quam ens, vel econtra, ut videtur esse in positivis.

I say that, whereas positive beings have entity of their own, privations (such as sin) would have no entity at all (for they would never exist) unless God ordained them for some good purpose. Such an entity is properly a *want of entity;* and this, if God suffers it to take place, is in so far good. Isaiah, denouncing woe against those that call good evil and evil good, had in his mind worldlings and sinners, who do so. calling the study of Scripture foolishness, virtue madness, cunning and craft, the acumen of science, and so on, in a sense quite different from our doctrine.

Hic videtur michi quod ens equivoce competit positivo et privativo, nec haberet aliquam privacio entitatem, nisi Deus prius respiceret eam, ordinando ipsam ad bonum, cum Deus non posset aliquam privacionem permittere, nisi ordinet ipsam ad bonum. Pro omni ergo instanti temporis quo privacio talis est, est bona, licet peccatum prius — non dico naturaliter, sed materialiter — habet *esse* defectivum, quod pocius est *deesse* quam *esse;* et illo *deesse* supposito, deus facit ipsum bonum. Et si obicitur per illud Ysa. 5[to]. *Ve qui dicunt bonum malum et malum bonum:* Cum ergo peccatum sit maximum malum, sequitur quod dicendo peccatum esse bonum, incido in *Ve* propheticum inprobatum: Dicitur quod sensus prophete est vaticinari viatoribus qui sentenciant quod laboriosa et exprobrosa servitus qua deo servitur in via sit mala moraliter, sicut generaliter sentenciant hodie omnes mundiales, avari, et omnes carnales voluptuosi. Nam hodie reputantur studium in speculativis scienciis et in Scriptura pura stulticia; incessus per humilitatem, paupertatem, et virtutes alias, timiditas, miseria, et actus amencie. Quos contra, ars callide negociandi vocatur vivificans et subtilis sciencia, gestus pompaticus, humana varietas; et sic generaliter tam de bonis quam malis accidentibus, que hodie interpretata sunt tam opinione quam opere ad sensum | contrarium. Sed longe est iste sensus ab 12a

4. Apostolus MS; *ib.* nemo scit MS. 8. verum *pro* bonum MS.

1. *Deo prius.* 'First in the eyes of God'. God sees first the whole successive existence of a man, and then each particular instant. Such I take to be the meaning. 4. *Ecclesiastes.* The MS. has Apostolus; but I have not found this text quoted in any of the Epistles. 7. *Bonum.* I have here made a change which is warranted by the sequel; but it is possible that there is really no mistake in the MS. for V and B are often written very much alike.

opinione theologi, qui dicit omnem culpam esse maliciam fugiendam, licet occasionaliter ex divina gracia accidentaliter proficiat. Et patet quod ista sentencia non est contraria sed consona sensui prophetico.

Tercio obicitur in materia insolubilium. Videtur enim quamlibet proposicionem signantem ex inposicione pro se ipsa esse inpossibilem, quia iuxta eius significacionem non posset habere significatum extra ipsam totaliter. Videtur eciam quod, limitatis significacionibus vulgaribus, non tollitur difficultas; ut (distinguendo seruum et liberum ex opposito, ut dicunt solum servitutem et libertatem civilem) starent raciones hinc inde.

III. It would follow that a proposition made to signify itself would be impossible, and the difficulty already urged in the same matter remains, unless the common meaning of words is changed,

Ad primum dicitur quod non sequitur. Quamvis enim proposicio non possit esse, nisi fuerit falsa, non ex hoc sequitur quod sit inpossibilis. Ut patet de istis: *ego non sum*, *nulla creatura est*, *quelibet proposicio est*, et quotlibet similibus. Satis ergo est ad inpossibilitatem signi quod partes eius habeant significatum primarium ex imposicione, et ipsum careat significato primario, eciam secundum *esse* intelligibile; unde tale signum quodammodo equivoce dicitur proposicio, cum caret veritate primarie representata pro qua poneretur. Conceditur ergo quod omnes tales proposiciones sunt false: *Hec consequencia est bona*, *ergo tu es asinus*. *Hec proposicio movetur* . . . et quotlibet similes. Non sic tamen false, quin vere; set deficit illis signatum primarium ex inposicione. Oporteret enim prius intelligere consequenciam ex parte rei, antequam hoc signum representaverit consequenciam ex inposicione: quia, si intelligo hoc signum sic significans, tunc intelligo consequenciam ex parte rei et non econtra; et ita est de omnibus similibus. Unde neganda est consequencia, cum antecedens sit verum et consequens inpossibile. Antecedens tamen est falsum, deficiens a veritate extra quam ex inposicione representaret. Verumptamen non est negandum quin

This is denied. Such a proposition would necessarily be false, but not impossible. A proposition is impossible when not only nothing real corresponds to what it means, but even nothing intelligible; and in this case it is not a proposition in the same sense as others are. Such 'insolubles' therefore are false in one sense, and true in another, in so far as they mean themselves.

23. *Hec consequencia.* This requires a little explanation. We suppose an argument put to a defender as follows: *If the consequence of the present syllogism is good, you are an ass: but the consequence of the present syllogism is good: therefore you are an ass,* Wyclif denies the consequence, that is, the conclusive power of the syllogism, nothwithstanding its correct appearance, because it leads to an impossible conclusion. And he points out that the minor (or antecedent) is false, since it has no other 'primarie significatum' but itself.

ars superaddita nature potest facere quod illud significet se, tam arte quam natura: ut hoc nomen, *signum*, naturaliter singulariter representat se; et universaliter artificialiter representat se de quanto ex inposicione intencio signi facit universaliter cogitare de omni signo: set singulariter vel naturaliter non significat aliquid [extra] se ex inposicione. Sic tamen pretenditur, quando dicitur quod, *hoc est falsum*, *hec consequencia est bona,* et ita de aliis in quibus ipsa tota vel partes eorum demonstrant se ipsa. Ideo sunt de tanto falsa. Si autem signum universaliter ex inposicione signaverit se et alia, tunc, non existente aliquo alio universaliter significato preter ipsum, foret ex parte falsum: ut patet de ista sola existente proposicione: *aliqua proposicio est; Omnis proposicio est falsa,* et cet. Si autem cum isto essent multe alie proposiciones, tunc haberet universale extra ipsam, ab ea independens; et foret partim vera. Et sic intellexerunt illi qui dixerunt quod quelibet proposicio significat pro quolibet alio á se. Nec video quomodo esset possibile omnem proposicionem esse talem: *Omnis proposicio est*, quia termini secunde inposicionis presupponunt inposicionem primariam. Ideo vel uno tempore vel alio foret aliqua proposicio preter talem.

Some such propositions, however, may be only partly false, when they signify themselves and other propositions.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Other objections. Universal truths imply universal negations, which must (like all universals) be based on singulars. Now whether affirmative or negative, a universal negative cannot be made up of singular affirmatives; and what we call a singular negative is in

Item, si sunt veritates, sunt negaciones: quod probatur tripliciter esse falsum. Primo ex hoc, quod cuiuslibet communis sit dare singulare; set quelibet negacio est communis. Ergo cuiuslibet negacionis est dare singulare. Consequens falsum, quia nec negacionem singularem, cum quelibet sit communis, nec affirmacionem singularem, cum nulla affirmacio continetur tanquam inferius sub negacione, quia tunc affirmacio esset negacio. Si autem aliqua sit negacio singularis, sit illa talis: *a non esse b*. Contra, infinita sunt, quorum quelibet est *a non esse b*. Ergo *a non esse b*, est commune ad infinita. Assumptum sic: Quidlibet quod est, est *non a esse b* (cum falsum

7. extra *deest* MS. 24. Capitulum quartum *deest, long initial* I *at line 21 for* item. 25. The words in italics at the beginning of this and of other chapters are underlined with red ink in the MS, 33. talis affirmacio MS.

33. *Sic.* Understand: *probatur.*

sit aliquid esse a esse b) et omne quod est *non a esse b* est *a non esse b;* ergo quidlibet quod est, est *a non esse b.*

reality a universal. Therefore there are no universal truths.

Item, omne contingens potest incipere vel desinere esse; quotlibet negaciones, si sunt, sunt contingentes: ergo possunt incipere et desinere. Consequens falsum, cum nulla negacio potest esse, nisi sit eterna; ut patebit post, ex hoc quod quelibet negacio negat subiectum de predicato pro omni instanti tempore vel mensura, sicut patet cuilibet amplianti verba de presenti. Si enim *me non esse* fuit antequam ego fui, et erit postquam fuero coruptus, sequitur quod contingit idem, quociens libuerit, redire preter sui corupcionem. Ideo non potest dici
12 a[b] quod talis negacio individuatur a tempore, cum, non existente aliquo tempore preterito vel futuro, non minus foret talis negacio.

Again, if there are any universal negations, they must be eternally true. The non-existence of any thing cannot be, cease to be, and be a second time. On the other hand, whilst I exist, where is my non-existence? It must be contingent on the fact of my birth or death.

Non obstantibus istis, videtur michi quod oportet catholicum concedentem peccata, tenebras, et alios respectus quos fides ponit, consequenter dicere negaciones esse. Quis, credens, sciret sustinere *sanctorum communionem, peccatorum remissionem, carnis resurreccionem, aut vitam eternam* immo *naturam divinam,* sine negacione? Num quia credimus precepta negativa, que semper obligant, primo et principaliter fieri super negacione prohibita; ut deus prohibet furari, quia precipit non furari (et sic de omnibus prohibicionibus, que vel directe vel indirecte fiunt de negacionibus)? Oportet ergo dicere quod illa super que cadit principaliter prohibicio sunt negaciones, eo quod faciendo affirmaciones directe contravenitur mandato: quod non esset, nisi negaciones essent prohibite vel precepte; ergo et cet.

Yet a Catholic must admit the existence of negations, on acount of his faith.

Negative commandments oblige us to the not-doing of certain things; that is certain negations are prescribed thereby.

Hic dicitur communitur quod tantum proposiciones sunt prohibite, vel prohibendo unum contrariorum, precipitur reliqum, et econtra. Ideo deus prohibet talem proposicionem verificari de te: *tu furaris, tu mecharis* et cet. Et videtur doctorem profundum, libro primo Ca° 34°, alludere isti modo loquendi.

The common answer is, that when one of two alternatives is forbidden, the other is commanded. Either the proposition: *thou stealest* or *thou stealest not*, is verified; God, forbidding the former to be verified, commands the latter.

Set contra istud tripliciter. Primo sic. Dato precepto, eque contingit te contravenire precepto, nulla proposicione ex facto suo formata, sicut aliqua formata. Ergo

But *a)* the commandment

17. Responsio *in marg.* MS. 20. anime *pro* esse MS; *ib.* credimus *pro* credens MS. 32. Opinio Bradwardini *in marg.* MS. 38. 1 *in marg.* MS.

v. g. not to eat of the forbidden fruit, was obligatory in itself, whether any proposition concerning it had been made or not.

percepcio non fuit principaliter data de verificacione aut falsificacione proposicionis; ut, dato precepto primo parenti de non comedendo fructum vetitum, non minus peccasset comedendo, nulla existente proposicione, quam proposicione formata. Oportet enim obligatum ex precepto cognoscere principalem formam precepti, quam verissimile est nec primos parentes, nec alios immediate, percepisse factam de verificacionibus signorum logicorum.

Then, if God forbids a proposition to be verified, the judge deciding that a man is a thief, commits a sin; which is absurd.

And if a thing is true, how can God forbid it to be admitted as true?

Item, posito quod, post prevaricacionem factam sine proposicione, unus (te inuito) ut iudex, formet proposicionem veram de prevaricacione; et tunc videtur quod ipse principaliter contravenit mandato, quia principaliter mandatum est quod non verificetur de te talis proposicio, et ipse verificat et tu non; ergo ipse principaliter contravenit mandato: quod ridiculum est dicere. Te namque cessante a prevaricacione, non potest sic opinans vere dicere quod tu verificas datam proposicionem: immo cum *illam proposicionem esse veram* non sit

On the contrary God directly wills all truth;

peccatum, sequitur quod sit a Deo simpliciter volitum, sicut ipse vult se et temporalem judicem cognoscere te peccasse. Nam omne verum quod non est iniquitas est a Deo volitum; set tale signum esse verum est verum

if not, sin could neither be known nor punished.

huiusmodi: ergo, et cet. Si enim non esset a Deo volitum, quia inplicat peccatum esse, tunc iusta pena vel dampnacio, divina sciencia, vel judicis cognicio (et sic de quotlibet iustis) non essent a Deo volita.

The answer would reduce God's law to mere logical formulae, whereas they have an imperative power that no such formulae can possess.

Item, precepta Dei habent quamdam generalitatem ad omnes obligandum, quamdam permanenciam et quamdam efficaciam obligatoriam, que non convenit signis logicis; ergo propter talia signa oportet . . . . . . Explicit tractatus tercius, purgans errores circa veritates in communi.

Incipit tractatus quartus purgans errores circa universalia in communi.

10. 2 *in marg.* MS. 28. 3 *in marg.* MS. 31. *After* oportet, *a gap of several lines* MS. 31, 32. Explicit . . . communi *in larger letters* MS.

DE ENTE LIBRI PRIMI

TRACTATUS QUARTUS

PURGANS ERRORES CIRCA UNIVERSALIA IN COMMUNI.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

12 b[a] *Obiciencium contra* dicta de universalibus quidam nimis pueriliter et quidam subtiliter obiciunt. Quidam namque nimis sensibiliter arguunt, quod si *a* universale sit tam homo quam asinus, tunc homo est asinus. Et hoc confirmant triplici medio. Primo sillogistice, sic arguendo: Omne genus generalissimum substancie est asinus; omnis homo est genus generalissimum substanciae; ergo omnis homo est asinus. 2° per sillogissmum expositorium, sic arguendo: hoc est homo (demonstrando genus animalis), et hoc est asinus; ergo homo est asinus. Et arguunt 3° per hoc principium per se notum: Quecunque sunt eadem alicui tercio, sunt eadem inter se.

Sed animus sic arguencium est tante fixus in sensibilibus obcecantibus intellectum, quod non sufficit apprehendere veritatem superiorem in natura. Et revera, sicut affeccio inordinata circa proprietates singularium corruperat pro magna parte veram religionem Cristianam, sic indisposuit intellectum ad concipiendum veritates fidei. Ideo dicit venerabilis Anselmus in *De Incarnacione Verbi,* Capitulo primo, quod "ille cuius racio est in ymaginacionibus inpossibilium adeo involuta, quod non intelligit quomodo plures homines in specie sunt unus

Some who attack the Universals use childish arguments; others are more subtle. Some say: *ass* is really identical with substance; so is *man;* therefore *man* is really identical with *ass.* Also: *This (the Universal animal) is a man; and this same is an ass:* with the same conclusion. For two things identical with a third are identical with each other. Their minds are so plunged in things material, that they cannot rise above them, just as inordinate affection for earthly possessions has corrupted the Christian religion. Anselm says that no one who cannot

4. Ca[m] 1 *in marg.* MS.

26. *Inpossibilium* is in the text; but I think it is a mistake for *materialium.*

understand the one in many, will be able to conceive the mystery of the Trinity.

Augustine says that we should love men because they are men, and not for any private reason, because *humanity* is a universal, and God's work in the first place.

Whoso loves in his neighbour anything besides his own nature does not love him as himself;

for that is not to love him, but one's own advantage.

If one singer loves another for art's sake alone, he will by no means envy him for singing better than he himself; and if he envies him, and dislikes good singing in another, he does not love Art itself.

homo; quomodo, in ipsa secretissima et altissima natura, comprehendet quomodo plures persone, quarum singula queque perfectus est deus, sint una essencia?" et Augustinus in *De Vera Religione* Cap° 9, et infra, docet quomodo res communes sunt amande propter affeccionem honestatis et pulcritudinis veritatis relucentis in eis, et non res singulares private proponende propter affeccionem commodi; ut quilibet debet principaliter amare in proximo quod est homo, et non quod est filius suus, vel utilis sibi: quia *esse hominem*, secundum Augustinum, est commune et principale opus Dei, set *esse filium tuum* vel *amicam tuam*, hoc est tuum, ut superius tactum est. Unde regula Augustini ponitur sub hiis verbis: "Quisquis in proximo aliud diligit quam sibi ipse est, non eum diligit tanquam seipsum. Ipsa igitur humana natura sine carnali condicione diligenda est". Hec Augustinus. Unde patet, quod Augustinus ab intento vult quemlibet Cristianum debere diligere proximum in natura communi, et non principaliter intuitu private utilitatis, carnalitatis, aut voluptatis: quia nemo, ut sic, diligit seipsum, nec ut sic diligit hominem, sed propriam utilitatem vel aliud accidens nature. Ut, supposito casu beati Augustini, quod aliquis cantor diligat bene cantantem in communi, prius et principalius quam se esse bonum cantorem vel aliud accidens sibi privatum; et ponatur cum hoc, si sit conpossibile, quod, sciendo illos solos esse cantores, invideant alteri, quia melius cantat illo, tunc patet quod tristatur de bono cantu proximi, propter affeccionem honoris vel proprii commodi. Ex quo plane sequitur, quod plus diligit privatum bonum proprium quam cantum simpliciter, consequens contra cantorem. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod bonum proprium prefert omni cantui singulari scienter.

All envy, all sin, proceeds from want of love for things universal; they are good above all others, and the special object of God's love; and so they should be of ours too.

Ex ista racione Augustini patet quod omnis invidia vel peccatum causatur ex defectu ordinate dileccionis universalium, et ita deducit Augustinus, Epist[a] 22[a]; et potest ostendi per racionem sic. Omne magis bonum quod Deus plus diligit est magis diligendum, set omne universale est magis bonum, et per consequens a Deo plus dilectum quam suum privatum singulare: ergo est magis diligendum. Minor patet ex hoc, quod universale

17. Hoc MS.

est prius natura suo singulari, gracia cuius sustentandi Deus ordinat singularia; ergo plus appreciatur universale suo singulari.

Attendant ergo invidi et singularibus dediti, qui ad tantum elevantur quod non curant qui sunt exaltati ad officium, pr̨elaciam, vel aliam dignitatem, dum tamen sint de affinitate sua, de loco suo, vel alia condicione materiali individuante. Et ascendant paulo superius, affectando indifferenter cuicunque de sua specia talem preeminenciam dum tamen ad hoc fuerit simpliciter magis bonus; quia indubie error aspectus et affectus circa universalia est causa tocius peccati regnantis in seculo. Sufficit ergo in talibus conveniencia in natura, et ydoneit as ad officium.

Let them mark this, the envious men to whom the individual is all, and who care not who it is that gets a Church dignity, only that he be a relation, a countryman, or in some way connected with themselves. Let them rise above this, and seek only the man who is most fit for this office.

Et si obicitur quod multi negantes universalia caritative diligunt: dicitur quod inpossibile est hominem 12 b[h] caritative diligere, nisi in re ponat sentenciam de | universalibus, quamvis discrepet in verbis; cum innata sit omni genti universalium noticia. Unde legiste, qui sunt subtiliores philosophi, ponunt universalia, ut patet ex descripcione legis naturalis, iuris, dominii, obligacionis, et aliorum que iura civilia ponunt esse res spirituales, et incorporales, et insensibiles; quamvis fuit de rebus corporalibus (ut dictum est de fundo) obligacio de pecunia debita, quamvis nec ista nec illa specialiter debeatur. Sentencia ista patet in *Digestis* de rerum divisione, lege prima, et sparsim multis locis in corpore Juris; et generaliter in omnibus scienciis.

Many, it may be said, deny universals, and yet show a spirit of love. Such may deny them in words, but they admit them in reality. Men of law, whose minds are specially keen, are consistent, and admit the existence of Universals, as is readily proved.

Discrepant ergo moderni in verbis ab antiquis ponentibus universalia, quidam propter obfuscacionem racionis per sensibilia, quidam propter difficultatem que stat in verbis repli[caciones] contra ponentes universalia: quia multi more sophistarum non solum volunt scire set videre scientes, nec solum evitare inconveniens, set et apparens inconveniens: quidam autem propter arroganciam, qua volunt extraneare ab aliis et pompatice sustinere quod quondam defendebant, et quidam propter defectum informacionis, et timorem consequentis responsionis. Set omnes homines conveniunt in sentencia, immo bruta cognoscunt universalia accidencium, ut superius tactum est.

Some of our moderns contradict the ancients because their mind is blinded; some because of verbal difficulties, wanting to avoid the appearance of self-contradiction; some out of obstinacy, and some out of ignorance and apprehension; but all men in reality hold our opinion.

17. carıtatīe MS. 31. repli *and a short gap* MS.

Reply to the two first objections. We cannot say: *The whole of humanity is Socrates, Plato is the whole of humanity; so Plato is Socrates.*

Dicitur ergo quod non sequitur "omnis species humana est Socrates, Omnis Plato est species humana, ergo omnis Plato est Socrates": et sic de similibus. Generaliter ergo tunc deficit paralogismus, quando deficit proporcionalis supposicio alicuius trium terminorum integrancium sillogismum, ut in proposito est medium commune ad utrumque extremum, et secundum unum suppositum est Socrates, secundum aliud vero Plato.

We can only say: Socrates is that which Plato is. It is impossible to say that. *All that is humanity is Socrates;* yet otherwise the argument proves nothing.

Ex istis tamen premissis bene sequitur quod Socrates sit illud, vel idem quod Plato; quod conceditur pro specie. Et sic arguendo foret dici de omni. "Omne quod est species humana est Socrates, omnis Plato est aliquid quod est species humana, ergo omnis Plato est Socrates"; set maior sic intellecta foret inpossibilis.

In the same manner should we answer all paralogisms of like nature.

Et patet quomodo respondendum est ad omnes huiusmodi paralogismos, affirmativos vel negativos. Non enim sequitur, "nulla species humana est incommunicabilis multis hominibus; omnis Petrus est species humana, ergo nullus Petrus est incommunicabilis multis hominibus," set bene sequeretur, assumendo "quod nulla species humana est id quod non communicatur, vel est incommunicabile multis hominibus, omnis Petrus est species humana, igitur nullus Petrus est incommunicabilis multis hominibus", set tunc assumeretur falsum. Sequitur eciam ex eisdem premissis quod nullus Petrus est species humana incommunicabilis multis hominibus: quod est verum.

The so-called expositorial syllogism is not one. It should have a middle term more concrete than either of the extremes: whereas here the middle term is generic.

Ulterius quoad sillogismum expositorium, patet quod inconvenienter sic nominatur, cum de racione sillogismi expositorii sit habere medium inferius utroque extremo; hic autem est econtra, cum medium sit genus communicatum utrique speciei. Unde convertitur paralogismus cum tali discursu; "animal est homo, et animal est asinus, ergo homo est asinus," quam deduccionem

24. *After* hominibus; set bene sequeretur assumodo quod nulla species est id quod MS.

30. Wyclif would have admitted, as an expositorial syllogism, something of this sort; *Edward VII. is a king; Edward VII. is an emperor:* therefore *some king is an emperor.* His adversaries persisted in saying that his Universal, if a really existing *thing,* must be an individual. And that Wyclif always denied most strongly; though it is not easy to conceive the real and separate existence of anything that is not an individual.

puderet quemlibet logicum approbare. Ex istis tamen premissis bene sequitur quod homo sit idem quod asinus, quia genus commune utrique.

Ad terciam confirmacionem, patet quod proporcionaliter ut duo idemptificantur tercio, sic idemptificantur inter se, ut si tercium in quo idemptificatur sit genus, tunc sunt idem genere; si species, tunc sunt idem specie; et si individuum, tunc sunt idem numero. Et ita ex istis verbis et sentencia patet quod oportet esse universalia, quia aliter non esset possibile aliqua esse idem alicui tercio. Et ex hoc patet quante degenerant sic paralogizantes a proprio nido. Nam ut philosophus dicit quod est dare triplicem idemptitatem, scilicet generis, speciei, et numeri, ista via dicit quod nulla est idemptitas alicorum, cum omnis idemptitas sit idemptitas numeralis. Nec est maior conveniencia inter hominem et hominem, quam inter hominem et asinum, vel quelibet alia: quia non est dare in quo conveniunt, et res quecunque quante sunt tante distinguntur; ut putant sic opinantes. Et sic nichil est simile alteri in specie, nec est generacio univoca propter signa: et sic consequenter in affectu negant amorem ex conveniencia specifica resultantem.

The third argument would deny all save numerical identity. If two things are identical with a third that is a genus, they are identical generically; if the third is a species, they are specifically identical, and if it is an individual the identity is numerical. Aristotle expressly enumerates these three kinds of identity. Between one man and another there is in their opinion no more in common than between a man and an ass.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Item, iuxta hanc viam, sequitur, quod universale non est demonstrabile per pronomen, quod est contra communem et necessarium modum loquendi de universalibus. Et consequencia probatur. Nam demonstrando genus animalis sic dicendo: *hoc est*, convertitur subiectum cum isto termino, *animal*. Cum ergo non solum signum, set significacio facit terminum pronomen, vel terminum demonstrativum, videtur quod in nullo tali dicto sit demonstracio, sed communis appellacio.

Another objection is that this doctrine forbids us to use the demonstrative pronoun in speaking of a Universal, except it be taken with a universal meaning. 'This is animality' will mean no more than 'Animality is animality.'

Set quia ista difficultas stat partim in gramatica, et partim in logica vel methaphisica . . . *

5. idemptificatur MS. 22. negans MS. 23. Cap. 2m *in marg.*; *long initial* I MS. 26 modum et nece m MS.

34. After *methaphysica* come the words *ideo brevius*, catchwords to a lost folium between ff. 12 and 13. There is therefore a considerable gap in this place, which is all the more regrettable as I do not think Wyclif deals with the present difficulty anywhere else.

* For lost part see Thomson, S Harrison, A 'lost' chapter of Wyclif's Summa de ente.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

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ideo brevius, habitudinem, predicacionem ab intrinseco 13 a[a] voco per se predicacionem, vel predicacionem accidentalem, que dicit motum in subiecto, ut quelibet predicacio accidentis preter relacionem. Predicacionem vero secundum habitudinem voco predicacionem secundum relacionem; et tales sunt concedende de universalibus, ut esse prius suo singulari, causare subiective in suo singulari quodlibet accidens illius singularis, esse simile, utile, vel aliter comparatum, secundum convenienciam vel differenciam alteri rei. Racio autem diversitatis est, quod tales predicaciones secundum habitudinem insunt sibi, secundum racionem qua universale est; quia secundum illam racionem intelligitur, noscitur, et amatur. Set alie predicaciones accidencium non inessent sibi, nisi racione suorum singularium. Non enim est prius suo singulari secundum racionem singularis, sed secundum racionem propriam universali. Unde "esse risibile in communi", et "esse subiectum in communi cuicunque sessioni", competit humanitati; et tamen "esse risibilem" vel "sedere" non competit humanitati; quia tunc per se quiditative homo esset risibilis et sederet, et tunc sequitur quod humanitas sit risibilitas, et sessio: ut Aristoteles arguit, 7° Methaphisice 11°, secundum textum Commentatoris. Ubi sic: "Aliquid enim esse in loco non est ipsum esse musicum"; et subdicit causam huius. "Musicus enim et *ubi* non sunt idem per se", intelligens indubie terminos in supposicione simplici. Unde in fine concludit: "In quolibet ergo, si essencia superficiei albedinis sit essencia superficiei levis, tunc albedo et levitas sunt idem." Et patet plane sensus expositus de abstractis. Non mirum ergo si in talibus humanitas est formaliter sedens; subiectum abstractum, supponens simpliciter, vel subiectans predicatum, limitat ipsum ad supposicionem simplicem, sic quod sedens supponat pro sessione, et non sic contrahatur si non subiectat.

I call accidental predication, that which denotes a change in the subject, and habitudinal predication that which only denotes a relation; the latter only can belong to Universals.

The latter exists in the subject as in its Universal, but not so the former.

'To be able to laugh', or 'to be able to sit' is in the Universal: 'to laugh' or 'to sit' only in the singular.

Aristotle points out why to be a musician, and to be in a certain place, are two different predications.

Humanity sits down when a man sits down, but it is only thus determined by its singular, which is the subject of this action.

25. Aristoteles *in marg.* MS. 35. substantivans MS. 38. substantivat MS.

* For lost part see Thomson, S. Harrison, A 'lost' chapter of Wyclif's Summa de ente.

Unde, secundum gramaticos, sicut ex materia et forma fit una usia, sic ex subiecto et predicato formaliter fit unum per se aggregatum per accidens. Quando autem subiectum est concretum indifferens, ut supponat simpliciter vel personaliter, limitatur per predicatum ad supposicionem personalem; ut per hoc quod homo currit, non asseritur quod humanitas est cursus, set quod cursus inest persone hominis. Unde solebat quondam servari pro regula, quod nunquam predicatur aliquid intrinsice de abstracto vel complexo equivalente, nisi unius concretum vel eius per se inferius sit per se predicabile de concreto alterius: et si sic, tunc regulariter predicatur. Ut si per se iustum est bonum, tunc iusticia est bonitas.

The subject and the predicate form a whole, like the compound of Matter and Form. When we say: A man runs, we do not assert an identity between *humanity* and *running*, since these two do not inhere essentially, but accidentally. But what is just is essentially good; so *justice is goodness.*

Ulterius non contradico quin contingit abusive intelligere huiusmodi abstracta convertibiliter cum concretis; et ita concederem quod species universalis subicitur formaliter cuicunque accidenti sui suppositi. Nec est sensus inconveniens; set verba non placent michi.

It is possible, by an abuse of terms, to say that the Universal undergoes every accident of its singulars; but I dislike this mode of expression.

Universalia ergo sunt propinquiora Deo, et per consequens sibi similiora; cum secundum Auctorem de Causis, proposicione 4[a], prima rerum creatarum est
242[b] *esse*, et ante ipsum non est creatum aliquid. Ideo consonum est, quod sicut Deus non suscipit formaliter aliquas predicaciones accidentales nisi relativas, sic nec verba substancie que sunt per se stancia. In hoc tamen Deus excedit universalia, quod ipsa suscipiunt predicaciones suppositorum et accidencium in concreto, in predicacione secundum essenciam, ut species humana est Petrus, album, et quodcunque concretum accidens personaliter intellectum, set Deus non nisi in predicacione secundum causam.

The Universals, as being nearer God, are more like Him, and thus (like Him) do not receive accidents. But God is above them in so far as He receives predications only as Cause of all, and they receive them as having singular subjects.

Ulterius concedo quod universale adquirit novum locum, in casu quo aliquis locus fuerit occupatus per suum singulare, qui prius non fuit occupatus per suum singulare. Verumptamen non movetur nec locatur proprie, set est motum et locatum: ut Deus non movetur, etsi mundus moveatur recte versus oriens, aut maioretur in infinitum, vel quociens libet generetur vel corumpatur, quamvis adquirat per suam creaturam novum

We may admit that a Universal, when one of its singulars acquires a new locality, acquires it too, but not properly so.

3. Nota exemplum *in marg.* MS. 17. concedere MS.

21. *Auctorem de Causis.* Alpharabicus. See Trialogus 86, 462; Serm. III, 255, and Miscellanea, I, 186.

For movement, there must be something movable, which the Universal is not. Of a universal we can thus say: "It is localized", but not: "It is in a place". When we move, our soul does not move, nor our universal qualities, nor our time-relations, nor God: yet all these are within us. And Aristotle seems to hold the same view.

locum. Nam ad motum mobilis requiritur · passiva et formalis adquisicio materie talis motus; quod non potest competere universali, vel Deo. Accidencia autem singularia commoventur cum subiectis suis, quia illis inest formaliter locari cum suis subiectis; set non universalibus. Hec ergo est predicacio formalis: "*a* locatur", et non hec: "*a* est in loco". Nec oportet quod, motis nobis, omnia moveantur que sunt in nobis, ut patet de Deo, de tempore, de Universalibus, et de anima. Non enim movetur anima, circumducto suo subiectó continue in eodem situ vel alterato. Et sic intelligo Aristotelem, 6° Phisicorum, quod non est possibile punctum per se moveri; et 7° Metaphisice, 31, dicit quod forma non generatur, set compositum singulariter ex materia et forma; universale autem non generatur vel corumpitur, ut patet commento 52°.

Yet the Holy Doctors ascribe sin to human nature, i. e. original sin, from which none are exempt save Christ and, as is believed, His most blessed mother.

Predicaciones tamen privative vel positive tribuuntur universalibus a sanctis doctoribus; ut peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum nature, eo quod tota natura est realiter infecta per ipsum, quia quadam naturali propagine | ex duobus primis parentibus sic infectis, ex- $13\,a^{b}$
ceptis duobus parentibus spiritualis generacionis, scilicet Domino Nostro Jesu Cristo, et beatissima matre sua. Unum enim fide tenemus esse immunem ab omni peccato, et de alio pie credimus illud idem; ut, sicut duo principia carnalis generacionis, scilicet vir et femina conparticipant in peccato, sic duo principia generacionis spiritualis, scilicet secundus Adam cum beata virgine, conparticipent in immunitate a peccato. Nec ex istis negandum est quin quilibet habeat peccatum proprium originale. Nec sequitur ex dictis speciem peccare actualiter. Peccare namque, cum sit formaliter deficere, potest competere formaliter speciei, sicut et amari a deo, vel

But original sin is only a formal defect, which may exist in the universal man; it does not follow that Humanity, as such, can be guilty of actual sin.

1. modum MS. 6. hoc MS. 7. hoc MS. 11. Aristoteles *in marg.* MS. 16. 9to MS. 20. regulariter (?) MS. 21. nota moralitatem de-x° ⁊bta vergine *in marg.* MS. 32. Id est peccare *in marg.* MS.

13. *Moveri.* Because a point *is a mere ens rationis.* What moves properly is the body in which our mind notes the meeting of two lines, which is a point. 25. *Pie credimus.* Here it would seem that Wyclif believed, at least at that period, in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother. And it may well be that he continued to believe in it to the end; for that doctrine, so far as I can see, has nothing in it to contradict his philosophical views.

esse in gracia, cum sint predicaciones relative: et sic creari, produci, vel causari, potest universali competere, ut patet consequenter Ca° 5°, set superbire, invidere, irasci, et talia personalia, non competunt universali.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Item si universalia sint ex parte rei, vel sunt omnino distincta ab individuis, ut Aristoteles imponit Platoni, 7° Methaphisice de Ydeis, vel sunt idemptica suis suppositis. Si primo modo, tunc non predicantur de suis individuis, nec conveniunt univoce essencialiter cum illis, componendo quiditative sua inferiora; set ita inpertinencia essent, sicut res omnino distincte quoad noticiam quiditativam. Immo non esset dare quibus essent communia, nisi essencialiter illa quibus sunt communia. Non enim sufficit causacio extrinseca ad composicionem quiditativam universalis, et alia que sibi conveniunt: quia tunc Deus esset universale cuiuslibet singularis. Certum est ergo quod est dare universalia communicata secundum predicacionem suis inferioribus, sic quod sint suorum singularium singulum, et ut *quemlibet hominem esse*, est *hominem esse:* et idem dicit Anselmus, de Incarnacione Verbi, Ca° 7°, et Aristoteles 7°, Methaphisice 44.

Aristotle argues against Plato, that a Universal cannot be distinct from its individuals, for then they could not be predicated of it: nor could we say that a singular belonged to a given Universal.

So most certainly they are identical therewith.

Set contra hoc tripliciter. Primo sequitur quod genus generalissimum sit quodlibet genus intermedium, species specialissima et quodlibet eius suppositum; et tunc non esset distinccio inter universalia et singularia, modo quo auctores ponunt. 2° videtur quod divisibile sit indivisibile, album nigrum, sedens non sedens, et cet. Petrus enim est genus substancie (quod est omnis spiritus creatus), et sic indivisibile, et per idem est genus intermedium (quod est corpus). Ipsum autem genus est omne corpus, album aut nigrum, omne sedens vel stans; ergo, et cet. Tercio arguitur sic. Racio universalioris non convenit suo contento, et per consequens nec illud universale, tali racione diffinitum. Nam communicari multis, esse superius singulari, et sic de multis compe-

Three objections.
1. The highest genus would be identical with the intermediate, with the species, and with the individual; and the singular would be universal.
2. Since a man is spirit and body he would *be* one and the other at once.
3. The Universal cannot be identical with that which it contains (as it does its singulars) in its universality.

5. Ca° 4^m^ *in marg.;* long initial I MS. 9. Obieccio *in marg.* MS. 13. uC| essen. MS. 18. opinio *in marg.* MS. 21. obieccio 3^x^ *in marg.* MS. 24. .1. *in marg.* MS. 28. .2. *in marg.* MS. 34. .3. *in marg.* MS.

The former exists in many; not so the latter: how can they be the same?

tentibus universali, aliena sunt a singulari. Et propter tales raciones concedit Aristoteles 7° Methaphisice, 44°, quod universalia non sunt substancie, et idem dicit expresse 56°, 51, 58.

General answer. Noting the difference between formal and essential predication, we admit that each universal is each of its singulars, not formally, but essentially. Aristotle is right if he means by *substance*, the individual substance of things; evidently that could not subsist in many.

Pro ista difficultate solvenda, notanda est distinccio supra posita de predicacione formali et predicacione secundum essenciam. Tunc dico quod omne universale est quodlibet suorum inferiorum, et per consequens econtra, set non formaliter; et hoc bene probat racio Aristotelis quod universale non est formaliter substancia (suple, substancia prima) quia tunc non communicaretur multis suppositis, sicut econtra, si individuum esset formaliter suum universale, tunc communicaretur multis suppositis, sic quod esset illorum singulum: quod est inpossibile. Ideo, propter equivocacionem in predicacione formali et predicacione secundum essenciam, dicit commentator, commento 34°, quod species dicitur equivoce de specie et individuo; et sepe revolvi antequam haberem istum sensum auctorum.

There are six kinds of differences: that of different personalities with different natures, of different personalities with the same nature, of different natures in the same hypostasis, whether these natures are separable or inseparable; of different species, or genera, or different beyond all genera; there is the formal, not real, distinction between the more and the less universal; but all these are either real or only notional differences.

Secundo, notandum quod sextupliciter ad posicionem potest accipi differencia vel distinccio aliquorum, sicut et idemptitas. Aliqua enim distinguntur suppositis, et hoc dupliciter; vel sic, quod sint diverse essencie singulares, ut duo homines; vel sic, quod sint eadem essencia singularis, ut persone divine, et tres res eiusdem anime. Aliqua autem distinguntur secundum naturam, et hoc dupliciter; vel sic, quod sint idem suppositum singulare, ut generaliter materia et sua forma substancialis, et natura humana, ac natura divina in Cristo; vel sic, quod sint omnino separabiles, ut forma et materia aliena. Aliqua vero distinguntur specie, que habent diversas species specialissimas, quarum utraque est causa distinguendi unius a reliquo, ut homo et asinus. Aliqua autem distinguntur genere intrinseco vel generalissimo, ut spiritus et corpus, substancia et qualitas. Aliqua autem plus quam genere: ut ens predicabile, et veritas extra genus. Set postremo distinguntur aliqua solum 13b[a]
secundum | racionem, quando sunt idem essencialiter sine distinccione reali, unum tamen non est formaliter reliqum, ut communius et suum per se inferius. Possunt autem omnes iste differencie reduci ad differenciam secundum rem, et differenciam secundum racionem.

4. Responsio 3ˣ *in marg.* MS. 5. . A . *in marg.* MS. 17. 9to MS. 18. hm̄ *pro* haberem MS. 20. B dr͡a 6ˣ t idemptitas 6ˣ *in marg.* MS.

Istis positis, concedo quoad primum argumentum quodlibet inferius esse suum superius, et econtra: ut Petrus est species specialissima et genus generalissimum, et per idem species specialissima est genus generalissimum, et ita reciproce. Set non formaliter; quia tunc Petrus communicaretur alicuius speciei omnibus individuis, secundum maximam eius communicabilitatem, et in quantum genus generalissimum communicaretur omnibus partibus eiusdem generis, quod est contradiccio. Ideo inpossibile est quod individuum sit formaliter eius species, aut species genus, vel aliquod inferius suum superius; et sic intelligunt negantes talia. Nec concedentes huiusmodi predicaciones volunt quod Petrus est genus substancie sub racione qua est genus, aut quod species specialissima, secundum racionem qua huiusmodi, sit formaliter singulare, vel aliquod communius, set quod singulare, utputa: Iste homo est homo vel humanitas, et illa est species specialissima. Et ita conceditur de iusto gramatico (et sic de formis signatis per adiectivam professionis) quod singulum talium est species, et econtra: et tum nulla species substancie est iusta gramatica, et cet.: quia extremum substantivum per se supponit essencialiter, set extremum adiectivum oportet supponere formaliter. Stat ergo ista sentencia cum distinccione inter singularia et universalia, quantamcunque aliqui auctores vere ponunt.

Answer to (1). A singular *is* its Universal, but not formally so; i. e. its Universal can be predicated of it, but not so that the special qualities of the former belong to the latter.

Peter is identical with Substance, but not with Substance considered as a genus.

Et si arguitur sic, "Socrates differt a specie, eo quod a qualibet specie distinguitur, et per consequens ipse non est species, iuxta exponentes vulgares istius termini, *differt*": dicitur quod tales proposiciones debent sic exponi vel probari, "Socrates aliqua differencia differt a specie, ergo differt a specie." Et antecedens sic probatur: "Socrates differencia secundum racionem vel formaliter differt a specie, ergo differt aliqua differencia a specie." Et assertum patet ex hoc, quod Socrates formaliter est, quia individuum et species formaliter est; quia communicata quiditate multis: et ipse non est formaliter species, ideo differt formaliter a specie. Nec sequitur, "Socrates formaliter non est species, ergo non est species"; nec sequitur: "Socrates formaliter est homo, et omnis homo est species, ergo Socrates forma-

If on the other hand, it be urged that a singular which is not formally its universal, is not its universal at all, we answer that the conclusion is illogical.

1. . 1 . *in marg.* MS. 20. Nota de adiectivis professionis *in marg.* MS. 30. De exposicione istius termini differt etc. *in marg.* MS.

liter est species," quia deficit *formaliter* in minori. Et sic dicendum est de aliis obieccionibus contra istud.

Answer to (2). We must admit that the Indivisible is Divisible, when we have to do with a compound of which one part is divisible, and the other not. But there is no contradiction, since these terms are predicated of the compound from different points of view; now because of one part, now of another.

Ad secundum conceditur tanquam necessarium, quod divisibile est indivisibile, quia Cristus divisibilis est indivisibile, cum sit natura divina, et specie creatus: et ita quelibet persona hominis divisibilis est indivisibile, cum sit anima. Set hic negatur quod res divisibilis est indivisibilis, quia tunc habens partes esset non possibilis partiri, vel sine partibus. Unde non sequitur: *ista res est res que non potest dividi, ergo est indivisibilis.* Cum ergo aliquid est duo, quorum unum est formaliter divisibile, et aliud formaliter indivisibile, tunc quando specificatur per unum tale adiectivum divisibilis vel indivisibilis, supponit specialiter pro formaliter tali, ut sic dicto, *Cristus divisibilis est indivisibile*, quia res que non potest partiri. Unde patet quod non est color in tali deduccione, "Cristus est divisibilis, mobilis, et cet., et iste est natura humana, ergo natura divina est sic passionata, quamvis sit res non sic passionata": et ita in proposito.

But this argument has no value whatever; if it had, it would land us in all sorts of absurdities.

Set quoad sensum argumenti dico quod non est color in deduccione. Non enim sequitur: "Lapis est genus generalissimum; quod quidem genus est res indivisibilis vel indivisibile: ergo lapis est indivisibile"; quia iuxta hoc sequitur quod omnis homo sit animal irracionale, rudibile, et quomodocunque est substancia, que non est homo, passionata. Sequitur eciam quod "omnis homo sit quantumlibet magnum, longum, latum, vel profundum corpus", et sic de aliis generibus accidencium. Et ut breviter dicatur, sequitur ex isto quidlibet esse quidlibet. Sequitur enim iuxta principium sic opinancium: "ego sum species hominis, et illa est res que disputat Rome, ergo ego sum res que disputat Rome." Et cum nullum universale disputat, ex proximo declaratis relinquitur, quod ego sum individuum quod disputat Rome.

2. neccoibȝ MS. 3. .2. *in marg.* MS. 19. non *deest* MS.

1. *Formaliter.* This touches a very difficult point in Dialectic, viz., how far we can conclude from a proposition modified by an adjective (or an adverb) to the same proposition without modification. "This man is not *at present* a millionaire ∴ he is not a millionaire", is a good conclusion. But: "This man does not work *perfectly* ∴ he does not work", would be wrong.

Attendendum ergo est ad tale predicatum materialiter et essencialiter, et videndum est quem sensum pretenderet ipsum resolutum in hoc transcendens, *res*. Suscipies predicacionem formalem relique partis adiecte, et omne tale est concedendum; ut ego sum eternum, communicatum multis, ens ubique cognitum ab omni cognitivo, et sic de quotlibet, que insunt universali meo. Sed non sic *rudibile, hinnibile, insensibile*, et cet., quia nullum universale meum est formaliter huiusmodi, quamvis sit *res que* est formaliter huiusmodi. Hoc ergo sequitur, "ego sum genus substancie quod non potest dividi, ergo ego sum res indivisibilis"; set antecedens est falsum.

Notice the force of this expression: *that which* . . . I am *that which* is eternal, one in many, &c. because my Universal is *formally* such. But this same Universal is not formally, only materially, able to bray, &c., so these things cannot be said of me.

Quoad terciam evidenciam, dictum est quod singulare distinguitur ab universali suo, | 13b[b] secundum raciones singularis et universalis; set omne singulare est idem essencialiter cum suo universali, ut patet ex processu, 7[1] methaphisice, 21°. Est enim universale substanciale substancia secunda in eius singularibus, inseparabiliter et per se, sicut accidens est in subiecto separabilis et per accidens. Unde prima inexistencia sortitur nomen generale, inesse; set secunda inexistencia vocatur specialiter, inherere. Nam sicut "quantitatem inexistere homini" non ponit nisi *inesse homini* quod sit quantus, cum aliis que inplicantur in hoc, sic "speciem vel aliam substanciam secundam inesse Socrati" non est nisi *inesse sibi* quod sit homo, vel animal, et cet. Et patet quod nec huiusmodi universalia nec accidencia possunt esse nisi insint, quia, destructis primis, inpossibile est aliquod aliorum remanere. Set cum universale sit equivocum secundum modum concipiendi, et non secundum rem, extra ad quattuor que patent 7° Methaphisice 7° quandocunque Aristoteles dicit quod universalia non sunt substancie, intelligit, ut supra posui, quod non sunt formaliter substancie prime. Significat enim hoc nomen, substancia, nunc quiditatem, essenciam, diffinicionem, vel *quod quid erat*

Answer to (3). The singular differs from its universal, in so far as it is a singular, but not essentially. Both it and the accidents are in their singulars; the former inseparably, the latter separably.

Neither can exist without its singulars. When Aristotle says that the Universals are not substances, he means, not individual substances: and he gives four different meanings of the word.

1. neu[ut'] *pro* materialiter MS. 14. .3. *in marg.* MS. 22. inhibere MS. 36. erunt MS.

31. *Extra.* I suspect that this word is a mistake; or if it applies to *rem*, then some words are probably wanting here. *Ad quattuor* probably refers to the four significations of *substance*, given below. 36. *Quod quid erat esse.* The word for word translation, in Mediaeval Latin, of the Greek words used by Aristotle to mean *essence*.

esse, et illud realiter est essencia, ut componitur ex genere et differencia, licet quandoque sumatur pro signo explicito sic compositi.

It means either the essence of a thing, or its form (universal or particular),

2° modo accipitur substancia pro specie que est primum universale post individua; et illa est forma, cum facit individuum formaliter esse substanciam. Ideo subdividit philosophus formam in universalem et singularem: forma universalis, sicut humanitas; et forma singularis, ut hec humanitas, que est hec anima. Unde commentator, commento 21°, dicit quod quiditas hominis est homo uno modo, i. e. forma hominis, set non est homo congregatus ex materia et forma, i. e. individuum formaliter.

or its genus,

Tercio modo sumitur substancia pro genere, quod secundum Platonem est maxime substancia, set Aristoteles ponit econtra quod individuum est maxime substancia; et est duplex genus, scilicet generale et intermedium.

or the subject of that form.

Set quarto modo accipitur substancia pro subiecto; et hoc est duplex, scilicet singulare compositum ex materia et forma, vel eius individua materia. Et quod omnia ista sint in re eadem essencia, patet infra 20° et 21°.

Aristotle, therefore, cannot be made to mean anything more than to deny that the Universals exist as singular substances. It is thither that the whole of his argument against Plato tends, proving their superfluity if they themselves are individuals, and exist separately from their subjects. This does not touch our doctrine in the least,

Unde ad pauca respiciunt, qui ponunt Aristotelem velle simpliciter quod universale nullo modo est substancia; vult enim utrobique quod non est formaliter individuum: et sic potest intelligi illud primi *De Anima*, 8°. "Animal autem universale aut nichil est, aut posterius est." Nichil enim singulare est formaliter universale, et raciones formales (quas Plato posuit inesse singularibus tamquam omnino separata essencialiter) concepit Aristoteles esse posteriora suis subiectis. Unde, quia illa credidit superfluere, dixit, primo Posteriorum Cap. 15°, "Gaudeant universalia, quoniam monstra." Non autem superfluit *esse hominem* in communi, et hoc est universale. Unde, quia natura intendit hominem esse, et alia huiusmodi universalia, inveniuntur auctores sepe vocare universalia intenciones Dei vel nature; quia intencio Dei est quod sit homo, et sic de aliis speciebus integrantibus universum.

and has been wrongly understood by our adversaries.

Et ex isto sinistre concepto, credo doctores signorum sumpsisse occasionem ad credendum quod nullum est universale, nisi signum, ut conceptus anime.

3. a substancia accipitur 4ter *in marg.* MS. 3. .b. *in marg.* MS. 12. .c. *in marg.* MS. 16. generativum MS; *ib.* .d. *in marg.* MS.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Item, ex posicione universalium cum distinccione eorum a singularibus, sequitur quod universalia ponunt in numerum cum suis singularibus. Ex quo sequitur sextuplex inconveniencia, primo quod in quolibet homine sunt duo animalia, scilicet species hominis et genus proximum. Et sic ad omnem punctum mundi essent quotlibet corpora coextensa. Sequitur eciam quod non sit possibile unicum hominem esse, cum sequitur, si est unus homo, tunc est homo singularis; quia destructis primis, et cet. Et si est homo universalis, tunc est species hominis distincta, ad quam dicitur relative, et sic duo homines. Sequitur eciam quod inpossibile est quicquam adnichilari a Deo, quia de racione adnichilacionis est quod nichil illius remaneat, nec pars nec accidens. Unde theologi nostri ponunt panem transubstanciatum non adnichilari propter remanenciam accidencium, que sunt omnino separata essencialiter, quamvis quelibet pars illius panis corumpatur. Cum ergo genus et species sint propriora individuis quam talia accidencia, que sunt quasi tunice suis subiectis, videtur multo magis quod si substancia adnichilatur, quelibet pars quiditativa adnichilatur, sicut in creacione subiecti sequitur creacio cuiuslibet sue partis quiditative. Et ita si attomus in sole adnichilatur, tunc genus substancie adnichilatur, et per consequens omnis creatura. Sequitur eciam quidlibet esse ubique, quia ubicunque pars rei est, ibi est 14a[a] ipsa res; set | ubique et semper est pars cuiuslibet creature, ergo quelibet creatura est ubique. Sequitur eciam esse processum in infinitum in universalibus, quia omnia duo que non differunt genere conveniunt in specie, set iste homo et homo communis non differunt in genere, ergo conveniunt in specie. Est ergo dare speciem illis communem, et sic in infinitum. Sequitur eciam quod prius non possit esse sine suo posteriori, quia species non potest esse sine suo individuo.

Ad illud dicitur communiter quod prima conclusio est neganda, quia numeralis distinccio nunquam est

Objections. If the universal and its singular can be counted separately, (1) In every man there would be two animals: the animal which is man, and the animal common to all. (2) One man alone never could exist; the singular and the Universal together would make two. (3) God could not annihilate anything. In Transubstantiation the substance of bread disappears. If the whole substance, then both the genus and the species; the singular substance cannot cease to exist without its universal also ceasing: so all creatures would cease, if a single atom were annihilated; which is absurd. (4) Everything would be everywhere. (5) We could make up new universals without end; (6) The Universal prior to its singular, cannot exist without it.
Answer. We deny the basis of these objections. What is the essence of another thing cannot properly

1. Cap. 5 *in marg.; long initial* I MS. 4. .1. *in marg.* MS. 8. .2. *in marg.* MS. 11. singularis MS. 13. .3. *in marg.* MS. 26. .4. *in marg.* MS. 29. .5. *in marg.* MS. 34. .6. *in marg.* MS. 37. Responsio *in marg.* MS.

inter res quarum una est essencia relique: ut essencia divina et persona divina non ponunt in numerum, quia tunc essent quattuor res in divinis; nec materia nec natura compositi ponunt in numerum cum se ipso. Mundus ergo universalis et iste mundus singularis non sunt duo mundi, set unus mundus, ut patet primo De Celo et Mundo, 92°; et 7° Methaphisice, 47° [ubi] docetur generaliter per deducens ad inpossibile, quia nullum universale ponit in numerum cum suo singulari, quia tunc essent formaliter due res per se in genere.

Notandum tamen quod triplex est numerus numeratus, scilicet largissime, large, vel stricte sumptus; largissime loquendo, omnia encia quorum nullum est relicum ponunt in numerum, et solum talia, sive sint universalia, sive singularia, sive mixtim; ut secunde species animalis, sicut bos et equus, ponunt in numerum. Hoc tamen est valde large locutum. Nam differencia secundum numerum distinguitur a differencia secundum speciem vel genus. Aliter enim omnis idemptitas foret idemptitas numeralis. Valde equivocant philosophi de distinccione numerali. Unde certum est quod aliter Petrus et Paulus ponunt in numerum, aliter Petrus et species bovis. Large loquendo, omnes veritates individue cuiuscunque [. . . . .] fuerint ponunt in numerum, ut materia, forma, memoria, et racio, qualitas, et substancia; cum talibus que formaliter sunt res distincte, quamvis sint idem suppositum. Proprie vero loquendo, solum substancia singularis per se existens ponit in numerum cum alia simili. Ideo dicit philosophus 3 Phisicorum [. . . . .] quod ex divisione continui fit numerus in actu. Talis autem multitudo est subiectum numeri formaliter dicti, qui est quantitas discreta et sensibile commune.

Patet ergo quod nullum inferius ponit in numerum cum suo superiori, quia omne inferius est essencialiter suum superius, et econtra; et per consequens non sunt formaliter due res in genere, set una et eadem. Unde mundus universalis est secundum alios multe res, quia anima mundi et eius subiectum, secundum alios multi mundi in potencia, secundum tercios multi mundi in intellectu; et tamen non ponit in numerum cum isto mundo singulari, quamvis uterque sit illud quod est

be counted as distinct therefrom; that would be separating a thing from itself. To do so would be to imply that the Universal and its singular are two individual substances.

It is possible to understand number in the widest sense, or widely, or strictly. In the first sense, if one thing is not the other, you can count them: and thus the ox species and the horse species make two. But it is not the same thing to count Peter *plus* Paul, and to count Peter *plus* the ox species. In the second, every truth (or thing truly existing) can be counted with any other different from itself, though they may belong to the same subject. In the third, only individuals can be counted; and this is number, in the sense of Aristotle. Therefore it is impossible to count a Universal with its own singular, since they are not two things, but one and the same. The Universe may thus be considered

1. reliqua MS. 7. ubi *deest* MS. 11. numerus 3^x *in marg.* MS.
24. *Before* fuerint, *a gap* MS. 29. *After* Phisicorum, *a gap* MS.

multe res, quia est genus corporis et genus generalissimum substancie, que sunt valde multe res, quia omnes substancie.

Set obicitur, si hoc individuum et sua species distinguntur, tunc sunt distincta, et per consequens distincta sunt illa; et sic 2° tria, quattuor, vel sic de alico numero signando. Ex quo sequitur quod si distinguntur, ponunt in numerum, et per consequens quodlibet inferius ponit in numerum cum quolibet eius superiori: et sic quodlibet singulare esset infinita, cum omne singulare habet infinita superiora. Item homo est multa universalia: ergo multa universalia sunt homo; et per consequens multe res sunt homo, cum per se universale sit res, dicente Aristotele primo peryermeneias, capitulo 3°: "Quoniam autem sunt hec quidem rerum singularia, hec autem universalia." Assertum patet ex hoc quod genus generalissimum et species specialissima, sunt duo universalia, cum distinguntur; ergo sunt due res; et quodlibet suppositum illius speciei est utraque illarum: ergo est multa. Item, omnis distinccio est inter distincta, et per consequens inter aliquot distincta. Distinccio ergo racionis inter singulare et suum universale est inter duo distincta, et per consequens inter ponencia numerum binarium. Nam duo homines, quorum unus intelligit principaliter Petrum, alius principaliter speciem hominis, intelligit principaliter duo distincta. Ista ergo sunt duo, demonstrando universale et suum inferius, cum se habent in quodam ordine, qui requirit duo ad minimum. Confirmatur ex hoc quod, si solum esset unus angelus creatus, adhuc esset numerus creaturarum; quia species angeli et iste angelus esset duo distincta, et utrumque creatura. Cum ergo inpossibile sit 2° esse sine numero, videtur quod universale et suum singulare integrancia binarium ponunt in numerum. Propter talia concedunt aliqui, quod largissima posicio in numerum est inter quecunque que distinguntur, et sic essencia divina ponit in numerum cum tribus personis, tamquam quarta res, set non quarta persona. Et ita intelligit decretale C[a]° *Dampnamus*, quod in deo ad intra solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas (*suple*, personarum) et tamen nichil
14a[b] obest esse quaternitatem, et quantumcunque | numerum

either as one or as many.

But it is urged further that there is a certain difference between the individual and its Universal; if so, they are distinct, may be counted together, form a new species and so on endlessly.

Again, we count many Universals in one man, and since they are *things*, we can count them.

Every distinction implies a certain *number* of things distinct; between the Universal and its singular the number two is implied.

Two men thinking of these respectively do not think of the same; any creature, along with its species, must make two: and *two* is a number.

This argument has led some to posit a yet wider idea of number, viz. between any things in any way distinct.

This is admitted by the Decretals, condemning the doctrine of the Divine Essence forming a fourth Person, but not its notional distinctness from the Three

3. . a . *in marg*. MS. 11. . b . *in marg*. MS. 20. . c . *in marg*. MS.
34. est in numerum est MS.; *ib*. Responsio quod *in marg*. MS.

Persons, and as such, can be counted with them. And thus a universal may be counted together with its particulars, not as two substances, but merely as two entities.

rerum formaliter distinctarum secundum racionem, et non sic quod nulla illarum sit idem quod reliqua. Et ita, largissime loquendo, quodlibet universale ponit in numerum cum suo inferiori; non sic quod sunt due substancie, vel duo accidencia, set transcenduntur. Extra genus sunt due res, duo encia, non descendendo ad aliquod genus; set sunt secundo universalia, vel unum universale et aliud singulare.

And if it be asked. These two are a number, of what? the answer is: Of entities. If the things counted differ as substances, we have a number of substances; if as persons, the number is that of persons; if they differ notionally only, we have realities of which the multitude is merely notional. And this cuts short a great many difficulties.

Et patet quomodo respondetur querenti que duo sunt ista. Nam diceretur quod hec duo sunt ista, scilicet hoc universale et hoc singulare, vel hec universalia. Aut sophistice posset dici, quod hec singularia sunt ista. Proporcionaliter enim ut res differunt, ponunt in numerum, ut si substancialiter tunc sunt multe substancie, si personaliter tunc sunt multe persone, si secundum racionem tunc sunt multe res secundum racionem differentes, ut passio et subiectum: 2° universalia quorum unum est reliquum et singulare cum suo universali. Nec sequitur: omnis res est substancia vel accidens, ergo omnes res sunt substancie vel accidencia; nisi forte tamquam ex inpossibili. Set res ponentes in numerum secundum racionem sunt substancia vel accidens; et tamen sunt multe res, set in casu una substancia. Et si queratur utrum sunt substancia prima, vel substancia secunda, dicitur quod utrumque, non utraque istarum substanciarum, set istarum rerum. Et si dicatur quod divisum genus per differencias oppositas, dicitur pluraliter de suis speciebus, patet quod iste non sunt species opposite: *substancia prima*, et *substancia secunda;* nec iste differencie: *universale* et *singulare*, cum utrobique coincidunt essencialiter. Nam ista consequntur se, circueundo omne genus.

But I do not choose to accept this answer: things that only differ notionally cannot be counted as diverse. I can find neither reason nor authority for the contrary doctrine.

Ego autem elegi conformiter philosophis et ecclesie [. . . . . .] quod solum illa ponunt in numerum, quorum nullum est reliquum, et sic quecunque 2° solum racione differunt, non ponunt in numerum. Racio autem huius eleccionis est, quia nescio fundare racione vel auctoritate illud propositum, set oppositum. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt multa, tunc sunt *illa que* ponunt in numerum, set non ex hoc sequitur quod ponant in numerum.

3. nota quod v͠le po͠it in nu͠n cu͠ suo infi'ori *in marg.* MS. 33. Electio responsionis *in marg.* MS. 34. *Before* quod, *a gap* MS.

Ad illud dicitur, concedendo quod omne inferius et quodlibet suum superius distinguntur, et sunt distincta, ac distincta sunt illa utrobique, intelligendo formalem predicacionem, ad sensum Aristotelis, Primo Phisicorum, 2°. Nichil enim differt: *hominum esse album* et *hominem albari*, vel *album esse* aut *fieri hominem*, nec differt *hominem ambulantem esse*, et *hominem ambulare*. Conceditur eciam in predicacione secundum essenciam quod singulare et suum universale sunt quotlibet distincta, cum singulare sit unum, ut universale quotlibet alia individua. Non ergo sequitur: "ista sunt res distincte, vel res distincta sunt ista, ergo ista ponunt in numerum," quia, demonstrato generalissimo et singularissimo eius supposito, quotlibet res distincte sunt ista, et tamen non ponunt in numerum, cum unum eorum sit reliquum. Et ita ista sunt distincta formaliter, sed non formaliter res distincte. Nec ista sunt formaliter *ista duo* (demonstrando singulare et suum universale) set sunt *istud;* et sic differencia sunt ista ad istum sensum, quod ista differunt, et tamen nulla numeraliter differencia sunt formaliter ista: quia solum differencia formaliter vel secundum racionem sunt ista: vel, essencialiter loquendo, que differunt numeraliter inter se sunt ista, et tamen ista non sic differunt.

So I reply to the above argument thus: The Universal and its singular are distinct, yet do not form a number,

since one is the other. They are formally distinct, but not formally distinct things. They are not these two, *but* this.

Et patet quod non sequitur quod sint corpora coextensa, etsi genus corporis sit ad omnem punctum mundi cum corpore singulari, quia illud genus est quodlibet corpus singulare. Immo, ponendo quecunque distincta ponere in numerum, et sic quidlibet numerari secundum multitudinem suorum universalium, non sequitur duo corpora coextendi, nec quod in quolibet homine sunt duo animalia, scilicet species et genus; ut patet ex supradictis.

Thus we avoid the above-mentioned difficulties,

Et ex isto patet solucio argumenti Abbatis Joachim, ponentis quaternitatem in divinis, si essencia non generat: scilicet, tres personas et communem essenciam que nec gignit nec gignitur.

and we are not driven to posit four realities in God — the Essence and the Three Persons — with Abbot Joachim.

11. ○#○ *in marg.* MS. 25. *After* sequitur, quod non sint MS.

24. *Differunt.* I confess the last few lines are quite beyond my depth. I have given what I think to be the sense in the marginal note; but I cannot conceive how Wyclif can use a plural (as he must) and then declare it to be singular (*ista* and *istud*). Yet the text does not seem to be corrupt.

If we attend to the difference between formal and essential predication, and the three meanings of Number, we shall easily see what things are numerically distinct, and we can answer all the arguments given above. The Universal, taken with its singular, makes two things, but does not form a number, although their ideal essences do.

Attendendum est ergo ad predicacionem formalem, et predicacionem secundum essenciam, et ad triplicem numerum, et faciliter patet que res numeraliter distinguntur, limitato modo loquendi de posicione in numerum, quia in illius solucione stat vis varietatis in respondendo: et patet responsio ad argumenta facta pro secunda via. Nam absolute necessarium est qualescunque numeros eternos esse, ut patet de ydeis. Immo, universale positum cum unico singulari esset eadem res numero cum illo, sicut est modo, et tamen distingueretur secundum racionem; et sic essent duo, licet non ponerent in numerum, quamvis sint ydee que ponunt in numerum; nec sunt multe creature, set unica creatura. Nulla ergo ponunt | in numerum, nisi que differunt naturaliter: quod 14 b[a] est plus differre quam sola racione differre.

But the world has a Universal: in what does one differ from the other?

Set dubitatur quomodo secundum principia Aristotelis species mundi differt ab isto mundo, cum iste mundus convenit cum specie mundi in communicabilitate, iuxta principia Aristotelis.

In that God, though He has created only one singular Universe, might have created another, if He had chosen; and this one would have been also a singular of the Universal World. Aristotle says it is in that our world is known by the senses and the other only by the intellect. Grosseteste refutes the error of saying that a Universal that can have but one singular is itself a singular.

Huic autem facile est fideli respondere per hoc quod speciem mundi posset deus saluasse, producendo in toto aliam materiam vel alium mundum, vel ponendo esse infinitos mundos; licet non secundum *esse existere*. Aristoteles autem ponit formalem distinccionem penes hoc, quod iste mundus est sensibilis; set mundus universalis est intelligibilis, set non sensibilis. Et patet ex dictis quod ista est formalis differencia. Unde Lyncolniensis, primo Posteriorum, Ca° 5°, dicit quod inter errores quibus erratur assignando proprium subiectum passionis, est iste primus, quando signatur singulare, loco universalis non habentis nisi unicum suppositum in actu, ut contingit de mundo: ita quod 'esse sperice contentivum cuiuslibet parcialis locabilis' non competit primo et principaliter isti mundo, set mundo in communi. Unde iste est textus Lyncolniensis.

16. *Dubitatur.* The difficulty is here that the Universal of *the World* is not one in many, since there can be but one Universe. 35. *Lyncolniensis.* Here follows a blank of nearly two columns to the end of the leaf. Very probably this word concludes the tractate.

DE ENTE LIBRI SECUNDI

TRACTATUS PRIMUS

DE INTELLECCIONE DEI.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

Illorum que insunt deo communiter, quedam insunt sibi soli ab intrinseco, ut inmensitas, eternitas, omnisciencia, omnipotencia et cetera; que indubie non ponunt in deo nisi eius nudam essenciam, quamvis signa, quibus ipsa exprimimus, connotent confuse et secundarie res de genere quantitatis et naturalitatis. Alia tamen sunt, que anologice insunt omni persone divine et creaturis, que quamvis non ponant aliam essenciam preter deum, tamen extra deum ponunt exemplata anologice communicancia in tali communi cum deo exemplificante, cuiusmodi sunt perfeccio, bonitas, sciencia, potencia, intelligencia, volencia, ordinancia, et quotlibet similia.

Of God's attributes, some are intrinsic to Him, and belong to none else: as immensity, eternity, etc.

Others, though they do not necessarily imply other beings, imply objects which are, at least as ideal exemplars, other than God.

Prima maneries communium est quasi passio dei, quia sequitur ad divinam essenciam, sicut passio ad proprium subiectum, et secunda maneries est quasi genus anologicum, quod secundum quamdam poporcionem inest deo et creaturis. Diversitas tamen est in hoc, quod passio, proprie dicta, est natura posterior suo subiecto, non sic autem de istis numeratis; nec ista anologa sunt prius naturaliter quam deus cui autonomatice insunt, sicut genus se habet ad suum inferius, set econtra. Ideo,

The former are, as it were, properties of God, that flow from His essence: the latter exist in God and in His creatures, not as a genus properly, but analogically. But a true property is of a nature posterior to its subject; whereas in God

De Ente *deest:* Tractatus primus, Liber secundus MS. De Intelleccione Dei *deest* MS. Cap. etc. *deest; long initial I in red ink* MS. 14. 9̃i *pro* communi MS. 17. 9īu MS. 25. cū genus, *perhaps* omne genus (?) MS.

5. *Illorum.* The tractate commences on f. 47a[a] of the Trinity MS., towards the beginning.

it is not so; in Him nothing exists that is imperfect.

secundum illud quod non implicat imperfeccionem in genere vel specie, competunt talia deo, et non secundum condiciones que imperfeccionem includunt.

We shall deal first with the latter, because they seem common to all beings; and we can thence find what attributes are proper to God alone.

Et primo ergo racione communitatis, tractabitur de anologicis communibus deo et creaturis, propter facilitatem doctrine; et ex illa doctrina elicere possumus sensus illorum que deo sunt propria; ut, notata sciencia vel potencia divina communiter, faciliter cognoscitur quod est omnisciens et omnipotens; ita quecunque sunt anologice communia deo et creaturis, illa que insunt secundum summam excellencie a quo alia mensurantur.

And firstly, with the intellection of God, starting from the assumption that He is of all beings the most perfect conceivable.

Ideo, supposito quod deus sit optimum quod potest esse vel intelligi, ex superius declaratis tractabitur primo de eius intelligencia, que creditur generalior quam eius sciencia, volencia, vel potencia.

God's intellection extends to all things intelligible whatsoever. Intellection is either the most perfect of all possible mental acts, or accompanies it necessarily; therefore it must exist in God. To will, to take pleasure &c., are acts the most perfect possible, since they are necessary to bliss: and they cannot be without intellection. If there is a given attribute *a* of which the possession is better than the non-possession, and God had it not, another being might possess it, and in so far be more perfect than God.

Quod autem deus intelligit omnia intelligibilia sic ostenditur. *Intelligere* est actus perfectissimus possibilis, vel ipsum concomitans; set omne tale competit deo, quod melius est esse quam non esse; igitur esse intelligens inest deo. Assumptum patet ex hoc quod *intelligere* presupponitur ad *velle,* seu *delectari*, *gloriari*, vel *quietari*: et aliquod horum noscitur esse perfectissimum, cum summa felicitas vel beatitudo consistit in tali actu. Igitur deus habet aliquem talem actum, et per consequens intelleccionem seu cognicionem. Minor argumenti probatur sic. Da quod *a* non competit deo, et tamen melius est esse *a* quam non esse *a*, vel ens quodcunque esse non *a*: tunc quodcunque ens esse non *a*, [non] est tam bonum sicut esse *a*. Set deus est non *a*, per datum; igitur deum esse non *a* non est tam bonum, ut datum [ens] distinctum a deo, et per consequens deus non est optimum possible. Confirmatur ex hoc quod, quam bonum est deum esse, tam bonum precise est quod sit non asinus, et ita de similibus quibuscunque. Et per illud principium videtur venerabili Anselmo, protologion c° 5°, quod probari potest omne probabile de deo: et quoad maiorem, patet quod *intelligere* nullam imper-

2. propria *pro* specie MS. 16. 1ª racio *in marg.* MS. 28. non *deest* MS. 31. ens *deest* MS.

16. *Intelligit.* I have been somewhat embarrassed in writing the marginal notes here. *Know* and *understand* seem to be rather stronger expressions than Wyclif intends, and rather fitted for the treatise *De Sciencia Dei.* 28. *Non est.* The omission of *non* stultifies the whole argument.

feccionem includit, nec aliquis predictorum actuum potest esse sine *intelligere* vel *noscere.* Illum igitur qui est beatissimus, oportet intelligere vel noscere suam beatitudinem; et non dubium quin si intelligit aliquid, intelligit omne intelligibile.

Eccli. XXIII, 29. Ideo dicit scriptura ecclesiastici, 23. *Domino enim deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita; sic et post perfectum respicit omnia.* Quia aliter indubie periret religio, cum aliter vere possemus dicere cum insipiente, Ps. XCIII, 7. Psalmo 93°: *Non videbit dominus, nec intelliget deus Jacob*: sic enim dixerunt blasfemi Ierusalem, ut patet Eze. 8° Ezech. VIII, 12. ubi dicunt, "non videt nos deus, dereliquit [Dominus] terram", et Eccli. 23°, ubi supra, *omnis homo qui transgreditur lectum tuum, contempnens in animam suam,* Eccli. XXIII, 25—27. *et dicens, quis me videt? tenebre circumdant me et parietes cooperiunt me, et nemo circumspicit me: quem vereor? delictorum meorum non memorabitur altissimus.* Set sequitur: *non intelligit quoniam omnia vidit oculus illius:* Et | 47 a[b] paulo post: *Oculi domini multo plus lucidiores [sunt] super solem, circumspicientes omnes vias hominum, et profundum abissi, et hominum corda intuentes in absconditas partes.*

It is evident that intellection implies no imperfection. His perfect bliss supposes Him to be cognisant of that bliss; and if of one thing, then of all things.

Holy Writ confirms this view.

Si igitur mundus esset unum animal, et sol eius oculus, quo videret per extravisionem; cum ad omnem punctum mundi sit lumen solis, secundum perspectivos ad omnem punctum mundi videret. Multo magis igitur sol iusticie. Ideo timens deum, et habens pro constanti quod christus sit omnisciens, statueret sibi pro regula retrahente a peccato, quod homo summe laudabilis ex collacione bonorum gracie et nature, summe venerabilis ex eius parentela et horrore nequicie, summe formidabilis ex eius inevitabili et distincto examine, premiando ad summum bonos, et infinite puniendo malos: talis, inquam, homo, ubicunque fuerit peccator, prospicit singulos actus eius summe sibi presens eciam quantumcunque abdito loco fuerit, quantumcunque occulte cogitando vel agendo. Et re vera talis actualis et pura noticia faceret hominem timere peccare, propter tam internam reverenciam tantidem, cum aliis condicionibus supra tactis. Ideo propheta Psalmista psalmo 138°, postquam declaraverit infinitatem divine sciencie quoad

If the world were an animal, and the sun its eye, it could see all things, wherever the light penetrated. Now Christ is the Sun of righteousness — a man most laudable, venerable and terrible, who sees each act of every sinner: the thought of this should make us flee sin.

It is impossible to flee from the face of God, as the Psalmist says.

7. omnia *deest;* sunt agnita MS. 12. Dominus *deest* MS. 13. Eze. 23 MS; *ib.* dixit impius MS. 16. circum spexit MS. 18. eius MS. 19. sunt *deest* MS. 23. Nota *in marg.* MS.

omnes actus humanos, subdit post inpossibilitatem subterfugii hominis ab illo domino omnisciente sub hiis verbis: *Mirabilis facta est sciencia tua ex-me*, et cetera; et subdicitur, *quo ibo a spiritu tuo, et quo a facie tua fugiam? si ascendero in celum*, et cetera. Quoniam igitur homo spirat in alium, et habet eum ubicunque fuerit facialiter presentem, non mirum si cum circumstanciis predictis incuciat timorem.

Ps. CXXXVIII, 6, 7.

Again, God is the cause of all things, and ordains and governs all; and being most perfect, He must do this wisely; which could not be, unless He had cognizance of all things.

Item, ut patet ex probacione qua ostenditur deum esse, ipse est causa efficiens et finalis cuiuslibet effectus, et per consequens gubernat, ordinat, et intendit quemlibet talem effectum tamquam opus suum. Set hoc non potest optimo et perfectissimo competere, nisi sapienter, provide, et discrete faciat opus suum. Igitur sic facit quod non faceret, nisi intelligeret, cogitaret, et nosceret quomodo est agendum, igitur deus sic cognoscit, et per consequens intelligit. Non enim potest sustineri quod effectus dei provide, sapienter, aut discrete agit, et non sic deus, set casualiter, et inordinate. Cum igitur sit actus purus, sicut philosophi coacti sunt asserere, patet quod actus immanens perfectissimus natus est sibi competere: set quis, si non *intelligere*?

How can we say that there is intelligence in a creature of God, and not in God Himself? And since God is Act, and the most perfect possible, we cannot deny Him the act of Intellection.

Also, God loves all His works: therefore He must have them in His thought. He could not measure out just punishments and rewards otherwise; prayer to Him, and virtuous deeds would be of no use; all religion would perish, together with virtue.

Et confirmacio huius est, quod deus amat omnia opera sua, cum vult illa creare, quia aliter non intenderet finem in agendo. Igitur intelligit omnia, cum non sit possibile amare aut velle non cognitum. Ideo concepcio philosophorum est, quod deus et natura nihil agunt frustra, set propter finem agunt, ex 2° phisicorum. Immo clauderet contradiccionem deum iuste librare penas aut premia, nisi cognoverit merita et demerita quorumcunque: aliter eciam superfluum esset ipsum orare, bene agere, aut virtutibus intendere. Immo nulla natura ageret propter finem, et per consequens non foret accio naturalis, nisi deus attenderit et cognoverit omnia talia particularia. Et sic periret tota religio, cum omni virtute morali vel naturali, et breviter omnis accio nature, cum ipsa non potest finem intendere nisi in virtute dei. Et per hoc concludit dominus lincolniensis, in libello suo *de libero arbitrio*, quod deus nedum habet scienciam omnium universalium, set omnium singularium, allegans ad hoc illud apostoli ad

Grosseteste asserts therefore that not only all Universals, but even all singulars, are present to God's mind.

2. et ab MS. 9. 2ª racio *in marg.* MS. 22. set quis *written over erasure* MS. 30. lib'rare MS. 38, 39. lyncolniensis *in marg.* MS.

Rom. XI, 34. ro. 11º; *quis cognovit sensum domini, aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?* Et eadem sentencia patet Ps. 72º, et creberime in scriptura. Ille igitur est stolidissimus qui Ps. LXXII, 11. musitat *quomodo scit deus?* aut dubitat, *si est sciencia in excelso.*

Item, inpossibile est per se causam efficientem dare formam, nisi habuerit penes se proporcionalem, ut puta, formam eiusdem speciei per quam agit, vel elegancius, virtutem secundum quam producit: ut patet 7º methaphisice, de producione rerum ex suo simili. Set deus per se facit omnem formam positivam factibilem, igitur habet penes se racionem cuiuslibet talis; et per consequens cuiuslibet effectus factibilitas eternaliter est in deo, sicut et eius cognoscibilitas. Set impossibile est factibilitatem vel cognoscibilitatem esse sine factivitate, vel cognitivitate, que sit perfeccior, sicut accio est 47 bª dignior | passione: igitur est dare cognitivitatem eternam, et per consequens substanciam eternaliter cognitivam; set quid, si non deum? Unde per modum questionis impossibilis querit Psalmista, psalmo 93º, contra Ps. XCIII, 9—11. tales insensatos: *Qui plantavit aurem, non audiet? aut qui fixit oculum, non considerat? qui corripit gentes, non arguet, et qui docet hominem scienciam?* et concludit: *Dominus scit cogitaciones hominum, quoniam vane sunt.*

No efficient cause can produce a quality unless it have in itself either the same quality, or one superior. Therefore the intelligibility of all things exists in God; intelligibility implies intelligence to apprehend it; and where would this intelligence be, unless in God?

Set quia tota scriptura contestatur isti sentencie, et tam philosophi quam theologie racione ducti in illam consenciunt, non oportet plus insistere ad illam probandam, quia indubie deus non esset iustus vel bonus, nisi esset cognoscens et intelligens, aut quomodocunque aliter vocatur actus suus, quo ordinat, dicit, vel intendit res ad extra. Ideo oportet consentire in terminos quales significant actus nostros perfecciores, ut significent anologice vel equivoce actus dei: ut puta, quod deus intelligit, cognoscit, scit, delectatur, vult, proponit, ordinat, et sic de quotlibet aliis, que non includunt inperfeccionem. Unde philosophi considerarunt res pure materiales maxime esse coartatas, quia solum formas proprias habentes; ut patet de inanimatis. Et tales dicunt non cognitivas res; aut ut sunt res minus materiales, sic sunt magis cognitive, quia nedum formas proprias, set formas vel species apprehensorum habent

But all Scripture and philosophy agreeing in this matter, we need not insist on proving it, but admit that the terms which stand for all our most perfect acts stand also for God's attributes.

Purely material beings are most confined in their essence, and are called inanimate, having no cognition; sensitive beings are already less confined, having in

1. Ro. 2º MS. 2. Ys.? (Ps.?) 44to MS. 6. 3ª racio *in marg.* MS. 9, 10. 7º metha^ce *in marg.* MS. 24. eciam si *pro* quoniam MS.

themselves the apprehended forms of other things; sense, however, falls short of intellect, which is truly (in a sense) all those things that it represents. God therefore, being supremely immaterial, is supremely intelligent. If there is order in nature, the God of nature, cause of that order, is intelligent. Material things, most capable of change, receive such order passively, and without cognition; and as beings are less material, they tend less to receive and more to produce order. As therefore at one extremity we have a being absolutely deprived of activity and cognition, and purely passive; so at the other, God infinitely immaterial, and cognitive, knows all things eternally. That any thing is intelligible or not, or has any other qualities, depends on God's will; therefore on His cognitive act.

penes se. Ideo dicitur 2°, *De anima*, 136°, quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, tamen est quodammodo coartatus, quia solum sensibilium cognicio, quorum formas precise recipit; et intellectus vere est quodammodo omnia, ut dicitur 3° *De anima*, 37°, quia omnium singularium formas recipit, ut ipse cognoscat. Cum ergo deus sit summe immaterialis, et omnium intelligibilium formas exemplares vel raciones penes se habet (ut patebit ex sequentibus) sequitur quod sit summe intelligens. Nemo namque dicit quod natura ordinat membra corporis, et omnem rem naturalem propter finem, et deus, auctor omnis talis nature non ordinat eundem finem, cum dat omni tali nature, vim et racionem seminalem, ut sic intendat et agat. Sicut igitur res, quia materiales, sunt magis mobiles, et per consequens ordinacioni subiecte et a cognicione exempte, sic in alio extremo, ut res sunt minus materiales et minus mobiles, set motive ac ordinative, sunt magis cognitive, et per consequens, sicut fundamentum nature est summe mobile, et per consequens ordinabile est sub non gradu agencie et noscencie; sic primum principium nature, quod est summe inmateriale, summe motivum, et ordinativum, est summe cognitivum; et illa est concors sentencia omnium recte philosophancium.

Qua habita, patet quod deus eternaliter intelligit omnia, et per consequens omne quod potest intelligi, et sic deus nichil potest incipere vel desinere intelligere.

Primum patet quadrupliciter: primo ex hoc quod de quolibet significando habet volucionem vel ordinacionem: ut puta, quod illud sit, vel non sit, quod proficiat vel noceat, quod posset intelligi vel non intelligi, et sic de quibuslibet veritatibus consequentibus quodcumque intelligibile. Igitur iuxta superius declarata, pari evidencia qua intelligit aliquid, intelligit quodlibet intelligibile. Non enim est racio quod deus ordinat *hoc esse intelligibile,* et tamen non intelligit *hoc esse intelligibile* quin per idem ex nulla ordinacione respectu causati arguitur, quod illud intendit. Cum ergo omne intelligibile deus vult esse intelligibile, patet quod omne intelligibile deus intelligit.

19. sic MS. 25—26. nota conclusionem quod deus necessario intelligit eternaliter omne quod potest intelligi *in marg.* MS. 28. 1 *in marg.* MS.

19. *Fundamentum*, i. e. primal matter.

Similiter, omne quod potest intelligi, deus potest intelligere, set omne quod deus potest intelligere, de facto intelligit: ergo omne quod potest intelligi, de facto intelligit. Assumptum patet ex hoc, quod aliter creatura posset intelligere quod deus non possit intelligere; et tunc non omnem veritatem deus posset cognoscere; quia si deus posset cognoscere quod dicta creatura intelligit hoc intelligibile, tum sine dubio deus posset intelligere hoc intelligibile. Inconveniens autem est maximum quod homo intelligat quicquam quod deus non potest intelligere, et sic de noticia: quamvis autem homo creditur multa posse facere quod deus non potest facere, ut peccata, non tamen est possibile hominem scire quod deus nescit; quamvis omnis homo multa scit de se ipso, que deus nescit de se ipso, cum quicquid homo scit de seipso, illud deus scit de eodem homine. Ut, sicut homo scit mentiri, vel se mentiri
47 b[b] (quod idem | est) ita deus scit illud idem mentiri, set non potest scire se mentiri, vel scire mentiri, quod communis scola habet pro eodem. Si enim *mentiri* sumatur nominaliter in accusativo casu, tunc concedendum esset quod deus scit mentiri, quia *mentiri hominis*, set non *mentiri suum*. Et sic respondendum est ad questionem, qua queritur utrum homo scit facere quod deus nescit facere. Minor autem argumenti satis ostenditur per hoc quod deus non potest capere intelligenciam a rebus extra intellectis; quia tunc inperfecius intelligeret quam homo, qui potest quodcunque extra ipsum intelligere, sive illud possit esse, sive non possit esse, sive hoc quod capiat intelleccionem suam ab illo intellecto: multo magis igitur deus. Ymmo, si diligenter attendas, videbis quod intellectus humanus, cum sit mobilis, non possit intelligere nisi moveatur a deo ad intelligendum. Oportet igitur deum intelligere finem ad quem movetur.

If God is able to cognize everything, He must actually do so: otherwise some creature might be in this respect more perfect than He is.

And this would be most absurd.

A man may do what God cannot (for instance, sin), but not know what God cannot.

Yet he knows *of himself* what God cannot know of Himself; he lies, and knows he does; God knows the lie, but not that He lies. Therefore He knows the same thing that the man knows, i. e. *that man's lie.*

God's intellection cannot spring from things outside of him; for even man abstracts from their existence, actual or possible.

3° patet, quod necessarium sit deum intelligere omne intelligibile, eo quod necessarium est illud esse intelligibile, et deus nihil potest ignorare: igitur necessario deus scit quod hoc est intelligibile; et per consequens

As whatever is intelligible is so necessarily, God must apprehend it as such

1. 2 *in marg.* MS. 18. use *pro* se MS. 24. nota qom̃. *in marg.* MS. 35. 3ª conclusio *in marg.* MS.

21. *Scit mentiri.* A verbal juggle that cannot be rendered in English; in French it is, *savoir mentir.* This would mean here either *to know how to lie*, or *to know the act of lying.*

and eternally, both as to the future and as to the past.

deus intelligit hoc. Ex quo patet quod non potest quicquam incipere vel desinere intelligere, eo quod si scit, eternaliter scivit quod fuit intellecturus illud idem, et eternaliter sciet quod intellexit idem. Et utrobique sequitur quod eternaliter intelligit illud, cum *intelligere* non ponit in deo nisi cogitare illud cogitabile, et nec illud cogitabile esse nec posse esse.

And this must be so, since it is more perfect to be than not to be omniscient;

and if man can apprehend all beings in a vague manner, God must apprehend all, but distinctly.

4to, confirmatur idem per principium superius assumptum, scilicet quod, si sit aliquod ens, et melius sit esse illud quam non esse illud, tunc deus est illud ens: set melius est esse omnium intelligens vel omnisciens, quam esse non omnium intelligens vel omnisciens; igitur deus est huiusmodi. Si enim deus esset non omnisciens, cum omne scibile potest scire, sequitur quod esset ignorans: quod sine dubio esset inperfeccionis. Immo, cum quilibet homo scit omne scibile, licet confuse in sciendo transcendens, multo magis deus scit omne scibile; et cum non potest confuse, vel imperfecte cum ignorancia, quicquam scire, sequitur quod omne scibile distinctissime et perfectissime scit. Et tunc sine dubio, cum de omni intelligibili sit sciencia, sequitur quod omne intelligibile distinctissime intelligit.

The very fact of God's existence implies that He is cognizant of all things in the most perfect manner possible.

For if we suppose God able to know anything, and not knowing that thing actually, we imply a possible beginning of actual knowledge in Him.

Ex isto colligo quod absolute necessarium est omne intelligibile esse distinctissime intellectum a deo; quia si deus potest quodcunque dandum intelligere, tunc illud sic intelligit. Set eo ipso quod deus potest esse, potest quodcunque dandum sic intelligere. Igitur, eo ipso quod deus potest esse, potest quodcunque dandum sie intelligere Sicut igitur absolute necessarium est deum posse esse, sic absolute necessarium est deum omne intellgibile distincte intelligere. Et assumptum patet sic. Da quod deus potest intelligere hoc *a*, et adhuc non intelligit hoc *a*; et tunc oportet consequenter concedere quod deus scit quod potest intelligere hoc *a*, cum homo scit hoc de deo; et oportet concedere quod possibile est deum incipere intelligere hoc, et utrobique oportet concedere consequens quod deus eternaliter intellexit hoc, cum absolute necessarium sit ipsum esse. Et sequitur oppositum dati. Non ergo oportet plus ponere ad hoc quod deus quodcunque intelligibile intelligat, nisi quod deus sit; quia,

1. conclusio *in marg.* MS. 8. 4 *in marg.* MS. 23. Conclusio *in marg.* MS. 32. Et da MS. 34. $9te^{re}$ MS.

si aliud oportet expectare, tunc aut erit illud disposicio intrinseca deo, ut puta adquisicio actus, aut habitus, vel dimissio actus vel habitus circa rem quam deus non potest intelligere cum dato. Vel aliter esset disposicio ab extrinseco quam oportet expectare. Si primum detur, tunc deus est mobilis secundum deitatem, nunc accidentaliter magis perfectus, et nunc minus perfectus. Et cum nichil potest immediate et per se movere se ipsum, esset mobilis et perfectibilis secundum deitatem ab alio; quia notum est quod melius et perfeccius est in actu 2° apprehendere, quam habere habitum sine actu; cum habitus quicumque ordinatur ad actum, ut finem gracia cuius est. Vile igitur esset quod deus quicquam intelligeret per habitum, vel actum elicitum; quia tunc posset delectacio sua esse interrupta, quia ipse de possibili nichil intelligeret, cum prius naturaliter esset intellectivus quam intelligeret de facto, quia prius intellectivus quam haberet actum vel habitum. Et hoc requiritur per datum a falsigrapho ad hoc quod intelligat. Oportet igitur noticiam vel scienciam dei eo ipso poni, quo ponitur noscibile sine ulteriori alteracione: ut patet per philosophum, 12°, methaphisice, 53°, ubi philosophus tractat illam sentenciam. Et confirmacio huius est, quod deus non est prius intellectivus quam intelligit, quia tunc disposicio habitualis precederet actum. Set necessario eternaliter est intellectivus eciam cuiuscunque. Ex dictis igitur necessario eternaliter intelligit quidlibet. Intellectivitas enim dei pro mensura priori
48a[a] actu intelligendi foret disposicio previa | voluntatis agentis. Nemo enim dubitare debet an deus non recipit penes se formas rerum per quas, ut similitudines sibi accidentaliter inexistentes, quicquam intelligit.

Even were the cause of this beginning essential to Him, still He would be subject to change, now less and now more perfect; which is unworthy of God.

'To be capable of intellection' cannot, in God, precede the act of intellection itself.

Set limitando sensui equivocationis predicte, difficultas est utrum deus primo intendat intelligere quam actualiter intelligit? Et patet ex dictis quod, cum quelibet intelligencia dei sit absolute necessaria, quod non

As the intention to think of anything can only precede the actual thought when

2. intu[ta] MS. 19. fl̃igpho MS.

19. *Falsigrapho.* Wyclif probably means here the supposed author of the false supposition which he is refuting. 29. *Previa.* After this word, a leaf is cut out before 48a[a]. There are a few marginal notes: the words "ens doce . .", "R°", "2m dubium", "R", are in margin. 48a[a], goes on as below. 31. *Per quas.* 'Agit' is omitted; or perhaps understood.

there is deliberation and actual non-thought, the intention and the thought are in God one and the same.

prius intendit deus intelligere quam intelligit; set intendendo intelligit et intelligendo intendit. Intelligendo enim, non precedit actum intrinsecum, nisi ubi est consiliacio et ignorancia futuri possibilis; quod cum non potest deo competere, concludendum est quod eque primo et quicquam intelligit, idem intendit intelligere, et illa intendencia est illa intelligencia. Simul et omnis intelligencia dei est eius intendencia.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Three objections to this. (1) If we make a distinction between God and His intellection, we may as well make one between Him and this immensity and eternity. (2) Anselm says that God apprehends Himself and His creatures by the same intellectual act. (3) It would follow that in man, every act would be a relation. (1) I answer that between God's essence and a Divine person there is a distinction, but merely formal; while immensity, etc. are attributes of God *as* God;

Set arguitur tripliciter contra istas applicaciones signorum. Primo per hoc quod pari evidencia immensitas et eternitas distinguerentur ab eo, cum potest cognosci deum esse, discernendo quod sit eternus vel immensus. 2° per hoc quod cum Anselmus, monologion 33°, movet dubium utrum deus eodem verbo dicit se et creaturas; ille tenet quod sic, et faciunt moderni doctores communiter. Item pari evidencia verbum hominis et omnis actus anime foret relacio ad sensum equivocum.

Ad primum videtur michi quod sit distinctio formalis vel raciones inter essenciam et personam, inter universale et suum inferius. Ita est distinccio racionis inter personam et ipsam inmensitatem; non sic quod deus non sit inmensitas, eternitas, bonitas, et cetera; set quia alia racione inmensus, cum tamen racione qua est deus est inmensus, set non econtra; in omni racione qua est deus, est eternus, set non econtra. Et eciam ut sic est inmensus et infinitus. Non igitur est distinccio realis inter deum et eius inmensitatem, set inter deum et

1, 2. intelligendo *pro* intendendo MS. 3. consiliacō MS. 9. Capitulum secundum *deest* MS. 10. 3ˣ obieccio *in marg.* MS. 14. un̄ *pro* cum MS. 15. ultra *pro* utrum MS. 16. .1. *pro* ille MS. 18. actus *deest* MS.

9. There is no indication that Cap. II in begins precisely here; but Cap. 2m is written at the top of leaf 48aª, and I have chosen the division I thought most probable. 12. *Distinguerentur.* Wyclif seemed hitherto to be following orthodox lines; it is in the answers to the objections that we find his peculiar doctrines set forth. The Ideal World is the Intellection of God, and therefore in a sense distinct from Him; whilst immensity is an attribute of God's essence.

relacionem quamcunque est distinccio realis, modo quo relacio est res. Ideo racio diversitatis illarum est in hoc, quod immensitas et eternitas predicta, que constant quantitatem et qualitatem, non dicuntur ad aliud, sicut relacio, set ad se. Ideo tradit Augustinus pro regula quod deus est quicquid ad se dicitur, et excipit relacionem a predicacione de deo.

for they do not imply any other being but God alone, and therefore are not relative attributes.

Quoad secundum, dicitur quod Anselmus intelligit verbum intencione absoluta. Et certum est quod non est dare verbum absolutum in deo preter secundam personam. Si autem intelligeret per verbum, vel diccionem qua deus dicit creaturas ipsam relacionem dicentis ad deum iudicis, concederet ad illum sensum plura esse in deo, cum ponit relaciones distingui a deo, ut superius allegatum est. Ideo nulli dubium quin, sicut catholice concedi potest quod est dare relacionem eternaliter [inter] personas divinas absolute necessariam, que quidem relacio non est deus, sic catholice concedi potest quod est dare tales differencias vel intelligencias in deo, que sunt relaciones distincte a divina essencia.

(2) Anselm must have meant the person of the Word, as an absolute reality. Had he meant the word by which creatures have being, he must, as has been shown, have admitted that in God there are many Words.

Ideo altercacio que consistit in methaphisica stat in equivocacione significationis terminorum. Nec est illa significacio insolita: quia sive intelligantur per verba secundum que sunt morum pervicacie quam mundus sensibilis intendencie ipsius secundum deitatem, sive veritates necessitate patet quod oportet ponere illa esse multa, eterna, et distingui a deo. Secundum illum sensum intelligendus est doctor profundus, ponens intelligenciam et scienciam divinam causari a rebus ipsius posterioribus in natura, quia indubie non caperet veritatem, nisi intelligendo relaciones dei ad intellecta.

8. Avicenna MS. 11, 12. disc^{am} MS. 13. iudic' MS. 17. inter *deest* MS; *ib.* necessarium MS. 21. est stat MS. 24. proma^{cie} MS. 25. intendē^{e} MS.

13. *Iudicis.* The text is no doubt corrupt here, and towards the end of the paragraph, which I have puzzled over in vain. 18. *Non.* This word ought, I think, to be omitted; but the text, even with this correction, would still be hopeless. What Wyclif means here is, if I mistake not, that "The Word is an absolutely necessary relation in God, and is God; but there are other relations (between God and the creatures which He eternally sees as possible) that exist in God eternally, and *yet are not God.* I underline these last words, since they embody Wyclif's idea of an eternal world of Ideas, neither God nor creatures, but prototypes of all that has been, is, or is to be created.

(3) We cannot argue from what is in God to what is in man. In man the act of thinking is an accident distinct from his substance; and as no accident can exist in God, we can but call His intellection of creatures a relation; and if this is vague, no wonder, since the perfection of His being transcends all language, and we have no positive concept of God, but negative, as also for all superior entities, that Aristotle calls *intelligences*.

Ad tercium patet quod non sequitur, quia in creaturis est dare unum formale distinctum a substancia preter relacionem, quod sit verbum vel actus. Ideo et termini significant tale principaliter connotando relacionem. In deo autem non est universale aliquod ens, nisi substancia dei, naturalis relacio. Ideo distinguendo talia a deo, non invenitur quid distinctum talia nomina significarent, nisi talem relacionem; et sic concedunt de talibus ad sensum expositum predicata relacionum. Nec mirum si sic equivocentur cum nominibus significantibus deum cum anologica connotacione creature, quia deficiunt lingue in eius narracione propter excellenciam sui *esse*; ut patet per auctorem de causis, proposicione secunda. Nec mirum; quia nomina imponuntur rebus a suis proprietatibus, set nullam proprietatem positivam de deo concipimus, set anologice communes vel negativas. Unde super nos spiritus creatos vocat Aristoteles ab actibus suis propriis intellectivis (sicut et a com- 48a[b] muni diccione qui est *intelligere*); vocat significanter intelligencias, ut patet 12° methaphisice 51: et illum modum loquendi habet auctor de causis communiter.

This word intelligence, however, has a different meaning when applied to God and to creatures; in the former it connotes only essence and relation; in the latter, it is an accident under the category of action. This answers all similar quibbles respecting God's knowledge, will, ordination, and predestination. The thoughts of God are the things that He eternally intends to be.

Et certum est quod intelligencia non personaliter univoce inest sibi et creaturis, quia in eo non dicit nisi essenciam vel relacionem, et in creaturis dicit actum accidentalem de genere accionis. Et ita equivocacio nominanda est pro alteracione de quiditate eorum qui insunt deo: ut puta de divina sciencia, volencia, ordinancia, predestinancia, et similibus. Patet autem fundacio formalis talium ex quot [libet] dictis doctorum, et videtur psalmista illam intendere, psalmo 32°, ubi sic: "Consilium autem domini in eternum manet, cogitaciones cordis eius a generacione in generacionem." (Ps. XXXII, 11.) Cogitaciones autem dei sunt eius intendencie eterne. Vide psalmo 118°: "Principium verborum tuorum veritas;" (Ps. CXVIII, 160.) verbum absconditum essencialiter eructatum est via, veritas, et vita. Io. 14. (Io. XIV, 6.) Et ipsum est principium omnium aliorum verborum in deo.

18. intelli[is] MS. 19. ϑī *or* ϑr MS. 19, 20. signat' intelligat MS. 24. in creaturis et MS. 27. libet *deest* MS. 36. Ro. *pro* Io. MS.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

Ulterius restat discutere de primo intellectus obiecto, utrum sit ens in communi, vel intelligibile in communi, vel aliud communius. Et videtur quod sit ens intelligibile; cum claudit contradiccionem esse communius ente, eo quod communius datum non superaddens ens in communi — non per ens, set ens — est commune ad omne ens. Igitur non superaddit ens in commune per illud datum, cum illud includitur in ente. Et cum intelligibile sit passio entis, quia omni enti et soli per se convenit, sequitur quod intelligibile sit equum subiectum intellectus cuiuslibet; hoc enim patet. Hoc idem patet de racione. Nam si intellectus intelligit quicquid, tunc illud est intelligibile. Et quia . . . . . cum claudit contradiccionem aliquod intelligibile esse intellectum a deo. Et patet conclusio.

What is the premordial object of the intellect — Being? — or the Intelligible, or anything more universal? I say, Intelligible Being; for there is nothing more universal. 'Intelligible' has a signification as wide as 'Being', and is its primordial attribute.

Contra istud tripliciter: primo sic. Intelligibile est communius quam ens. Igitur non est eius passio nec eius primum obiectum intellectus. Assumptum sic. Omne ens est intelligibile, et non econtra. Igitur intelligibile est commune et superius ente per consequencia[m] per hoc principium: idem superius a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequencia.

Objections. (1) 'Intelligible' is more universal than 'Being'; therefore it is neither its first attribute nor the first object of the intellect. For every being is intelligible, and not *vice versâ*.

Hic quadruplex responsio. Prima concedit quod omne intelligibile est ens, quia ad minimum habet *esse* obiectivum in intellectu; ut chimera, mons aureus, et multa alia, que non habent actuale *esse*, vel *esse existere*. Et in illam sentenciam concordant multâ dicta antiquorum, et facilitates loquendi, unde ista concederet quod omne intelligibile est ens, quia est ens actuale vel ens potenciale, vel ad minimum ens intelligibile; et illa ampliacio intelligitur racionalis.

We may answer that whatever is intelligible is a being — at least existing in the mind: actual, possible, or merely intelligible, i. e. *ens racionis*.

Secunda via dicit quod solum illud quod actualiter est, est ens; et illa est bipartita, ut aliqui dicunt, quod omne quod est in alico instanti est. Aliqui tamen, cum quibus ego, dicunt quod omne quod est, fuit, vel erit, est in eternitate, vel tempore suo; et utraque via negat

Or say that only what actually exists at some moment is a being, either only at the time when it exists, or (as I assert) eternally as a

1. Ca^{m} 3^{m} *in marg.; initial U in red ink* MS. 19. subiectum MS. 31. aliud *pro* ad MS. 32. alia *pro* illa MSs. 35. ens Unl^{x} *in marg.* MS.

14. *Quia.* There is no gap in the MS. but I conceive that some words are omitted here.

past or future entity, temporally as a present one.

We say that it is impossible for anything else to be intelligible, for the word 'intelligible' signifies a *thing*; that is, some *being*, and we do not admit that anything else deserves that name.

quod intelligibile communius est, quia tunc de facto communicaretur pluribus vel superhabundanter super ens, quod est falsum; cum impossibile sit aliquid communicari aliter, nisi de tanto communicetur enti. Et constat quod claudit contradiccionem aliquem terminum transcendere illum terminum, ens, in significacione; quia, si terminus significat aliquod signatum, tunc signat rem vel ens quod significatur. Et sic claudit contradiccionem terminum signare dandum significatum, nisi ut sic significet ens. Non igitur sequitur isti vie, si aliquod sit ens, illud est intelligibile, et non econtra; igitur *esse intelligibile* est communius quam est ens; set oportet capere quod non, si aliquod est, quod est intelligibile, et illud idem est ens; quod non est falsum.

This, however, does not remove the difficulty; since we have some intelligible things that are not (in our doctrine) beings, 'Intelligible' must be more universal than 'Being'. But if we take Being in the wider sense of the first answer, we shall easily find a way out. The distinction between actual and purely intelligible Being (this pure intelligibility being in God's mind) is universally admitted by all the ancients, and the most famous theologians.

Ista tamen responsio non tollit quin *esse intelligibile* sit superius quam *esse*, cum omne *esse* sit intelligibile, et non econtra: et omne tale supponitur esse prius. Et certum est quod nullo genere prioritatis, si non superioritate. Et sic omne intelligibile esset communius ente; quod est contradiccio. Probabile igitur videtur michi ampliare ens, ut dicit prima responsio; et tunc clarescunt vie faciles ad loquendum conformiter: ut puta quod intelligibile sit passio intellecti cum aptitudine ut intellectum intelligatur. Et omnis aptitudo presupponit illud cuius est *posse* vel possibilitas, non quidem secundum *esse existere*, set secundum *esse intelligibile*, vel saltem secundum *esse intencionale*. Unde *existere* non est synonomum cum *esse*, set longe inferius, quia est *existere* | in proprio genere. (48 b[a]) Set prius oportet quod creatura habeat *esse intencionale* vel *intellectuale* in deo, iuxta illud Io. primo, "quod factum est in ipso vita erat" (Io. I, 3, 4.). Et sic intelligunt antiqui doctores concordanter. Unde doctor profundus, li° primo, ca° 17°, "Reliqua vero intelligibilia que non sunt deus, infinita secundum patrum senteciam, duplex *esse* habent, scilicet *esse intelligibile* et *esse existere*, et secundum primum *esse* precedunt quodammodo intellectum divinum". Et illi modo loquendi innititur consequenter, nec memini me legisse scriptum completum alicuius doctoris nobilis, quin explicite vel saltem inplicite inculcat illam senteciam. Nec mirum, quia natura docet sic loqui, sicut et multiplex auctoritas et sensus compositus est a

This wide sense of Being should be admitted by all.

34. 11° *pro* vero MS; *ib.* inf~ MS. 23. cum aptitudinem (!) MS.

quolibet catholico accipiendus. Quis namque dubitat, quin ampliantes *esse* ad quodlibet quod fuit vel erit, concipiunt *esse* communi[us] quam illi qui restringunt ens ad illud quod solum nunc est? 2°, illi qui ampliant ens ad omne possibile vere esse, et solum tale, excedunt 2os priores. 3°, illi qui ampliant ens ad omne intelligibile videntur ulterius et quantum est possibile ampliare. Nec dubium quin iuxta antiquos verbum communissimum fuit *esse*, secundum quod tamquam amplicativum sunt quelibet alia resolubilia; ut si aliquid potest, tunc est potens; si intelligitur, tunc est intellectum: et sic de ceteris; quia *posse* et *intelligi* sunt proprietates superaddite essencie. Cum ergo ens non potest una vice esse communius, et alia vice minus commune, patet quod semper est commune ad omne possibile, et per consequens ad omne intelligibile. Si enim aliquid potest commune [cuilibet] esse, potest communicari; et [si] nunc non communicatur, tunc *esse* potest incipere sibi competere. Quod est contradiccio, quia eternaliter communicabatur sibi in racione ydeali. Ymmo ens communicatur omni existenti in alico tempore preterito vel futuro, et hoc absolute necessario, quamvis contingenter secundum *esse existere*. Nec potest esse transcendens *esse* una vice communius, et alia vice minus commune quoad actualem existenciam suorum inferiorum; quia sicut deus semper scit omnia, quamvis non semper omnia sint scibilia, sic ens semper communicat se omnibus in quocunque tempore existentibus, quamvis ipsa non participent ente, nisi in tempore sue existencie.

Being is more universal, if it includes all past and future things; still more, if taken to include all things that may possibly exist, and most universal, if made to mean whatever can be an object of thought. Certainly the ancients understood it in the widest sense: the Possible, the Intelligible, meant what *is* possible, what *is* intelligible; these latter are attributes supperadded to bare entity. We cannot shift our standpoint and say that Entity is now more universal, and now less, without falling into self-contradiction.

2° sic arguitur contra dictum de primo obiecto intellectus: inintelligibile, melius deo, et multa talia possunt intelligi, igitur non solum intelligibile potest intelligi; et per consequens intelligibile non est primum et adequatum obiectum intellectus. Assumptum arguitur primo de inintelligibili: nam capta tali proposicione "inintelligibile est", ipsa satis intelligitur esse inpossibilis pro suo significato; igitur eius partes intelliguntur pro suis significatis. Cum igitur subiectum significat inintelligibile, ex quo tota proposicio significat primarie inintelligibile esse, sequitur quod inintelligibile intelligitur per subiectum, quia aliter sine dubio subiectum non significat

(2) We can think not only of the Intelligible, but of the Unintelligible, of something better than God, &c.; therefore the Intelligible is not the first object of our intellect. For when we say: "*The Unintelligible exists* is an impossible proposition", we

3. -us *deest* MS. 7. unir' MS. 14. coie MS. 17. c[1] *pro* commune MS.; *ib.* cuilibet *deest* MS.; *ib.* si *deest* MS.

evidently know what the subject of the proposition means, and so it is an object of thought. And many other similar quibbles are made to the same end. Some answer, admitting this, and saying that the Unintelligible, when thought of by me, becomes intelligible, being thought of as 'my inability to understand it'; so that we think of the Unthinkable, the Unmeaning, the Nothing. It would follow that man knows far more than God, since his mental activity extends to where God's does not. And again, take the expression; *Understanding all things most distinctly and more perfectly than God;* if any man knows the meaning of this, this 'understanding &c.' is in his mind. This view, besides, entails many other absurdities.

inintelligibile. Et per tales capciones probantur quod melius deo potest cogitari: et ita de multis similibus.

Unde aliqui concedunt omnia talia, concedentes quod non solum inintelligibile potest intelligi, set quamvis non potest intelligi, intelligitur a me; et per consequens 'quod ego non possum intelligere' intelligitur a me. Et ita conceditur quod precise illud quod potest intelligi intelligo ego, eo quod omne quod intelligo potest intelligi; et tamen aliud quam potest intelligi intelligo, sicut et omne quod potest intelligi intelligo; et cum ille terminus, ens, significat omne significabile, sequitur quod qualibet cognicione transcendenti cogitatur incogitabile, insignificabile, non ens. Et cum cuiuslibet intellectivitas sit eo melior quo plura potest intelligere, sequitur quod quilibet homo sit infinitum intelligencior deo, quia infinitum plura quam deus potest intelligere, potest ipse intelligere, et de facto intelligit. Ymmo sequitur de possibili, iuxta capcionem predictam, quod Socrates omne intelligibile distinctissime intelligit, ymmo infinitum perfeccius quam deus potest intelligere. Nam non est racio diversitatis significanda, quare Socrates intelligit per illum terminum *quod nemo potest intelligere*, quin per idem ille terminus compositus omne intelligibile distinctissime et perfectissime significat sibi omne intelligibile distintissime, perfectissime, et qualitercunque terminus significat sibi, sic ipse intelligit. Igitur et per idem omne intelligibile infinitum perfeccius quam deus potest intelligere significatur Socrati per illum terminum compositum. Et cum omne significatum | sibi intendit, 48b
sequitur conclusio. Non enim est dare racionem quare adverbium significat *bene* vel *male*, et sic de aliis adverbiis quibuscunque, nec est maior racio in hoc, quod proposicio significat aliquid quod non potest intelligi, quam est in hoc: *a* significat *qualiter nichil potest significare*, significatur per *a*; igitur pars eius significat qualiter nichil potest significare, et sic de similibus quibuscunque.

Quis enim concederet quod *a* significat omnia que *b* significat, et infinite plura, et *b* significat omnia que *a* significat, et infinite plura? tunc planum est quod omnia que *a* significat, significat *b*, et econtra; et sic tantum significata per *a* significantur per *b*, et econtra. Tamen alia quam plura significantur per *a* quam per *b*. Unde

26. et ille MS.

sic subtilisant aliqui per capciones quod concedunt hec 2° simul vera: nulla que significantur per *a* significantur per *b*, posito quod *b* sit iste terminus compositus: nulla que significantur per *a*. Et tamen sequitur: *hoc est non intelligibile*, ergo, *hoc non est intelligibile*, habent concedere quod eodem significato hoc est intelligibile, et hoc non est intelligibile.

Similiter, iuxta capciones predictas, signo per *a* unum cogitabile, quod si tu intelligeres, tu esses asinus; et pono quod tu intelligas illud. Probo possibilitatem casus. Nam ille terminus compositus, ens, quod si tu intelligeres, tu esses asinus, significat ens generale: ponitur, quia aliter non concederetur quod *a* significat quod ipsum non potest significare, cum eque intelligendo istam proposicionem et singulas eius partes, quod si ego intelligerem, ego essem asinus, intelligitur a me, sicut intelligo aliquam proposicionem significandam. Signo ergo illum terminum sic significantem per *a*, et pono quod tu intelligas *a* pro suo significato, sicut de facto intelligis, negando casum.

Take another case. Let A be *a term such that if you know its meaning, you are an ass.* According to the above position, a man knows the meaning of every term; therefore he knows the meaning of A; and the consequence follows, as it seems.

Et videtur tunc sequi quod tu sis asinus. Et si tu cogitares significatum per *a*, tu esses asinus; et hoc facis: igitur, et cetera. Sic enim probant sophiste quidlibet probandum. Infinita talia potest quis excogitare contra corruptos et abhominabiles, in suis studiis consentientes quod melius deo cogitari potest.

By this means sophists prove anything, and infinite cases of the same kind might be propounded against the doctrine.

Expedit autem arguendo contra tales incipientes, supponere quod non fiat sophisma anteponendo vel postponendo terminum respectu talium verborum "significatur", "cogitatur", et cetera: ut, si *a* significat *b* vel aliquod significabile, tunc *b* significatur ab *a*, et est significabile: hoc enim directe fuit concorditer concessum ab antiquis sapientibus.

We must suppose that when one term means another, the other means the former; and this puts an end to all such sophisms.

3° arguitur contra concedentes quod melius deo cogitari potest. Peto illum modum loquendi, quod omne intelligibile habet *esse* intelligibile. Arguitur sic: si magis deo cogitatur, sit *a*: et quero utrum *a* habet *esse exis-*

If any thing better than God can be thought of, does it really exist in fact, or only in thought?

17, 18. σig° 9° MS. 27. arido MS.

8. *Similiter.* The text of the preceding paragraph is too corrupt to make out; but its general meaning may be gathered by what follows. 12. *Ens generale.* We are supposed in the theory attacked to know the meaning of everything, in so far as it has universal entity.

If the former, it is God, since 'God' means the best of possible beings. If the latter, it cannot be thought of as better than God, who exists in fact.

tere vel solum *esse intelligibile;* si primo modo, tunc *a* est deus, quia quicquid quod existit quọd melius est esse quam non esse, illud est deus quem nos colimus, ut suppono. Et certum est quod non in quantum ille cogitatur, melius deo cogitatur. Si *a* solum sit intellectum, cum melius sit esse in re infinitum bonum et intellectum simpliciter, quam esse solum intellectum, sequitur quod deus noster sit melior *a.* Non ergo propter cogitationem *a* sequitur quod melius deo cogitatur.

Again, the word, God, standing for any god, and consequently for A (a being better than our God) A would be infinitely superior to Him, if A were thinkable.

This thought would destroy all happiness in Heaven.

Item, ille terminus, deus, significat infinitos deos, et per consequens omnem deum cogitabilem, cum *a* deus potest cogitari. Sequitur quod ille terminus, deus, significat deum. Et sic non contingeret intelligere deum simpliciter *a,* nisi intelligendo infinitum meliorem deum domino nostro. Et assumptum patet ex hoc quod infiniti dii significantur per illum terminum, *infiniti dei*, et omnia significata termini communis pluralis significant suum singulare: igitur et cetera. Set data questione inquietaretur animus noster, eciam in patria, in deo nostro; set continue cogitaret et sciret deum esse meliorem; quod esset frustra et impossibile, et per consequens deus non principiat tale cogitatum.

God, the Most Wise, cannot think anything better than Himself; how then should it be possible for a fool to have the concept: 'Something better than God?'

Item, quam bonum deum potest insipiens vel infidelis cogitare, potest et sapiens, et specialiter deus sapientissimus. Set est dare optimum deum quem aliquis sapiens potest cogitare; igitur et quem insipiens potest cogitare. Assumptum patet ex hoc quod aliter stultus racione stulticie sue potest cogitare quod deus non potest. Et minor patet ex hoc quod deus Israel est optimus quem rectus corde potest cogitare: ymmo sapientissimus cogitat esse deum optimum cogitabilem, per illum terminum, deum optimum cogitabilem, sicut stultus. Nec valet dicere quod dare non est deum optimum cogitabilem; tum quia est dare terminum compositum significantem *deum optimum cogitabilem*, tum eciam et potencia | intellectiva creata est limitata a deo quoad [49 a] veritatem et subiectum maximum et adequatum, sicut quoad actum. Ideo certum est quod [habetur] per exponentes quod deus noster est deus optimus cogitabilis; quia aliter esset melior deus qui potest cogitari.

3. esse non MS. 19. inquietaretur MS. 25. q̂m MS. 33. deus optimus MS. 38. habetur *deest* MS.

Item, omne enthymema tenet per medium: igitur oportet dare medium per quod tenet illa consequencia: *Hoc intelligitur pro quocunque significato*: *igitur magis deo intelligitur*, quia pari evidencia posset concedi quod non sit intelligibile, quum in quantum illud intelligitur, magis deo intelligitur. Set hoc medium non sufficit, *hoc est vel potest esse magis deo*, quia iuxta prius probata nihil potest esse magis deo, eo quod aliter quidlibet esset magis deo in intellectu; nec sufficit hoc medium quod *hoc intelligitur esse magis deo*, quia iuxta probata superius, si aliquid potest intelligi esse magis deo, quidlibet *esse* est necessario a deo intellectum esse magis deo. Tunc veritate talis medii sequeretur, quod in tantum quod aliquid intelligeretur ab alico, *magis deo*, *et minus deo* intelligeretur ab eodem, quod communiter conceditur, et contra istud sequitur quod quelibet intelligencia creature sit immensa, quia tam extensa ut intelligencia dei: si enim aliqua esset finita, tunc terminaretur ad obiectum sibi adequatum, cum actus sit eo extensior, quo suum obiectum adequatum est amplius. Set iuxta hanc viam non est dare obiectum adequatum cuiusquam intellectus, ergo nec eius magnitudinem terminatam.

If we take the enthymema; *A (signifying any term whatever) has a meaning; therefore, 'something greater than God' is a term that has meaning:* there must be a midde proposition understood. This may be either: *A is something greater than God* (which is self-contradictory, as has been proved); or, *A is something understood to mean 'greater than God'*; and this too has already been refuted; and to conceive it would require infinite intelligence in a creature.

Similiter ex illo sequitur [quod] quodlibet signum et quilibet actus intelligendi foret cuilibet synonomus, quod confunderet totam doctrinam et capacitatem hominum, ut constat. Et consequencia patet ex hoc, quod quilibet terminus, quantumcunque singularis, significat omne quod intelligitur esse suum significatum; set necessario quidlibet intelligitur a deo esse quidlibet; igitur quidlibet terminus significat quidlibet, et per idem quidlibet actus senciendi foret summe communis, sicut et actus intelligendi.

This doctrine, moreover, would make every word and thought of ours synonymous with every other.

Similiter, quam communicabile est obiectum intellectus, tam magna est suo modo vis intellectiva, quia aliter non esset medium ad probandum intellectum excedere sensum infinite, non quia infinitum plura potest perfeccius capere quam sensus, set immense

This doctrine would imply that our intellect has infinite power. For if it could only grasp things of the senses, it would

1. omne eptı^ma MS, 12. intellectu MS. 16, 17. quilibet MS. 18. fi^a MS. 20. subiectum MS. 24. quod *deest* MS. 27. contra MS. 28. simV MS.

24. *Similiter*. I cannot understand this argument at all. Possibly it is corrupt or mutilated (see *quidlibet terminus* etc.).

have *x* power: if twice as many, then 2 *x*, and so on. If then it can grasp not only all beings but all Not-Beings, all things intelligible and intelligible, and all that are neither the one nor the other: and so on without end: then our intellect must have infinite power.

communicabile est obiectum intellectus; igitur et vis intellectiva est inmensa. Si enim solum sensibilia sufficeret capere, esset alicuius capacitatis; si in 2^{lo} plura eque perfecte, et illa esset 2^{le} capacitatis: cum igitur non sit dare terminum usque ad quem precise potest capere, sequitur quod sit illimitate virtutis, ut superius tangitur, tam de multitudine intellectorum, quam de perfeccione intelligendi. Nam non solum ens potest intelligere, set tam ens, quam non ens; nec solum intelligibile, set tam intelligibile quam inintelligibile; nec solum intelligibile vel inintelligibile, set aliud quam intelligibile vel inintelligibile; et sic [in] infinitum, ut superius tactum est.

We reach the same conclusion by comparing the mind with the will. A will that could attain any object would be of infinite strength, and omnipotent. And likewise a mind that could attain any object would be infinitely powerful, and omniscient. If our intelligence is finite, it must have certain fixed limits; but according to this theory, it has none.

Similiter, si esset *a* una voluntas operativa, de qua esset verum, quod si vult quicquam operari, tunc operatur illud quante vult, in *a* vis esset inmensa, quia omnipotens. Igitur per idem, si sit una vis intellectiva de qua est verum quod si vult quicquam aut intelligit, et *c* id sit intellectum, sequitur quod illa sit inmensa quoad intellectivitatem, quia omnisciens: set sic est de qualibet virtute intellectiva: igitur, et cetera. Et hoc videtur habere colorem, si infinitum perfecte potest mens creata intelligere. Si enim esset finita intelligencia, tunc esset significandus gradus, quod est tante intellectiva et non plus. Consequens falsum, quia est plus quam infinite, ymmo plus quam deus intellectiva, iuxta deducta superius ex opinione. Nam per illum terminum, *plus quam deus potest intelligere*, intelligit plus quam deus potest intelligere, et per illum terminum *perfeccius quam deus potest intelligere*, ubi adverbium *perfeccius* significat adverbialiter, cogitat animus cui ille terminus significat plus perfecte quam deus potest intelligere, cum sic notatur per signum, ad cogitandum

This has driven some to assert that our soul is of infinite capacity, giving the above reasons. But they are worthless, for there are many limits in the mental acts of creatures, as God's

notatum. Propter illa enim sophismata, putant aliqui quod anima sit capacitatis infinite, confirmantes ex hoc quod deum infinite potest capere, et infinita distincte intelligere. Set evidencia non valet, cum quelibet creatura capit deum modo suo, et quelibet vis anime est limitata per finem superiorem quoad obiectum, quoad gradum necessitaccionis actus, et sic de omnibus racionibus eius que sumuntur per deum; quia sapiencie | 11° Sap. XI, 21. 49a^b

12. in *deest* MS. 34. notatur MS. 35. cōpacit̃ MS. 41. 5° MS.

dicitur de deo quod omnia disponit in mensura, numero, et pondere; nec sufficit creatura capere deum secundum ultimum sue noscibilitatis, quod est comprehendere; quia hoc solius dei est, qui omne verum potest de se cognoscere. Creatura autem, si omnia distincte cognoscit, hoc est ex unione cum deo illustrante ipsam sicut idem punctus luminis irradiat puncta adiecta. Comprehendere omnem aut noscenciam eius secundum ultimum sue noscibilitatis, quia soli deo proprie competit, quamvis creature dicuntur apprehensores ad alium sensum, quoniam secundum ultimum sue potencie cognicione quicquam cognoscunt.

providence has ordained. The most perfect knowledge of God cannot, in a creature, attain to comprehension.

Item, cum ille terminus, deus, significat iuxta illam viam, infinitos deos, sequitur quod sit terminus *a* specialiter propter speciem quam primo significat: sequitur quod est dare speciem dei priorem naturaliter illo deo. Consequens claudit contradiccionem iuxta superius declarata, eo quod quelibet species nedum est prior natura suo singulari, set est causans quodlibet eius singulare, ut finis gracia cuius est, et sic componit quodammodo quodlibet singulare. Que aliena sunt deo; nec potest tali speciei aptari genus vel racio speciei cum alico alio. Et per idem sequitur quod omne signum generis non esset, [nec] certitudo in locucionibus hominum, cum utrobique esset summa confusio significacionum, ut tactum est. Si enim ille terminus, deus, significet multos deos, hoc est quia multa significat, quorum quodlibet intelligitur (vel est intelligibile) esse deus. Set constat, iuxta hanc viam, quod omne ens intelligitur esse omne ens. Igitur quilibet terminus transcendenter significat; et sic non dicetur causa quare unus terminus est species, vel huiusmodi universale, vel vere predicabilis. Ideo defectus vel modus predicandi seu significandi non exigit ab illo termino, deus, quod sit qualecunque universale: et consequentes deducciones sunt de divina intelligencia. Ipse enim intelligit quicquid creatura intelligit, et sic nedum intelligit infinite plus quam intelligit, set in-

The theory implies that God is a general term, standing for an infinity of individual Gods.

This cannot be; for then any singular God would be naturally posterior to the Universal, which causes it, as has been demonstrated; but this is contrary to the nature of God, and would entail utter confusion as to the doctrine of genera and species.

Many other absurdities besides would follow thence.

God would know what He does not know.

3. ut *pro* nec MS. 24. nec *deest* MS. 33. pre𝔤ı𝔤ⁱ MS.; *ib.* exivit (?) MS. 35. conferens MS. 37. infi¹' MS.

3. *Nec.* I think that the end of the sentence justifies me in making this change, without which there would be palpable self-contradiction. 7. *Comprehendere.* This last sentence is evidently corrupt.

telligit illud quod ipse non potest intelligere; et cum quod intelligit cognoscit, sequitur: cognoscit non cognitum; et ita scitum et cognitum est non scitum et non cognitum, quia deus intelligit non cognoscibile iuxta hanc viam. Et tamen nichil intelligit, nisi vel in se vel in ydea eterna secundum *esse* intelligibile, ut patet ex dictis. Sequitur quod sit ydea non cognoscibilis, et sic aliquod eternum sub racione qua ydea non cognoscibilis, et per consequens sub racione qua intelligibile foret inintelligibile. Si igitur malum non habet ydeam in deo, cum non haberet ydeam secundum *esse* intelligibile, ut sic, repugnat ipsum habere ydeam. Si enim quodcunque dandum intelligitur, tunc ut sic habet *esse.* Set repugnat formaliter inintelligibile habere *esse existere:* igitur relinquitur quod habeat ut sit solum *esse* intelligibile, et per consequens de quanto intelligitur est intelligibile. Et illa racio daret fidem cuilibet non eronee vacanti in supposicione materiali signorum; ut multi non penetrantes ultra signum, per vim cogitandi concedunt se intelligere intelligibile, i. e. terminum talem: quia tam repugnans esset contemplacio rei [in] intelligibilis quam repugnans esset contemplacio hominis non risibilis. Intelligibilitas enim est passio consequens quamcumque rem, quantumlibet extense loquendo de re, ut patet superius.

There might be an eternal idea, which is unknowable.

As a matter of fact, many admit that they think the unthinkable, since they think of the term in question; but this is absurd.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Our notions are thus limited by *God* on the one hand and matter or empty space on the other.

Propter tales evidencias credi potest quod nihil magis deo potest intelligi, sicud nec maius mobile potest intelligi quam esset corpus vel vacuum undique infinitum. Set ista via est tripartita.

Three different theories agree on this point. One maintains that nothing is intelligible, save what is capable of existence.

Prima pars dicit quod deus non intelligit, nisi illud quod potest existere, cum deus non superflue vagatur circa tales intellibilitates, et nichil potest intelligi nisi quod deus intelligit; igitur nichil potest intelligi nisi quod potest existere.

Against this there is the common opinion that we

Set contra istud est communis sentencia, quia communiter percipitur quod nedum intellectus sed ymaginativa concipit chimeram, montem aureum, vacuum

21. rei contemplacio; in *deest* MS. 26. Ca^{m} 4^{m} *in marg.*; *initial P in red ink* MS. 33. intelligencias MS; *ib.* intelligere MS. 34. intelligere MS.

infinitum, et quotlibet talia, que non possunt esse nomina imposita ad significandum talia, nec aliqui intelligerent seipsos loquendo de talibus. Immo in componendo 49b[a] quod | chimera vel vacuum potest esse, vane componerent; cum subiectum nec significat nec potest significare nisi illud quod potest esse. Et tunc indubie necessario vacuum et quodcunque nominale posset esse. Vel aliter oportet dicere quod talia non sunt intelligibilia: quod non est verum nec verissimile, cum ille famose sint significaciones *quid nominis huius* terminorum. Et quod plus est, precipue philosophi posuerunt quod necesse sit vacuum esse. Inter illos igitur et homines illius opinionis, credentes cum hoc nullum vacuum posse esse, foret mirabilis communicacio. Et confirmacio huius est quod multe veritates habent necessario *esse* intelligibile, que non possunt existere.

can think and even imagine things that cannot exist. Besides, in speaking of monsters and absurdities, we surely know what we mean: which would not be true if only things possible could be thought of. Their meaning, too, is often well known by accurate definition; some philosophers, v. g. have affirmed that a vacuum must necessarily exist.

Item, nemo dubitat quin intelligit, sicut proposicio completa inpossibilis significat, ut nemo negaret inpossibile, nisi actus intelligendi firmaretur super inpossibili. Igitur contingit intelligere significatum primarium cuiuscunque proposicionis inpossibilis: et cum nullum tale significatum potest esse, sequitur quod contingit acceptare illud quod non potest esse, ut ista, "ego possum esse [quidlibet]". Proposita igitur una proposicione inpossibili, ut ista, "deus non potest esse", "ego possum esse quidlibet", secundum sic opinantes, tali proposicione quomodo non potest esse potest significari. Non dubium quod nemo bene negaret talem, vel non discerneret illam esse inpossibile, nisi cognoscendo illam significare sicut non potest esse: et per consequens quilibet in significando sicut non potest esse movet ad apprehendendum significatum eius primarium quod non potest esse.

A man who denied its possibility, would still have to admit with them that the word has meaning.
To deny an impossible proposition, is to deny that thing which it signifies; if so, we must know what this signification is; which could not be, if only what is possible is thinkable.

Item, contingit intellectum ferri super uno significabili, quod sit possibile, cum hoc tamen quod claudit contradiccionem illud esse: ut patet de contradictorie opinantibus de possibilitate significandorum in quacunque sciencia, ut unus theologus concedit tamquam verum quod natura humana sit deus, et sic creator est creatura, alius quod hoc est inpossibile: et sic est in quotlibet punctis in qualibet sciencia. Si igitur vis discressiva

We are able to debate the question whether such and such a thing is possible, or not:
a clear proof that our mind,

4. v[e] MS. 9. illa MS. 13. u[m] *pro* nullum MS. 19. firmiretur MS. 24. quidlibet *deest* MS. 37. quecunque MS. 41. discressiva *in full* MS.

while thinking of it, does not yet think of it as something possible. If not, we must admit that this thing is possible, since we know its meaning, and everything intelligible is possible (to be understood). The intellect, if only what is possible is intelligible, could not guide the will, which is apt to desire things impossible.

potest ferri super signandum ambiguo, discurrendo utrum possit esse, an non, patet quod contingit intelligere ante discrecionem ut iudicium tam[quam] quod potest esse. Aliter enim vident racione omne significabile posse esse, sic arguendo; omne intelligibile potest esse, omne significabile est intelligibile, igitur omne significabile potest esse. Cum igitur nulla vis iudicat aliter quam de suo proprio objecto, sequitur quod intellectus non iudicat nisi de possibili, si solum possibile sit intelligibile. Sic enim sensu non iudicatur nisi de sensibiii. Unde sensu non creditur aliquod sensibile esse, nisi visibile, audibile, olfactibile, gustabile vel tangibile. Set cum voluntas sit impossibilium, sequitur quod intellectus prius considerat de inpossibili. Non enim est possibile quod homo appetat id quod non cogitat, vel bestia appetat vel fantasiat.

It is of no use to say that we can know certain impossible things, as, v. g. the drift of an impossible proposition, or a very complex one; the objections are not eluded thereby. If you know of a mountain of gold, you know that it exists.

Nec valet via quod aliqua inpossibilia possunt intelligi: ut puta, significata primaria proposicionum impossibilium et non signata primaria incomplexorum, quia par iudicium et racio est de singulis; tum eciam quia omne significabile per incomplexum est significabile per incomplexum, et econtra. Ymmo videtur esse idem *intelligere montem aureum, et intelligere illum esse;* cum omne quod potest intelligi esse, potest intelligi, et econtra. Cum igitur [homo] possit intelligere rem que non potest intelligi esse, videtur quod possit intelligere rem que non potest intelligi.

God knows, by His simple apprehension, all that the creature knows, and what He knows, exists. If then any creature knows what is impossible, God knows it, and it exists.

Confirmatur tripliciter, primo per hoc, quod omne quod creatura intelligit, deus cognoscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, ut probabitur: et omne quod deus cognoscit, ipse cognoscit esse, ut patet ex dictis superius. Igitur, si creatura intelligit inintelligibile esse, deus cognoscit intelligibile esse, et per idem cognoscit non cognoscibile; quod est patenter impossibile. Non enim refert dicere: *deus (vel homo) credit, cognoscit, vel intelligit inintelligibile, vel non ens, simpliciter intelligendo, et ipse intelligit tale esse.* Similiter, omne significabile est demonstrabile per pronomen, ut patet ex predictis superius; cuiuslibet proposicionis significatum primarium est demonstrabile per pronomen, et per consequens distincte intelligibile. Si igitur quis intelligit aliquid esse

3. quam *deest* MS. 7. iuducat MS. 25. homo *deest* MS. 26. quo *pro* que MS.

quod non potest intelligi, illud quod primarie intelligit per proposicionem est demonstrabile per pronomen; et cum non sit racio quare illud intelligitur, cum non per idem omne quod non potest esse intelligitur, sequitur quod nedum inpossibile intelligitur esse, set quod ipsum intelligitur. Non enim intelligo quicquam
49b^b esse, nisi illud previe intelligam, cum regulariter | simplex apprehencio precedit actum complexum.

Similiter videtur, iuxta communes exponentes, quod omne quod non potest esse intelligitur, quia aliquod ens quod non potest esse intelligitur, ut patet de significato primario proposicionis inpossibilis. Igitur omne quod non potest esse intelligitur. Patet consequencia ex hoc quod cum utrolibet sincategorice communibus tenet consequencia a particulari ad suam universalem, ut si homo est, omnis homo est. Cum igitur ex equo concurrunt *esse* et *intelligi*, sequitur quod si aliquod ens quod non potest esse intelligitur, [intelligitur] et quodlibet. Nec valet negare quin significatum primarium proposicionis inpossibilis intelligitur, quia racio, recte discernens signum esse inpossibile, non solum cogitat illo modo quo signum significat, set cogitat illud quod significatum significat. Omnis enim modus quo signum significat est de facto, et per consequens, cum illo modo potest esse, oportet igitur dare unum aliqualiter significatum per signum; quod quidem significatum non potest esse racione cuius signum est inpossibile. Unde communiter logice tractatores diffiniunt proposicionem inpossibilem per hoc quod significat sicut non potest esse, intelligendo significatum quod signum significat ex parte rei et non modum significandi signi; ut patet ex modo probandi quod sic non potest esse ut datum inpossibile significat.

It follows also that we understand all impossible things. For if *a man exists*, is true, then *all men exist* is also true: likewise, if some impossible propositions are understood, all are understood.

Some would answer: We know that A is impossible, but we do not know A. This is inadmissible, for we cannot know *how* A is without knowing A itself.

Logicians generally define an impossible proposition as one which signifies *something that cannot be;* and that something is A, the Impossible.

Secunda via dicit quod talia possunt bene intelligi, set non cum assercione, consentiendo quod talia sint;

The second theory maintains that our mind can

6. intelligendo MS. 7. intelligāū MS; *ib.* reguraliter MS.; *ib.* | cum MS. 14. u^t'hʒ sinc' MS. 18. intelligatur *deest* MS. 19. q͡m MS. 21. est MS.

8. *Sincategorice.* A mere guess: I suppose the rule is as follows. When you have two terms more or less general, but on both sides (utrolibet) syncategorical, if you posit the particular, you posit its universal. Example: *Sword* is the particular, *weapon* its universal. If then a sword exists, a weapon must exist.

conceive the Impossible, but without assenting to it as true.

ut nemo plene intelligendo terminos potest assentire quod aliquid sit vel possit esse melius deo, magis extensive vacuo infinito: et sic de ceteris.

But surely, when two men take contradictory sides in debating the possibility or the impossibility of a given thing, each believes his own opinion to be true. Now one of the two must necessarily assent to an impossibility in such cases.

If anything is impossible, then its being possible is absürd; and vice versa.

And if we can assent to an impossibility in these cases, we can in all.

Contra quam viam sic çerte est instandum quod multi credunt [quod] possunt assertive cogitare; igitur multi possunt inpossibilia assertive cogitare. Maior patet ex hoc quod multi subtiliores opinantur contradictorie de possibilitate rerum, ut patet de universalibus, de compositione continui ex non quantis, de assumpcione cuiuslibet nature create ad quamlibet trium personarum divinarum, de possibilitate huius: *deus non est;* et sic de quodlibet similibus. Et certum est quod alteruter contradictorie opinancium in talibus opinatur sicut claudit contradiccionem esse, cum sequitur: *hoc non potest esse*, igitur *inpossibile quod hoc potest esse;* cum sequitur: potest esse quod hoc potest esse, igitur hoc potest esse. Et ita sequitur ex alio latere: si *hoc potest esse*, igitur *inpossibile est quod hoc non potest esse;* cum sequitur, si hoc potest esse, absolute necessarium est hoc posse esse: ut patet ampliantibus *esse* ad omnem mensuram, presentem, preteritam, et futuram. Si enim hoc non potest esse, tunc pro nulla mensura potuit, vel potuerit esse. Minor autem argumenti de se est evidens, cum quilibet in quantum credit quicquam, de tanto asserendo cogitat illud. Nec videtur ratio possibilitatis assercionis unius inpossibilis et cuiusque similiter inpossibilis, cum par sit racio inpossibilitatis assercionis utrobique: non enim sunt gradus in *non posse esse*, sicut nec in contingencia.

Madmen believe they are dead, or transformed into beasts; which proves that, given certain circumstances, every impossible thing may be believed. Ancient philosophers, whilst admitting the mind, have denied its

Item, contingit hominem credere se non esse, set esse mortuum, ut patet de inanimatis, qui credunt se esse bestias, et quotlibet inpossibilia de usitatissime sibi notis. Igitur per idem de quodlibet impossibili est possibile quod intellectus ad tantum dispositus assenciat. Nichil enim est magis notum quam eius obiectum; et tamen sequitur, 2º metaphisice (de tanta dispericia antiquorum) quod negarunt primum et concesserunt 2^{m}. Nihil eciam est magis inpossibile quam deum non esse. Et cum subtiliores philosophi nostri temporis concedunt

4. sic sic MS. 5. quod *deest* MS.; *ib.* ponunt MS. 6. ponunt MS. 10, 11. quantumlibet MS. 13. aliter MS. 16. homo *pro* hoc *before* potest MS. 33. v͡iai^{me} MS. 35. t͡u MS.

quod necessarium est deum posse non esse, cum nulla negativa, ut dicunt, sit inpossibilis, certum est quod facilius mihi esset saltem assentire quod melius deo posset esse, quam quod deus posset non esse. Neque valet dicere quod talis insipiens non sufficienter advertit vel intelligit *quid nominis terminorum*, quia nec hoc concedendum, nec tangit propositam difficultatem. Sic enim diceretur quod quandocunque quis falsum asserit, insufficienter advertit, vel inperfecte intelligit *quid nominis terminorum*. Satis est igitur suadere quod possibile sit hominem asserere tale inpossibile, quantumcunque fuerit indispositus. Ymmo satis est pro difficultate quod hoc potest cogitare inpossibile, sive assentiendo, sive dissentiendo.

object, — God, — of all things the most evident; and in our days many admit this denial as a possibility. If you say that this is only a mistake proceeding from inattention or ignorance, then you could just as well offer this plea whenever a man is in error.

Item, opinabile est quod deus crescat in bonitate saltem accidentali, vel saltem quod unum aggregatum ex deo et mundo sit melius deo. Igitur responsio falsa.
50 a[a] Assertum patet ex hoc quod opinabile est deum | nunc in habitu, nunc excitare se ad communicandum bonitatem suam creaturis, et nunc eas adnichilare; et cum hoc eciam est compossibile, sic eciam est probabile quod ex hoc, si esset deitas, posset vicissim perfici et inperfici: igitur possibile est quod quis credat deitatem posse perfici et inperfici. Confirmatur tripliciter, primo per hoc quia possibile est quod quis det fidem isti discursui: Deo est aliquis magis, igitur deitate est aliquid magis; sicut sequitur: Aliquid est magis deo, igitur est magis deo: igitur est magis deitate; eo quod, si aliquid est magis deo, tunc est magis quam deus secundum aliquam naturam, et sic per consequens magis quam deus est secundum bonitatem, vel secundum deitatem. Et est compossibile cum hoc quod det fidem asserto per hoc, quod deo filio est deus pater maior, eo quod filius est minoratus per eius beatam incarnacionem; ut dicit Psalmista; et exinanitus secundum apostolum ad philip. 2°, eo quod ipse est factus ex muliere, ut dicit idem apostolus ad galathas 4[to], et ro. primo: et per consequens concedendum est quod est inperfectus et creatura, in quantum est par homini, et aliquid quod ipse aliquando non fuit (ut puta natura humana, quam dimittendo fecit se de inperfecto perfectum) et sic de quotlibet discursibus, ex quibus in-

It is possible to believe that God has increased in goodness, or that God together with the world is more than God alone.

It is possible to maintain that God the Son is less than God the Father, after taking man's nature;

Ps. VIII, 6. Phil. II, 7. Gal. IV, 4. Rom. I, 3.

7. concedit (?) MS. 40. tpe (?) *pro* ipse MS.

dubie homo potest elici ad credendum quod deitate sit aliquid magis, ut patebit in illa materia de incarnacione.

or on the other hand, that God has become, greater by His incarnation, as the Apollinarian heresy held.

Similiter, ex alio latere est possibile quod quis credat melius esse quod deus sic sit simul deus et homo, quam deus solum; quia non obstante quod infinitum bonum sit esse deum, probabile tamen est quod unum infinitum sit relico magis, et quod bonitas hominis sic assumpti addat ad bonitatem aggregati, vel compositi ex deitate et humanitate, ut crediderunt Appollinariste heretici. Et potest ad probabilitatem hujus fieri argumentum topicum ex evidencia venerabilis Anselmi in suo Proslogion, ubi probat quod deus est misericors. Igitur, cum deus sit quicquid melius est esse quam non esse illud, sequitur quod deus sit misericors. Et sine dubio per illud videtur posse probari quod deus sit eciam homo, et melius sit eum esse deum et hominem quam esse solum hominem. Propterea unitas rerum cointelligendo deum cum creaturis potest credi esse melius deo, sicut credi potest quod multi sunt mundi et multi di, ut patet de erroribus antiquorum philosophorum in philosophia Aristotelis. Igitur possibile est assertive cogitare [aliquid] deitate magis. Sic enim creditur a subtilibus philosophis quod unus numerus infinitus est relico maior et quod deus est melior numero infinito animarum, quamvis ille numerus sit infinite bonus. Quare igitur non potest credi quod aggregatum ex deo et mundo sit melius quam deus solus, et sic per consequens assertive cogitari quod deitate sit aliquid virtualiter magis? Sic enim conceditur quod multitudo vel communicabilitas unius universalis est reliqua maior, eo ipso quod convenit omnibus quibus universale inferius, et aliquibus ultra. Quare igitur non excedit perfeccio universitatis perfeccionem deitatis, cum ponit eam tamquam partem sui, et superaddit perfeccionem universitatis creature? Tales evidencie indubie possunt dare fidem ad taliter

St. Anselm proves that God is merciful, because it is better to be thus than otherwise; can we not say it is better for Him to be God and man than only God?

It is possible to think that the world together with God is better than God alone, and the plurality of worlds and of Gods has been taught by thinkers of old. If one infinite number may be greater than another, then God together with the world is greater than God alone. The more universal, compared with the less, has a greater number of singulars, comprising all those in the latter and others. The same reason applies to God and the world. Now if such things can be

9. sic hominis MS; *ib.* afp^{ti} MS. 13. Prosodion MS. 15. esse non MS. 17. ēi (enim?) MS. 23. aliquid *deest* MS. 31. m^{to} MS. 32. universale *(sic!)* MS; *ib.* minor MS.

17. *Melius.* Note Wyclif's drift. Here, as before and after, he is only showing that false and absurd propositions can be thought to be true, and gives apparent reasons in favour of them.

credendum, et per consequens ad intelligendum, cum oportet intelligere precedere credulitatem.

believed, they must first be apprehended.

Item, scimus pro tempore viacionis christi pro quo pharisei et quotlibet alii arriani heretici crediderunt christum esse solum creaturam; tunc illa persona cogitabant isti infideles assertive aliquid esse magis, et illa persona est deitas. Igitur deitate cogitat infideles assertive aliquid esse magis. Non dubium quin multi theologi concederent et consequenciam et consequens in casu posito illis significatis possibili.

The Pharisees and the Arians believed Christ to be only a creature, though He was God: this, impossible to be, could yet be believed.

Confirmatur tripliciter; primo per hoc quod adorando illam personam, [illa] dulia adoratur, et deitas dulia, propter ydemptitatem nature humane et divina in eadem persona; igitur illud (si illa persona creditur adoranda dulia et non latria) sequitur quod deitas creditur sic adoranda.

Those who only reverence Christ as a holy man, believe that God (since Christ is God) should not receive our supreme worship.

2° sic: duplex est credulitas, scilicet, implicita et explicita. Implicita, qua creditur intellectui et principaliter credito, et ignorante credente: ut vulgus credit omnes articulos fidei implicite in credendo quod fides christiana est in toto vera. Igitur, quamvis non explicite possit credi deitate magis, ad minimum im-
50 a[b] plicite potest | illud credi; ut non dubium quin credi possit de potencia dei absoluta omnes vocatos hereticos ab horigine mundi fuisse sinistre dampnatos ab hominibus propter hereses quas recitat augustinus in libro suo *De Quinque;* potissime cum quelibet heresis habuit multos fautores, et magis mirabile credi potest. Infidelis igitur, credens dictam universalem, crederet quod deitate sit aliquis magis, quia 73[a] heresis dicit quod in Christo divinitas doluit cum figeretur caro eius

Those who are ignorant believe implicitly; and if they cannot explicitly believe that anything is greater than God, yet, if they think in general that ancient heresies have been unjustly condemned, then, since one heresy maintains that the Three Persons are parts and God

12. illa *deest* MS. 15. adorando MS. 16. adorando MS. 18. inte^{m} MS. 25. fi nifi^{e} MS. 27. quqȝ MS. 29. vni^{lem} MS. 31. in ex^{lo} divinitatis MS.

12. *Dulia* is in the ablative. 15. *Latria.* It is perhaps advisable here to note the distinction between *dulia* and *latria* in the Catholic Church. *Dulia* is the reverence we owe to a creature on account of its holiness, which is always finite, so that this reverence is limited in extent. *Latria* is the worship due only to the Supreme Being. Christ is at once Creator and creature, but as creature we owe him *dulia.* The point of the difficulty is that, as He is one with God; if we pay Him only *dulia* as to a mere man, we refuse the cult of *latria* to God. 31. *In Christo.* It is a liberty; but the reading of the MS. gives no sense at all, and those who know paleography can guess how readily an ignorant scribe would put ex^{lo} for x^{to}.

is the whole, they implicitly believe an impossibility of the same kind.

in cruce, et dicit quod quelibet trium personarum divinarum est pars dei: et cum poneret deum homogeneum, credo quod diceret deitatem cõmpletam esse maiorem deitate parciali.

So also, certain philosophers have thought that things are what they seem to be, and that truth is falsehood.

Et idem contingit de philosophis qui crediderunt omnia esse ut apparent, et verum esse falsum. Omne enim huiusmodi possunt implicite credere quodlibet falsum significabile. Quis, queso, diceret quod nemo posset dare fidem isti discursui; "Si ista persona verbi humanata intelligitur, tunc deitas intelligitur. Igitur, si ipsa creditur aliquid esse magis, divinitate creditur esse magis". Non enim est racio quare est dare intelleccionem implicitam quin per idem et credulitatem, ut tactum est.

In general, everything false may be implicitly believed.

So many instances show us that not only the Intelligible but also the Non-Intelligible is the object of our thoughts, and as such the latter possesses intelligible entity.

Patet igitur quod ex quodlibet illusionibus sensuum tam exteriorum quam interiorum et ex indisposicione intellectus credi potest simpliciter inpossibile, et cum par sit iudicium de quotlibet, ut patet ex dictis, sequitur quod non solum verum set inpossibile sit obiectum intellectus, et per consequens non solum ens vel intelligibile, set non ens et non intelligibile foret intellectum a deo, et sic cognitum vel intellectum, in quantum huiusmodi, habet ad minimum *esse* intelligibile. Sicut ergo hoc est *oppositum* in adiecto, *intellectum* et *non intellectum*, sic et hic intellectum est inpossibile, vel non ens: de significato, non signo, loquor.

The third theory holds that we cannot think without self-contradiction of *a being greater than God;* though we can know the meaning of these words.

Ex istis videtur quod tercia via doctoris subtilis, *Super primo sentenciarum* sic intelligit . . . . vel magis deitate potest asseri sine repugnancia. Hoc enim non queritur set medium probandum deum esse foret tale supponendo quod ille terminus deus significet sic: ens, quo non potest esse melius sine formali repugnancia, et non sic: ens, quo non potest melius cogitari; quia

24. ·i· . . . . *after* et MS. 7, 8. quodlibet falsum *twice* MS 10. huncta MS. 25. est *pro* et *before* non MS.

29. *Sentenciarum.* Petrus Lombardus was the author of the *Libri Sentenciarum*, which at one time enjoyed such universal reputation that it became, so to speak, a text book or Manual in all Europe, and many great Schoolmen wrote commentaries thereon. Amongst these was St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, here mentioned as the Do tor Subtilis. 29. *Vel.* There is no gap here, but either some words are wanting, or *vel* is a mistake for *quod nihil.*

tunc superflue fieret mencio de *cogitare*, cum intricat et non participiens proposito. Unde contra insipientem, ca° 2°, sic scribit, quod "sepe repetis me dicere quia quod est magis omnibus est intellectum, et si est [in] intelligencia est et in re. Aliter enim omnibus magis non esset magis. Nusquam in omnibus dictis meis invenitur talis probacio. Non enim illud valet quod dicitur magis omnibus et quo magis cogitari nequit, ad probandum, quia est in re quod dicitur". Ex illo patet quod ipse non habuit pro eodem ens quo magis non potest esse sine repugnancia, et ens quo magis cogitari non potest. Ymmo videtur quod, si magis deo cogitari potest sine contradiccione, magis deo cogitari potest, eo [quod] quod qualitercunque potest esse, sine contradictione potest esse. Immo, plus accedendo ad sensum doctoris, videtur quod si magis deo cogitatur, magis habet *esse* intelligibile, et sic, iuxta modum loquendi doctoris, magis deo est; et per consequens illa non repugnat, ut *homo* et *irracionale*, *deus* et *magis deo*. Videtur igitur quod illa responsio vere vadit ad mentem Anselmi, nec tollitur per illam responsionem difficultas, cum argumenta militant hinc inde contra illud, si magis deo potest cogitari vel intelligi.

Duns Scot is of this opinion, which he expresses very distinctly.

Anything can be thought, but not everything can be thought consistently. But if you can think of anything, it has being (at least intelligible being); and therefore it *is*; so then a being greater than God, since it *is* thinkable, *is*.

This answer, though agreeing with St. Anselm, does not solve the difficulty.

Quarta via dicit quod homo intelligit inintelligibile, licet non inintelligibile intelligit: et sic per cambiacionem terminorum a parte predicati tollit difficultates. Set illa evacuacio est contra sentenciam necessariam de universalibus; et eque contingit verbum limitare subiectum ad quamcunque supposicionem, sicut et predicatum; et, mutatis paululum proposicionibus, stant difficultates. Conceditur enim pro difficultate, si illud quod non est potest terminare actum intelligendi.

There is also a fourth answer, but though it gets rid of the difficulties, it does so by a mere verbal subtlety; and besides that it contradicts the doctrine of the Universals, it does not say if Non-Entity is the object of an intellectual act.

In isto teneo quod solum illud quod est potest cogitari vel intelligi.

In my opinion, only that which *is* can be thought of.

Set pro solucione argumentorum suppono quod non sit contradiccio, nisi assint sensus compositi. Illam supposicionem particulariter innuit Anselmus, *Proslogion* c° 4°, sub his verbis. "Insipiens cogitavit quod deus non est, quia sic dicit in corde". Et illud *dicere* est *cogitare*, et non dixit in corde vel cogitavit quia co-

But I hold that self-contradiction is possible only when thought is a compound act;

1. $int^{i}cat$ MS. 2. partipiens MS. 4. in *deest* MS. 9. ne quot *(sic!)* MS. 14. quod *deest* MS. 18. deo *deest* MS. 24. 4 *in marg.* MS. 25, 26. $ca'm'a^{en}$ MS. 31. diffinitas *(sic!)* MS. 37. $proso^{on}$ MS. 40. cogitatur *pro* cogitavit MS.

one of its objects being the words which express the thought; the other, the thing which these words stand for. We can think of the proposition: *There is no God;* that is, we can say it in our heart; but no one understanding what *God*, and what *non-existence* mean, can admit that those two *things* are one. And this is clearly St. Anselm's meaning.

gitare non potuit. Unde non tantum uno modo dicitur aliquid vel cogitatur. Aliter enim cogitatur | res, cum 50b[a] vox eam significans cogitatur; aliter, cum illud ipsum quod res est intelligitur: illa sentencia potest cogitari "quod deus non est", ista vero minime. Nullus quippe intelligens illud quod est deus, potest cogitare quod deus non est, licet hec verba dicat in corde. Ex quo patet ipsum sentire quod dupliciter contingit cogitare. Vel sic: quod *cogitare* terminet cogitatum totale in signo, sine ulteriori intellectu principaliter significati; vel sic: quod attendit rem intellectam secundum *esse intelligibile* per eius obiectivam presenciam; et illo modo distinguit de triplici *dicere*, monologion, ce°.

In a sense we can think of any contradictory things whatever;

but we first think of one, then of another, then of both together present to the mind in one compound idea;

which act by no means affirms that the object thus present corresponds to facts.

Primo modo loquendo vellet concedere quod homo cogitat melius deo et quodcunque nominandum, cuius non est alius sanus sensus nisi quod homo, intelligens talia quorum singulum sic significat sibi, incomplexe, cogitat sine intellectu primarie significati per totum complexum. Et ita in talibus proposicionibus: *a significat melius deo*, vel melius: *ad apprehendendum melius deo;* intelliguntur signa supponere quasi medio inter supposicionem materialem et signativam. Nam intellectus non intelligit rem meliorem deo, set cogitat primo deum et secundo comparative excellenciam bonitatis; et cogitans sic, componit aliquid esse melius deo; nec sic quod res intelligibilis sit obiecta intellecti, set *esse intelligibile;* quam rem intelligens primo intelligit complexum per inpossibile, set per eius extrema intelligit res sibi presentes secundum *esse intelligibile:* et pro illis componit sine corespondencia veritatis ad actum suum componendi. Unde Augustinus, 15° *De Trinitate*, 4°: "Intelligere est essenciale anime, set cogitare, cum dicit actum elicitum, est sibi accidentale." Et id patet 38° et 90°; ubi vult deum non proprie cogitare, set dicere. Et illud patet prologion, capitulis 2° et 4to. Inpossibile enim est intelligere quicquam, nisi intellectum sit [in] intelligenti, ad minimum secundum *esse intelligibile*. Unde *intelligere* dicitur

When the soul understands, it reads what is, so to speak, written in it,

4. 13^m *pro* sentencia MS. 5. 1to MS. 16. fani^9 *pro* sanus MS.; *ib.* intelligit MS. 21. me° MS. 37. in *deest* MS.; *ib.* inte^te MS.

13. *Ce°*. This is probably a mistake for some number: perhaps X°.

ethemologice quasi *intus legere;* et "*cogitare*" est frequenter *cogere* et *adiuvare.* Sic ergo mens nostra invenit rem scriptam in ipsa, et intelligit illam. Ideo dicit Anselmus, proslogion, ca° 2°, "quicquid intelligitur in intellectu est, nec intelligendum est principaliter quod omne intellectum sit in amina secundum *esse existere,* scilicet species lapidis."

not that the external and existing object is identical with the soul.

Et ex istis facile est videre quod nihil potest intelligere inintelligibile, vel aliquid quod non potest esse. Et per consequens nec deus nec creatura intelligit aliquid quod non potest intelligi; et sic de similibus. Nec potest signum complexum vel incomplexum significare quod non potest esse. Set movet creaturam errabilem ad componendum vel cogitandum alico modo, et non potest esse proporcionaliter ex parte rei ut illa cogitat: quia sic cogitare est ex parte modi cogitandi, et non terminatum ad primarium cogitatum per totum signum. Nec sequitur: *Intelligo illam proposicionem, ergo intelligo sicut illa primarie significat,* nisi intelligitur sic: *Intelligo tali modo,* vel *illum modum quem illa primarie significat.* Sicut enim illa significat modo cui non potest ens adequate significatum illa significacione corespondere, tali modo, et illum modum ego intelligo. Verumptamen nec aliquod significatum primarie illa significat, nec aliquod tale homo intelligit. Et ita utrobique insistendum est in modo intelligendi, quando dicitur quod *intelligo hominem esse asinum,* et non est progrediendum ad intelligendum quod adequate primarie significatur; quod nullum est, quia nullum tale.

Therefore the Unintelligible, as such, can enter neither into the mind of God nor of any creature. No symbol or combination of symbols can stand for what is not; but it may determine a fallible creature to think in a certain way, the thought bearing on this way itself, not on the objective sense of the symbol. Understanding an impossible proposition, I understand, not *what* it means, but the way in which it means: i. e. so that no being corresponds to its signification.

Et si queritur quid intelligo per illos terminos, *inintelligibile, aliquid non potest esse,* et ceteros similes, dicitur quod omne intelligibile, set privative vel alio modo ficto, qui quidem modus est, ex parte intelligentis. Et si obicitur quod tunc ille terminus, *inintelligibile,* cum precise eadem significant, convertitur cum illo termino *intelligibile,* dicitur quod evidencia non movet, quia ydemptitas significatorum. Quia indubie omne

What then do I mean by *the Unintelligible, the Impossible,* &c.? I hold them all to be intelligible, as fictions of my mind, &c. Do Intelligible and Unintelligible mean the same? Yes, the same singulars, but they mean them otherwise.

1. enthe^{ce} MS. 4. proso^{on} MS. 20. in celo *pro* intelligo *(sic !)* MS. 33. intelligitur MS.

1. *Cogitare.* Wyclif's strong point is not etymology; but this was a common failing, even with the best minds in the Middle Ages. Even St. Thomas, often and in all seriousness, gives us the wildest etymologies.

There is no God and *There is a God* are identical as both relating to God, one as an impossible, the other as a necessary proposition. So it is with all other such propositions that mean things impossible. We are apt to be mistaken, when our mind has formed contradictory ideas into one complete one, thinking that something objective must correspond thereto, just as, when our eyes see a circle of light made by a brand whirled round, we may fancy that the whole circle exists objectively. To go deeper into the matter: I hold that *intelligere* has as wide a meaning as *cogitare;* and then comes the objection: If so, a man understands (intelligit) something better than God.

significatum per illam proposicionem, *deus non est*, significatur per illam *deus est;* et econtra. Una tamen est inpossibilis, et alia necessaria. Oportet igitur attendere ad modum significandi pro convertibilitate signorum; nec est possibile, ut credo, quod quis intelligat vacuum, yrcocervum, montem aureum, vel quecunque alia que non possunt esse. Signa tamen illa intelligit et cogitat, componendo vel dividendo ex mocione talium signorum modo suo; et ex parte rei taliter non potest esse. Et quia simplex intelligencia hominis terminatur ad intellectum ab eo, putat errore deceptus quod est unum primarie significatum per completum signum, ad quod acies mentis attingit; sicut visus ex circumduccione celeri ticionis in | tenebris 50b[b] fantasiatur, videns quod est unus completus circulus extra oculum, ad quem visio terminatur. Intelligendo igitur tales terminos, *chimera*, *tregrilaphus*, et cetera, habeo species significatorum et rerum communium quales intelligo: et superaddo modum meum confuse componendi, putando quod extra mentem est unum tale intelligibile, cum tamen non sit illa.

Set ut ulterius videatur illa materia, suppono quod *intelligere* sit commune ad omnem actum intellectus, ut communis scola modernorum utitur; et cum sit triplex comparacio intellectus (ex 3° *de anima*, 21°, et infra), scilicet, sensuum apprehensus, composicio vel divisio, et discursus vel argumentacio, suppono quod *intelligere* sit commune ad quodlibet talium, et esse sic amplum cum *cogitare;* tunc videtur quod homo intelligit melius deo, et quecunque talia, sicut homo cogitat magis, ad sensum Anselmi.

There is a verbal difficulty here, but if I used other expressions, I should have to admit many ill-sounding conclusions.

Hic dico quod nolens sic loqui et mutare supposicionem figurativam in materialem aut accusativum casum in ablativum, et sic de aliis abusionibus in significacionibus terminorum, haberem concedere multa male sonancia; ut, quod homo intelligit inintelligibile, quia intelligit signum ex cuius mocione cogitat sic inintelligibile; sic intelligit quod deus non intelligit, quia intelligit componendo, sicut non potest esse in re: quod non potest deo competere. Admittens igitur illos sensus equivocos, potest concedere quod creatura in-

I therefore admit this, but the sense is equivocal.

11. pu~ = puta MS. 22. ne *or* nec MS. 26. s^x uu MS. 27. argui° MS. 28, 29. sic esse MS. 36. ipse *pro* homo MS.

telligit melius deo, et sic de aliis questionibus predictis superius. Et deus non potest cogitare talia, nec intelligit omne quod ego intelligo, eo quod ipse non potest intelligere nisi seipsum vel sibi presens in ydea, et sic intelligit homo multa que deus non intelligit. Nec sequitur: Deus facit me intelligere illud, igitur deus intelligit illud; nec sequitur: Deus intelligit quamlibet partem huius signi, et qualiter illa significat, ergo deus intelligit adequate significatum per illam partem. Et racio est, quia signum non proprie significat deo, nec ipse potest desistere in apprehensione signi, sic quod ultra signum non comprehendat suum significatum. Ideo, cum deus non componit vel dividit, patet quod talis de cognicione superius exposita non potest deo competere, nec potest quisquam impetrare super tanto domino capcionem qua probaretur ipsum cogitare quod ignorat, sic arguendo: Omne quod ego intelligo, deus cognoscit, set ego intelligo quod deus ignorat (ut patet, capiendo illam proposicionem, *quod deus ignorat non potest esse subiectum*. Subiectum enim significat mihi *quod deus ignorat*, ut patet per capcionem sophisticam): igitur deus cognoscit quod ipse ignorat. Ex quo videtur sequi per illud quod sit summe ignorans, quia intelligit se infinitum plus ignorare quam ego possum intelligere, cum ego intelligo hoc, et omne quod intelligit nescit. Igitur sic nescit, et per consequens sic est.

God can understand (or think) nothing but Himself and His own ideas, prototypes of all.

God knows every sign in the human mind, but not necessarily their signification, for He needs no sign to understand,

nor does He, like us, think by putting together and separating ideas.

If it be argued that according to this doctrine God is ignorant of things that we know, and knows Himself to be thus ignorant,

Sanatur talis deduccio per hoc, quod ego intelligo *sic*, set deus non; cum intelligencia talis dicit modum intelligendi complexum terminatum ad signa sine intelleccione primaria significati; et sic non potest deo competere, quia non potest complexe intelligere sic signum sibi significare, tam pendule et inperfecte. Idem igitur est secundum talem sensum: homo cogitat melius deo, et homo cogitat excelenciam bonitatis, et deum, et sic ficte componit. Nam secundum Aristotelem, primo *peri ermeneias*, c° 2°, "verbum significat quamdam composicionem quam sine extremis non est intelligere"; intelligens per composicionem, actum complexe componendi vel dividendi. Et tales actus connotant verba in proposicionibus nostris, cum non mirum si sub

the answer is that my knowledge, restricted and confined (in the case of the Impossible, &c.) to the fictions of my own mind, cannot be predicated of God.

We unavoidably confuse our own fictions with the real objects of ideas because we

3. est *pro* ego MS. 11. decistere MS. 14. talis est MS.

apprehend fictions as real things.

eodem involucro intelligimus significata et nostros modos cogitandi, quia ad ambo simul advertimus.

All that which a creature can really think, God can think; but not in the same imperfect manner. And He knows these imperfections, but does not undergo them. The fool thinks of God and of non-existence, and combines them in his mind; which God cannot do; but even the fool is unable to find an objective meaning to this combination,

Videtur igitur mihi quod consonancius sit concedere deum omnia intelligere que creatura potest intelligere; verumptamen infinitis modis inperfeccionis potest creatura intelligere, quorum nullo [deus] potest intelligere; quamvis deus intelligat omnes illos modos, non sequitur quod, si *insipiens cogitat sic: deus non est*, et *deus cogitat omne quod insipiens potest cogitare*, *igitur deus cogitat quod ipse non est*, quia nichil potest cogitare quod deus non est, nisi ad illum sensum quod cogitat de deo et de ente in communi; et sic complexe negat, quod non potest deitate competere. In quodcunque fertur actus cogitandi humanus ex anima, illud cogitat et deus, sicut et omnem modum latentem in anima. Set modus quo creatura in
positis | non potest formaliter deo competere, et illum 51 a
modum exprimo quando dico quod cogito deum non esse. Et si arguatur sic: *Hoc cogito* (demonstrando *deum non esse*), et *hoc non potest deus cogitare*, ergo *quod ego cogito* [*est*] *quod non potest deus cogitare;* dicitur quod minor non est vera nisi ad illum sensum: illo modo cogitandi cogito ego; et ad illum sensum foret conclusio vera; scilicet quod *modo quo ego cogito non potest deus cogitare*. Et si limitetur hoc pronomen, *hoc*, in alico casu ad demonstrandum unum cogitabile extra animum, quod secundum *esse intelligibile* sit *deum non esse*, patet ex dictis quod non vult [eum] esse, quia nichil potest ad illum sensum intelligere deum non esse.

which amounts only to his wish that God should not exist.

Thus we easily reply to the objections previously made. In ch. III, there is an evident equivocation between the signification and that which is signified.

Ex istis potest faciliter responderi ad argumenta facta superius. Non enim oportet discurrere per prima argumenta facta superius, c° 3°, quia concedens conclusiones equivocat in supposicione materiali et significativa. Unde, sicut aliqui logici concedunt quod ipsi possunt facere deum (velit, nolit) adnichilare mundum et omne significabile, sic isti, miscendo supposicionem materialem cum significativa, concedunt quod intelli-

6. deus *deest* MS. 15. a͡iam MS. 16, 17. ipo[tis] MS. 21. est *deest* MS. 28. eum *deest* MS. 33. quod *pro* quia MS.

16. ***In positis.*** Probably the copyist, on turning the page, has left out a word or two: *casibus cogitat,* or something like.

gunt rem quam non possunt intelligere, quia intelligunt apprehensione simplici rem in communi, potenciam in communi, et *intelligere* in communi; et consequenter sic cogitant rem quam non possunt intelligere. Si enim totam cogitacionem suam referrent pure ad cogitabile extra, et non referrent cogitacionem totalem et finalem ad modum suum cogitandi, non esset color concedi talia. Ego autem elegi alium sensum concedendo; et cogito sic: deus non est; compono sic: intelligibile est inintelligibile, set nec cogito nec intelligo (vel compono) illud quod non potest esse; et illum sensum sapit Anselmus cum aliis recte intelligentibus. Et patet quod habeo dicere: nichil posse cogitare nisi quod potest esse alico modo; et per consequens nichil potest intelligere vacuum aut chimeram, que non possunt esse. Set natura que intellectualis creature potest cogitare sic: aliquod est locativum carens locali: et sic cogitando, intelligitur ille terminus *vacuum* pro suo modo intelligendi; non enim significat ille terminus vacuum, set omne locativum et locale significat. Et correspondenter dicendum est de similibus. Nomina igitur non sunt inposita ad significandum vacuum hoc conservatum, et cetera, set sunt inposita ad significandum rem locatam, consignando carenciam localis, et sic ad habendum unum modum significandi primative vel aliter complexe, cui non potest veritas primarie corespondere; et talis inposicio est utilis scrutando.

We can think of the Unintelligible as the signification of a word, but not as something that exists out of our mind. I say that when I think *thus:* God does not exist, or make a combination *thus*. The Intelligible is not intelligible, what is in my mind is not impossible.

When we think of a void, we really think only of a space and of a body to occupy it: the combination indicated by *without* (space *without* a body to occupy it) is the mode of our thought, not a distinct object.

Ulterius dicitur quod multi loquntur de talibus qui minus bene intelligunt seipsos, quia significanciam *quid nominis* oportet primo cognoscere, et super hoc videre si possibilis sit corespondencia primo significati; sive illi qui dicunt se intelligere vacuum habent sub uno involucro intencionem signi et intencionem confusum locantis et locati, et 3° intencionem actus complexi. Et sic est dare multas significaciones, quarum quelibet terminatur ad ens, et tota cogitacio aggregata termi-

Some think they really find an objective meaning in such terms; but they do not understand them clearly, so that they may have many meanings, which are all possible.

15. terra *(sic!) pro* chimeram MS. 22. h̄ cōbāū MS. 26. corespondcri MS. 28. multe MS.

16. *Natura.* The text is certainly corrupt here, though the general sense is pretty clear; but I have not seen my way to suggest any correction here; and indeed I fear that those I have already made (v. g. *chimera* for *terra,* a line above) will be thought too great a liberty. At any rate, the text of the MS. is preserved in the variantes.

They say for instance, that they can imagine a mountain of gold; but they could not, if they took a mountain to mean a great heap of earth and rocks. In such compound terms there is a greater contradiction than in 'an irrational man'.

natur ad aggregatum. In toto illo suppono quod vacuum, chimera, et talia, non possunt existere, gracia solucionis materie tacte, quia multi dicunt quod possunt fingere tale animal, montem aureum, et cetera. Si autem mons dicat tumulum terre et lapidum et . . . . . . et sic de similibus: patet quod intelligendo tales terminos, oppositum est in adiecto. Ideo vere dicit doctor subtilis, quod intelligendo sic, magis est repugnancia inter intellecta, ac si homo cogitaret sic: homo irracionalis, et ita est in quacunque intelligencia qua intelligitur sicut non potest esse. Philosophi igitur, quorum sciencia resultat ex composicione et divisione cum discursubus valde vagis, putant aliqualiter se habere, quorum opinionem nec deus verificare poterit. Unde, communicando cum credente sic: vacuum est; patet quod noscitur quid terminus significat et quomodo; significat enim sibi omne locativum, et omne locabile, et preter hoc significat uno modo (ex parte sui vel errantis) sic complexe quod locativum sit sine locabili; et ideo vacuum esse est inpossibile, sicut hominem esse asinum, et cetera.

We understand the meaning of an impossible proposition, but only as something fictive and notional.

Per hec patet ad secundum quod intelligit sicut proposicio inpossibilis significat; quia intelligit quam rem illa proposicio significat racione sui partis. Intelligit eciam quomodo illa proposicio significat, attendendo ad modum suum ficte componendo. Set non intelligit significatum primarium proposicionis sic inpossibilis, quia non est nisi secundum *esse intelligibile.* In hoc ergo quod literatus intelligit illam ultro illiteratum ut ad ipsam respondeat, non igitur fertur | intellectus 51 a[b]
super inpossibili significato per signum, set sistit ad signum quoad illud, quamvis intelligit significata parcium signi.

It may be said that it were better to admit that we can think of impossible things.

Et si obicitur quod facilius esset in multis loqui secundum sensum expositum, concedendo quod intelligit

3. quod *pro* quia MS.; *ib.* facere MS. 5. et capit azi[nū] dicat capi[tū] azi[m] MS. 26. sibi *pro* sic MS. 27. vel *pro* nisi MS.

5. *Et lapidum et* . . . . I have purposely omitted some words. The abbreviation azi is generally used either for *asinus* or for *albus.* But here neither can make sense. 8. *Magis.* Because 'An irrational man' merely denies and affirms *rational,* implied in *man;* whilst, for example, in *a round square, round* implies *not square,* and *square* again implies *not round.* Each part of the term not only contradicts the other, but positively asserts a quality incompatible with the other. So too of a golden mountain, if *a mountain* means only earth and stones.

chimeram et multa que non possunt esse, sic et venerabilis Anselmus loquitur. Hic dico quod venerabilis Anselmus expresse dicit quod nichil potest intelligere "magis deo". Ideo satis est tenere sensum suum quoad aliquam partem. Scio tamen quod in multis facilius sic loqui, et multum expediens apud bene intelligentes sensum expositum, nolentes extorquere male sonancia que racione concedenda essent. Ego autem timens malediccionem, precise non audeo ista concedere, nam
Ps. XI, 4, 5. [Psalmo] 11° dicitur: Disperdat dominus universa labia dolosa et linguam magniloquam qui dixerunt "linguam nostram magnificavimus, labia nostra a nobis sunt, quis noster dominus est?" quomodo, queso, posset homo esse magis magniloquus quam concedere se infinita intelligere, ad quorum intelligenciam deus non potest attingere? ymmo quis foret dominus illius qui flatu labiorum potest facere deum non esse, et ultra quam intelligi quam potest servire sibi specialiter talia?

In certain cases it is not so; in others it may indeed be more convenient, if the present doctrine is properly understood. But I fear to use such expressions as seem to admit that we can think of things beyond God's intelligence: they sound very heterodox.

Et [quoad] consequentem racionem de veritatibus et ydeis, videtur michi quod referenda sit acies mentis ad significata, et non ad signa eorum. Insistam limitacione ad supposicionem materialem signorum; ut intelligo sic: "*homo est asinus*", "*melius deo est*", et cetera. Non tamen intelligo sua primaria significata, quia non sunt alico modo, nec deus potest movere ad illa apprehendendum, cum ipsemet non potest illa intelligere: nam ex infirmitate et inperfeccione nature intellectualis creature est, quod potest vagari, componendo signum cum signo pro suis significatis, que non possunt conbinari. Ideo comparat philosophus, 3° *De anima*, 21°, vim componendi animo casui componenti res quantumlibet improprie coactas ad invicem, ut posuit Empedocles, sicut dicitur 2° *Phisicorum*. Posuit enim quod universalis natura fecit ramos et folia seorsum, et sic quodlibet membrum casualiter vigendo cum quolibet, cum natura (ut asseruit) non habet regulam disponendi media ad finem quem intendit. Sic dicit philosophus. Intellectus quandoque componit diametrum esse assimetrum, quod est verum, et quandoque sic: diametrum est simetrum; quod est inpossibile: et sic de quotlibet composicionibus in po-

The mental act, when we think of such terms, refers to what they signify, but materially, i. e. in each of their parts, for as wholes they can have no meaning whatever. It is an imperfection of our intellectual nature, that we can combine together ideas, when the things they represent are incompatible. Our mind puts them together at random, as Empedocles, in his philosophical system, supposed nature to do.

7. volentes MS. 10. Psalmo *deest* MS. 13. deus MS. 18. fpt' MS. 19. quoad *deest* MS. 30. condempnari MS. 32. imdHP~ cotas MS.

And as Empedocles' system was false, so man cannot by thinking combine *things* at will; only the concepts which signify them.

sicionibus". Sicut igiter opinio Empedoclis est inpossibilis, cum natura non potest sic componere membra animalis unius speciei cuilibet membro alterius speciei indifferenter, propter legem nature prime; sic falsum est quod homo componit rem intellectivam extra cum re distincta, set signa ipsas significancia ficte componit. Deo autem non potest talis ficta composicio competere, sicut nec error in accione nature.

Our mind, when thinking of the Impossible, thinks of its mental representation partly, and partly of the separate elements which, if combined, are impossible. Our adversaries contradict themselves, not agreeing in the meaning they give: which could not happen, if they understood it. It is in the act of combination that error occurs; in Heaven it will not occur, but here below our acts oft have for objects mere fictions that we think real.

Per hec patet ad 3^m, quod intellectus fertur super signo inpossibili, et non super significato inpossibili extra; false crederet non posse esse verum, si *hoc non potest esse.* Omne enim quod potest esse est absolute necessarium posse esse, et totalis actus terminatur partim ad signa, et partim ad materie composite significata. Patet hoc ex opinancium apparenti contradiccione. Unus communiter equivocat cum altero: quod non esset, si uterque inmediate attingeret significatum. Sicut enim sensus non errat contra sensibile proprium, quod attingit sine errore, immediate: sic a maiori, intellectus nunquam errat sine errore in composicione signi cum signo. Ideo in patria, quando omnis veritas est summe presens anime, movens ipsam inmediate per deum, evacuabitur error vie. Sumus enim hic quasi sompniantes pro maiori parte, parentes actus terminatos a simulachro signorum pro quibus erranter componimus, ut promittimus nos tractare de vacuo vel alio inpossibili, solum ad signa attendimus, ubi significata possibilia perspicimus; et non impossibile, signa tamen. Ideo concedo quod racio vera iudicat omne significabile posse esse, cum necesse sit *esse* significabile esse alico modo. Intellectus igitur non iudicat nisi de possibili, sicut nec sensus nisi de sensibili.

I deny that any symbol, as such, can be other than true.

Et si obicitur quod intellectus iudicat de signis impossibilibus, sicut et sensus, conceditur quod omnia talia non solum [non] sunt impossibilia, ymmo vera.

When I, speaking of a proposition, say: *This* is impossible: does not *This* mean something besides the mere symbols?

Et si 2° obiciatur quod pronomen | demonstrat in- 51 bª
possibile ex parte rei, ut patet de talibus; *ego compono*

1. Similiter *pro* sicut MS. 10. f^{e} *pro* false MS. 11. verius MS.; *ib.* sic *pro* si MS. 14. $\text{m}^{e}\text{9}^{e}$ MS.; *ib.* ex hac MS. 15. apparenter MS. 19. $\widehat{\text{pp}}$ non MS. 19. imme^{us} MS. 21. movens movens MS. 27. tibi MS. 28. concedendo MS. 31. insensibili MS. 34. non *deest* MS.

16. *Equivocat.* Wyclif probably alludes to those of his adversaries who fancied they could find a meaning in absurd propositions; each one found a different meaning.

True, many may use such words, not thinking of the symbols at all.

quod homo est asinus, et hoc est inpossibile; ubi videtur intencionem loquentis dirigi ad significatum, et non ad signum, cum multi cogitant quod impossibile est chimeram esse, qui ignorant signa intrinseca. Hic dicitur quod sicut nemo potest cogitare per intellectum unum quod non potest esse: sic nemo potest demonstrare non ens. Unde, posito quod pronomen convertatur cum tali inpossibili, *chimera est*, dicitur quod pronomen demonstrat omne ens, sicut proposicio significat omne ens, cum nichil primarie demonstratur per pronomen huiusmodi, set unum modum significandi, racione cuius inpossibilis est predicacio cuiuslibet verbi de ipso, cum hoc sit falsum: hoc est vel hoc intelligitur. Et tamen subiectum solum demonstrat illud quod est intellectum, Sicut: *Hoc est falsum: Magis deo est;* et tamen subiectum solum significat illud quod est. Communiter nemo loquitur vel cogitat, sic: *inpossibile est chimeram esse*, nisi habuit intencionem de signo ad quod terminatur actus suus complexus; et si hoc ignoraret (ut communitas hominum cogitat simul res significatas et signa earum, ipsa hoc ignorante) sicut legens silibicat, ipso ignorante.

But a demonstrative pronoun cannot stand for a non-entity: it must here stand for a mode of thought by which a certain impossible combination is made.

It is hard to speak of impossible propositions, without having their symbols present in the mind, at least implicitly, as one spelling words he does not understand.

Et si tercio obicitur quod proposicio ideo est inpossibilis, quia primarie significat sicut non potest esse, dicitur quod illa non est causa, cum nichil potest significare sicut non potest esse; ut patet tam ex parte signi quam ex parte significati. Nec valet illa consequencia: *Hec proposicio significat sic; "homo est asinus", et sic non potest esse: igitur illa significat sicut non potest esse;* quia adverbium *sic* significat modum significandi signi. Qui quidem modus est, et in minori significat convertibiliter cum diccione proposicionis: et sic, ut in minori (cum paribus), valeret silogismus: set minor foret inpossibilis. Set econtra in minori foret ille sensus: *hoc significat hominem esse asinum;* et proposicionaliter in sequentibus valeret silogismus. Set minor foret inpossibilis, cum nichil potest movere ad apprehendendum *hominem esse asinum*, ut sepe dictum est. Scio tamen quod ex tali deduccione inolevit modus concedendi huiusmodi proposiciones; sicut bene sequeretur, admittendo supposicionem significativam et

No proposition can have meaning in an impossible way.

Refutation of a sophism maintaining the contrary,

This mode of speech, however, is much used, and is permissible,

11. significandum MS. 21. sic MS. 30. ad verbum MS.

provided we remember the distinctions given above.

materialem mixtim simul. In illo modo loquitur scriptura de ydeis, (ut post modum), et antiquiores frequenter.

Every symbol by which nothing is primarily signified, is false. This lack of correspondence between symbol and thing symbolized, is falsity; it is in the mind, and all things are true, in so far as they are. In this Augustine and Aristotle agree. All false things are true, but not *vice versâ*. Aristotle's divisions of falsity: — *a) In things signified.* What is not — either (1) not conceivable or (2) though conceivable, not existing. *b) In signs.* (1) External to the mind, as v. g. a shadow. (2) In the mind, as v. g. a dream. (3) In the expression of thought: error. (4) In words and deeds that are untruthful or wrong.

Ideo igitur est signum falsum, quia est signum carens primarie significato. Unde falsitas non est nisi defectus talis adequacionis vel correspondencie, sicut veritas signi est adequacio talis, vel correspondencia. Unde omnis talis falsitas causatur ex operacione intellectus, dicente Augustino 7 *Confessionum*, 25, "Vera sunt omnia in quantum sunt, nec quicquam est falsitas, nisi cum putatur esse quod non est", et Aristoteles, in [*De*] *Anima*, 21°, et 6 *metaphisice*, 8vo, satis expresse dicit quod verum et falsum sunt in anima. De hoc dixi superius quod omne falsum est verum, set non econtra. Aristoteles tamen, 5° *metaphisice*, 34to, distinguit de falso quod, quando sumitur sincategorice, convertitur cum hoc complexo: *non est*. Et hoc dupliciter: vel sic: scilicet *quod non est sic* simpliciter secundum *esse intelligibile*, et sic solum inpossibile est falsum; vel sic: quod non sit secundum *esse existere*, set potest esse: ut *filium meum existere* est falsum; et illud videtur posse dici verum, cum habet *esse intelligibile*. Falsum autem in signo dupliciter: vel sic, quod capitur occasio ex debili apprehensione ad false componendum; et hoc dupliciter: vel sic, quod sit extra animam, ut umbre; vel solum in anima, ut apparicione fantastice in sompnis; vel 3° quod signum instituitur ad significandum complexe, et deficit sibi veritas adequate significata; vel 4to in creatura racionali, que verbo vel facto dicit dictum sine correspondencia veritatis. Exemplum primi est de umbra et aliis sophisticis quibus sensus illuditur. Exemplum secundi de sompnis. Exemplum tercii de quocunque signo logico inpossibili vel falso contingenti.

The last of these is the greatest of all falsities.

Exemplum quarti est de homine falsidico vel iniuste

2. anteriores MS. 5. signatum MS. 11. De *deest* MS. 16. qη aliquando MS.; *ib.* fin^{ce} MS. 17. complexe MS. 18. nec *pro* est MS. 24. debilitate MS. 28. de^{at} *pro* deficit MS.

16. *Sincategorice.* I have thus rendered the abbreviation in the MS.; but I think the MS. itself is mistaken, and ought to have *categorice.* "Hoc est falsum" is a categorical proposition, convertible with *Hoc non est.* But as the abbreviation might possibly stand for something also, I have not inserted this correction.

vivente. Et inter omnes falsitates signi hec est proprissima, quia peccatum, quod quasi adnichilat hominem, et falsum secundum philosophos, est oppositum enti, sicut accidens (secundum commentatorem 5° *metaphisice*, commento ultimo) est propinqum non enti.

Logicians wrongly attend only to logical falsity. Since the Possible implies true entity, how can anything, but the Impossible be logically false? I reply that *entity* has various meanings, different when restricted by the idea of existence, and when not so restricted. This restriction bears also upon all other predicates that imply and restrict existence: the truth of these requires the actual existence of the qualities they imply. Other predicates only restrict the meaning of Entity as purely intelligible:

Inter illas sex significaciones falsi logici solum attendunt ad falsitatem signi logice instituti: de quo videtur quod solum inpossibile est falsum, quia omne possibile significat sicut est, et omne tale est verum: maior patet ex hoc quod omne possibile habet ad minimum *esse*
51 b[b] *intelligibile.* | Hic dicitur quod *esse* non dicitur pure univoce, set analogice de *esse existere* et *esse intelligibile;* ideo, quando per se dicitur, sive limitate, sumitur pro famosiori: limitat autem hoc verbum *existere* et quodlibet ipso inferius ad *esse existere;* sicut et quodlibet predicatum per se in genere; ut sic dicto, *petrus existit*, *est quantus*, *albus*, *similis paulo*, et cetera. Omnia enim talia, si sunt vera logice, implicant suum primarium significatum realiter existere. Alia autem que non possunt habere nisi *esse intelligibile*, limitant ad *esse intelligibile* propter pertinenciam; ut sic dicto, *negacio est preတericio*, vel *futuricio est possibilitas*, et sic de aliis extra genus. Et ita non sequitur, propter limitacionem ad *esse existere:* est ita secundum *esse intelligibili* sicut hec significat, 'melius deo est': igitur illa est vera, vel "ita est sicut hec significat"; quia privacio dicit aptitudinem forme, et modum quo nata est inesse. Ideo, si signum natum est habere correspondenciam veritatis existentis, et caret, de tanto dicitur falsum. Scio tamen quod tam scriptura quam sancti doctores equivocando communiter concedunt quamlibet creaturam esse pro omni mensura pro qua habet *esse intelligibile*, et sic oportet. Rem positivam dicunt esse vitam eternam, et
Io. I, 3, 4. ideo iuxta illud. Io. primo, quod factum [est] in ipso vita erat. Aliquando autem predicatur creatura contraccius; et sic negant huiusmodi predicaciones. Unde super Io. omelia prima, exponens illum textum, sic scribit, "attendite fratres carissimi, archa in opere non est vita, archa in artifice vita est". Et sequitur "terram, celum, solem, et lunam [que] vides in opere, formatorum

16. ex[tat] MS. 34. est *deest* MS. 35. q̂η *pro* aliquando MS.; *ib.* creature MS. 40. que *deest* MS.; *ib.* foΨ MS.

sunt corpora; in artifice vita sunt". De ista materia dicetur tractatu de ydeis.

It is necessary that things should be as they seem; but notwithstanding, there are illusions of the senses and the intellect; when we follow our imaginations, we cannot contemplate eternal Truth.

Et si quarto, obicitur quod omnia sunt sicut apparent, ut antiqui dixerunt (4to *metaphisice*) eo quod non potest apparere alicui sicut non potest esse: hic dico: etsi deus cuiquam appareat, necesse est omnia esse ut apparent. Verumptamen multe sunt illusiones sensuum et intellectus viantis; et generaliter est quando creatura deficit a veritate exemplari in deo, intendens fantasmatibus; ut pulcre declarat Augustinus in *De vera religione* diffuse. Unde hic 1° sic scribit: hec enim fantasmata tuentes et volutantes veritatem constantem videre non sinit; loca offerunt quod amenius, tempora suppeditant quod amenius, et relinqunt in anima turbas fantasmatum, quibus in aliud atque aliud cupiditas intenditur. Unde post probat quod de 7 modis ydolatrandi peior est quo quis suis adheret fantasmatibus tamquam incommunicabili veritati. Ex quo patet [quod] omnis error in affectu, qui est peccatum morum, causatur ex primo errore in intellectu. Unde infra, 96°, vere dicit quod, diligendo ludicrum et iocularia, a veritatibus eternis excidimus, et ab eis recedentes amplexamur nostra fantasmata. Nam redeuntibus nobis ad investigandam veritatem, ipsa in itinere ocurrunt, et nos transire non sinunt. Ideo, ut dicit particularirer, dicit beatus Io. ibi in fine epistole prime: "filioli, custodite vos a simulacris". I. Io. V, 21 Est enim simulacrum, secundum gramaticos, ymago, effigies, vel similitudo quasi simulans aliud quam est. Ex quo patet quod propriissime est in anima, et per accidens in ymaginibus sculptis vel pictis extra; et ita doctrina finalis beati Johannis foret universalis pro omnibus peccatis cavendum; cum omne peccatum potest reduci ad ydolatriam, sicut Augustinus reducit omne peccatum ad mendacium. Patet igitur ex dictis quod nichil potest apparere nisi quod potest esse, et per consequens nisi quod habet *esse intelligibili*. Verumptamen affectus potest velle volucione

To be attached to our own imaginations is the worst idolatry; all error in the heart proceeds from error in the mind.

We must beware of idols, and those in our own minds most truly merit that name.

Nothing seems, but what *is:* at least in the sense of intelligible Being.

5 deo *pro* dico MS. 11. Jo. MS.; *ib.* hic MS. 12 tuentis MS.: *ib.* volubi^te MS. 13. sicut *pro* sinit MS. 14. surripiunt *pro* suppeditant MS. 15, 16. intelligitur *pro* intenditur MS. 17. finis *pro* suis MS. 18. quod *deest* MS. 29. *after* aliud quod (?) MS.

2. *De Ydeis.* I have found the latter part of this paragraph, and its connection with the end, completely incomprehensible.

inpossibili, sicut intellectus intelligit actu complexo inpossibili. Ideo vere dicit philosophus, 3° *Ethicorum*, c° 5°, hoc: "quod voluntas est impossibilium", non quia vult illa que non possunt esse, quia nec intellectus hoc potest, set quia vult actu complexo [rem] quam inpossibile est inpleri conformiter ad illum actum; ut quando volo sic quod semper vivam in voluptatibus vite; vel quando considero bona sensibilia [esse] bona insensibilia, et sic compono illa sensibilia. In talibus enim terminatur voluntas cum integra ad simulacra et non penetrat ad raciones ydeales in deo, preferendo res ut sunt in naturali ordine meliores; et patet quod proporcionaliter ut omne peccatum iudicii racionis est in erronea vel indirecta composicione simulacrorum, sic omne peccatum actuale moris consistit in erroneo consensu
52a* voluntatis, [con]|sencientis minori bono, dimittendo magis bonum.

But the will can tend towards the Impossible, just as the mind can think of it, and in the same way as the latter, desiring, not the Impossible as such, but what cannot be according to the order of Nature, preferring the less to the greater good. In this idol-making all sin consists.

Ideo veritas racionaliter describitur ab Anselmo quod est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. Quando enim indirecte componitur signum pro significacione, tunc est falsitas; et si directe, tunc est veritas: quamvis pro falso vel iniuste componam. Philosophi igitur, 4to *metaphisice* recitati, non ponunt idem simul esse et non esse, cum non poterunt idem simul intelligere; nec homo appetit illa que non possunt esse, cum nichil potest velle qualiter non potest esse. Set voluntas fertur in bono pro quibus erronee componit, et appetit proporcionaliter ad inpossibile intellectum. Unde Aristoteles, 4to *metaphisice* 9°, sic dicit: "Nullus enim hominum posset existimare quod affirmacio et negacio sunt idem". Evanuerunt igitur philosophi in cogitacionibus suis, false, componendo signum cum signo, cum falsitate in significato.

Truth is mental rectitude, and falsity, any deviation therefrom, when the sign does not correspond to the thing signified. The ancient philosophers, though they erred, did not deny the Principle of Contradiction; nor can anyone desire a non-entity, save by mistake.

No one can think that Yes means No.

Et si queritur quid intelligo per predicatum, quando dicitur quod *proposicio non significat sicut non potest esse*, "*deus non intelligit chimeram*", "*lucifer noluit parificari deo*", et sic de similibus: dico ut sepe prius dictum est, quod solum possibile intelligo per signum, set indirecte; non ut sic dicto intelligo illud quod non potest esse, predicatum significat *esse* quod potest esse

When an impossible predicate is denied, this denial amounts to the thinking, though indirectly, of something that is possible.

3. est est MS. 5. rem *deest* MS. 8. esse *deest* MS. 15. concessu MS. 16. con *deest* MS. 28. q̂u *pro* dicit MS. 35. differunt *pro* dico ut MS.

5. *Rem.* It being impossible for me to verify Aristotle's text, I have corrected by myself such mistakes as were flagrant.

Also, if I say: This is possible, all depends on what I mean by *this*. It may mean an absurdity.

et solum illud; tamen impossibili modo, cum deus non potest adequare veritatem illi modo significandi. Et per idem non sequitur [quod] pronomen illius proposicionis, *hoc potest esse*, solum denominat illud quod potest esse. Et proposicio significat iuxta composicionem primariam terminorum: igitur *hoc potest esse*, posito quod ille terminus "hoc" convertatur cum illo aliquid magis deo. Non enim negetur proposicio propter demonstratum vel significatum, set propter modum significandi. In notando ergo *aliquid est magis*, negativa termina actum noscendi, quamvis habeat solum *esse intelligibile*.

How can we say that an act of our mind has nothing that corresponds to the mental symbol as an object, since *act* and *object* are relative terms?

Et si obiciatur quod cuilibet actui simplicis apprehensionis correspondet intellectus ex parte rei et actui composicionis correspondet signum; et per consequens toti actui aggregato est dare principaliter et primarie [significatum] correspondens; potissime cum quilibet actus, ut huiusmodi, sit de genere respectivorum que requirunt extrema: dicitur quod actus complexus est falsus vel inpossibilis, quando deficit veritas extra signum ad quam terminatur. Ideo, cum extrema significant pro rebus extra, et actui complexo non correspondet veritas signata extra intellectum, non mirum si non sit dare quid primarie vel adequate significatum per totum signum, quia non veritas: et per consequens nichil, cum componens intendit confuse et generaliter veritatem preter signum, et hoc deficit. Patet igitur quod deus noster est tam bonus quam bonus actus [quem] vis apprehensiva potest cogitare, eciam si fuerit infinita.

Because we affirm that the necessary object of every act is the mental symbol itself, and its correspondence with things extra-mental is its truth, its non-correspondence is falsity.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

The Divine Nature admits no falsity whatever.

Ex istis tam diffuse narratis colligere possum tria. Primum quod, sicut natura divina est speculum sine macula deformitatis, sic est purissimum, sine macula falsitatis. Ideo signanter dicitur sapiencie 7, quod est candor lucis eterne sine nigredine falsitatis. Non enim

3. quod *deest* MS 16. significatum *deest* MS. 24. veritatis MS. 27. quem *deest* MS. 29. Ca[m] 5[m] *in marg.; initial E in red ink* MS.

5. *Deo.* I think that the end of the sentence is wanting here. 32. *Non enim.* This sentence is hopelessly corrupt; but I think, too, that several others are wanting here. The next paragraph, "Sanatur", is evidently a reply to an objection, of which there is no hint in the text.

repugnat natura divina absolute necessario ab eterni persone divine quod *hoc est asinus* quod *chimera est.* Et sic quibuscunque inpossibilibus contradictoriis creatura potest componere, qui tunc indubie foret deus absolute necessario, signum summe inpossibile. Non est racio quare quecunque res est falsa vel inpossibilis, nisi propter modum representandi; et si sic errans male conparet preter intencionem obiecti: ut astra dicuntur signa falsa pari evidencia qua umbra, propter errorem iudicii. Cum igitur deus noster (secundum falsigraphum) habet summe quod ex se modum representandi sicut non potest esse, sequitur quod sit signum necessario summe falsum.

But all modes of mental representation are necessarily in God; it would follow that all falsity is also in Him.

Sanatur istud per hoc quod deus non potest per se vel per creaturam representare sicut non potest esse. Non enim obest signum quamlibet necessarium in natura sua esse quamlibet falsum, secundum communiter loquentes, propter representacionem. Deus, data illa via, foret summe falsus. Set vanum est hoc credere, cum falsitas consistit principaliter in composicione indirecta signi cum signo; et inde dicitur signum falsum, sicut urina dicitur sana, propter sanitatem in corpore. Cum igitur non potest ad intra componere, et ad extra semper componit rectissime, patet quod sic est summe verus, carens omni falsitate. Nec valet illa responsio que dicit deum non esse falsum, quamvis cogitet hominem esse asinum, et qualitercunque componit creatura potest cogitare, eo quod deus non assentit quod sit ita; quia ad falsitatem signi non requiritur assensus, ut patet de homine sciente signum esse inpossibile pro
52 a[b] sua apprehen | sione, cui tamen [non] assentit. Cum igitur in deo verbum, quod est secunda persona et principium omnium aliorum verborum vel cogitacionum in deo, sit verissime, patet quod deus nil scit nisi veritatem, et per consequens nil representat nisi veritatem.

This we absolutely deny. In God there is no falsity whatever, either in Himself or through His knowledge of creatures; for in His mind there is no act of combination, and all His external works are most perfect.

Some say: God has falsehood in His mind, but does not assent to it, therefore He is not false. This will not do; for the assent does not matter; if there can be a false symbol in the mind, this gives it a taint of falsity.

God can know nothing but truth;

Istud plane patet concipienti quod *intelligere* dei non ponit nisi ipsum et intellectum, et ad ipsa formaliter

for His intelligence supposes only Himself and the *thing* known

1. et'ni *pro* eterni MS. 2. quia *pro* quod *before* chimera MS. 3. $\bar{9}$ie *pro* contradictoriis MS. 7. et sic si MS. 10. iudicum MS. 11. mom *pro* modum MS. 27. imponit MS. 31. non *deest* MS. 34. verisimiliter MS. 37. potest *(in full)* MS.

11. *Falsigraphum.* See p. 57, note. 31. *Tamen* may be a misreading for *non;* at any rate, I think the negative is indispensable.

The absurd, being nothing, cannot even be thought by God.

Our word can be false; God's Word cannot, as Augustine says.

sequitur; sicut alie relaciones racionis secuntur ad sua extrema sine actu elicito expectando. Cum igitur non potest poni quod homo sit asinus, vel quod sit inintelligibile, vel aliquid magis deo; patet quod non potest poni divina intelligencia respectu talium. Intelligencia enim quecunque dicit intelligens et intellectum. Ideo certum est, si non sit intellectum, non est intelligencia ad ipsum terminata. Totum autem istud de pura veritate verbi eterni pulcre declarat Augustinus, 15° *De trinitate* 36, ostendens quod verbum nostrum potest esse falsum; verbum autem dei propter vehemenciam sue potencie hoc non potest, qui sicut non potest facere quicquam, nisi quod viderit patrem facientem, Io. 5°; Io. V, 19.
sic non potest facere quicquam loqui, set a patre [dicente] illi omne quod loquitur.

But God causes every positive act in His creatures; is he then false, as being the author of error?

No for when I say: a star twinkles, the impression is true; it is only when referring it to the objective star that I mistake.

And God's concourse does not force me to refer thus to the object; it only helps to form the impression; and the impression, as thus felt, is never false.

Et si obicitur quod deus, cum causat actum positivum creature, facit omnem false componentem actum talem elicere, et per consequens racione illius mocionis continue foret falsus: hic dico, supposito deum concurrere ad quemlibet actum creature, utendo creatura ut suo organo, non est color concludendi eum propterea esse falsum. Nam ille terminus, *falsum*, proprissime sumptus, opponitur contradictorie huic signo, *ens*, et ad hec contrahitur significacio falsi ad rem obiective significantem nature false concipienti. Unde, concipiendo astrum sintillare vel solem esse minorem homine, utor illo signo tamquam michi false, cum compono sic pro sintillacione et magnitudine astri michi obiecti; et deficit veritas subtracta adequata composicioni inesse. Cum igitur deus officialiter et non obiective movet me ut sic componam, non est color concludendi eum propterea esse falsum. Ymmo, cum nihil ex eius mocione obiectiva potest false sentiri de ipso, patet quod ipse non potest alicui esse falsus. Non igitur oportet timere tales deducciones: *creatura intelligit melius [deo] componendum, et multa que non possunt esse; igitur et deus.* Non enim relucent in deo ydee falsi vel inpossibilis, cum sit plenus veritate positiva.

Does God know things possible? Yes, as they are: not as existing, but capable of existence or intelligibility.

Et si dicatur quod deus intelligit multa que sunt falsa, ut creaturas possibiles non existentes, ac filium meum, et cetera, conceditur communiter conclusio. Non

1. sic MS. 3. hoc *pro* homo MS. 3, 4. intelligibile MS. 4. aliquos MS. 14. dicente *deest* MS. 19. ɔuto *pro* supposito MS. 29. subtrancta *(sic !)* MS. 33. sentere MS. 36. deo *deest* MS.

tamen est falsus, quia non dicit vel asserit ita esse, set posse esse vel intelligi, et sic proporcionaliter ut intelligitur habet [esse]. Set difficultas est, si deus intendit illam existere; et videtur quod non, quia tunc existit. Sicut igitur in homine non omne *significare* est *dicere*, ita ponitur in deo. Ideo, 15° *De Trinitate* 36to, ut supra, dicit Augustinus quod non omne verbum nostrum, id est, diccio vel assercio, procedit ex nostra sciencia; set cum putamus nos scire aliqua et decepti asserimus (secundum opinionem) falsum, statim gignimus in nobis verbum falsum: quod si postea noverimus nos deceptos, sic asserendo gignimus verbum verum". Et concordat communis locucio. Non enim dicimus aliquem dicere deum non esse vel demonstrari, etsi proferat illa verba sic significancia, nisi assit animo [intencio] taliter asserendi. Unde cogitacio hominis est falsa in casu et non diccio correspondens. Si igitur deus nichil cogitat nisi quod dicit, videtur quod nil cogitat nisi verum. Solucio huius difficultatis patet posterius, ca° 4to tractatus proximi.

But does God intend them to exist? It seems not, for then they would exist at some time or other.

Here note that a man may have in his mind a false proposition which he utters without assenting to it: could we then say that he denies God's existence?

God can only think what is true.

2° patet ex dictis quantum se extendit vis cognitiva ad apprehensivam humanam vel volutivam humanam; nam omne intelligibile et solum tale potest cogitari. Ideo totum genus entis, sicut est maximum intelligibile, sic est cogitabile. Patet: nam verum et ens convertuntur ex dictis superius, igitur entitas et veritas convertuntur. Set omnis veritas est cognoscibilis ab homine, igitur et omnis entitas. Et quod solum veritas est credibilis patet, ex hoc quod solum entitas est credibilis; et omne tale est veritas, igitur solum veritas est credibilis. Et ex eodem sequitur quod solum verum est apprehensibile vel volubile. Nam nichil est volubile, nisi quod

How far do the Apprehensive, the Cognitive, and the Volitional faculty extend in Man? To all that is. Universal Being is what most intelligible, and as it is therefore most true, it is the direct object of the faculty which knows truth.

Truth again, the object of Apprehension,

3. esse *deest* MS. 14. demoñi MS. 16. animis; intencio *deest* MS. 21. quod quantum MS.; *ib.* negativa MS. 22. apprehensiva humana vel volutiva humana MS. 23. cogitare MS. 31. bonum *pro* verum MS.

25. *Cogitabile.* I think that *cognoscibile* would be better here. Wyclif distinguishes between the *apprehension* of an idea, the *knowledge* of a truth. and the *will.* To the first corresponds Being, to the second Truth, to the third Goodness. 31. *Verum.* Here again I have taken a considerable liberty with the text. But the abbreviations for *verum* and for *bonum* resemble each other very much; and it seems nonsense to say that *bonum movet voluntatem sub racione boni.* Besides, Wyclif's intention to show that the three faculties are of equal scope does not come out so clearly if we follow the text as it is.

is also that of the Will; for it alone can move the will as being good.

potest movere voluntatem creatam sub racione boni; solum verum sic potest: igitur solum verum est volubile, ex quo videtur quod obiectum intellectus, racionis et voluntatis sunt equalis ambitus.

But our knowledge cannot extend to everything, or it would equal that of God, who alone can know all truth.

Set obicitur tripliciter. Primo per hoc quod multa possunt esse que nulla creatura | potest scire: quia, 52 b *quod deus scit nullam creaturam existere* [ille] potest, et hoc nulla creatura potest scire, igitur, et cetera. Ideo, ut alias dixi, si aliquid sit quod omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, hoc est deus. Nam deus quamlibet creaturam potest cognoscere non existere; igitur extensior est potencia cognitiva dei quam alicuius creature.

Our knowledge is not of possibles only (as is our apprehension), but also of things contingent; so its scope is greater.

Et nedum hoc, set videtur quod vis cognitiva creature intellectiva sit amplior vel quam vis volitiva. Nam vis cognitiva fertur super 2° contingencia et non intellectiva, quia sic contradiccio esset possibilis: ergo vis cognitiva hominis est extensior intellectiva.

A man can know himself to be damned, but is unable to will this; knowledge therefore extends farther than will.

Item, creatura racionalis potest se scire dampnari et scire se nolle dampnari vel affligi, et non potest homo velle suam dampnacionem; igitur potencia noscendi est amplior quam volendi. Si enim posset velle suam dampnacionem et penam, tunc posset puniri et non puniri; cum [non] sit penale virtuti incorruptibili, nisi de quanto opponitur voluntati. Si ergo intellectus posset velle suam dampnacionem, tunc illa posset sibi placere, et sic in dampnacione delectari, et tunc non esset dampnacio, set remissa premiacio.

And we think of many things that we do not know, and know many that we cannot will.

Item, natura intellectualis multa intelligit que ignorat vel noscit, et multa scit que non potest velle, ut peccata: igitur obiecta illarum virium non sunt equalis ambitus.

I answer that, according to the general doctrine, *Unum, Verum* and *Bonum* are each identical with a certain aspect of Ens. *Ens*, as being *Unum*

Hic dico quod, cum ens in sua maxima communitate [sit] obiectum virtutis cognitive; bonum quia in sua maxima communitate obiectum virtutis volutive; et omnia ista, secundum infringibilem sentenciam philoso-

2. bonum *pro* verum MS. 4. equales MS. 7. ille *deest* MS. 11. se non MS. 14 vel sit amplior MS.; *ib.* cognitive MS. 15, 16. cognitiva *pro* intellectiva MS. 17. cognitiva *pro* intellectiva MS. 21. nolle MS. 23. non *deest* MS. 24. ostenditur *pro* opponitur MS. 32. sit *deest* MS. 33. opositum *pro* objectiva MS.

32. *Virtutis.* Since a little farther down we have *Obiecta harum trium,* it seems clear that there is a gap, *verum* not being even mentioned. I believe the gap is here, after *virtutis*, and should fill it up so: . . . *apprehensive, verum in sua maxima communitate est obiectum virtutis.* — *Quia,* a few words afterwards, seems unnecessary.

phorum, sunt equalis ambitus: necesse est obiecta harum trium virium esse equalia. Verumptamen est ordo inter opposita sicut inter vires, cum ens, sub racione qua unum, movet memoriam vel vim intellectivam; et sub racione qua verum, movet racionem vel vim noscivam; et 3°, sub racione qua bonum, movet vim voluntariam: et tam trinitas obiecti quam eciam subiecti est unitas essencie.

is the object of Memory or Apprehension; as being *Verum*, it is the object of Cognition; as being *Bonum*, it is the object of Volition; a Trinity in the Object as in the Subject.

Ad argumentum: patet, quamvis obiecta multa possent esse que natura creata potest cognoscere existere, si tamen ens sit commune solum ad actuale ens, et non ad *esse possibile*, tunc est varie respondendum. Nam sic intelligencia dei excederet intellectum creatum, cum in hoc est vis cognitiva dei privilegiata supra alias quod ex se infinite perfeccius cognoscit quam creatura; et sola ipsa omne cognoscibile potest cognoscere. Verumptamen, cum intelligibile et cognoscibile sunt passiones entis, et per consequens presupponunt ens, patet quod illud quod non est non est cognoscibile. Ideo creature intellectuales omne cognoscibile cognoscunt, que non omne cognoscibile possunt cognoscere: et sic, extendendo *intelligere* ad quodlibet *cogitare*, ut dictum est superius, concedendum est quod tam deus quam natura creata intelligit aliqua que nescit, ut posterius dicitur de sciencia dei. Nam dupliciter dicitur aliquid intelligibile, sicut dupliciter dicitur *intelligere;* vel sic, quod habeat *esse* secundum intencionem intellectus: et sic intelligibile est passio equalis cum ente, et sic quod posset intendi ab intellectu, licet non intenditur; vel dicitur ab *existere*, et taliter intellectum, [ut] non simpliciter *esse*, set *esse possibile* vel *esse cognitum*, *posse esse;* et tale non continetur sub primo obiecto illarum virium, quia non est Secunda responsio, amplians ens, est multis placibilior: de qua tractatur proximo capitulo. Ergo patet quod homo cognoscit omne quod potest cognosci.

We must distinguish between Being in the sense of possibility and of actual existence.

God knows all things infinitely better than any creature.

But a non-existing thing is knowable in some respects, unknowable in others; and therefore both God and the creature may know and not know it.

'Intelligible' has a double meaning, according as the word *Being* refers to anything thought of, or to actual existence; then it is not equivalent to Being, but to possible or to known Being. In this latter case, it is not equally the object of our faculties.

Ad secundum dicitur quod, sicut homo cognoscit confuse omne ens, eciam illud quod ignorat, sic vult homo confuse omne volubile, in volendo omne ens esse, etsi multa sint que vult in particulari: illa enim non

As man, knowing Being in general, has some knowledge even of what he does not know in particular; so the Will, tending towards

3. unu MS. 7. uni^{ta} MS. 12. in celum *pro* intellectum MS. 14. ifı$^{t'}$ *pro* infinite MS.; *ib.* quod *pro* quam MS. 24. non nescit MS. 27. econtra *pro* equalis MS. 29. eodem *pro* existere MS. 30. ut *deest* MS. 33. placi^{or} *pro* placibilior MS. 34. 4to *pro* ergo MS. 37. et *pro* eciam MS. 38. vocando MS. 39. inpertiri MS.

what is, in general, tends somehow towards every being. The question of damnation will be examined later. My non-existence is an object of my thought: is it therefore an object of my will? Yes; it being an object of thought, I will it as such.

repugnant. Primo vult hoc in universali, et [2°] vult hoc in particulari. Utrum autem possibile sit hominem velle in particulari suam dampnacionem vel penam, dicetur postmodum. Sequendo extensionem entis ad omne intelligibile, dicitur quod non sequitur: *Omne ens volo, et "cognosco me non existere" est ens: igitur me non existere volo et cognosco:* et ita de similibus argumentis factis, tam de noticia dei quam intellectus creati. Hoc tamen volo et cognosco confuse (de | mon- 52 b[b]
strando *ens intelligibile* quod est 'me non existere') sicut et volo et cognosco '*me non existere*' esse: suple secundum *esse intelligibile.* Set si dicatur sic: 'Volo me non existere' est limitacio ad volucionem negacionis formaliter et non affirmacionis; sicut quando dicitur: volo hoc (vel me) non existere esse; et ita generaliter, omne limitans actum intellectus vel voluntatis est verum et bonum. Et ita intelligendo hoc dictum *me non existere.* Et conceditur [quod] quicquid deus cogitat vel intelligit, illud dicit; et intendit et cogitat omnia possibilia que non existunt; et tamen nullum terminum [intendit] existere, set omnia intendit esse secundum *esse intelligibile* vel *possibile esse.* Quando enim dicitur: *deus intelligit vel intendit illa existere,* sic limitacio [est] ad *intelligere* visionis; et quando dicitur: *deus intelligit hoc vel hoc esse* est indifferens ad visionem, vel simplex dei noticia. Et conformiter non sequitur: *omne quod deus cognoscit vult; set cognoscit eum peccare: igitur vult ipsum peccare:* ut dicit sanctus Thomas, prima parte Summe, questione 16ª, articulo 5°.

Whatever God thinks, He wills to be; not necessarily in existence, but to be possible. If it is to exist, God *sees*; if not, He simply *knows* it.

1. 2° *deest* MS. 9. cer'ati *pro* creati MS. 18. quod *deest* MS. 21. intendit *deest* MS. 23. est *deest* MS. 25. in^{ler} *pro* simplex MS. 26. noticiam (?) MS. 29. sic' *pro* sumne MS.

12—17. *Set — Et conceditur.* I can find no means of restoring this passage. 28. *Thomas.* Sum. Th. *loco citato: Utrum Deus sit veritas.* The third objection runs thus: *Si in Deo sit veritas, omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum: ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum.* The answer is: *Quicquid est veritatis in hoc, quod dico, Istum fornicari est verum; totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur: Ergo istum fornicari est a Deo: est fallacia accidentis.* This quotation has some bearing on the matter, but not so much as might be expected. However, the reader has already seen that this MS. is shockingly mutilated, though the writing is fair; and this may account for discrepancies. A great many other MSS. are far worse as to handwriting, yet better as to the text. Mr. Matthew and others incline

Ad tercium, dicitur quod non obest multa esse cognoscibilia et volubilia, etsi non actualiter moveant quamcunque talem potenciam; quia satis est quod nata sunt movere talem potenciam et quod ydea moveat ad actus huiusmodi transcendentes. Omne igitur intelligibile est cognoscibile, et per consequens natum est movere vim raciocinativam; et omne cognoscibile, eciam et peccatum, est volubile sub aliqua racione, ut post dicetur. In hoc igitur est ordo quod repugnat naturam creatam intellectualem quicquam cognoscere, nisi primo illud intelligat; nec potest velle volubile, nisi previe ipsum cognoscat. Verumptamen in quodcunque potest aliqua illarum virium, potest et quelibet.

It is not necessary that anything should be actually known or willed; potentiality is sufficient. All that can be thought can be willed; even sin, from a certain standpoint. First comes simple apprehension, then knowledge, then the act of will.

Set obicitur per hoc quod iuxta illam viam membra distinccionis data de triplici *esse* videntur coincidere, cum omne ens predicabile sit ens intelligibile; et econtra, eo quod solum illud quod potest esse potest intelligi. Hic dico quod multa potest deus de sua potencia absoluta que non sunt in potencia eius ordinata, nec in potencia cause secunde; ut omnia possibilia existere que non existunt; et sic forte intelligunt hii qui distingunt inter *esse possibile* et *esse intelligibile,* quod non ex equo sunt, vocando illud possibile ad quod est potencia ordinata. Set expressius dicitur quod potencia dicitur comparative respectu actus, vel veri *esse* in genere. Cum igitur multa sunt que non possunt [creari], ut patet de veritatibus extra genus, videtur quod multa habent *esse* que non habent *esse existere.* Nec est intelligendum quod illa tria distinguntur ex opposito, cum omni creature simul insunt secundum quemdam ordinem: us *esse intelligibile* creature est eius *esse* suppremum; quod *esse* est eternum in hoc quod

But do we confuse intelligibility with possibility, or make the latter the condition of the former? God can by His absolute power, make all possible things to exist; but many cannot exist if we consider His wisdom. Some would call these impossible; others, merely intelligible. Power is relative to action, and there are many truths which never can have existing being. We must not imagine these three orders of entity as

1, 2. cognitiva *pro* cognoscibilia MS. 2. voluta MS. 7. et *pro* eciam MS. 10. cogitare *pro* cognoscere MS. 15. viur *pro* vidintur MS. 23. illud vocando illud MS. 27. creari *deest* MS.

to believe that this MS. is the work of a paid scribe, and that others — those of Prague and Vienna, for instance — were copied hastily by students. 27. *Extra genus.* I suppose Wyclif alludes to that part of the Universals which does not correspond to existing beings; that which corresponds, has, in and by them, *esse existere.* For instance, beyond the genera of substances existing now, in the past or in the future, you may conceive other beings: the truth of their being has no existence, but only intelligibility.

opposed to each other; they co-exist and are coordinated. Thus, in any being, its intelligible entity is first: meaning that God eternally wills that it should exist in time. After this comes its possible entity: possible because of its causes, ordained by God; and lastly, its actual existence. This is the doctrine of Augustine.

deus eternaliter intendit illam creaturam existere tempore suo; et post illud *esse*, sequitur *esse possibile* creature in causis secundis ordinatis a deo ad producendum creaturam in tempore suo; et illud est temporale medians inter *esse intelligibile* et *esse existere*; 3° vero sequitur *esse existere* vel *esse* accidentale creature in suo genere. Patet ista distinccio per beatum Augustinum 6°, *Super Genesim* ad litteram, 13°: ubi sic: "creata aliter sunt in verbo dei, ubi ista non facta set eterna sunt; aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia futura simul facta sunt; aliter in rebus que secundum causas simul creatas iam non simul, set suo quelibet tempore creantur". Et secundum membrum capit subdivisionem secundum genus et genera causarum, ut patet 6to super genesim, 10.

Still there remains a great difficulty: can all that is thinkable be termed Being? The answers to this are various.

Difficultas autem stat et in illo, si ens vel *esse* sit commune ad omne intelligibile. Igitur, si omne quod potest intelligi vocetur intelligibile . . . Et movent evidencie hic inde. Et indubie, iuxta variacionem respondendum in illa logica stat magna variacio.

Is it possible to give assent to a flagrant absurdity? and by what means? I think such foolishness is possible in the case of every absurd proposition. Yet all that seems absurd, is not. *I am dead,* may be said truly by a Saint in Heaven; and by a man on earth, taking it as a future truth. A man may be dead and yet living at the same time; as Christ is now.

Set difficultas stat ulterior, quibus signis potest natura creata assentire (ut potest assentire) tali proposicioni: "*ego sum mortuus*", "*illud simul est et non est*", et sic de similibus significantibus. Et videtur michi probabiliter posse dici quod contingit hominem ad tantum desipere quod cuicunque tali proposicioni inpossibili assentiat. Isti autem proposicioni "*ego sum mortuus*" | contingit quemlibet dispositum assentire; ut omnes 53 a[a]
sancti in celo, qui quidem erant mortui, noscunt se esse mortuos, sicut et viventes nunc in terra noscunt se esse mortuos pro tempore futuro, noticia fidei inperfecta. Quilibet tamen bene dispositus scit se vivere, et sic esse. Ideo dicit salvator, beato Io. apoc. primo: *fui mortuus et ecce sum vivus in secula seculorum.* (Apoc. I, 18.) Et certum quod si christus fuit, ipse est mortuus, quia est ille qui moriebatur; et per consequens est mortuus in tempore, quoniam privatus vita corporali. Aliter enim non diceret Paulus ante, eodem capitulo, quod christus est "primogenitus mortuorum et princeps regum terre". (Apoc. I, 5.) Si enim esset primogenitus mortuorum et prin-

3, 4. probandum MS. 18. *no gap before* et MS. 26. descipere MS. 28. quodlibet MS. 30—31. sicut — mortuos *twice, with* nunc *omitted* MS. 30. nesciunt MS. 29. quidam MS. 37. privatur MS.

ceps regum terre, tunc est de numero mortuorum, et non solum primo omnium genitus quo ad generacionem eternam, vel principalem necessitatem generacionis humanitatis, set primo inter mortuos resurgens ad beatitudinem. Sic enim dicit apostolus ipsum esse primicias dormientium. Ideo non obest quod idem sit simul et semel visum et mortuum: ut patet de persona verbi in triduo; set hoc esset impossibile quod idem simul et semel et secundum idem sit vivum et mortuum. Sic enim assignat philosophus contradiccionem, 4to *Metaphisice*, et primo *Elencorum*. 3° cum homo sit due nature, sicut Christus est tres nature, patet quod non repugnat hominem simul vivere et esse mortuum. De nihilo ergo est homo magis certus quam de hoc quod ipse vivit. Unde Augustinus, 15° *De trinitate*, 38°, sic scribit. "Alia autem sunt que ita sciuntur ut nunquam excedere possunt, quoniam principia sunt et ad ipsius animi naturam pertinent; ut est illud quod nos vivere scimus. Manet enim hoc quamdiu animus manet, et quia semper animus manet."

God the Son was actually dead (as man) and living (as God) at one time: there is only contradiction when the same thing is and is not at the same moment and in the same sense.

Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas quibus aliqui putant se probare quod verba scripture et doctorum sunt falsa de virtute sermonis. Credencium igitur actibus suis in talibus, quidam equivocant et desipiunt, confuse et imperfecte intelligentes significata, quia contradiccionem ex parte rei nemo potest intelligere, licet utramque partem posset intelligere in materia contradiccionis. Contradiccio autem in signis potest esse: ut puta, quando unum signum dicitur dupliciter de eodem secundum idem, vel pro eadem mensura, ut docetur 4to *metaphisice*. Nec est scientificum tractare ad quantum potest animus deviare, credendo actibus suis inpossibilibus, quia infinitis modis hoc contingit, sicut et alii errores qui sunt per accidens, et solum de illis que semper sunt vel in maiori parte temporis est sciencia, ut dicitur 6° *metaphisice* 6°.

The words of Scripture and of the Fathers are literally true: no sophists can prove the contrary; they only juggle with the meaning of words.

It is simply impossible to understand a contradiction as an existing thing, though we may do so for each part separately.

How far mental aberration may go is not a matter of scientific knowledge.

20. ut *pro* nec MS. 22. v' s' *pro* virtute sermones MS. 23. quidem MS. 24. significat MS. 26. contingentis *pro* contradiccionis MS. 33. minori MS. 34. fuit *pro* est MS.

31. *Credendo actibus.* Wyclif has all along contained that it is beyond the power of man to *understand* a self-contradictory proposition; but he now says that it is by no means impossible to *believe* it as true. His theory is that what we conceive in such cases is merely the objective terminus necessary to every mental act, which we take for something really possible (or existing) *extra mentem.*

In my opinion, a man may go so far as to believe that *nothing exists;* and if so, he can believe anything. Assent does not necessarily follow thought. God's aid as to assent may be so feeble one way that assent to the other side is possible. This may happen in dreams. If God's concourse for the act of sin is a fact, how much more for the belief in an absurdity! And He may thus blind them in order to punish sin. These men, however, seem incapable of all knowledge, since they contradict the first foundation of all. But God can illuminate them.

Videtur ergo mihi quod contingit hominem ad tantum infatuari quod duobus contradictoriis signis credat quod hoc sit verum: *nihil est;* et per consequens quodlibet aliud signum potest esse ab eo creditum, quodcunque significaverit. Assumptum sic: quelibet cogitacio et assensus creature sunt actus creature secundum naturalem ordinam, set habentes [se] sic, quod prior potest esse sine secundo; set deus libere contradictorie agit omnem actum cogitandi, non producendo actum assenciendi vel credendi: quo habito, non foret difficile deo tam remisse movere intellectum ad assensum unius partis, et tam necessario ad oppositum, quod unumquodque equale discedat. Sic enim ligantur racio estimativa in sompniis, quia ymaginativa assentit composicioni quam vigilans sciret esse inpossibile. Nec obest perfeccioni dei quod concurrat ad posicionem cuiuscunque actus intellectus, quia concurrit ad inpossibiles actus voluntatis, in quibus est peccatum moris: quid igitur obest deum infatuare homines in penam peccati ad credendum quodcunque inpossibile, ut recitatur 4to *Metaphisice*? Et si arguitur quod tales non possunt quicquam addiscere, cum deficiunt in primo principio, dicitur ut supra, quod primum cognitivum et primum omnium movens in quacunque noticia intellectus creati est deus. Ideo facile est eum ammovere impedimenta, demonstrando quamlibet veritatem per illustracionem ad videndum primo primum principium.

Our theory reconciles Augustine and others who acknowledge eternal truths, independent of the human mind, with St. Thomas and Aristotle who seem to make truth dependent on the mind.

3° patet ex dictis via concordandi doctores qui in materia de veritatibus videntur contradicere sibi ipsis. Ponunt enim Augustinus, Anselmus, Lincolniensis, et alii sequaces eorum veritates ex parte rei eternas independentes ab intellectu creato; et videtur sanctum Thomam dicere in libro suo *De Veritate* et alibi multis locis quod omne verum et falsum dependent ab anima,

4. quandocunque MS. 5. aff^s *pro* assensus MS. 7. se *deest* MS. 11. in celum *pro* intellectum MS. 13. eηη^le *pro* equale MS. 14. quod *pro* quia MS. 16. con *deest* MS.; *ib.* poi^m *pro* posicionem MS. 17. contingit *pro* concurrit MS. 23. mo9 *pro* movens MS. 25. de^do *pro* demonstrando MS. 29. vnir *pro* videntur MS.

26. *Illustracionem.* God blinds certain men, so that they believe absurdities; yet He gives them light on other points by means of the Principle of Contradiction, notwithstanding that, blind on one point, they ought naturally to be blind on all. Such, I think, is the sense of this passage.

For Truth may be understood in four different ways.

$53a^{b}$ sicut | videtur Aristoteles dicere, 3° *De anima*, 21° et 6° *metaphisice*, 8vo. Set patet attendendo dicta superius, quod non est realis repugnancia inter illos. Nam [veritas aut] falsitas aliquando accipitur pro forma positiva qua signum est verum vel falsum formaliter, que est adequacio signi significantis ad veritatem significatam; et quandoque vocatur ipsum signum; 3° vocatur quodcunque ens extra animam veritas; et 4to aggregatum ex veritate reali et actu anime. Veritas autem, primo modo et quarto modo dicta, dependent ab anima, sicut vult sanctus Thomas; et quecunque veritas tercio modo dicta, que non est intellectus, dependet ab intellectu: ideo, sicut est, est in illo. Unde, pro explanacione 4^{ti} membri, notanda vulgata sentencia doctorum, que est: aliquod est totaliter extra animam (ut lignum, lapis, et cetera), aliquod totaliter in anima (ut sompnia et actus anime); aliquod autem, ut dicunt, partim in anima et partim extra animam, ut universale, tempus, et cetera aggregata ex operacione intellectus et rebus extra. Unde dicunt philosophi quod intellectus facit unitatem in rebus. Et 4to *Phisicorum* 131°, dicitur quod tempus habet *esse* ab anima. Nec mirum de istis modis loquendi; quia talia qui componendo et dividendo cognoscimus simul [ac] apprehendimus cum actu anime, cum sine extremis non est intelligere. Ideo, cogitando de illis, simul cogitamus de actionibus nostris, et de veritate: igitur 4to modo dicuntur.

Some of these depend on the mind.

Quod autem sit dare veritatem a parte rei independentem ab anima, patet ex hoc quod, destructa vel non posita quacunque, deus sciret 2° et tria [non] esse quinque; nullas creaturas posse scire se non esse creaturam; et sic de quodlibet veritatibus nominandis. Et tamen inpossibile sit dari sciencia proporcionata illis sanctis que de virtute sermonis sunt veritates. Unde Augustinus, 2° *De doctrina christiana*, 32°, sic

Some of them do not. For there are truths, which, if supposed non-existent, God would know the Self-Contradictory to be true. Yet we can have no complete science of these.

2. attendendi MT. 3. veritas aut *deest* MS. 8. veritatis MS. 13. est *deest* MS. 14. notandum quod vulgatam sentenciam doctorum quod MS. 15. cum aliquod MS. 17. et tunc MS. 24. ac *deest* MS. 27. dicta *pro* dicuntur MS. 30. non *deest* MS. 31. multas MS. 32. nominandum MS.

33. *Et tamen.* This sentence must have been very badly copied. *Sanctis* is of course nonsence: possiby the abbreviation stands for *proposicionibus;* and if so, I would suggest *est* for *et*, and *sic* for *est.*

Augustine says they are eternal: whoso knows that the falsity of a consequent renders the antecedent false, does not make it, but only shows it, to be such.

scribit: "Illa veritas connecciónum non instituta est, set animadversa ab hominibus, cum sit in rerum racione perpetua et divinitus instituta". Et ponit exemplum: "Qui dicit: 'cum falsum est quod sequitur, necesse est ut falsum sit quod precedit', verissime dicit; nec ipse facit ut ista sit, set tantum ita adesse demonstrat." Et sequitur: "hoc igitur, ut consequente ablato, auferatur et illud quod precedit, non instituerunt homines, set ostenderunt".

If you doubt a truth, you know your doubt, and this knowledge is truth.

Et [in] *De vera religione,* sequitur conclusio; probando quod nemini deficit lumen cogitandi veritatem, sic describitur: "omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit certus est: de vero ergo certus est. Omnis ergo qui utrum verum sit, verisimiliter dubitat, in seipso habet verum. Unde non dubitat; nec ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non itaque oportet de veritate dubitare. Ubi videtur hic, ita est lumen sine spacio locorum et temporum, et sine ullo spaciorum talium fantasmate; ut illa ex aliqua parte corporis ponit, et cetera, si omnis racionator intereat.

Reasoning does not make, but merely finds out those truths.

Non enim racionacio talia facit, set invenit; igitur antequam inveniantur, in se manent; et cum inveniuntur, nos innovant, et ita renascitur interior homo." Et utrobique patet quod Augustinus dirigit aciem mentis ad veritatem extra, et non ad aggregatum huiusmodi.

Now St. Thomas, inquiring whether truth is in the mind or in things, says: Truth implies a relation to the mind,

Unde quod sanctus Thomas sic sentit, patet prima parte *Summe*, questione decima [sexta]. Nam primo articulo querit si veritas sit tantum in intellectu vel in rebus: et in solucione dicit quod verum, in quantum huiusmodi, nominat illud in quod tendit intellectus. Oportet igitur quod res dicatur vera secundum ordinem quem habet ad intellectum; quod potest esse dupliciter: vel per se, sic quod dependet ab intellectu secundum suum *esse* et racionem; et sic universitas creata est vera in comparacione ad intellectum divinum a quo dependet: vel 2°, per accidens, verum dicit ordinem ad intellectum a quo non dependet, set a quo cognoscitur per accidens; sic quod eius noticia dependet ab illo intellectu; ut veritas extra animam se habet ad intel-

which may mean truth essentially dependent on the mind — as the world in respect to God — or only in accidental relation, therewith.

9. in *deest* MS. 19. pout *pro* ponit MS. 27. sexta *deest* MS.

27. St. Th. I[a] Pars, loco citato, in corp. art. 1[i]. Wyclif does not quote Aquinas, but merely gives a summary of this passage.

lectum humanum. Cum autem iudicium de re non sumitur secundum illud quod inest sibi per accidens, set secundum illud quod per se ei inest, patet quod unaqueque res dicitur vera secundum intellectum divinum a quo dependet. Unde [dicitur] verus lapis, quia assequitur propriam naturam lapidis secundum preconcepcionem intellectus divini, a quo intellectu principaliter est veritas, et secundarie in rebus.

53 b[a] Ideo dicit Augustinus in *De* | *vera religione*, quod veritas est similitudo vel imitacio sui principii; et Anselmus, quod est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; et in libro de diffinicionibus Ysaac, dicitur quod veritas est adequacio rei et intellectus; et Avicenna: veritas cuiuscunque rei est proprietas sui *esse* quod stabilitatum est ei.

Definitions of truth by various writers.

In omnibus istis dictis, patet quod veritas quecunque creata dicit comparacionem ad intellectum primum. Ideo vere dicit Anselmus quod veritas quecunque, sub racione qua veritas, est sola mente perceptibilis. Ex istis patet quod superficialiter perlegunt illum sanctum, qui dicunt ipsum [dicere] quod nulla sit veritas causata, nisi consequitur per animam. Unde, primo *Soliloquiorum*, reprobat Augustinus illam descripcionem veri: verum est id quod videtur, suple, *a creatura;* quia, ut arguit Augustinus, tunc lapides in abditissimo sinu terre non essent veri lapides. Quod exponit sanctus Thomas ubi supra, Summa, hiis verbis: "Dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei, et excludit a racione huiusmodi veritatis comparacionem ad intellectum nostrum, non autem ad intellectum divinum, nam id quod est per accidens ab unaquaque diffinitione excluditur". Ex istis patet quod nulla veritas creatur ab intellectu humano, nisi forte sit actus anime vel aliud huiusmodi

They all suppose a reference to the Divine Mind.

St. Thomas, comenting a passage of Augustine, expressly admits truth in the things themselves.

Therefore our soul does not produce truth in things; when it comes to know

1. iudi[m] *pro* iudicium MS. 1, 2. q͞uitur *pro* sumitur MS. 3. scilicet *pro* ei MS. 5. dicitur *deest* MS.; *ib.* versus MS.: *ib.* qui MS. 5, 6. asseritur *pro* assequitur MS. 13 am[na] *pro* Avicenna MS. 21. quo *pro* qui MS.; *ib.* dicere *deest* MS. 24 illud *pro* id quod MS. 27. sη̃ *pro* Summa MS.; *ib.* v̓3 *pro* verbis MS. 28. ibi de MS. 30, 31. per accidens est MS.

12. *Ysaac.* I have not been able to identify this writer. From the name, be may have been a Mediaeval Jewish philosopher. St. Thomas (St. Th. 1[a] Pars, qu. XVI, art. 2) mentions him in connection with the definition given here; one, by the way, that has been widely adopted by Scholastic philosophers. 27. *Summa.* St. Th. loco citato: *Ad primum.*

it, truth begins to exist in our mind, while it is inseparable from the mind of God.

dependens ab anima, et per consequens veritas ex parte rei, habens completum *esse* ab intellectu divino, est inpertinens huic quod ipsa cognoscatur ab anima [que] invenit veritatem; tunc potest dici quod ipsa incipit veritas anime, postquam inseparabiliter est veritas intellectui primo.

All truth is there, more than in the things themselves; and all truth in our minds proceeds from the light of God, without which knowledge (as bodily vision without bodily light) would be impossible.

2° patet quod omnis veritas est in intellectu divino, ymmo veritas quecunque causata principalius est in deo quam in suo *esse existere;* et nedum hoc, set quandocunque alica veritas invenitur ab intellectu creato, ipsa est in ipso secundum *esse* obiectivum intelligibile per deum, qui illabitur animo. Sicut enim inpossibilem est terra vel aliud opacum videri ab oculo corporali sine lumine corporeo irradiante, sic impossibile creaturam intellectualem secundum eius intellectum possibile quicquam videre mentaliter sine irradiacione lucis prime pure: quam quidam vocant intellectum agentem, quantum ad hoc quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum in aspectu quolibet mentis sue.

Aristotle is right in saying that truth is not in things, but in the mind, speaking of merely logical truth.

I have shown elsewhere that he admitted truth as existing in things.

Per hec patet quod Aristoteles, 6° *Metaphisice*, 8°, verum dicit, ponendo diversitatem inter obiectum intellectus et voluntatis sub hiis verbis: "Falsum autem et verum non sunt in rebus, sicut bonum et malum, set in mente." Illud verum est de vero et falso primo et 4to modo dictis, quorum consideracio pertinet ad logicos, [qui] non consistunt citra composicionem et divisionem in anima. Quid autem fuit de mente Aristotelis concedere veritatem ex parte rei, 3° modo dictam, que est de consideracione mathematici, alias declaravi. Unde, secundo *Metaphisice*, capitulo secundo, sic scribit de subiecto metaphisice: "Vocari vero philosophiam veritatis scienciam recte habet; nam theologice finis est veritas, et practice opus"; et quia subiectum metaphisice est ens quod convertitur cum veritate, ideo consequenter subiungit: "quare unumquodque sic se habet

3. og'ar *pro* cognoscatur MS. 4. que *deest* MS. 18. enim *pro* quod MS. 27. que *deest* MS.; *ib.* consistit MS. 28. quia *pro* quod MS. 32. vo͞ji *pro* vocari MS. 33. l͞ce *pro* recte MS.

33. *Theologice.* I am unable to consult the old Latin translation of Aristotle; but, so far as my memory goes, the word *theologica* is never used by him. It may be a mistake for *speculativa.*

ut sit, ita ad veritatem". Super quo verbo dicit sanctus Thomas; "nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicuius speciei, set se habet communiter ad omnia encia. Intencionis igitur philosophi est quod methaphisicus habet tractare et de veritate ex parte rei 3° modo dicta, et logici est tractare de veritate signi primo modo dicta, et ad scienciam de anima pertinet tractare de actu componendi vel dividendi, prout procedit a potenciis anime. Et patet quod tota controversia loquencium de veritate stat in apprehensionis variacione signorum; ut sic dicto, '*mundum esse*' *est verum*, gramaticus, qui solum signa considerat, intelligit quod talis oracio infinitiva est vera. Logicus autem concipit sic mixtim, quod *mundum esse* est verum ex parte rei, ut mens cogitat. Methaphisicus autem, considerans deum esse in fine veritatis, cum sit causa quare alia sunt vera, intelligit per oracionem infinitivam nominaliter intellectam quod essencia mundi est vera, ut prima causa videt. Et illo modo intelligit Aristoteles per oraciones infinitivas generaliter, quando supponunt verbo personali; sicut et Augustinus et alii reales philosophi.

St. Thomas says that a metaphysician ought to deal with truth as it is in things, a logician with the truth of its expression, and a psychologist with the act of affirming or denying, as it proceeds from the mental powers.

The whole controversy, therefore, comes from a confusion of the various senses of the word.

Ulterius notandum pro dicto philosophi, 6to *Metaphisice*, quod verum et bonum, prout sunt extra animam, diversimode terminant actus potencie intellective et volutive. Oportet enim verum, in quantum terminat actum intellectus, habere *esse intelligibile* in eo intellectu, ut patet ex dictis; set non oportet bonum, | 53b sub ea racione qua bonum, habere *esse* in mente illud considerante; quia utilitas, honestas, moralitas eciam, sunt extra animam, licet omnia ista oportet esse in intellectu divino, ubi non est distinccio inter vim intellectivam et volutivam. Unde, secundum commentatorem, propter *esse* intelligibile spirituale intellectorum in anima, non repugnat contraria, immo contradictoria, secundum *esse* intelligibile sibi inesse; racioni tamen et voluntati est quedam regula assentire aut velle talia esse, quia

We must note that, in the doctrine of Aristotle, the objects of the will and of the mind are not alike in this, that the latter, as it were, *enter* the mind, whilst the will *goes out* to the former.

And contraries may be thought together by the

1. i^{a} *pro* ita MS. 9. ut *pro* et MS. 26. intel~ *pro* intellectu MS. 33, 34. erat *pro* repugnat MS.

30. *Extra.* In the marginal note I have given what I suppose Wyclif to allude to in Aristotle's doctrine. The mind takes in; the will stretches out. Otherwise, a great many objects of the will cannot properly be said to be *extra animam*. I want to make a fortune; this possible fortune is nowhere but in my mind. But my desire tends towards it as to something external.

mind, existing there, as they do, in purely intellectual entity; but think or will them as existing thus in the world of things.

respicit res ut extra animam sunt; et propter tale *esse* dicit philosophus quod non repugnant contradictoriorum species materie sensitive. Hoc habet colorem penes eos qui dicunt quod sensibile habet *esse* spirituale in sensu, sicut et [in] intellectu habet *esse* intelligibile. In deo autem uniuntur omnia in unum essencialiter.

It may be said that our doctrine contradicts St. Thomas, who denies the eternity of truth. But the passage may be explained; and he certainly admits the Ideal world in God, formally distinct from Him.

Set ulterius videtur scienciam predictam de veritatibus contradicere sancto Thome, cum ipsa ponit quotlibet veritates esse eternas in deo; et sanctus Thomas sepius illud negat in libro suo *De veritate*, et prima parte *Summe*, questione 16ª articulo [7°] et hic dictum est superius et verba sancti Thome sicut et dap° pery^{tai} de veritatibus eternis potest separare quadruplicem sensum verum. Set specialiter pro sensu sancti Thome videtur michi indubie et ipse sapuit multas esse veritates eternas: ponit enim relaciones eternas, ydeas eternas, et alias veritates enunciabilium eternas in intellectu divino, ut patet respicienti scripta sua in prima parte *Summe*, que inter cetera, tanquam finale complementum dictorum suorum, est magis autentica; et certum est quod ipse ponit omnia illa distingui a deo formaliter. Unde, questione 16ª articulo 7° ubi supra, solvendo illud dubium, sic scribit: "cum veritas dicit comparacionem ad intellectum, patet quod nulla esset veritas eterna, nisi intellectus esset eternus. Unde, cum solus intellectus divinus sit eternus, patet quod in ipso solo veritas eternitatem habet; nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit eternum quam deus, unde racio circuli et duo et tria esse 5, que [in] *De libero arbitrio* Augustinus (primo de libero arbitrio) ponit esse veritates eternas, eternitatem solum habent in mente

He says that there are eternal ruths, but only in the Divine Mind.

5. in *deest* MS. 9. puus *pro* sepius MS. 11. 7° *deest* MS. 19. c'as *pro* cetera MS. 29. in *deest* MS.

11. St. Theol. loco citato. It is needless to note that this passage, besides being corrupt, has some words that cannot be made out. As to the quotation itself, I find the sense of St. Thomas, but not the words by any means, from *scribit* to *patet quod.* Here we find "*Unde si nullus intellectus esset eternus, nulla veritas esset eterna; sed quia solus intellectus divinus est eternus* . . . . and so on, as in the text, down to *Deus*, where St. Thomas continues: *quia veritas intellectus est ipse deus, ut supra ostensum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod racio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent eternitatem in mente divina.*"

divina". Et sic futuriciones rerum, ut dicit, erant eterne in deo, in quo eternaliter fuit quod ipsa erunt futura. Et sic respondet ad eternitatem veritatum negantes, concedens quod eternitatem habent ab intellectu divino. Cum enim intellectus divinus non potest mutari ab una opinione vel cognicione in aliam, nec alia mutacio rei extra potest esse pertinens ad mutandum veritatem que [est] *nihil simul esse et non esse* (et sic de similibus) patet quod oportet illam manere eternam et immobilem in deo. Hec racio huius doctoris.

He also says that the possibility of future things existed from eternity in God, their future maker. Thus he admits eternal truths, and replies to those who deny them.

Ideo, quia minus bene intelliguntur doctores loquentes de ista materia, est ignorata distinccio triplicis veritatis, in qua antiqua assueti sunt. Prima est, quia nescimus distinguere inter significatum primarium proposicionis necessarie et actum nostrum componendi, sic quod pure concipiamus ipsam veritatem, sine connotacione actus nostri, 2ª est, quia nescimus distinguere inter encia racionis et encia intelligibilia que non habent existenciam vel *esse* in genere set solum in intellectu divino: cuiusmodi sunt quotlibet potencie, raciones, prericiones, futuriciones, et alie veritates significate per ypotheticas, que, quamvis sunt eterne. non tamen [habent] existenciam vel *esse* extra intellectum, set tantum *esse intelligibile*. Et tercia est, quia nescimus distinguere inter predicaciones formales et essenciales, putando quod si doctores dicunt tales veritates non esse aliquid aliud quam divinam essenciam, quod non distinguitur formaliter inter se invicem et a deo, cum tamen communiter, quando queritur de quiditate talium, tunc convertunt se ad *esse*, naturam, vel existenciam quam ponunt; et non invenietur, antequam veniatur ad naturam divinam, que est basis omnium istorum. Et sic, in predicacione secundum essenciam, concedunt quodlibet esse deum, et quando loquitur de illis, concedunt istas esse multas, et per consequens distingui ab invicem et a deo.

Three distinctions that are much neglected now: that between our mental act of judgment and the primary object of this act; between purely fictive beings and those that have existence in the mind of God, and between formal and essential predication; truths, for example, may be essentially identical with God, yet formally distinct from Him and from one another.

Unde in deo est dare duplicem distinccionem, in genere: vel realem, qualis est inter personas, quarum quelibet est inter res, quarum nulla est alia; vel distinccionem racionis; et ista habet multa membra. Nam aliqua est inter communius et minus commune, ut

In God there is (1) Real distinction between the Three Persons — (2) Notional distinction: which is of many sorts.

3. negativorum MS. 8. est *deest* MS. 11. quare *pro* quia MS.
22. ypo^cas *pro* ypotheticas MS. 23. habent *deest* MS.; *ib.* existencia MS.
24. qua *pro* quia MS.

inter essenciam et personam; vel 2° inter | essenciam, et personam, et attributa communiter quasi passiones deo, cuiusmodi sunt eternitas, omnisciencia, omnipotencia, et cetera; vel 3° inter analogum et essenciam, vel personam. Et in qualibet tali distinccione non infertur quod unum distinctorum non sit reliqum, set quod raciones formales distinguntur. Que quidem raciones sunt res racionis eterne. 2° modo est distinccio racionis inter rem racionis in deo et divinam essenciam; vel sic, quod relacio eterna inter personas, vel relacio eterna dei ad unum distinctum, vel veritas necessaria aut contingens, que non ponit aliquid existere extra deum pro omnium mensura pro qua ipsum est. 54 a^a

The disregard of these distinctions occasions much confusion, both in speech and in thought. Doctors will now say that these eternal truths are identical with God, now that they are formally distinct.

Et propter confusionem talium distinccionum in dilapsum ab una predicacione in aliam, contingit intricacio, tam in loquendo quam intelligendo. Doctores enim nunc concedunt quotlibet talia esse deum, equivocando in dubio, modo quod intelligendi secundum predicacionem essencialem, et nunc loquntur de eis ut multis formaliter distinctis. Et quando queritur de quiditatibus illarum racionum, est conformis ambiguitas respondendi; quia aliqui dicunt quod nulla talis racio est divina essencia (intelligendo *formaliter*); et alii dicunt quod omnis talis racio est deus, et, consequenter negant silogismos expositorios, et alia que arguunt distinccionem racionis. Ymmo alii ad tantum decipiuntur quod non ponunt relaciones, raciones vel tales veritates in deo, nisi per operacionem intellectus humani. In tot igitur tales intricaciones rixosas sumus multipliciter involuti.

Some even deny that there are any such distinctions really existing in God, and aver that they are only in our minds.

12. potest *(in full)* MS. 17. tle *pro* talia MS. 20. distinguntur MS. 26, 27. decipiunt MS.

DE ENTE LIBRI SECUNDI

TRACTATUS TERCIUS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

71 a[a] Tractando de volucione dei, quem oportet ex dictis supponere, notandum est quod aliquando accipitur pro essencia divina non solum volucio qua vult se esse, set volucio qua vult res ad extra esse; licet in predicacione secundum essenciam, vel causali. 2° modo accipitur pro effectu volito a deo. Qui quidem effectus est produccio a volucione predicta. 3° modo accipitur pro relacione eterna dei volentis ad volitum. Et 4° modo accipitur pro aggregato ex hiis.

By God's *Volition* is meant either His essence as determining existence, or the effects willed by Him, or the relation between the two, or all these together.

In creaturis accipitur voluntas pro actu, vel habitu, aut potencia volendi, que non sunt in deo. Et tot modis, vel pluribus, accipitur voluntas dei, quamvis proprie loquendo voluntas sit essencia, ut potencia a qua procedit actus volendi, qui volucio dicitur. In deo igitur non est dare potenciam distinctam ab essencia. Ideo voluntas aliquando accipitur essencialiter, ut est communis ad omnes tres personas; aliquando personaliter, ut dicit terciam personam. 3° modo accipitur pro affectu volito a deo, ut secunda Thess. 4, "*hec est enim voluntas dei, sanctificacio vestra*", et Psalmo 142°, "*doce me facere voluntatem tuam*"; et nedum pro effectu, set pro veritate que [est] principium operabilium; ut nulli esse in mirandum: et sic de quotlibet ceteris veritatibus eternis a deo

Will, understood of creatures, means the act, or habit, or faculty of willing anything.

In God — since act and power are identical, it means either the Divine Essence, or the Holy Ghost, or the thing willed by God,

II. Thess. IV, 3. Ps. CXLII, 10.

3. Ca^m p^m *in marg.* MS. 13. volucio *pro* voluntas MS. 20 persona *pro* personaliter MS. 25. est *deest* MS.

25. *Ut nulli.* This must be wrong. Mr. Austin, the transcriber, remarks that the first *m* in *mirandum* ends the line.

or the relation between the thing willed and His will.

volitis. 4to accipitur pro habitudine relativa inter deum volentem et volitum, de qua nonnulli intelligunt probabiliter illud psalmi 110. "*Magna opera domini; exquisita in omnes voluntates eius.*" Ps. CX, 2.

God's will is of two sorts, intrinsic, that which pleases Him, and extrinsic, or His will as signified.

Of the first, there are as many divisions as there are objects of His Will, as is the case also with the Thoughts of God.

Est autem communis distinccio et notanda, de dei voluntate, quam ponit Hugo, *De sacramentis*, li^{o} primo, parte quarta distinccione c^{o} 2, et magister primo *sentenciarum*, divisione 46, et infra, et alii doctores scribentes super sentencias, quod quedam est intrinseca, que vocatur dei beneplacitum, et quedam est voluntas signi. Racionalitas beneplaciti non est nisi placencia dei de suo causato. Et formaliter loquendo tot sunt huiusmodi voluntates in deo, quot sunt volita ab eodem, et in assimili dictum est de eodem ut in assimili dictum est de divina sciencia et eius intelligencia.

Of God's Will signified, there are five divisions: precepts and prohibitions, commanding and forbidding in matters of great importance, counsels, advising or dissuading in lesser matters; examples to instruct us, and threats of punishment.

Voluntas autem signi est signum temporale de inexistente, representans eius voluntatem intrinsecam; et dividitur in 5: scilicet in precepcionem, que est obligatoria ad grandia faciendum, prohibicionem, que est obligatoria ad mala grandia dimittendum, et consilium, quod est communiter ad excitandum ut bona mediocria supereroganter fiant, et mala mediocria dimittantur. 4^{m} signum voluntatis divine consistit in opere; nam nedum ex operibus nature que a deo principiantur dicemur bene vivere, set ex operibus christi, que sunt quasi liber, nos instruens de dei voluntate. 5^{m} autem signum voluntatis divine vocatur dei promissio, que est circa peccata. Ipsa autem promissio infallibiliter significat quod deus habet voluntatem beneplaciti ipsa puniendi, quia aliter non posset deus ipsa permittere.

All these manifestations of God's will are made in Time.

Omnia autem ista 5 sunt temporalia, quia deus non precipit, prohibet, consulit, facit opus exemplare, vel permittit, nisi temporaliter. Et quodlibet istorum est indubie signum alicuius voluntatis divine.

Now, according to Holy Writ, God's will is irresistible,

Ex istis sensibus bene notatis possunt sane intelligi concorditer dicta scripture; ut quando dicitur, Ge. 50, "*dixit Joseph fratribus suis, num possumus dei resistere voluntati?*" hoc intelligitur de divino beneplacito, secundum quod *omnia quecunque voluit dominus, fecit in celo et in terra*, ut dicitur Psalmo 134. Et de illa

Gen. L, 19.

Ps. CXXXIV, 6.

10. quoddam MS. 14. ut *pro* et MS. 16. inexistens MS. 37. non *pro* num MS.

6. Hugo de St. Victor.

Rom. IX, 19. dicit apostolus ro. 9. "*voluntati eius quis resistet?*" quasi diceret: nullus potest. Nam, si deus sit omnipotens et summe bonus, tunc habet quicquid vult habere. Ideo patet de virtute sermonis contradiccionem claudere, talem voluntatem dei esse non impletam: unde, hester Esth. XIII, 9, 10. 13°, dicit ille sapiens mardocheus, "*Domine rex omnipotens*": et eciam sequitur tam "*tu enim feciste celum*", et cetera. Si enim deus habet scienciam eternam, et voluntatem liberam omnium futurorum, patet quod non ordinaret aliquid quod sciret rebellare eius beneplacito: quia si hoc faceret, deus eternaliter sciret et ordinaret 71 a[b] illud sic rebel | lare, et per consequens esset de ordinacione voluntaria quod rebellaret; et per consequens non inpugnaret divinum beneplacitum, set impleret. Nec potest istud verti in dubium, nisi insipienti, qui vel ponit deum malum ab eterno cum gente tenebrarum, cum tota natura corporea sibi subiectata, repugnantem deo bono cum natura spirituali; ut opinati sunt manichei, sicut Augustinus frequenter recitat in li° *Contra Manicheos*, in "*De moribus Manicheorum*" in "*De natura boni*", et alibi multis locis: vel aliter quod ponat deum ordinare primo unum finem de eius beneplacito, et post, videndo creaturam repugnare, renovare ordinacionem precedentem, ordinando oppositum. Set quia utraque illarum viarum non habet vel sintillam evidencie apud quemcunque methaphisicum, ideo stat sciencia de infringibilitate et infrustrabilitate divini propositi vel beneplaciti.

since He is the Almighty, Our Creator; for, knowing all things, He would permit nothing that resisted His will and plan; for if He permitted such resistance, it would enter into His plan, and thus fulfil His will.

This could be denied only by a Manichean, with his theory of two eternal Gods, one good and one evil, in perpetual conflict; or by one who supposed God to have changed His plan after the revolt of His creatures; both of which opinions are untenable.

De signo autem divini beneplaciti loquitur scriptura communiter, quando dicit viatorem, merendo salutem, intendere facere voluntatem patris. Ista tamen dicta possunt probabiliter intelligi de opere facto et ordinato, conformiter ad voluntatem dei intrinsecam; sicut et Isa. LXII, 4. illud Ysa. 62°, "*non vocaberis ultra Derelicta, et terra tua non vocabitur amplius Desolata, set vocaberis voluntas mea*". Et vere inter omnia nomina conveniencia creaturis est hoc consonancius; quia si creatura est ad hunc sensum voluntas dei, tunc beneplacet deo, agendo ut deus vult ipsam agere; quod non potest esse malum.

Holy Writ generally speaks of God's Will in the extrinsic sense, *i. e.* as signified.

Accipitur autem voluntas dei pro precepcione, vel con- Matth. VI, 10. silio modo dicto, M[t] 6°; "*fiat voluntas tua, sicut in*

In the Lord's Prayer, 'Thy will be done' refers to God's precepts and counsels.

2. q d *pro* quasi diceret MS. 15. incipienti MS. 30. seu *pro* salutem MS. 39. ultra *pro* vult MS. 41. malo *pro* modo MS.

But a Catholic should not pray thus in order to *obtain* the fulfilment of God's will, since it is always fulfilled, but as an outburst of the mind, assenting in prayer to what we know to be a fact.

celo, et in terra". Cum enim quilibet catholicus sit certus quod sit absolute necessarium voluntatem beneplaciti dei impleri, non oportet orare pro implecione illius, saltem speciem oracionis impetrative, cuius videntur esse omnes appeticiones oracionis dominice. Oracione enim, que est elevativa mentis in deum per prorupcionem in laudem oramus, que scimus esse intra; ut, laudando trinitatem, confitemur inesse sibi gloriam, honorem, et imperium, sanctitatem, et virtutem, et potestatem; ut patet apocalipsis 4 et 5: et tamen scimus hec 3 ultima absolute necessario sibi inesse. Apoc. IV, 11; V, 9.

We desire then that God's commands should be obeyed in earth as in Heaven.

Rogamus eciam in tercia peticione, quod preceptum dei ampliatur a terregenis, scilicet sicut inpletur a spiritualibus celestibus, non quod omnino eodem modo, set proporcionabili; quod idem sonat ac si rogaremus pro ecclesia militante, quod meritorie serviat deo.

Corollaries. (1) God's volition, though its object is in time, must be eternal; so it does not follow that the object is simultaneous therewith. As with knowledge, so with volition: there is no beginning nor ceasing in God.

Istis significacionibus premissis, patet ex dictis superius quod omnis volucio dei relativa est eterna, eciam si volutum fuit temporale: ex quo patet quod non sequitur: *deus vult hoc: igitur, hoc est nunc volitum a deo.* Patet ex hoc quod deus non potest incipere vel desinere quicquam velle, pari evidencia qua non potest quicquam incipere vel desinere cognoscere. Unde Ieremie, 31, dicitur, "*caritate perpetua dilexi te, ... miserans*"; et Io. 17, dicit salvator quoad humanitatem, quod pater dilexit eum *ante constitucionem mundi:* Ideo dicit Io. "*Nos ergo diligamus deum, quoniam deus prior dilexit nos*", prima Io. 4°. Cum igitur omnis dileccio, vel amor, gracia, vel caritas dei sit eius bona voluntas, patet quod quelibet voluntas dei sit eius bona voluntas; patet quod quelibet voluntas dei intrinseca est eterna. 2° sequitur, quod quelibet volucio dei terminata ad volubile in *esse* intelligibili est absolute necessaria, et quelibet terminata ad contingens, secundum *esse existere*, non

Jer. XXXI, 3. Jo. XVII, 24. 1 Jo. IV, 19.

(2) God's will, as regards purely intelligible entity, is absolutely necessary; as regards contingent

2. ƀtus *pro* certus MS. 4. spem MS.; *ib.* impetrativa MS. 6. pro MS. 12. secunda MS.; *ib.* quia *pro* quod MS. 24. *no gap after* te MS. 25. 15 MS. 26. const. mundi MS. 27. autem *pro* ergo MS.; *ib.* quum ipse *pro* quoniam deus MS.

1. *Cum enim.* It may seem that there is a gap here; but though a word or two may be wanting, I thing they are not important. Wyclif's bold deduction evidently goes to destroy the value of so-called 'impetrative' prayer. It is possible indeed that a paragraph is wanting, explaining prayer in the usual way: viz., that God has foreseen our prayer from eternity, and that it enters into His plan to grant it.

sit deo accidens, set contingens, et ùtraque causata modo suo a suo termino. Ex quo patet quod non sequitur: "*deus vult istud possibile, igitur vult istud existere*", nec sequitur, "*si deus vult Petri salutem, tunc vult ipsum salvum fieri*"; et ita de consimilibus. Patet istud ex dictis de duplici sciencia dei, scilicet speculativa et practica: nam conformis est racio utrobique de eius volucione. 3° sequitur, quod omnis volucio dei est determinata, et per consequens deus neminem amat vel odit, solum condicionaliter, si bene vel male se gesserit. Patet ex hoc quod omne bonum est determinate cognitum a deo, secundum omnem gradum vel circumstanciam sue bonitatis, preteritum vel futurum. Igitur, cum amor determinatus dei non ponit plus, nisi deum et
71 bª determinacionem bonitatis amandi, sequitur | intentum. 4° sequitur quod, sicut omnis voluntas beneplaciti de determinante est circa quod, sicut sequitur, "*placet deo de* a, *igitur* a *est*", ita sequitur "*deus permittit hoc, igitur hoc est*": deus igitur nichil permittit nisi determinatum.

Ex quo sequitur, quod omnia que erunt vel fuerunt, sunt in tempore sempiterno. Nam si deus vult aliquid, ipse eternaliter vult illud ex prima veritate; et si vult aliquid, ipsum est. Ex ista veritate igitur conclusio. Patet consequencia sic. Sit quod *a* erit vel fuit, et tamen ipsum non est: contra, si *a* erit vel fuit, deus vult *a*, eo quod, dato antecedente, volet vel voluit *a*; et si deus vult *a*, ipsum est: igitur a primo, si *a* fuit vel erit, ipsum est: aliter enim deus haberet voluntatem incompletissimam, volendo quotlibet preterita que non possent esse; et haberet appetitum incompletum de futuris que non sunt. Languet igitur pro impossibilitate implecionis sue volucionis de lapsis preteritis, et de tardacione implecionis sue volucionis de futuris. Omnia igitur, preterita vel futura, sunt deo presencia, sic quod respectu quorumcunque habet volucionem quod erunt vel fuerant, habet volucionem quod sunt; quamvis voluciones distinguantur penes subiecta, etsi una non possit esse sive altera. *Appetere* igitur in deo, propter eius eternitatem, non distinguitur a suo *diligere*, cum semper habet omne quod vult habere; saltem

existences, it is contingent. To will the Possible, is not to will that it exist; and to will that a man may, is not to will that he shall be saved. (3) God's will is determined by His knowledge of all things, and He loves or hates them as He sees them, doing good or evil.

(4) All that God permits is permitted determinately, since every act of His will must have something on which it acts. All things that have been or shall be exist in eternal time. For what God wills to exist, exists. We cannot conceive His will bearing on any past or future thing that does not exist, for then His will would be without efficacy.

All therefore is present to God, determining their future or past being by His acts of volition, different as the subjects differ. God's desire that a thing should be, as He is eternal,

10. mᵉ *pro* male MS. 14. potest *pro* ponit MS. 16. bonitas *pro* voluntas MS. 31. languent MS. 37. fbª *vro* subiecta MS. 39. igitur in deo non MS.

is not distinct from His dilection.

si non sequitur: *deus nunc habet hoc; igitur hoc nunc habetur a deo*, ut dictum est superius.

Objection. God's will is that all men should be saved. But this means either (a) all the elect;

Et si obicitur per illud apostoli, prima thi. 2°, "*deus* I. Tim. II, 4. *vult omnes suos predestinatos salvos fieri*", sic quod nemo sit salvus nisi per eum, et ista est glosa Augustini, *Enchiridion*, 12°, et infert et convenit modus loquendi. Nam preco invitans homines ad cenam, sicut fuit opus, exhillarat invitatos, dicens quod dominus vult omnes homines bene valere (suple, intrantes ad cenam).

or (b) all conditions of men — rich, poor, &c. —

2° modo, quod fiat distribucio pro generibus singulorum, cum de omni genere hominum deus vult aliquos salvari; et istud videtur consonum processui apostoli et scripture. Nam apostolus innuit quod non est desperandum, quum reges, ignobiles, et quecunque condicio hominis potest salvari. Et hec distribucio pro generibus frequens in scriptura: ut luc. 11, dicitur quod pharisei decimant Luc. XI, 42. *omne olus*, i. omne genus olerum, et M^c ultimo, precipitur predicare Marc. XVI, 15. *omni creature*, i. e. omni generi hominum in quo conjungitur omne genus creature. Unde ad hunc sensum exponit scriptura seipsam, Gen. 7: ingressi sunt, Gen. VII, 14. *ipsi et omne animal secundum genus*.

or (c) it means that God provides means to save all men; or (d) that it is the desire of His Saints, and in so far His own, since it is conformable to God's will, and proceeds therefrom, as also the natural desire of all men for happiness. This form of speech is common enough in Holy Writ.

Vel 3°, quod deus consulit quod omnes homines salvi fiant. Vel 4° quod deus vult in sanctis suis quod omnes homines salvi fiant. Nam, orante uno viatore devote generaliter pro salvacione omnium, potest [dici] voluntas illa dei, de quanto est conformis voluntati dei et eius effectus; sicut quelibet naturalis volucio, qua quilibet naturaliter vult beatitudinem, quamcunque fuerit sceleratus, potest dici volucio antecedens qua deus vult omnes salvari. Ille igitur bonus instinctus nature create est ut homines laborent pro sua beatitudine: vocari [potest] dei voluntas, de quanto infunditur in suas creaturas, que in populo quodammodo uniuntur. Unde salvator dicit Paulum persequi eum (in membris suis, suple) act. 9. Et talis Act. IX, 5. modus loquendi est usitacior in scriptura, in quo deo attribuitur denominacio sue creature. Volucio igitur,

6. inf^t *pro* infert MS. 7. 9m *pro* cenam MS. 13. opus *pro* apostolus MS. 15. non *pro* hec MS. 18. terre *pro* creature MS. 20. igitur *pro* Gen. MS. 25. dici *deest* MS. 27. quelibet MS. 29. ans que MS. 30. increate MS. 31. vori; potest *deest* MS.

3. *Et si.* The text is: *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri.* A few words are no doubt wanting after this text to complete the sense; as v. g. *explicatur textus primo modo sic quod . . .* Wyclif enumerates the three other modes of explanation.

qua creatura rationabiliter pie vult omnes homines salvos fieri, denominat deum sic velle secundum figuram sic predictam. Et iste est sensus Augustini, 22. *De civitate dei*, c° 2°, et *De corrupcione et gracia*, 74. Vel 5, secundum sensum Io. Damasceni, deus vult voluntate antecedente omnes homines salvari; vult enim deus, sicut bonus legislator, quod mala fugiantur: ideo dat legem universalem prohibitivam ne malum fiat. Bonum consequitur signum volucionis divine, quod est precepcio ut bonum fiat, qualis est ista lex, "*deo esse obediendum*". Et quia ad decorem reipublice est quod habeantur aliqui supereroganter operantes, ideo sequitur tercia volucio consultiva, qua consulitur legem eternam, taliter esse operandum, et 4to ut capiatur exemplum de puni- 71 b^b cione mali, permittit deus mala | fieri, ut punicio eorum proficiat vel facta doceant; et 5° implet deus in opere legem suam. Voluntas ergo antecedens vocatur signum; ut puta precepcio, prohibicio, vel consulcio, qua legislator ordinat quantum in lege est sufficiens remedium, unde posset evitari quodlibet malum: et illam vocat doctor subtilis voluntatem immediatam, ab aliis vero vocatur volutas. Vel 6°, exponitur a bono Ambrosio ibidem, quod deus vult condicionaliter omnes homines salvos fieri. Nam tam bonus est deus, quod ipse vult omnes salvari, si ipsimet volunt, non ponendo obicem.

Istis igitur 6 modis, vel alico eorum, intellexit apostolus. Contradiccionem autem claudit quod voluntas, que est beneplacitum dei vel appetitus eius, non impleatur; quia, si cum illa sciret volitum non esse, sequeretur quod volens esset insufficiens ad implendum, vel resistencia impediens nimis fortis, vel mutabilitas volentis, quod posset mutare voluntatem suam, nunc volendo unum et nunc aliud: quorum quodlibet est inpossibile, cum 2° prima includunt inpotenciam et inperfeccionem, et 3^m concludit mutabilitatem et ignoranciam in deo.

5° patet quod claudet contradiccionem creaturam racionalem deobligari, quod non teneatur conformare voluntatem suam voluntati divine. Patet sic; creatura racionalis non potest deobligari ut nichil velit; quia, si est, vult seipsam actu essenciali, et oportet quod velit aliquando actu elicito bonum concorditer ad intellectum

or (e) it is God's will, prior to and independently of man's, that all should be saved. St. John Damascenus quoted. God gives a universal law: *Do no evil;* commands man to obey Him, warns those that should disobey, permits evil to happen, that its punishment may make for salvation, and executes His law. All this suffices for the salvation of man.

Or (f) God's will is conditional: if men are themselves willing to be saved. We may choose any of these six explanations; but it is inadmissible to suppose that God's will can be frustrated, without denying God's might and perfection, or His immutability and omniscience.

(5) No rational creature can be relieved from the obligation of obeying God's will. For we are by nature under the duty of conforming to reason in our acts.

15. mlia *pro* mali MS. 16. et 5 *before* vel MS. 22. sicut *pro* vel MS. 25. ipsemet voluit MS. 28, 29. implentur MS.

The only debt that we should leave unpaid is love, which never ought to cease, because by its nature it is endless.

This obligation is towards both men and God, to whom we must conform our will.

et racionem, quamvis pro aliqua mensura posset cessare ab actu elicito. Unde apostolus, considerans illud debitum indissolubile, dicit, Ro. 13°, "*nemini quicquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis*". Vult enim apostolus christianos tam parate solvere debita corporalia, quod non supersit aliquid ex debito eis solvendum, nisi amor mutuus caritatis, qui quanto plus solvitur, tanto amplius obligatur solvens recenter diligere. Ideo apostolus optat nos esse obligatores: et quid sic amenius? amor enim, cum ducit ad infinitum, debet esse infinitus, quia excludit violenciam vel tedium, et ponit naturalissimum gaudium. Econtra, debita corporalia, cum sint violenta et temporalia, oportet habere finem. Ideo homo potest plene exuere se a tali debito, quod non amplius sit debitor talium, cum nullum violentum eternum; non sic autem obligacio amoris. Ideo sensus apostoli est quod exuamus nos plene ab omni debito proximi preter dileccionem mutuam, quia hoc non bene possumus; et multo magis non possumus nos exuere a debito diligendi deum. Et quod oportet creaturam, sub pena peccati, conformare voluntatem suam quamcunque voluntati divine, patet ex hoc. Si illa voluntas est bona, placet deo quod sit bona, et per consequens inter voluntatem illam et voluntatem dei terminatam ad illam est conformitas, cum voluntas illa creature libere terminat obiective voluntatem divinam. Magna igitur est conformitas, quando ego volo sicut deus vult me velle. Volucio enim talis placet deo, et causat in eo volucionem.

Rom. XIII, 8.

All sin consists in the lack of conformity to God's will: i. e. when we desire anything absolutely, not caring if it pleases God.

Therefore no act, whether exterior or interior, save that of the will, can be sinful.

Ex isto patet quod omne peccatum actuale creature racionalis est propter difformitatem voluntatis create ad voluntatem divinam. Patet sic: omne peccatum actuale est in volucione voluntatis create principaliter, et non ut illa volucio est beneplacito dei conformis: igitur, ut est divino beneplacito difformis. Quando igitur homo vult aliquod volubile, cum circumstanciis que non placent, vel displicent deo, tunc peccat actualiter. In operibus igitur extrincecis nec in actibus intrinsecis est peccatum, nisi de quanto est difformitas in voluntate, que est supprema potenciarum anime: qua servante rectitudinem, servatur creatura racionalis inmunis a peccato actuali.

3. Jo. *pro* Ro. MS. 9. ut que MS.; *ib.* amem9 MS. 32. plnt' *pro* principaliter MS.

6° patet quod non consequuntur se, *creaturam velle* quod deus vult in *ipsam velle* meritorie, vel econtra. Stat enim deum precipere homini ut velit ut faciat illud quod deus vult non fieri; ut patet de precepto dato abrahe, ut immolaret filium suum, Ge. 22. Stat eciam hominem velle et operari illud quod deus vult, et tamen quantumlibet demereri, ut patet de Juda proditore, qui voluit et fecit Christum mori: | id quod tota trinitas voluit, et eciam christus secundum naturam corpoream mediante divina potencia, hoc voluit, sicut et mater sua cum aliis apostolis. Et idem est iudicium de tyrannis martirizantibus sanctos, quos Deus voluit martirizari.

Gen. XXII, 1—18.

72 a[a]

(6) In a meritorious act of the will it may happen that the object intended by creatures does not coïncide with God's intent; and *vice-versâ*: Abraham intended to slay Isaac, which God did not intend; and the betrayal of Judas was in God's plan

Ex quo patet quod deus pocius attendit ad intencionis rectitudinem, et modum faciendi, quam ad substanciam operis, premiando. Unde M[t] 6°, dicitur, "*si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit*". Et hic vulgariter dicitur, quod deus est remunerator adverbiorum, plus apprecians quod *bene* agatur, quam *bonum* de genere.

Matth. VI, 22.

likewise, putting martyrs to death, tyrants fulfil God's will. All depends on the rectitude of our intention.

2° patet ex isto quod voluciones, quibus contradictoria sunt volita, sunt conformes, ut Abraham vult occidere Ysaac, et deus vult quod non occidat eum, et tamen utraque volucio est dei bene placita. Opposita enim nata sunt fieri circa idem, cuiusmodi non sunt volucio dei et volucio Abrahe. Ideo quod Abraham velit occidere Ysaac, et quod velit eciam similiter non occidere illum, sunt voluciones quodammodo opposite, quia vicissim eidem insunt, et simul repugnat ipsas inesse.

The creature, even if it wills the opposite to what God wills, may be in conformity with Him, for there is no real and intrinsical opposition in the soul.

3° patet, cum in deo non sunt *est* et *non*, nichil repugnant iste 2 voluciones, deus vult Ysaac non occidi, et ipse vult Abraham velle ipsum occidi. Patet ex hoc quod semper insunt deo iste ambe voluciones simul, eo quod utraque istarum volucionum aliquando inest deo, et omnis volucio dei est eterna. 4[to] patet quod duorum volencium, unius solum illud quod deus vult, et alterius illud quod deus non vult, prima volucio cuicunque dei volucioni est difformis, et secunda volucio cuilibet dei volucioni est conformis: patet de Iuda, qui voluit in actu Christum mori, et de beata virgine, vel Petro, qui voluit

Neither is there opposition between God's will that Abraham shall not slay Isaac, and yet that he shall intend to slay him: for both are simultaneously in God's mind. You may desire a thing that God wills shall come to pass, and yet sin; and you may desire its opposite and yet not sin.

8. id *pro* et MS. 9. et tu MS. 10. mete aliqua *pro* mediante divina MS. 12. deus *deest* MS. 26. de Abrahe MS. 31. vel *pro* nichil MS.

> In the first case, you are opposed to God's will in all; that is, as regards the mental attitude of obliquity, opposed to God's will as such; whilst the rectitude of the other implies submission to God's will in all things, although the object may be opposed to it; for it is God's design that we should have natural acts of volition of our own; for instance, the desire of life, so that we may substitute for it that of death and bliss. Likewise, He may excite men to elicit acts of will in obedience to His decrees, though they may not be translated into acts. Since we know death and suffering to be God's will, we ought to be pleased with this, though naturally and rightly we have contrary feelings; for the same faculty can love and dislike the same thing from different standpoints. (7) Every one of God's volitions is incomplex,

b actu christum non tunc mori. Tunc patet quod *a* volucio est difformis volucioni dei, qua deus vult Christum mori, et per consequens cuilibet volucioni alteri dei. Nam *a* volucio est obliqua, declinans a rectitudine propter malum modum, et quia dei volucio, dei. Rectitudo namque et obliquitas sunt forme valde dispares. Et de *b* volucione sequitur, si habet rectitudinem, est conformis cuilibet volucioni divine. Nec sequitur: Eius difformitas culpabilis; etsi velit contradictorium a deo politi. Deus enim vult omnes habere volucionem naturalem ad *esse*, ad ostendendum quam bonum est esse creatum a deo, ut sic eleventur ad plus volendum deum, a quo est illud *esse*, eliciendo volucionem ad tempus non esse in corpore propter beatitudinem in deo adquirendam. Vult eciam, propter obedienciam ostendendum, homines elicere actus volendi, quos non vult omnino esse executos, ad ostendendum quod ipse satis appreciatur bonam volucionem pro beatitudine merenda, etsi non assit facultas exequendi; ut 3° Regum, 8, dicit III. Reg. VIII. 18, 19.
Salomon, in persona dei loquentis, ad David patrem suum, "*quod cogitasti in corde tuo edificare domum nomini meo, bene fecisti, hoc ipsum mente tractans; verumptamen tu non edificabis michi domum, set filius tuus*". Ecce deus commendat actum quem vult non esse exequtum; quilibet tamen, sciens effectum esse de dei beneplacito, tenetur complacere in illo.

Et per consequens, cum omnis mors vel pena sit de dei beneplacito, quilibet homo cognoscens tenetur complacere in ipsa; nec obest huic quod affeccione naturali habeat naturaliter et meritorie displicenciam de eodem, nichil enim obest velle et nolle idem, et sic gaudere et dolere de eodem secundum diversas raciones, non solum secundum diversas potencias, set secundum eandem; quamvis repugnet quod idem secundum eandem potenciam et racionem primo simul velit et nolit idem, ut patet alibi.

Septimo, patet quod nulla intrinseca deo volucio est complexa, set aliqua universalis, aliqua particularis, pro-

1. b *pro* bono MS. 5. quod *pro* quia MS. 16, 17. omne ad esse equivocos MS. 20. dicendum *pro* David MS.

38. *Complexa.* This (unless it be a mistake) seems to be a technical word used to express a certain defect in our will. We wish a thing sometimes, yet we do not wish it to be. For

porcionaliter ad obiectum; et quelibet practica modo suo, ymmo quod quamlibet divinam scienciam concomitatur volucio, et econtra; eciam sic totalis dei volucio fit concomitacione sua totali sciencia. Prima pars patet ex racionibus factis ad probandum nullam dei scienciam esse complexam. Nam deus vult omnem veritatem debitam incomplexe: ut idem est deo velle quodcunque, et velle ipsum esse; sicut dictum est de sua sciencia. Igitur non restat vel ex parte dei vel ex parte voluti, unde aliqua talis volucio sit complexa. Concedendum tamen est quod deus habet volucionem
72 a[b] terminatam ad creaturam in | *esse intelligibili* absolute necessariam, quam quidam vocant volucionem speculativam, quidam volucionem simplicem, quidam volucionem ydealem; et aliam terminatam ad existenciam creature contingentem vocant practicam, vel quocunque alio nomine. Certum namque est quod tales voluciones distinguntur, tamquam absolute necessarium et contingens. Et secunda pars patet ex hoc, quod proporcionaliter distinguntur voluciones ad que terminantur; set est dare universalia prius naturaliter volita a deo quam sua singularia: igitur et voluciones illis proporcionales. Et tercia pars patet ex hoc, quod volucio dei, quantumlibet remota ab opere, cum sit directiva operis, est practica. Et ita secundum tres gradus practice sciencie concedendum erit omnes gradus practice in volucionibus divinis. Et cum hoc, omnis volucio divina est speculative iocunda, cum deus non apponit vim fatigabilem ad producendum volubile, set eternaliter volendo et gaudendo in seipso pro mensura oportuna, producit effectum ex sua bonitate, non indigencia. Quarta pars patet ex hoc quod omne bonum quod deus intelligit vel cognoscit, vult esse sicut bonum, cum omne tale vel bonum sic, vel deus vult ut sit bonum. Et cum deus nichil causat nisi voluntarie, patet quod omne bonum esse vult; et ita circa omne bonum cognitum habet volucionem actualem, quia omne peccatum moris con-

having for object the existence of the thing willed;

except in the case of purely intelligible entities, when the volition is of absolute necessity;

some are universal, some singular, according to their objects; all are practical, since they in every case serve to direct God's actions in the world.

And His volition corresponds to His knowledge, since all either is good, or He intends it to be such.

Punishment is an entity essentially consequent on

2, 3. 9cord^t *pro* concomitatur MS. 3. si *pro* sic MS. 4. sic *pro* fit MS.; *ib.* 9tccoe *pro* concomitacione MS. 26. oe *pro* omnes MS. 34. vel bonum vel sic deus vel eo sic bonum MS.

instance, a merchant in a storm, obliged to throw all his gold overboard, wishes it in the ship, yet does not wish it to be in the ship. I think the term should be understood thus.

sin, and as such, just and good; whether God does or does not will sin itself, He must will its punishment.

sequitur essencialiter pena iusta. Et per consequens circa *esse* 2^m cuiuslibet talis peccati habet deus volucionem; et hoc oportet concedere, etsi concedatur deum non velle primum *esse* peccati: de qua materia postmodum.

Holiness consists in a man's conforming his will to that of God, when he knows it, without a murmur, and suffering all, save only sin.

Patet igitur ex dictis, quod sanctum est hominem, scientem aliquod esse de beneplacito dei, conformare voluntatem suam voluntati divine, non remurmurando vel inordinate vindictam inprecando, sive sit pena, sive derisio, vel iniuria, aut quodvis aliud quod non sapiat dampnum moris: quia omnis paciencia est iusta, et per consequens de dei beneplacito. Cum igitur quilibet rectus theologicus scit hoc, non debet sic dolere de ordinatis eventibus. Ideo, proverbiorum 12°, dicitur, "*non contristabit iustum quicquid ei acciderit.* Prov. XII, 21.

The human will may either act according to the senses or to our natural lights; and we are not obliged to make these tend only towards God's will; what is natural is right, if kept within bounds. Deliberate volition is either conditional or absolute; conditional, when "*If this be God's will*" is understood; for want of this clause, many act wrongly. Absolute volition ought always to be of what we are certain is the will of God. Consequently, a Catholic ought to love every fact which he knows to be such, because every such fact is pleasing to God.

Communiter, cum distinguitur de voluntate humana [dicitur] quod quedam est sensualitatis, et quedam rationis naturalis. Set neutram istarum tenetur homo semper sic subdere voluntati divine, quod altera illarum velit illud quod scit deum velle: ut patet de pena corporis, de morte parentum, et similibus. Quelibet tamen talis est conformis voluntati divine, si moderate fiat, sive circumstancia gravante. Alia autem est voluntas deliberativa, et hec duplex: quia vel condicionata vel absoluta. Condicionata; ut vellem, si placeret deo, hoc bonum. Et iniuste erra[n]t multi, imprecantes sibi inaniter bona, inimicis mala: quamvis liceat hominem velle sibi bonum spirituale, vel quodcunque bonum medium ad illud (subintelligendo, *si placet deo*) etsi non placeat deo quod ipsum habeat. Voluntas autem deliberativa absoluta debet conformari voluntati divine semper, tendendo in illud quod scitur deum velle. Unde videtur mihi sancta et pia conclusio, ac religionem stabiliens christianam, quod quilibet catholicus debet velle omnem veritatem quam determinate cognoscit preter peccatum, cum omne tale est dei beneplacitum, ac ad ordinanciam pulcherimam universi. Non enim tenetur christianus in particulari cogitare de qualibet tali veritate, quam determinate scit in habitu, set debet sibi complacere habitualiter vel confuse de omni huiusmodi, et quamcunque in particulari cognoverit, gau-

17. dicitur *deest* MS.; *ib.* quidam MS. 18. neutrum MS. 26. iniusta MS. 36. beneplacito MS.

He may, v. g. consider the chastisements of persons and communities, rejoicing in God's justice.

denter velle, laudando dominum veritatis. Ideo purum videtur considerare diligenter penas personarum et communitatum, et congaudere iusto iudici, qui non relinquit in sua universitate aliquam maculam inpunitam. Per talem contemplacionem patiencia stabilitur, caritas rutilat, et preciditur vana cupiditas ac causa murmuris contra deum; specialiter si cum tali gaudio mixtus sit dolor de peccato causante, cum pena sit signum laudabile, habens indubie causam malam. De peccato vero, quoad *esse* primum eius, non debet quicquam complacere, et per consequens multa contingit determinate cognoscere que non sunt directe volubilia. Fatui igitur est cum deliberacione absolute tristari de hoc quod homo non
72 b[a] est episcopus, vel bonis naturalibus | aut fortuitis plus dotatus, eo quod omne tale est determinate cognitum a privato talibus, ut suppono, et non est peccatum, cum sit eterna negacio a deo ex causa sibi cognita, iustissime ordinata.

Sin, however, as sin, must not be approved.

It is folly deliberately to regret the want of a bishopric or a fortune, &c., since these wants are not sins.

As to the future, we ought to wish ourselves and everybody all the good that may please God: i. e. conditionally.

Set quoad futura de quibus est viator indeterminatus, videtur probabile quod confuse quilibet debet velle esse bonum sibi vel nature create conveniens, volucione sic condicionata: si deo placuerit, et nolle sic condicionaliter quodlibet malum moris. Ex quo patet, quod licet meritorie velle sic condicionaliter tale possibile quod deus vult, et nolle proporcionaliter quod deus vult, quam discrepanciam a volucione divina excusant ignorancia voliti, et condicionata volucio cum rectitudine intencionis. Nam prescitus existens in gracia meritorie vult beatitudinem suam, et vult suam perseveranciam; deus tamen utrobique vult oppositum. Et conformiter contingit viatorem nolle et velle media ad hos fines; ut licite possum velle habere solidos, vel aliud quodcunque quod non habetur: dum tamen deliberacione condicionata, gracia finis laudabilis, volo illud quod michi puto michi possibile, non addendo inordinatam circumstanciam; quod est difficile propter errorem intencionis voluptatis, propter omissionem debiti, et alias quotlibet malas circumstancias involutas, quibus contingit deviare a rectitudine voluntatis. Semper autem peccatum et ad ipsum simpliciter sunt nolenda ab

A person 'foreknown', when in a state of grace, may rightly thus desire his salvation and perseverance, though they are contrary to the will of God, because he does not know them to be so. We may wish to possess money for a good purpose; but here it is easy to mistake one's motive. Sin (and what leads to it) is under no circumstances to be desired;

1. p⁹'m *pro* purum MS. 12. faciūti MS. 23. q̄lı3 *pro* quodlibet MS. 29. dependenciam *pro* perseveranciam MS. 33. habet MS. 40. volenda MS.

bliss (and the means thereto) is always desirable; the rest must be wished for conditionally.

homine, licet deus vult, set non vult talia. Et beatitudo ac media ad illam, quibus non contingit male uti, cuius [modi] sunt veritates, sunt simpliciter desiderabilia a quolibet viatore. Alia autem media quibus contingit male uti viatorem de quorum futuricione est ambiguus, debet solum condicionaliter per verbum optativum, ut "*vellem esse, esse episcopus*", et cetera.

Some say: 'I *would* does not mean, I *will*; but it does, though conditionally.

Et alii, licet male, dicunt quod non sequitur "*vellem sic illud bonum, igitur volo illud*": nam sic velle est desiderare, vel velle adiecta cum condicione volita. Nemo namque dicit quod "ego vellem ydemptificari deo", vel "esse asinus", quia nullo modo volo tale impossibile: vellem tamen, loquendo logice, si deus vellet, cum deus non potest sic velle.

The rectitude of the will consists in its following the rules laid down. [Many desires, which do not seem sins in themselves, may lead us thither; for we easily fall away from this rectitude. I myself have been much exercised by long waiting that tried my patience; and so, I believe, have others.

Ex ista igitur quadruplici volucione, et volucione secundum dictas regulas regulata, stat tota rectitudo debita voluntatis; nec miretur aliquis, quod dico tales imprecativas voluciones volvere cupidos in peccata et tristes remurmuraciones determinate verorum, que non sonant in peccata, quia valde faciliter contingit deviare a rectitudine voluntatis. Et indubie talis diutina mora, ymaginando talia, retraxit [de] mea paciencia et humili subdicione divine ordinancie, omittendo alia quibus debui interne deservire; et ita, a mihi verisimili, facit multos. Consideret igitur homo profugorum ultimorum murmura in deserto, et videat exemplariter quomodo murmur tale deo displiceat. Quam grave autem peccatum huius vana inprecacio vel murmuracio, non est meum discutere; satis est michi scire quod debeo a talibus abstinere, et non inutiliter languere circa talia, et cetera.

1. non vult MS. 3. modi *deest* MS. 22. de *deest* MS. 24. de interne MS. 25. prof^{u} ult eorum MS.

22. *Mea paciencia.* This personal note in such an abstruse work is interesting. It is known that Wyclif remained long in hopes of a certain benefice, which in the end was given to another by the Roman Curia. If this passage is an allusion to Wyclif's long-deferred hopes, it shows how deeply he felt the delay, and was likely to feel the ultimate disappointment. Catholic historians, however, who accuse him of having become a heretic on this account, are certainly in error. The logical development of his doctrines, benefice or no benefice, must at last have brought him into conflict with the Church: though I do not deny that this may have hastened and embittered the conflict.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Premissis istis preambulis, sunt tria dubia lacius pertractanda: primo, si aliqua sit causa volucionis divine, modo quo dictum est superius.

Et videtur quod non; quia, si sic, tunc quilibet effectus haberet causam, qua posita ille sequeretur; et per consequens omnia contingencia de necessitate naturali contingerent, et sic nichil ad utrumlibet.

Rom. IX, 20. Confirmatur per apostolum Ro. 9, ubi increpat querentes quare deus voluit alicuius misereri, alium indurare": "*O homo, tu quis es ut respondeas deo*" et ponit exemplum de figulo, quomodo habet potestatem ex eadem massa facere unum vas in honorem et aliud in contumeliam. Ideo dicit Augustinus super Io. omelia 26, Io. VI, 44. exponendo hunc textum, "*nemo [potest] venire ad me, nisi pater meus traxerit eum:* quare hunc trahit, et hunc non trahit, noli querere, si non vis errare". Ex quo patet quod errant qui querunt causam divine voluntatis.

Is there any cause of the volitions of God? It would seem not. If there were, God's volutions would be necessary, as the effect of a cause; and nothing would be contingent. St. Paul compares creatures to a potter's vessel, freely made to one purpose or another. And Augustine forbids us to ask why God acts thus or otherwise.

Item, iuxta illud sequitur, vel quod sit processus in infinitum in causis, vel quod aliqua reciproce causent seipsa. Nam cuiuslibet effectus voliti a deo est dare voluntatem dei pro causa, ut patet ex dictis: et illius voluntatis est dare causam, ut dicitur. Igitur vel oportet 72 b^{b} procedere in infinitum in causis, | vel dare voluntatem incausatam in deo, vel 3° dare voluntatem causantem causabile, quod reciproce causet eadem consequencia. Sic reducitur: sit *a* prima volucio contingens in deo: et quero utrum habeat causam, vel non. Si non, per illud nulla; si habet, vel ex parte dei, vel ex parte creature; si tantum ex parte dei, cum *a* sit prima volucio contingens, oportet omnem causam *a* esse absolute necessariam et per consequens, cum ex completa causa *a* sequitur *b*, formaliter oportet *a* absolute interesse; si

A cause of the Divine volition would either be caused itself, and so on *ad infinitum*, or one cause would be at the same time the effect and the cause of another, which is impossible.

1. Ca^{m} 2^{m} *in marg.; initial* P *in red ink* MS. 6. creaturam *pro* causam MS. 15. potest *deest*, venit MS. 16. traxit MS. 20. alius *pro* aliqua MS. 22. nam pro MS. 30. tm̑ *pro* tantum MS. 33. a(?) *pro* b MS.

9. *Ro.* In the text we have Io. continually. I suspect this is a blunder of the transcriber, for the long down-stroke of the *r* is often very like a *j*.

creatura extra deum causat *a* volucionem, cum ipsa causat primam creaturam, sequitur quod aliqua reciproce se concausant.

God's will would not be free unless its volitions were absolutely uncaused.

Item, iuxta illud sequitur quod voluntas dei non sit summe libera, eo quod est necessitata intrincece [necessitate] antecedente; et hoc tollit de libertate, ut patet ex sentencia doctoris profundi, li 3°, c° 4°, cum suo correlario, parte 34, primi capituli, pudenter redarguit Aristotelem de voluntate antiqua, a qua non potest pure procedere accio nova; quia tunc, ut arguit Aristoteles, posita illa voluntate eternaliter, foret eternaliter accio. Set doctor dicit quod hoc sequitur de potencia naturali vel irracionali, non autem de potencia libera, sicut probat testimonio Aristotelis et commentatoris 9, metaphisice 10. Et confirmat multiplici racione, et iuxta hoc diffinit potenciam contradictorie liberam, li 3°. Confirmat, sic; non est processus in infinitum in causis, set statur ad primam, quam oportet esse voluntatem divinam: igitur illa est incausata.

This is Aristotle's doctrine of an eternal will that must cause the world eternally; which Bradwardine refutes, showing that God's will, though eternal, must be free. The last answer to all, he says, is God's will, and we can go no further.

Unde Augustinus, 83. 9. 928. sic scribit; "qui querit quare deus voluit mundum facere, causam querit voluntatis divine". Omnis autem causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur, nichil autem maius est voluntate dei. Et de ge. *Contra Manicheos* 5°, sic scribit; "Causas voluntatis divine Manichei scire querunt, cum omnium que sunt ipsa sit causa. Si voluntatis dei aliqua sit causa, est aliquid quod antecedit voluntatem dei; quod nefas est credere. Qui igitur querit quare deus fecit celum et terram, respondendum est ei, quia voluit: qui autem querit, quare voluit, [querit] magis aliquid quam voluntas dei, nichil autem maius inveniri potest. Compescat igitur se humana temeritas, et illud quod non est non querat, ne illud quod non est non inveniat". Ex istis videtur stultum querere causam voluntatis divine.

Augustine again writes strongly against those who ask *why* God has acted thus and thus, because there can be nothing prior to God's will.

Let not rash men seek that which is not, lest they fail to find it.

Ad istud dicitur quod necesse est cuiuslibet volucionis divine relative esse aliquam causam.

But we say that of all Divine volitions relative to creatures there must be some cause, for what is caused must have a cause, complete and logically convertible therewith.

Et ad primum conceditur conclusio, quod respectu cuiuscunque causati signabilis est dare causam completam secundum subsistendi consequenciam, convertibilem

5, 6. necessitate *deest* MS. 30. querit *after* voluit *deest* MS.

7. *Doctoris profundi,* Bradwardine. 8. Or *prudenter?*
39. *Convertibilem.* If, for instance *A is struck by somebody* (here

cum eodem. Unde apud philosophos fuit iste sensus famosus, dicens quod causa particularis in actu simul est et non est cum suo causato, ut patet 2° posteriorum, capitulo 3°, et 2° phisicorum 37°, cum exposicione Averoys ibidem, et Lincolniensis in utroque loco, et cum aliis concorditer exponentibus istum sensum.

In a sense then, any particular cause is, and in a sense it is not, simultaneous with its effect.

Et concordat racio: nam respectu multorum causatorum est dare causas completas. Et idem est iudicium de omnibus: igitur, et cetera. Assumptum patet de verbo dei, cuius pater est causa completa, de spiritu sancto, cuius pater et filius est causa completa, et de quolibet effectu positivo, cuius voluntas dei est causa completa: quare igitur non sic de quolibet causato?

And this is true of all causes and effects.

Confirmatur: sit *a* causa, tamen non habens causam completam; et sit *b* aggregatum ex omnibus eius causis, quod per adversarium est causa incompleta, et patet quod non sufficit (se solo) causare *a*, cum requiritur aliud quod nec est *b*, nec aliquid eius; et si *b* non sufficit (se solo) causare *a*, certum est quod non (se solo) causat *a*: igitur *b* non (se solo) causat *a*; et cum *a* plenarie causatur, sequitur quod *b* non includit omnes causas *a*: consequens contra datum. Si non requiritur aliquid aliud preter *b* vel aliquid eius ad causandum *a*, sequitur quod, posito *b*, ponitur *a*, et sic *b* est causa completa *a*, cuius oppositum est datum.

If B includes all the causes of A, and these are not sufficient to determine its existence, and if A happens to exist, then there must be another cause of A, which is not B nor any part thereof: this contradicts our adversary's position.

Forte dicitur quod *b*, vel aliquid eius sit agens liberum: ideo non sequitur quod posito *b*, ponitur *a*, etsi non requiritur aliud.

Illud non valet, quia vel in *b* includitur sola essencia libera, vel cum essencia eius, volucio. Si nuda essencia, patet quod requiritur volucionem superaddi, et sic *b*

But suppose that B is a free agent, will it not be false to say that its existence necessarily entails that of A? No, for we must take this free agent B. together with its act of volition; if this is

2. dicentis MS.

you have the effect), then *somebody strikes A* (this is the cause, equipollent to the effect by logical conversion). 11. *Causa*. Note here that Wyclif uses the word in a sense very different from that of most Scholastic Metaphysicians. "Cause, in the strict acceptation of the word, is a principiant which essentially and positively communicates being to another *entity*, or which produces an existing *essence distinct from its own* (Father Harper, S. J. Metaphysics of the School: Bk. V, Chap. I, Art. 2). Now since Wyclif everywhere asserts that the Three Persons are one Essence, it is clear that he here means by Cause the vaguer *Principium: — id per quod aliquid est vel fit;* not necessarily: *aliquid aliud;* and theologians say consequently that the Father is *alius a Filio*, but not *aliud a Filio*.

supposed, and there is no impediment, A must follow necessarily; if there is an impediment, A follows as soon as this is removed. This reasoning is unanswerable.

non est causa completa *a*; si volucio sit pars *b*, vel est frustrabilis vel infrustrabilis; si infrustrabilis, patet | quod, [73a] posito *b*, ponitur *a* tempore suo; si frustrabilis, requiritur amocio impedimentorum, que si intelligitur complete in *b*, patet quod, posito *b*, ponitur *a*. Et idem est argumentum de quolibet causato.

Supposita igitur ista veritate pro firma, propter racionem predictam quam innuit Aristoteles, 8 phisicorum, contra ponentes creacionem mundi, restat respondere ad argumentum in oppositum.

Answers to Objections. It does not follow that there is nothing contingent; for two beings can mutually cause each other in different ways. God's volition creates the world, and is in another sense caused by the potentiality of the world to be created. Being is the first of Universals caused; the World, the first of singulars. If you posit God's existence and that of the world, you posit His volition that the world shall exist.

Ad primum, negatur sequi ex isto quod nullum sit contingens ad utrumlibet: hoc tamen inevitabiliter sequeretur, si non eadem causarent se reciproce. Ideo philosophi, hoc videntes, concesserunt concorditer; (ut patet 2 *phisicorum*, 30, et 5 *metaphisice*, 2°) quod aliqua causant se reciproce in diversis generibus causandi; ut prima volucio qua deus vult istum mundum existere: et utraque istarum volucionum causatur materialitate extrinseca, vel obiective a suo subiecto primario. Unde inter effectus universales est *esse* creatum primus, ut dicit autor *De Causis*, proposicione quarta. Et inter effectus singulares est iste mundus primus. Aggregatum igitur ex deo et volucione relativa, qua de bonitate sua vult illum mundum esse, est completa causa extrinseca huius mundi, sic quod claudit contradiccionem illud aggregatum esse, nisi iste mundus sit; et econtra aggregatum ex deo et isto mundo est completa causa huius volucionis, sic quod claudit contradiccionem illud aggregatum esse, nisi sit volucio divina, cum volucio dei relativa non dicit nisi deum et illam creaturam bonam, cum suis consequentibus.

But the difficulty is that if you take 'God and His will that the world exist' as a complete logical antecedent to 'God and the existing world', each causes the other; or if not, you cannot substitute for them God's mere will and

Difficultas tamen est: si illud aggregatum sit secundum se totum, tunc aliqua causant se reciproce, ut volucio dei causat mundum, et econtra. Si secundo modo, tunc illud aggregatum non est causa mundi, set unica pars eius; et tunc inaniter sumitur illa volucio, que est non causa mundi, pro causa aggregata completa signanda. Non enim plus foret illud aggregatum causa mundi,

4, 5. complexe (?) MS. 18. mlite *pro* materialitate MS.

18. *Materialitate.* The abbreviation is not clear; but as *materia*, in Scholastic language, is used for passivity, and determinability in general; and besides, since Wyclif adds the word *extrinseca*. I think I am right in giving the sense as I have done in the side-note.

quam aggregatum ex deo et filiacione sui ad Petrum. Ideo verisimiliter dici potest quod volucio dei, quicquid sit de sciencia eius, est unum previe requisitum ad existenciam voliti, non solum quia oportet eam eternaliter precedere quodlibet volitum creatum, set quia oportet ipsam efficere volitum. Si enim labor efficit sanitatem, quia infirmus laborando fit sanus, pari evidencia vel maiori videtur quod volucio dei efficiat creaturam, quia deus volendo efficit creaturam: et econtra illa volucio causatur obiective vel finaliter, medio ab ipso volito, ad quod principaliter terminatur.

its result — the existing world. We may answer that the volition of God is a necessary pre-requisite to the existence of any creature, and is that which produces it, as an efficient cause; and on the other hand, this will has the world for its final cause.

Et ad illud apostoli dictum est superius; nam secundum doctorem subtilem, super primam distinccionem, 41, apostolus redarguit presumptuosos romanos, inquirentes illa quorum non sunt capaces, et non propter inopiam racionis reddende, saltem in communi, de dei volucione et eius ordinancia. Et videtur michi expediens tacere soluciones talium rudibus et plebeis, tum quia non sunt dispositi ad capiendum subtilitatem scripture, tum eciam quia propter sinistrum sensum, quem errore proprio acciperent, incidere possent in heresim, imputando deo quod indebite vel culpabiliter ordinat: ad quod destruendum vadit exemplum apostoli de figulo. Sicut enim vas fictile non potest calumpniari figulum, etsi ordinet de massa a se constructa unum vas vinarium, et aliud vas urine, sic nec homo potest calumpniari contra deum, etsi fuerit creatus in naturalibus suis incomposicior et ad mores indisposicior, quia deus totam massam materialem hominis creavit ex nichilo, sicut et animam. Unde igitur nobis titulus vendicandi amplius quam habemus, cum totum quod habemus non de condigno, set de pura gracia obtinemus? Et ad eundem sensum vadit dictum Augustini.

As to St. Paul, Scotus says that he merely rebuked the presumption of the Romans. For my part, I do not approve of any such explanations being given to ignorant people, who might misunderstand, and fall into heresy; and for them the Apostle's simile of the potter and his vessel is in place. Even were man created with means less sufficient for salvation, God cannot be accused, since all we have, we have as a favour.

Sufficit igitur in talibus, quod credamus deum neminem posse dampnare sine suo demerito exigente; 2°, quod nemo est in materialibus tam incompositus, quin habet ab ipsis et de gracia semper parata, unde possit beatitudinem promereri, si apponat sufficientem diligenciam.

Enough that we believe (1) that God damns no one, unless he has deserved damnation; (2) that no one's nature

1. fili^{e} *pro* filiacione MS. 10. medie MS. 13. p^{m} d^{i} *pro* primam distinccionem MS. 26, 27. causari *pro* calumpniari MS. 28. incompossibilior MS. 32, 33. optinemus MS.

29. *Incomposicior* is very ungrammatical, and seems strange as a correction of the text; but see l. 36. Besides, *incompossibilis* would have no sense at all here.

is so bad as not to be able to attain salvation with God's grace, if he tries; and (3) that if he does what in him lies, God cannot fail him. If you feel that God does not help you, it is your own fault. Pray for help, and do not complain of God.

sic possibilem; et 3°, si homo faciat quod ad eum pertinet, non ponendo obicem resistendo, non est compossibile deum sibi deficere illustrando, et | ad suum 73a[b] [finem] expediencius dirigendo. Ideo si sentis te a deo non tractum aut allectum, noscas pro certo te ipsum in causa negacionis. Ideo dispone te ad devocionem, et ora ut traharis; et illud est prius faciendum, quam musitandum cur deus tam varie seminat graciam suam. Quia satis est quoad hoc scire quod deus nullum tale facit sine causa evidenti, ut pulcherimo ordine universitatis sue integrando, et quotlibet aliis causis, de quibus non oportet nos sillogizari.

We have already answered the second objection. The Will of God produces the thing willed; the thing willed, as the object of that will and its matter (*that which* it tends towards) is also the cause of the volition. If the cause of all these contingent volitions and things willed were external to them, everything would be absolutely necessary; but it is within them by reciprocal causation, which takes place by means of a substantial cause, external to them. They are like a material Whole and its parts; the former is materially caused by the latter, but the latter are parts, because they exist in the Whole. Thus each volition effectually causes its object

Ad 2m argumentum, patet ex dictis quod prima volucio dei contingens causat suum primo volitum, et econtra; et ut apparet michi, volitum est finis et materia extrinseca, vel obiectum talis volucionis, que est relacio racionis, et sic perfeccior illa: nec sufficit illa quicquam agere, set facere raciones, racione sui subiecti agentis. Et sic patet quod, capta tota multitudine contingencium, illa non habet extra se causam adequatam, quia tunc omnia que evenirent, absolute necessario evenirent; set ista multitudo causat se reciproce secundum partes. Nec est possibile istam multitudinem quicquam causare, nisi in virtute cause per se stantis extra istam multitudinem. Simile est de quocunque continuo, cuius omnes partes causant ipsum materialiter, et (ut sic) sunt prius natura. Econtra autem quodlibet totum causat finaliter suas partes: et sic, captis omnibus partibus *a* ignis, ille reciproce causant se, cum partes parcium causant ipsas materialiter, et sua tota recausant partes finaliter. Quod si contingit separare partes indivisibiles a divisibilibus, tunc contingit dare primas causas materiales. Et omnes alie partes divisibiles sunt sue cause finales, totum autem est tota causa finalis, non habens causam finalem ulteriorem intrinsecam, quia omnis multitudo est reducibilis ad unitatem. Consimiliter tota multitudo contingencium est causata, cum quelibet eius pars causata est, et non est dare aliquid illius multitudinis, quin sit causatum ab alio illius multitudinis. Ideo causat se ipsam reciproce; ut tota multitudo volucionum contingencium in deo causatur a volitis ad que terminatur, et illa causat ipsa

1. si MS. 4. finem *deest* MS.; *ib.* expetio *pro* expediencius MS.
7. hora MS. 24. creature *pro* cause MS.

volita quodammodo efficienter: et ita de quolibet creaturis se causantibus reciproce. Et si queras causam extra multitudinem contingencium, dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam essenciam esse causam extra talem multitudinem, preter deum. Si autem alique sunt veritates absolute necessarie, causantes contingens, omnes ille sunt essencialiter deus, ut dictum est superius, licet formaliter distinguantur; et sic voluciones in deo eterne se habent in ordine contingencium quasi partes indivisibiles continui, si ponantur; et volita, gracia quorum deus vult illa esse, se habent tamquam partes divisibiles finaliter causantes. Nam querenti quare deus vult eternaliter *a* effectum esse, dicitur quod ut ipsum *a* sit in tempore suo, et hoc est ut universitas sua integretur; et illa universitas finaliter propter bonitatem increatam talium.

Igitur relacionum eternarum cause finales medie sunt creature temporales, ut dictum est in assimili de divina sciencia. Nec est possibile dare causam absolutam extrinsecam, qua posita, ponitur aliquis effectus extra ipsam signabilis: quia, si volucio dei esset essencia absoluta causata, deus posset suspendere eius accionem ad extra, sicut fecit eternaliter, ne causet ad extra creaturam; quia aliter talis causa plus necessitaret deum ad causandum ad extra, quam essencia absoluta subordinata nature create potest ipsam necessitare. Oportet igitur ponere voluciones dei eternas de genere respectivorum, et sic non possunt de potencia dei per se esse, set disponibile facere racione sui subiecti, quod est deus; sicut dictum est de accidentibus.

Et per hec patet solucio ad argumentum Aristotelis, 8 phisicorum. Nam volucio dei est causa completa mundi, cum ad illam formaliter sequitur mundum esse; non tamen sequitur, si illa sit eterna, quod mundus sit eternus, ut sepe dictum est in assimili; nec est illa volucio totalis causa intrinseca vel extrinseca, cum quotlibet partes mundi sunt requisite ad *esse* mundi, que sunt temporales, et sic tota causa aggregata mundi est, secundum philosophiam eius, temporalis. Et si queratur quid deficit ad hoc, quod mundus sit eternus quoad causas extrinsecas, dicitur quod hoc deficit, deum velle mundum esse eternum a parte ante: quod si esset,

and is caused thereby as a determination. But the Cause, external to these volitions and things willed, is and must be God. If there be any necessary truths which cause the Contingent, they, as such, are identical with God. Why does God eternally intend A's existence? That A may exist at the right time to complete God's world. It is impossible to suppose another cause of God's volitions, external to God, yet necessarily causing these volitions and their object; for if external, God could always suspend their operation. There are therefore eternal volitions of God, of the nature of relations, that cannot exist but in God. This answers Aristotle's argument for the world's eternity. It does not follow that the world is eternal, though God's will is, for each of its parts must exist at a certain time. The world is not eternal because God did not choose it to be so.

13. non ut MS. 28. ꝺiſpo̅le *pro* disponibile MS. 38. phi̅m *pro* philosophiam MS.

Three things are required for the world's existence at a given instant: the world, that instant, and cause of the world. God wills that the world be in existence at a given instant, and it must exist then.

mundus esset eternus. Et si queratur causa com | pleta 73 b[a] et sufficiens ad hoc quod mundus sit pro dato instanti, dicitur quod requiritur ad hoc tamquam causa; mundus, illud instans, et quelibet causa mundi. Quibus positis, sequitur mundum esse pro dato instanti, sicut sequitur ex hoc: deus vult mundum esse pro hoc instanti. Et si causa illa totalis sit pro aliqua mensura temporis, causatum illud est pro eadem.

It is true that God's volitions, not being absolutely uncaused, are not absolutely free; supreme freedom belongs only to God's essence, which is supremely necessary. Necessity and freedom do not contradict each other, but correspond. A thing caused freely may be a necessary sequel of something else.

Ad 3m argumentum, dicitur quod nulla volucio dei relativa est summe libera, set solum natura divina. Nam relacio consequens est equivoce dicta prima libertatis dei. Nec repugnat libertas et necessitas in eodem, set, ut patebit posterius, libertas et necessitas, ex equo proporcionaliter se invicem consequntur: sic quod summus gradus necessitatis, tam in absolutis quam in respectivis, correspondet summo gradui libertatis, et ita de gradibus proporcionaliter ut sunt vera; ut sicut deus est summe necessarius, sic est proporcionaliter summe liber, et spiritus sanctus liberime producitur et causatur, et tamen absolute necessario. Ideo, ut dictum est superius, non est repugnancia necessitatis et libertatis, et pari evidencia non est repugnancia necessitatis antecedentis et libertatis causate.

Bradwardine seems to me to distinguish clearly between God's essence and His volition. For he speaks of things willed by God in the first place and in the second: there being the production and the creation of things.

Unde pro processu doctoris profundi, videtur mihi primo quod satis patenter distinguit inter volucionem dei et eius essenciam. Nam primo li°. ca° 11, in solvendo auctoritates beati Augustini superius allegatas, ad hoc quod non est causa voluntatis divine querenda, dicit quod omnes ille loquntur de volitis posterioribus voluntate divine, ut est creacio mundi et similia: non autem de volitis prioribus voluntate divina. Quis enim vocaret voluntatem divinam, volucionem eius producere et creare? et post distinguit de racionibus, ponens quod aliqua sunt priora naturaliter voluntate divina, et illa

13. ex quo MS. 22. av'te^te *pro* antecedentis MS. 31. produceret creare MS.

4. *Illud instans.* As is seen in Wyclif's published works, he gives a real entity to time, which according to him is made up of indivisible instants corresponding to indivisible parts of space. See specially, *Logica*, vol. III, Intr. p. XXVIII; and p. 162.

10. *Liberime.* I confess I do not understand what Wyclif understands by liberty here, unless it be *libertas a coactione.* It cannot surely be *libertas ad utrumque.* Our natural wish for happiness (since we cannot desire to be miserable, and no one can force us) would in his view be called a free desire.

movent et determinant voluntatem divinam, ut deum esse omnipotentem, et similia. Alia autem sunt posteriora voluntate divina, ut quelibet creatura, et illa non movent voluntatem dei. Tercia autem maneries racionum est mixta ex naturaliter priora voluntate divina; et ponit istam creaturam quod est contingens et posterius voluntate divina, et ponit istam veritatem, "*si illa creatura, est deus*", quod est absolute necessarium, et prius voluntate divina, ut dicitur.

Ista autem sunt vera, si intelligitur de volucione relativa dei ad volitum: si autem intelligitur de voluntate que deus est, quis dubitat quod sunt inpossibilia? scilicet quod aliquid sit prius naturaliter vel causa illius voluntatis, et specialiter veritas causata a deo. Ideo certum est quod ipse distinxit volucionem dei ab eius essencia. Unde, ca° 39° primi libri, sic scribit; "si quis querat, cum non propter merita, quare igitur deus eligit vel reprobat hunc vel illum, cum *quare* semper querit causam: causa autem formalis volucionis divine est quodammodo ipse deus. causa vero efficiens prior quodammodo est sua voluntas, que est deus". Et quod distinxit inter essenciam volentem, ac volucionem, patet 3° li° c° 5°, cuius nulla pars dicit quod solus actus voluntatis divine ad extra est simpliciter contingens equaliter. Et vocat contingens equaliter actum primum inmanentem agentis racionalis; quo posito, cum omnibus disposicionibus naturaliter previis, cum quibus ipsum producit, non sequitur necessario ipsum produci, set utraque parcium potest stare equaliter; ut describit c° 4to. Si autem intelligat per actum illum racionem racionis inter volens et volitum, que, quamvis sit eterna, est tamen contingentissimum ipsam esse, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligat, vel essenciam divinam vel accidens de genere accionis, sive immanens, sive transiens, vel quamcunque rem aliam absolutam, certum videtur michi quod sensus sit inpossibilis.

Talis igitur volucio est causata a voluto obiective et finaliter, ut in assimili dicit doctor, li° primo, c° 39°, dans multiplices causas quare deus vult aliquos salvari,

And God's will is determined to be, v. g. almighty, by that which is antecedent to His will (i. e. by His essence). Creatures, on the contrary, do not determine Him to will them. But at the same time, a contingent being may imply a truth that God must necessarily will as truth.

Now all this is true if we understand it of the volitions of God relative to His creatures; but if of that Will which is God Himself, it is certainly impossible. What can be antecedent to that Will? He says: "The formal cause of God's volition is God Himself, i. e. His Will, identical with Him, and only the external act of God's will is contingent."

If he means by this act the relation of volition which, though eternal, is quite contingent, he is right. It were absurd to mean any entity which is not a relation. He approaches our sense again, when he says that God

5. priora (sic!) MS.

5. *Priora*. Some words are wanting here, no doubt. 7. *Illa*. We should either add *est* (understood) after *creatura*, or substitute *est* for *illa*.

is the ultimate final cause of damnation and salvation; and the mediate cause is the good that flows from this. Therefore, though (in these mediate causes) salvation, &c. is a necessary antecedent to the good that flows therefrom, it does not follow that God's volition is not free.

et aliquos dampnari. Causa autem finalis ultima est ipse deus, et cause finales medie sunt bona que ex illis volucionibus eveniunt, ut instruccio predestinatorum, laudacio salvorum, et generaliter pulcritudo et decencia universitatis create, que omnia cedunt ad laudem dei. Et patet quod non sequitur volucionem dei non esse liberam, etsi antecedenter fuerit necessitata; nec esset possibile doctorem plene salvare causam adequatam necessitantem, nisi ponendo respectus. Non enim est deus causa adequata ponens formaliter datum effectum, nisi aliquis actus sciendi aut volendi sit sic absolutum, cum nullus talis sit efficacior quam natura divina. Et ex isto patet generaliter quod nulla causa extrinseca sive respectiva est adequata causa effectus extrinseci, sic quod, illa posita, formaliter sequitur ille effectus.

To prove his point fully, he must admit volition to be relative entities. But the 'Profound Doctor' goes so deep that he imagines eternal accidents in God, and his conclusions are rather questionable.

Ideo si, ponentes causam extrinsecam adequatam necessitantem ad causatum absolutum bene prospicerent, essent inducti ad ponendum respectus cum antiquis. In tantum itaque profundavit se doctor profundus in materia de actibus dei, quod posuit in deo quotlibet eternas continuitates que sunt essencie absolute de genere accionis, ut patet li° 3°, c° 6°. Et ex ista radice posuit multa sequencia, quorum opposita sunt satis probabilia.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

What is Free Will?

Ed ut predicta magis appareant, videndum est quid sit potencia libera descriptive; quia hoc habito, facile est videre quid sit libertas, et in quo consistit eius racio. Et cum idem sit potencia libera et liberum arbitrium ad modum loquendi doctoris, ideo describendum est liberum arbitrium.

It is the power of judging between right

Est autem liberum arbitrium potencia arbitrandi vel iudicandi bonum, iustum prosequendi, et iniustum dimit-

3. instincto *pro* instruccio MS. 18. indu'ti *pro* inducti MS. 21. contintes *pro* continuitates MS. 24. Cam 3m *in marg.; initial S in red ink* MS. 26. discriptive *and so all through* MS. 30. quidest liberum arbitrium *in marg.* MS.

22. *Accionis.* As, in the doctrine of Aristotle, action and passion are not absolute accidents, but relative, either Bradwardine makes an absurd blunder here, or his position is very similar to that of Wyclif. 31. *Est autem.* It must be noted that this is a general definition which suits God and the creature equally well. According to this, our 'power of choosing evil' is not really a power, but a defect. Of course there is a

tendi. Unde, ut est commune deo et creaturis, discribitur secundum sentenciam Anselmi in libello suo *De libero arbitrio*, ca° 9°, ad hunc sensum, quod est potestas nature racionalis voluntarie servandi rectitudinem vel iusticiam.

and wrong, of choosing the former and rejecting the latter.

Videtur namque multis [quod] quodlibet brutum, ymmo quelibet natura inanimata, habet potestatem servandi rectitudinem propter se, quia certum est quod talia servant modum quo rectum est ipsa se habere, et hoc faciunt gracia et intento primo rectitudinis regulantis, solum: cum racionalia et omnia talia nata sunt clare et distincte arbitrari vel discernere rectitudinem. Ideo solum talia nata sunt clare et distincte arbitrari; que sic possunt discernere et libere exequi dicuntur habere liberum arbitrium: ut sunt deus et omnes creature racionales. Set cum omne quod est perfeccionis commune deo et creaturis reperitur antonomastice in deo, patet quod in deo est summa libertas arbitrii, que est exemplar et mensura cuilibet alteri libertati. Deus igitur habet potestatem discernendi et exequendi iusticiam, sine possibilitate recistentis vel difficultantis ipsum quomodolibet ab intento. Creature autem quecunque racionales habent inseparabiliter, in quantum huiusmodi, absolutam huiusmodi potestatem, sic quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam racionalem carere potestate huiusmodi, vel amittere, aut adquirere secundum dispares gradus huiusmodi potestatem. Si enim creatura racionalis est, ipsa obligatur a deo servare rectitudinem. Et cum deus non potest obligare quicquam ad impossibile, relinquitur deum inseparabiliter dare cuilibet tali nature potestatem servandi rectitudinem; sicut vinculatus, servatis naturalibus illesis, habet potestatem faciendi quicquid sufficeret facere solutus, licet deficiat disposicio.

All animals and inanimate beings do right, but without knowing it; intelligent beings alone know, and therefore they alone can choose.

Now, liberty being in God and in creatures, it is in Him otherwise than in them: God has the power of knowing and doing what is right and cannot possibly be prevented therefrom. Rational creatures have also essentially this faculty of free will, though they may be like chained prisoners, impeded from acting by circumstances.

Unde multi doctores equivocant in hoc quod libertas arbitrii non suscipit magis aut minus. Aliqui, attendentes solummodo ad illam absolutam et incorruptibilem potestatem: ut Anselmus et sui sequaces, et alii attendentes

The question whether free-will can be increased or diminished is a great stumbling-block here.

5. anselmus *in marg.* MS.; *ib.* quod *deest* MS. 16. coe *pro* commune MS. 30. sicut ergo MS.

difficulty here. How can one be said to choose, if there is only one side that can be chosen? Hobson's choice is no choice. And therefore many theologians have not admitted this definition. 32. *Sicut.* I have omitted *ergo* to make sense; but possibly the end of the sentence, applying the simile to human nature, may be wanting.

Anselm, Augustine and others, speak of its being greater or less; so does Scripture in several places.

ad disposicionem accidentalem secundum quam potencia racionalis sufficit prompcius aut tardius exequi rectitudinem debitam. Et secundum hoc suscipit libertas magis et minus; et sic videtur Augustinus loqui, *Enchiridion*, 18vo, et 2° *De libero arbitrio*, et alibi multis locis. Et isto modo loquitur scriptura, vocans mundos a peccato liberos, at alios servientes peccato servos turpissimos, ut patet Jo. 8vo: "*Amen, Amen, dico vobis [quia omnis] qui facit,*" et cetera. Ideo dicit 2a Cor. 3° "*ubi [autem] spiritus domini, ibi libertas*": quam libertatem exponit Ad Gal, 4°, dicens quod "*qua libertate Christus nos liberavit*". Et certum est quod talis potest suscipere magis et minus, cum sit, secundum quotlibet gradus, adquiribilis et deperdibilis usque ad non gradum. Nam claudit contradiccionem creaturam racionalem esse non | servientem deo, et per consequens non servantem rectitudinem, cum (eo ipso quod est) se habet ut debet, iuste vivendo vel iuste paciendo.

Io. VIII, 34. II. Cor. III. 17. Gal. IV. 31.

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This readiness may indeed be greater or less, even reduced to vanishing point.

Freedom therefore may be ascribed to any nature capable of volition, or to the free act of the said nature; the former is actively, the latter passively free. In the former there are two degrees: the supreme freedom of God, and that of created beings, which is inferior. Thus liberty and necessity correspond, and sin, which of all things seems most contrary to liberty, would not be sin, were it not the outcome of free will.

Set, ne laboremus in equevocis, notandum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid liberum: vel quia est natura volutiva potens libere secundum naturalem rectitudinem, vel quia libere procedit a tali natura. Primum vocatur active liberum, et secundum passive liberum. In primo membro sunt duo gradus notabiles; nam aliqua est natura volitiva increata, que ex se sine superiori possibili libitante, vel pari aut inferiori imperante, potest gratis servare rectitudinem; et illa est solus Deus, qui est finis libertatis. In secundo gradu est natura volutiva creata, ut homo et angelus, qui proporcionaliter est inferius liber, ut est inferius ens vel verum. Non enim potest libere tendere in bonum sine superiori limitante. Et cum omne ens quod libere causatur ab altera illarum naturarum sit ita libera, patet quod omne ens posterius est 2° modo liberum. Et cum omne ens sit verum, et sic necessarium, ut patet ex dictis, satis liquet quod omne ens, ut necessarium, est liberum; et hoc est quod dictum est superius, libertatem et necessitatem ex equo concurrere, in tantum quod peccata, que videntur maxime contraria libertati, non essent peccata, secundum Augustinum (primo retractacionum 13°) nisi essent libera,

4. aug℘. *in marg.* MS. 8. quia omnis *deest* MS. 9. autem *deest* MS. 11. 12. Christus nos liberavit illa libertate MS. 15. causam *pro* creaturam MS. 15. 16. non secundum servientem MS.

ut peccatum originale cuiuscunque est liberum, quia primus parens libere causat ipsum. Et si obiciatur quod causa particularis simul est et non est cum suo causato, dicitur quod hoc intelligitur de causa particulari inmediata, et non de remota, ut est ad intra respectu cuiuscunque individui sui generis. Quia igitur liberum arbitrium in homine potest dicere essencialem potenciam, habitum, actum, vel opus productum, et consequencia, in deo, non est formaliter habitus vel actus. Ideo Anselmus, volens complecti sub una discripcione libertatem dei et angeli, describit libertatem modo predicto. Augustinus autem, et alii, loquntur de aliis libertatibus ut sunt actus, habitus, vel opera producta a creatura libera; de talibus enim pertinet loqui, excitando homines. Set quia libertas potestatis sonat in activam potenciam, ulterius est notandum quod tripliciter dicitur aliquid procedens a voluntate libera esse liberum: primo modo actus inmediate procedens a voluntate circa bonum, 2° modo actus extrinseci principiati a potencia et eius actu intrinseco libero; et 3° opera procedencia ex hiis tribus: et taliter possunt omnia opera nature dici libera.

Even original sin would not be sin in us, were it not that each of us came into existence by an act of free will.

Anselm's definition is general, embracing God and His creatures; but others take liberty, as it is in the creature, either a disposition, an act, or the result of this act.

We must also make a distinction between the internal act, the external act, and the thing done.

Istis suppositis, probatur quod miserimus dampnatus est liber ad eliciendum actum proprium voluntatis; nam quelibet talis sufficit, nolle se puniri, cum ad hoc movet tantum malum: nec aliter esset sibi penale dampnari. Set eo ipso quod potencia sufficit nolle malum, sufficit velle bonum, cum genus illius actus sit prius naturaliter, sicut et eius obiectum. Igitur quilibet talis sufficit velle bonum et per consequens [habet] libertatem ad eliciendum actum proprium voluntatis. Deus igitur non potest servare naturam incorruptibilem volutivam, cum hoc quod non sufficit elicere actum proprium immanentem, quia tunc illa insufficiencia diceret aliquam disposicionem accidentalem substancie. Et per consequens posset ad tantum disponi, quod nolit bonum sub racione boni, set velit malum sub racione qua malum, et non sub racione qua bonum: quod est inpossibile, cum nichil vult aliquid, nisi quia prius naturaliter [non] vult eius oppositum. Sicut igitur intellectus terminatur ad ens ut verum, sic voluntas terminatur ad ens ut bonum: ut dictum est superius.

The lowest of the damned is essentially free; for if he can certainly desire not to be punished, i. e. if he can shrink from evil, he can also desire good.

For if there was such an impediment to his freedom that he could no longer desire good as good, then he would be forced to desire evil as evil, for this amounts to the same, and is impossible. Thus every act of the will is essentially free.

28. quelibet MS. 29. habet *deest* MS. 39. non *deest* MS.

Patet igitur quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis quod voluntas producat non libere actum suum, et per consequens ut cogatur invite ad volendum aliquid vel nolendum. Nam si voluntas vult aut non vult quicquam signabile, et tunc placet sibi de illo vel eius opposito, et per consequens gratis fertur in illud ut suum obiectum natura, et sic non coacte. Istam conclusionem deducit Lincolniensis in libro *De libero arbitrio* isto modo: "Nulla mens cogi potest, maxime si bona est: nam a mente mala cogi non potest, cum mens mala sit ipsa infirmior; nec a corpore per idem, cum omne corpus sit ipsa inferius; nec a mente bona inferiori, ut pari, tum quia non potest, tum eciam quia bonitas sua impedit ipsam cogere voluntatem. Et per idem [a] bona superiori cogi non potest; quia, eo ipso quod cogeret ad malum, esset ipsa in cogendo mala; et, si ad bonum cogeret, adhuc hoc esset iniustum: | quia, 74 a[b] si bonum per coaccionem faceret, nullum exinde consequeretur meritum. Et istam racionem tangit beatus Augustinus, primo *De libero arbitrio*, 19.

No mind, especially if good, can be coerced to do either good or evil, either by a good spirit or an evil one.

Ex quibus patet quod longe differt allicere vel necessitare voluntatem, sive increatam sive creatam; potest velle volitum, set quod cogatur ad volendum est contradiccio in terminis. Natura autem creata allicitur per quedam sibi primo displicencia, set in racione boni movencia, ut demum gratis eliciat actum suum; ad cuius eleccionem necessitatur necessitate ex supposicione; ut patet ex dictis tractatu proximo.

To induce a free agent is not the same as to compel him; the latter is a contradiction in terms. We are induced to do right by motives which, though not at first pleasant, attract us as being good.

Ex istis patet quid est libertas et in quo consistit. Cum enim omne bonum, in quantum huiusmodi, sit liberum, et omne ens sit bonum, sequitur quod omne ens sit liberum, et per consequens bonitas rei est eius libertas. Nam omne bonum incausatum est active pure liberum, et omne bonum causatum est passive liberum de quanto libere causatur. Et propter istam vehemenciam naturaliter appetit libertatem, ut patet de avibus et omnibus violentatis, que appetunt oppositum violencie. Et racione illius universalis libertatis, quelibet res mundi causat modo suo rectitudinem. Si autem loquamur de libertate activa nature create volutive, patet quod illa

All beings are free, in so far as they are beings, freedom and goodness being equivalent terms.

Birds in cages show a great desire for liberty;

this tendency makes for the good of the world.

This is passive liberty: active liberty belongs

1. intr'is *pro* interminis MS. 4. nult *pro* vult MS. 8. luc' *pro* Lincolniensis MS. 10. bonum MS. 15. a *deest* MS. 18. am *pro* bonum MS. 23. volūi volitum MS. 32. voluntas *pro* bonitas MS.

est passio nature volutive, et ita subiective in illa, sicut risibilitas in homine, et in deo formaliter et effective.

only to natures capable of choice.

Et si queratur signum in quo cognoscitur, dicitur quod in hoc, quod quelibet talis natura potest placenter servare iusticiam: et non consistit in latitudine, nec suscipit magis aut minus, sicut et illibertas vel servitus opposita, nec tollitur talis libertas nisi per peccatum; nec potest in toto tolli, ut dictum est superius, quia potencia in quantum volutiva potest ad minimum libere velle bonum et libere nolle malum, etsi sit peccato ligata quoad multa que debet in particulari diligere. Qui enim est liberior ad amandum est simpliciter liberior, et qui plus necessitatur ad odiendum naturam bonam est illiberior, ut patet [de] dampnatis.

In what then does it consist? In the possibility of loving what is right; which can neither increase nor diminish, as can its opposite, the lack of liberty. Even sin cannot destroy it completely; but whoever is less capable of loving goodness is less free.

Ex predictis patet ulterius quod homo coruptus interius, cum corrupto corpore pregravatus, illibertatur quodammodo, nedum ad actus mediate procedentes a voluntate, set quoad facilitatem eliciendi multos actus proprios voluntatis. Patet illud ex hoc, quod corpus tale vel homo exterior cruciari potest multipliciter calore, frigore, fame, siti, et aliis tediis infinitis: set tanta est compassio istorum ad invicem pro tempore quo sunt eadem persona, quod oportet superiorem compati inferiori. Igitur contingit animum retardari ab actu volendi circa proprium et per se bonum, propter occupacionem circa talia sensibilia. Et nedum hoc, set tanta est rebellio sensus ad invicem, quod sensus corporis quodammodo necessitat animum ad sensum illicitum, specialiter in illis qui non mortificant appetitus bestiales per legem mentis.

And not only this freedom of deed is diminished, but the will itself is hindered in the production of its own acts. If the body suffers, the mind is taken up by its pains; the will is turned away from the tendency toward what is good in itself, the senses exerting an influence almost amounting to necessity.

Tota ista sentencia patet per apostolum Ro. 7° (ubi primo dicit in prima parte capituli: *venumdatus sub peccato*): *Non enim quod volo bonum hoc, set quod odi*

Rom. VII, 14, 15.

This doctrine is that of Saint Paul,

14. de *deest* MS. 15, 16. interior MS. 32. prima nᵉ carᵗ MS.; *ib.* venumdate MS.

5. *Non consistit.* I strongly suspect that several sentences are missing towards the end of this paragraph. Wyclif begins the sentence by saying that liberty, as the possibility of loving good, can neither increase nor diminish, and ends by using the comparative *illiberior*. Perhaps the missing words explain what he evidently means: that the readiness or facility to love good *is* susceptible of being greater or less, and is also called liberty in another sense, whilst its contrary is spiritual slavery or bondage. This clause should, I think, come after the words *magis et minus*.

who shows how the passions make us leave undone what we should and do what we should not do, even as regards the assent of the will itself.

And pointing out the righteousness of the law of God, which our reason says we should obey,

he asserts that there is another and contrary law, by which we are enthralled to sin;

and moved by the consideration of this slavery and weakness, he cries: "Who shall deliver me? God's grace."

All this refers firstly to the time before, and then to the time after the giving of grace.

malum, illud facio. Ecce rebellio exterioris hominis ad interiorem, cum illud quod homo interior extra passionem dictat esse faciendum in passione, dimittitur in malum; quod extra passionem quum est compos mentis dictat omittendum, allectus peccato et passione prosequitur; nec solum quoad opera extrinseca, set quoad actus intrinsecos, inclinatur animus ad assensum nepharium. Ideo geminat apostolus eadem verba transpositis terminis. Sicut enim negacio bone volucionis. . . . Secundo principaliter concludit apostolus spiritualem bonitatem legis date, cuius occasione male accepta generatur peccatum. Nam secundum interiorem hominem pro mensura qua gracia et racio dominantur, iudicat esse illi legi obidiendum. Cum igitur sano iudicio, et non infirmo, sit standum, patet quod legi dei et non legi carnis vel membrorum sit obediendum. Ideo dicit: *Condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem* Rom. VII, 22, 23. *aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis mee, et captivantem me in lege peccati.* Tripliciter principaliter apostolus considerans servilem captivacionem nature humane, vendentis se diabolo pro brevi dileccione sensus in cibo vetito, et impotentem liberacionis a seipsa, cum sit spiritus vadens et non rediens, prorumpit in hec verba: Infelix ego homo! quis. . . . Gracia dei per Ihesum Christum dominum nostrum. Set caveat | legens textum apostoli, quod non referat ista dicta ad 74b[a] eandem mensuram; tunc enim involveret se in contradiccione manifesta: nam pro mensura pro qua captivatur homo lege peccati ante graciam a Ihesu Christo factam servit diabolo, set pro tempore gracie unificantis et liberantis servit deo.

Objections. (1) If the body can force the soul to sin, it is sin no longer.

Contra predicta arguitur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod mens humana videtur necessitari ad peccandum ex infeccione corporis et aliis extrinsecis allectivis; et per consequens et contingit libertatem tolli totaliter, et animum inculpabiliter peccare, cum deus non potest quicquam obligare ad sibi inpossibile.

(2) Take A as the first act of free will. When *all* the conditions necessary for

Item, posito quod *a* sit primus actus liber libertate contradiccionis, quero utrum, positis omnibus previis ad produccionem *a*, sequitur *a*, vel non: si non, tunc non

1. malum odio MS. 7. extrinsecos MS. 8. generat MS. 9. *no gap after* volutionis MS. 16. quod delector MS. 18. legem alteram MS. 22. in ponentem MS. 24. *no gap after* quis MS. 25. autem dei MS.

sunt capta omnia previe requisita, cum quodlibet causatum habet causam. Ex qua formaliter sequitur iuxta dicta, si sic (cum illa previa non sunt in libera potestate producentis *a* actum, eo quod *a* est primum liberum causatum), sequitur quod nec *a* actus sit in libera potestate potencie date, nec formaliter consequens.

Item, posse in contradictoria est magna libertas, set non intelligitur de beatis, et remanet libertas solum ad unam parte[m] contradiccionis: igitur in illis minuitur libertas. Assumptum patet ex hoc quod omne *posse* est bonum; vel deus vel donum dei; et per consequens, cum potencia libera sit eo liberior, quo extencior ad plura subiecta, sequitur quod tollendo libertatem solum ad alteram, minuitur libertas, non augetur. Contradiccionem namque claudit quod compositum ex duobus excedatur ab altero secundum racionem sue composicionis, vel quod aliquid crescat per solam ablacionem; ut beatus non esset tam liber ad producendum actum meritorium, si fuisset continue confirmatus, non ponens in oppositum. Tunc enim, propter defectum libertatis non meretur, sicut nec mere[n]tur beati in patria, nec dampnati in tartaro.

Ad primum dicitur quod consequencia non valet, quilibet enim peccans est necessitatus ad peccandum necessitate ex supposicione, cum qua stat summá contingencia et potencia libera ad oppositum, ac carencia cuiuscunque causacionis animi: ut patet ex predictis proximo tractatu. Ideo modicus color est tam cito concludere ex tali necessitate defectum meriti aut demeriti. Necessitacio enim talis non ponit nisi disposicionem primam, cui repugnat non peccare, quam oportet quemlibet ponentem respectiva et statum hominum in via, ponere. Nemo namque dubitat quin contingit hominem

its production are present, must A follow, or not? If it may not follow, then some of the conditions must be absent, or you would have an effect without a cause. If A *must* follow, then A is not produced freely.

The Blessed in Heaven are able to choose only good, or evil; their liberty is therefore less than ours, for this liberty is greater; the more objects it has, the greater the freedom is.

A part cannot be greater than the whole, nor can anything become greater by diminution alone.

Answers.

(1) The body obliges the soul to sin, but only by a hypothetical necessity.

Under certain conditions, not to sin is impossible: and these conditions are those of man in his present state;

8. hoc *pro* non MS.; *ib.* a *pro* de MS. 18. deus *pro* beatus MS. 21. meretur MS. 22. int'tari MS. 25. non necessitate MS. 28. non *pro* tam MS.

25. *Ex supposicione.* Modern Scholastics would call this moral necessity: as when many people skate on very slippery ice, somebody must fall; or when there is a winning number in a lottery, somebody must draw it, but no one must in particular. Wyclif's language, however *(cum preordinancia dei . . . .)* might authorize us to think he means absolute, or at least physical necessity: but since he has just strongly affirmed liberty *(potencia libera ad oppositum)*, I think this is the right interpretation.

and evidently, if we consider temptations and our own propensities, the ordinance of God, and all things together, we have to conclude that human beings must sin.

esse tam pronum ad peccandum et tam fortiter instigatum cum preordinancia dei eterna de sua pena et amocione iuvamentorum ad resistendum temptacioni, cum terminis qui constituunt causam completam peccati, quod non stat cum istis ipsum non peccare. Verumptamen, cum ista contingentissime sunt, patet quod facilime potest quilibet, quantumlibet induratus vel eciam indampnatus, non peccare.

Thus nothing can absolutely destroy free will; nor can we imagine a case in which it is simply impossible to resist temptation. The influences of the heavens may dispose a man's body to sin, but his soul also has influence over it, a nobler and a more powerful one. The supposition of this influence of the stars being increased ad infinitum, so that a man could not avoid sin, implies a contradiction in terms: with God's grace, he could always avoid it.

Ex quo sequitur quod claudit contradiccionem libertatem simpliciter tolli ab aliquo. Claudit eciam contradiccionem aliquod absolutum poni, ex quo sequitur quamcunque datam creaturam non posse resistere temptacioni. Quamvis enim homo secundum corpus, quod est pars mundi, sit mobilis et inclinabilis ab influencia celesti ad actum quemlibet inordinatum, quia tamen est mobilis ab anima propria, et sic a duplici motore, quorum anima est vel par in potencia vel potencior ac nobilior specialius, quia motiva corporis proprii privati; non esset possibile celum ad tantum influere in corpus quod anima non possit movere ipsum ad oppositum. Ideo vani sunt casus quibus ponitur potencia celi vel intelligencie moventis ad actum aliquem crescere ex omnipotencia dei in infinitum, vel tantum quousque anima vel ex deperdicione sue potencie vel cremento potencie orbis, non possit evitare peccatum. Quilibet enim talis casus claudit contradiccionem formalem. Disposicio autem potest esse in corpore, quod anima non habet sufficienciam propinquam cum illis paribus ad resistendum. Semper tamen manet potens in oppositum ex naturali potencia ad vitandum quodlibet peccatum, adiuvante tamen gracia dei, influencia que non potest deficere.

This controversy is a quibble. Nothing can tempt a man beyond resistance.

Altercacio itaque istius materie stat pro magna | parte (74b[b]) in methaphisica et logica de sensu composito et sensu diviso; et a pari non est possibile mundum, carnem, vel diabolum ad tantum temptare hominem ad pec-

17. inpotencior MS. 32. Alteracio MS.

21. *Casus.* Catholic theologians admit that there may be cases when a passion is so violent that an act, outwardly wrong, must take place; but then it is not a free act, the mind being unable to act; and so it is not a sin. 33. *Composito—diviso.* Man is not free *in sensu composito,* i. e. supposing the happening of *all* that goes to make up his mind; but *in sensu diviso,* i. e. if any of these requisites should happen, but not all together, he is free.

candum, quod non possit resistere. Oportet enim deum facere cum omni temptacione proventum, ut nemo fiat adeo indispositus quod non possit resistere temptacioni, vel quod fiat cum aliquibus circumstanciis insufficiens sine culpa suam insufficienciam demerente.

God cannot allow it, nor would He allow a man ever to give way, if the man himself had not been undeserving.

Unde Lincolniensis declarat quomodo diabolus et vicia sunt satis forcia ad detinendum prostratum et eum amplius deprimendum; cuius racio. et omne peccatum, est corrupcio, et quoddam *non esse*. Set non est possibile augere a *non esse* ad *esse*, nisi quod per se est essencia indefectibilis; igitur inpossibile est prostratum vicio erigi, nisi a dei infinita potencia erigatur. Set cum peccando a deo per se stante receditur, cum peccatum dividit inter deum et naturam prostratam, non mirum si nitens erigi a quantumlibet exili potencia retundatur, quia tali voragini depresso deficit fundamentum cui innixus subsisteret. Ideo claudit contradiccionem taliter prostratum erigi, nisi infinita potencia sustinente naturam, preveniente per graciam. Ad deiiciendum vero erectum, per se stanti innixum, sunt omnes hostes debilissimi, quia cum nemo stat erectus nisi in virtute per se stantis, in quem non possunt coruptibilitas et vicium, manifestum est quod in racionalibus (ipsis gratis ac vecorditer se reddendo) et propter vim tenendi et retundendi prostratum peccatis, diabolus dicitur *fortis armatus* in evangelio, Luc. 11; et Iob 41, dicitur quod non est super terram potestas que comparetur ei.

Luc. XI, 21.
Iob. XLI, 24.

The devil is strong enough to keep us down when we are down, and to bring us lower yet, for all sin is a non-entity, and it is impossible for non-entity to become entity by itself; and when we have separated ourselves from Infinite Being by sin, the slightest attack throws us prostrate. But when we draw our strength from Him that stands by His own power, it is only by our willing surrender and the power of holding us when we have fallen, that the devil can be called strong.

Nec sunt talia dicta solum predicabilia, [sed] scolastice demonstrabilia convenientibus in significacionibus terminorum. Ut sic: inpossibile est creaturam superare spiritum unitum deo, nisi deo ipsam deserente; set inpossibile est deserere talem spiritum, nisi ipse prius naturaliter deserat deum suum: igitur inpossibile est creaturam superare talem spiritum, nisi ipse prius naturaliter deserat deum suum. Maior patet ex hoc quod superare sic spiritum unitum, modo quo dicitur, Io 17, quod fideles *sint unum* in deo, sicut persone unum sunt, esset superare deum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod oportet culpam precedere penam; et hinc dixerunt antiqui doctores concorditer quod nemo leditur nisi ledatur a se ipso, ut patet in tractatu Jo. Criso-

Io. XVII, 11, 21, 22.

This is not merely preachers' talk; it can be demonstrated. No creature can overcome a spirit united to God, unless God abandon him; this is a punishment which must be preceded by a fault.

8. est *pro* et MS. 12. deo infinite potencie erigitur MS. 22. co4t MS. 23. racionalem MS. 27. potestas super terram MS. 28. p'e&lia MS.; *ib.* sed *deest* MS. 31. deus *before* ipsam MS.

If then, having determined to resist temptation, we yield to it, we undoubtedly have in the meantime sinned, either by omission or by commission, and this sin has been punished by the withdrawal of grace.

stomi de ista materia. Unde quelibet catholicus potest considerare de ista veritate pro respectu quod si viator extra tempus temptacionis statuit temptacioni resistere et tempore temptacionis succumbit culpabiliter temptatori, suum peccatum precedens indubie est in causa, vel omittendo quod debet facere, vei faciendo interim quod non debet. Patet ex hoc quod omnis peccati vel pene eius est voluntas creata causa precedens. Ideo, si talis indisponitur, ad penam peccati sui est quod indisponitur.

Even in the impossible case of a tempter having infinite power, he would have to overcome God, unless the soul chose to desert Him; though otherwise even the weakest tempter must easily succeed. To suppose God neutral between man and his foe, is to know nothing of God, who dwells in the free will of His creature, and can only be driven thence by its own act.

Idem igitur esset deum creare temptatorem infinitum ponentem ad superandum sic deo innixum, et facere temptatorem niti superare deum. Ideo, etsi deus, secundum vanos casus inpossibiles, creaverit quantumlibet potentem temptatorem, nunquam posset superare mentem deo unitam, nisi superavit ipsum deum, et per consequens non posset separare ipsam a deo, nisi gratis voluerit; quia sic separare esset deum et animum superare. Et si ponatur eum subtrahere graciam suam a tali animo, vere et facile esset exilem temptatorem superare, et necessitate, animum sic desertum; quia sine gracia domini nostri Ihesu Christi nichil potest facere. Ideo fingentes quod deus potest dimittere duas naturas repugnare sine hoc quod ipse apponat partem suam, ipsis pure derelictis nature proprie, sunt nimis rudes ad recte sapiendum de deo. In hoc igitur cognoscitur creature racionalis libertas, et habet naturam divinam pro domicilio, in quo potest quiescere sine possibilitate |
expulsionis a quocunque hoste possibili, nisi gratis velit 75a[a]
amittere abeundo.

(2) There is a complete cause, which posited, A must happen. But this cause need not be beyond the sphere of free will. Call A the primal act by which God wills that

Ad secundum dicitur quod habet causam completam, ex qua posita ipsum sequitur, et sic in alico ordine nature est obiectum voluccionis vel alterius respectus ipso prius. Nec sequitur, *si* a *sit primus actus vel prima volucio contingens habens causam ipsum necessitantem, quod illa causa non sit in potestate libera producentis* a *actum, ut primus actus contingens.* Vel verius: prima

4. temptari *pro* temptatori MS. 6. dicit *pro* debent MS. 11. deus MS. 18. enim *pro* eum MS. 21. vel *pro* nichil MS. 22. surgentes *pro* fingentes MS.

22. *Duas naturas.* The animal and the rational in man. 36. *Verius.* I have given the best explanation I could of this passage, according to Wyclif's doctrine, as already made known; but it is by no means clear that I have hit on the right corrections and punctuation.

volucio contingens in deo, que est relacio racionis, est volucio qua deus vult in communi creaturam esse. Et illa, significata per *a*, causatur a deo et a communi ad quamlibet creaturam (quod auctor de causis vocat *esse* creatum a deo obiective) *a* volucione eternaliter precedere creaturam causantem et ipsam efficienter recausare, ut philosophus ponit exemplum, 2° phisicorum 30, de labore causante sanitatem, et [e]contra.

Created Being shall exist; A is caused equally by God and by the Universal 'Created Being', which itself is efficiently caused by A.

Et ista videtur esse sentencia doctoris profundi, parte 34, primi capituli primi libri, ubi querenti quare deus voluit producere mundum, respondet quod non quia voluit, quia cum *a* sit prima volucio libera contingens, si deus causat *a* quia vult, tunc eadem volucio prior; et rediret eadem questio de illa volucione, et sic infinite. Ideo (ut dicit) causa efficiens volucionis prime in deo est potencia libera divina. Causa autem finalis est finis quem deus sibi prescivit in agendo; et tot sunt fines medii talium volucionum, quot bona ex illis proveniunt; ut dicitur alibi de predestinacione et reprobacione dei.

Bradwardine seems to think so, saying: Why did God choose to produce the world? Not because He chose; the efficient cause of the first volition is God's Power to act; the final cause is the object foreseen in His Mind. This relation of the volition to its object is caused by the latter.

In istis tamen non assero quod fuit intencionis sue sic dicere, set hoc puto consequenter dicendum, quod volucio que est relacio racionis eterna et contingens, terminata ad creaturam volitam, causatur ab illa, ut dictum est de divina sciencia. Ideo querenti quare deus producit mundum et naturam pertinenter respondetur: quia vult. Et ulterius dicitur quod illius volucionis contingentis [causa] est volucio dei absolute necessitas; stabitur ad volucionem qua deus vult se esse, cuius non est causa querenda, cum ipsa sit divina essencia. Et de illa loquitur Augustinus in auctoritatibus superius allegatis. Et si queratur causa adequata volucionis contingentis qua deus vult formaliter mundum esse, dicitur ut supra, quod deus et mundus est causa adequata huius volucionis. Ymmo mundus est in genere suo completa cum huius volucione, ideo, querenti quare deus vult mundum producere, dicitur quod ideo quia bonum est ipsum esse productum a deo, et illud bonum est iste mundus, ut patet alibi.

And now to the question: *Why does God produce the world?* the answer: *Because He chooses* is reasonable. This volition is contingent; its cause is the necessary volition of God by which He exists; this being God Himself, we can inquire no farther. God on one hand, the world (to be created) on the other, make up the cause of His contingent volition, which He produces, it being good that the world should exist.

4. causam *pro* creaturam MS. 5. ab uno sub *pro* a deo objective MS. 8. e *deest* MS. 26. n^e *pro* naturam MS. 28. causa *deest* MS. 36. volucionis MS.

The sophisms which assert that in this doctrine a thing exists before itself, vanish: two beings may mutually cause each other. Since the act of God by which the Holy Spirit proceeds, is free, yet not contingent, none of those that are contingent are primal acts of His free will. They are necessary indeed, but because God necessitates Himself to these acts. They are eternal, but do not need that the creature should be coeternal.

Et quoad argucias quibus logice arguitur quod idem sit naturaliter prius seipso, dictum est superius quod non habent colorem, si aliqua causarent se. Causa prime volucionis contingentis in creata est simpliciter in potestate dei, et satis libera, sicut effectus libere productus dicitur liber; ut totus mundus dictus est superius esse liber de quanto deus libere ipsum producit. Nec est racio quare dacio pecunie foret libera, sicut et ipsum donum, quin per idem quilibet effectus quoad voluntatem dei. Quilibet igitur effectus dei infinitus preceditur a volucione dei qua producit spiritum sanctum; ideo nulla volucio contingens est primus actus liber in deo. Et conformiter, sicut deus necessitat se ad producendum quemlibet effectum suum, non absolute, set ex supposicione, sic necessitat se ad premiandum quemlibet predestinatum, et puniendum quemlibet prescitum, sicut in assimili dictum est superius deum obligare se de congruo ex promissione graciosa. Et per idem eternaliter obligat se ex ordinancia qua eternaliter conscivit taliter benefacere creature: ista tamen obligacio non requirit creaturam coevam obliganti.

Therefore, though God eternally renders such and such an act of His creature necessary, it does not follow that this act is not free, since freedom and necessity are not opposed. God's act of creation — and much more its own act — is caused by the creature, and in its power; not that it can in any way change that act, since it only causes it *quà* object. Though I doubt whether 'in its power' is a proper

Et per hoc patet solucio ad illud commune argumentum de libertate cuiuslibet actus voluntatis create. Videtur enim quod, si deus antecedenter necessitat creaturam ad illum actum, quod ipse non sit liber; set non sequitur, cum summa et absoluta necessitas stat cum summa libertate; quare igitur non necessitas ex supposicione cum libertate creata? Nec est putandum quod volucio dei eterna, qua deus vult creaturam racionalem velle, non sit in potestate illius creature, quia volucio qua deus vult illam creaturam esse est ab illa creatura causata: multo magis igitur volucio propria. Nec sequitur ex isto quod creatura potest mutare volucionem, ipsam generando aut | corrumpendo, quia nec hoc potest 75a[b]
deus, set creatura potest obiective causare illam. Difficultas igitur stat in hoc verbo, *potestas*, utrum concedi debet volucionem dei esse in potestate alicuius. Et videtur michi quod non, cum potestas dicit potenciam dominativam, set deus non est eternaliter dominus,

3. nisi MS. 4. intt'o *pro* in creata MS. 10. infinitum MS. 19. contra *pro* qua MS. 34. homo? *pro* hoc MS. 38. possibilitas MS.

2. *Prius.* The world as *to be created*, induces the volition of God to create it.

igitur non habet potestatem super volucione sua, set solum super creaturas. Maior patet volventi scripturas sequentes de potestate, quarum quelibet, si non fallor, intelligit per potestatem dominativam potenciam; et sic intelligit Augustinus, primo *Retractacionum* 22°, 3° *De libero arbitrio* 3°, et in "*De spiritu. et litera,*" 26. Ex istis patet, cum homo sit dominus omnium actuum sue voluntatis, quod illi sunt proprie in eius potestate; non sic tamen, quin habeat dominum superiorem de quo tenet suum dominium.

expression, since to have power over anyone' means cöexistence, according to many passages of Scripture. Man has his acts in his own power, but he owes this power to his Overlord.

Patet 2° quod non sequitur, si consequencia sit bona, et antecedens non sit in potestate mea, quod nec consequens: nam, ut sophiste arguunt, illa consequencia est bona: *si ego sum asinus ego nolo loqui*, et antecedens non est in potestate mea, set consequens, tam signum quam significatum, ut pono. Set particularius exemplatur de ista consequencia reali, *deus vult me diligere ipsum: igitur ego diligo ipsum.* Consequens est in potestate mea, et antecedens, cum sit eternum, nec est in potestate mea nec in potestate dei. Uterque tamen nostrum habet potenciam ipsum causandi, et causat modo suo. Et patet falsitas regule assumpte. Et minor color est concludere, si antecedens sit in potestate mea, tunc et consequens; vel si antecedens non sit in potestate mea, tunc nec consequens, vel si consequens non sit in potestate mea tunc nec suum antecedens; etsi convertantur. Qui autem utitur potestate simpliciter quod potencia, equivocat in termino.

Some say: 'If a hypothetical proposition be true, and the truth of the antecedent is not in my power, neither is that of the consequent', but this is false. Take, for instance: *If I am an ass, I will not speak.* Or: *God wills that I love Him: therefore I love Him.* In both cases the consequent is in my power, but not the antecedent. But we must not confuse *power* with mere *faculty*.

Ad tercium dicitur quod nulla libertas est eo maior quo potest in contradictoria. Verumptamen omnem libertatem consequitur tamquam passio "suum subiectum posse in sua contradictoria". Ideo sic posse est signum libertatis. Libertas enim est passio nature volutive, sicut et incorporeitas. Ideo quicquam est causa talis nature est causa quare ipsa est libera; nec est alia et alia risibilitas in homine, ut est alius et alius actus ridendi; set sicut eadem libertate deus producit spiritum sanctum et quantumlibet creaturam, sic eadem libertate qua homo in via peccat, in patria fruitur trinitate. Set ut difficultas gravetur, restringatur libertas ad disposicionem

(3) The liberty of contradiction is indeed the greatest of all, and being an essential attribute of the will, can never be changed; the same freedom with which man sins here below, is that with which he enjoys bliss.

4. po[a3] *pro* potenciam MS. 14. volo MS. 16. particularem MS. 24. consequens *pro* antecedens MS. 25. et *pro* nec MS. 34. incor[tas] = incorruptibilitas (?) MS. 38. quantum MS.

But if we understand by liberty a readiness to tend towards our ultimate end, this is an accident which differs from the liberty of contradiction; and the state of a man prone to sin is rather bondage than liberty. The possibility of sinning belongs to freedom; the act does not. Christ on earth was the freest of all possible men; yet nothing could influence him for evil.

prompte tendendi in finem naturalem nature volutive. Sic enim sumitur libertas, ut patet ex dictis. Set, cum natura divina non potest habere talem disposicionem accidentalem, patet quod in deo non est talis libertas: et hoc est ex eius summitate qua non potest ligari vel indisponi, cum ipse sit principium et finis quem omnis natura ultimate intendit. Sic igitur intelligendo libertatem pro disposicione libere tendendi in finem, patet quod talis est accidentalis creature, et variatur in eadem creatura secundum variacionem finium. Set nulla talis est libertas contradiccionis, cum nulla una sit disposicio ad con[tra]dictoria. Disposicio, vel pocius indisposicio, qua homo est pronus ad peccandum, non est sic libertas, set pocius illibertas. Libere tamen potest homo peccare, quia potencia peccandi est bona, set illibere peccat. Et patet quod nemo est liberior propter hoc quod potest vagari per mundum, tendendo in illa que abducunt a suo bono finali. Ymmo, ille homo qui libere potest tendere in illum finem sine abduccione possibili per peccatum est liberimus homo possibilis, qui est Christus deus noster, mensura cuilibet alterius libertatis.

The Blessed are quite free from all snares of the enemy; and any man, if armed with virtues and specially protected by grace, is all the more free on that account.

Ex quo patet quod beati in patria [sunt] potentes tendere in finem suum, sine insidiis affectatis; et informatus virtutibus disponentibus ad credendum, et inimicis in sublunaribus resistendum, cum speciali assistencia protegentis, de tanto haberet disposicionem magis liberam ad viandum. Vera enim libertas crescit in potencia vel sufficiencia innitendi primo principio; set in patria manebit eadem potencia que in via, et disposicio vel sufficiencia amplior; ideo libertas maior.

Thus the Blessed possess this liberty of contradiction as much as they ever did, but their state renders a fall impossible;

Patet igitur quod beati possunt et omnia contradictoria in que unquam poterant, cum deus non potest tollere hoc ab illis: verumptamen sunt positi in statu cui repugnat quod demereant. U[l]terius etiam patet quod libertas beati non est restriccior quam libertas vie, quia

17. domum *pro* mundum MS. 20. inpossibilis MS. 22. sunt *deest* MS. 27. t^e^fcat *pro* crescit MS.

34. *Ulterius.* The Blessed could sin, if they chose; but their union with God and repugnance to all that displeases Him renders it impossible for them to choose to sin. Thus in this life a man has the liberty of contradiction, v. g. of choosing between eating and not eating human flesh; and the fact that he would far rather die of hunger than be a cannibal is by no means a bondage: he *cannot*, because he *will not.*

beatus secure fruitur creatore et quodammodo in ipso utitur qualibet creatura absque formidine hostium, absque servitute fatigativa vel timida, set cum plena securitate | 75b[a] coregendi eternaliter cum suo domino, quo plus absolvitur a servicio exactivo quo dominium quod habet est pulcrius, et quo in minori timore est positus quoad forisfacturam vel offencionem suo domino. In patria autem non est servicium exactivum, set ibi servare est frui, sine mixtione violencie vel doloris. Dominium eciam, cum sit beatitudo, est habitus omnium bonorum in statu plene perfecto, cum non oportet timere domui sue ab estu vel frigore, nec eruginem, furem vel tineam; cum omnis violencia, tam quoad corpus, quam quoad animam, suspenditur in beatis. In via autem cum gaudio quocunque dolor vel violencia miscetur; ideo non est plenum gaudium. Cum autem beatus, adherens deo, unus spiritus est cum eo, non mirum si excluditur timor servilis de boni perdicione, de delicti punicione, vel laborum fatigacione.

which takes nothing from their freedom, for they can do all they like without fear of offending their Lord,

or of losing their possessions.

In this world there is no perfect joy, for it is always mingled with some sorrow.

Est igitur in patria vera libertas, sine coaccione vel servitute contraria; nec est putandum quod talia sunt improprie accepta preter intencionem recte loquencium de libertate, set propriissime ad cuius avariciam libertates alie, de quibus loquatur penales, transmittuntur. Unde fatuum est putare quod libertas vie componitur ex sufficiencia vel disposicione ad peccandum in disposicione ad non peccandum. Stultum eciam est credere quod pura creatura racionalis potest per beatitudinem sic disponi quod non potest peccare, et per consequens quod deus potest producere angelum vel hominem, non deum, qui propter confirmacionem careat potencia secundum quam potest peccare, vel libere non peccare. Unde beati non ideo non merentur, quia sunt confirmati, vel quia non possunt peccare, vel quia privantur

It is foolish to suppose that liberty implies a sinful disposition, or that beatitude takes away even the fundamental possibility of sinning from a creature.

The reason why the Saints do not merit is not because they cannot

3. pelua MS. 21. putandus MS. 24. transmutantur (?) MS.

23. *Avariciam* is certainly wrong, but I can make no guess as to the right word. I think Wyclif means that liberty and servitude are here taken in the precise legal sense (*penales* suppl. *leges*) from which the other significations are derived. But this is the merest conjecture. 28. *Pura creatura.* God would not be God, if He could sin; the Blessed, if they could sin, would be blessed no longer; but beatitude is not essential to their nature, as Deity is to God's. 33. *Confirmati.* The Apostles and some other Saints are believed to have been 'con-

sin, or are confirmed in grace; for Christ and His Mother could not sin, and many Saints were confirmed in grace. The Blessed have just the bare possibility of sin; if they do not merit, it is because they already have their reward to the fullest possible extent. It is probable that Christ merited bliss both for Himself and for us; and that the Saints will merit until the Day of Judgment.

aliqua libertate, quia cum confirmacione stat meritum: ut patet de christo et matre sua cum multis aliis sanctis. Beati eciam possunt summe contingenter peccare, nec diminuitur eis de libertate. Ideo, racio quare non possunt mereri secundum illum statum est quia meritum, ut huiusmodi dicitur relative et antecedenter ad premium; set beati habent secundum ultimum capacitatis sue premium; ideo non merentur sibi secundum illum statum premium ulterius. Ideo probabiliter dicitur quod Christus, nedum nobis, set sibi, meruit beatitudinem anime; eciam sancti usque ad diem iudicii merentur tam sibi quam nobis beatitudinem plenam quam habent postquam plene receperant in unione plenas dotes corporis et anime. Usque illuc enim retardantur quodammodo a sua beatitudine secundum beatum Augustinum. Cum ergo meritum sit via ad finaliter consequendum, patet quod fine habito ipsum cessat, et cetera.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

It is objected that our mind is called free only because it is capable of choosing one out of two contradictories.

Contra predicta arguitur ex hoc quod potencia racionalis ideo dicitur libera, quia valet ad opposita, ut patet 9° metaphisice 10: cui sentencie tam philosophi quam theologi contestantur. Igitur non ex pura potestate tendendo in unum finem causatur vel cognoscitur libertas. Confirmatur per doctorem profundum, libro 3,

16. *Before* cum. *a small gap* MS. 19. Ca^{m} 4^{m} *in marg.* MS. 21. dei *pro* dicitur MS.

firmed in grace'. This state is not necessarily of utter sinlessness, like Christ on earth; but such slight sins as they may have committed from the time of their 'confirmation', were at once repented of, and formed no obstacle to their salvation. Of this grace some were, and some were not aware. 11. *Iudicii.* This doctrine is not accepted, though I am not sure whether it is condemned, by the Catholic Church. There was a controversy between St. Augustine and St. Jerome, the latter believing — and his opinion has been generally followed — that the Blessed enter Heaven at once, if their souls are quite pure. St. Augustine thought that they 'slept' until Doomsday; and as there may be merit during sleep, this seems to be what Wyclif alludes to. But Augustine's view would come in conflict with the practice of the Invocation of the Saints.

capitulo 4°, qui ex sentencia illius dicti philosophi describit libertatem contradiccionis sub hac forma. "Libertas activa, qua posita, cum omnibus disposicionibus necessariis ad agendum libere potest agere et non agere, sic quod non sequitur de necessitate quod agat, set hoc quod altera pars contradiccionis equaliter potest stare". Actum eciam liberum contradictorie sic describit, quod "est actus proprius potencie libere, qua posita, cum omnibus disposicionibus naturaliter previis actui, libere potest produci vel non produci"; id [est], non necessario sequitur actum produci, set hec et altera pars contradiccionis equaliter potest stare. Et istis innititur, probando quod nichil citra deum potest necessitare voluntatem creatam, ut patet 2° libro, ca° 3°. Et videtur conformis racio hoc probare, qualiter probavit quod nichil potest cogere voluntatem. Et 2° libro, ca. 30°, multiplicat quasi innumerabilia argumenta contra Pelagianos ad probandum quod nichil posterius deo est causa volucionis divine.

This is clear from Bradwardine's definition: when all conditions are posited, our will is yet able to choose either of two contradictory things.

Nothing less than God can render an act of the will necessary,

and only God can cause the act of His own will.

Confirmatur primo ex hoc quod volucio divina est distancior a quacunque causancia tempore quam est volucio terreni domini a quacunque causancia sui servi. Set quilibet dominus potest libere, quomodocunque sibi placuerit, sine concausancia sui servi, sicut econtra servus invito domino. Igitur, per locum a maiori, deus potest velle quomodocunque. A simili deducitur communiter quod deus est dominus suorum actuum, eo quod liberius vult quam homo, qui non libere vellet adversarium sue volucionis; igitur multo magis deus.

Firstly, because God's volition is more distant from the creature than that of any earthly lord from that of his slave. This lord does not need his slave for the performance of an act of volition: so neither does God.

75b[b] Item, deus ordinat volucionem suam | gracia finis, sicut et ordinat quod volucio creature sit sibi conformis: igitur, sicut subiacet sue ordinancie, sic et subiacet sue potestati. Non enim videtur potestatem includere servitutem, quia (Dan. 7°) dicitur potestas dei potestas eterna, et tamen non est servitus eterna. Et diabolus ac multe alie creature dicuntur in scriptura habere potestatem que non sonat in dominium, set pocius in servitutem:

Dan. VII, 14.

Then God is so free that He even permits opposition to His will.

If God ordains His act towards any object, He also ordains that this object (the human will) should conform to His will, and be subject to his power.

10. est *deest* MS. 15. quat *pro* qualiter MS. 18. Pelagianum MS.
22. ꝺeu *pro* domini MS. 29. adūaret[a] MS.

3. *Cum omnibus.* This definition given by the *Doctor profundus* was afterwards destined to become very famous in the quarrel between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, the latter taking it up, developing and defending it with all their might.

Answer. 'What is capable of opposite acts' (Aristotle's definition) is too loose to define freedom properly. Brutes are capable of opposite acts, now moving, now resting. So even of things inanimate. The same degree of heat warms one man and chills another. God can use any natural qualities to opposite ends; therefore all things in nature are capable of opposite acts.

igitur dictum de potestate capit calumpniam. Quantum ad istam proposicionem philosophi, videtur logicis quod sit nimis nuda ad fundandum discripcionem potencie contradictorie libere, cum potencia bruti valet ad nunc movendum, ad nunc contrarie quiescendum, et sic de quotlibet contrariis et contradictorie oppositis in que potest; et ita est de omni potencia naturali mixti vel simplicis, in tantum quod eadem virtus que hunc sanat, hunc infirmat; idem calor hunc calefacit, hunc infrigidat, et ita de aliis virtutibus quibuscunque. Et, ut breviter concludatur, quibuscunque virtutibus potest deus uti ad fines aliquos, ille virtutes valent ad eosdem fines. Set omni virtute creata potest deus libere uti ad fines quantumlibet oppositos; igitur valent ad fines oppositos. Et sicut natura terminatur ad unum quod per se intendit, et aliud per accidens potest intendere et causare, sic ars et potencia racionalis, et breviter quecunque potencia, habet obiectum adequatum in quod per se potest, et in oppositum per accidens; ut voluntas hominis potest per se in bonum, et per accidens in [malum]; nec potest in malum nisi sub racione boni, in tantum quod nemo vult peccatum ut huiusmodi; ut patet alibi.

To understand Aristotle properly, note that inferior beings have not the power of tending *by themselves* towards their aim, but only by an exterior impulse. And in this consists the privilege of rational beings: they may intend to do in the future what they are not impelled to do now. God from all eternity intends to produce what He only produces in time. Men and angels determine their acts, referring them to a future time.

Pro intellectu tamen philosophi, notandum quod potencie, ut sunt particulares, sunt ad obiecta limitaciores, et a potencia simpliciter libera distanciores, cum sint organa virtutum racionalium non habentes ex se sufficienciam [ad] tendendum in obiectum extrinsecum, sicut nec movendi ex se ad quemquam terminum, set ex libitante extrinseco. In hoc ergo privilegiatur potencia racionalis, que ut sic est libera, quod stat ipsam pro quantalibet mensura temporis appetere vel intendere actum vel opus aliquod, etsi non omne, sine hoc quod pro illa mensura, subducto impedimento, producat illud opus. Et hoc est speciale in potenciis liberis; ut deus eternaliter vult producere quemcunque effectum quem umquam producit, et tamen non eternaliter, set tempore suo, producit effectum, ut racio determinans. Et proporcionali modo, set inferiori, homo et angelus determinant se per quantumlibet tempus, actus, vel opera, quos non interim faciunt, etsi impedimenta fuit deducta: ut *ego nunc volo legere cras, et post cras*

20. malum *deest* MS. 27. ad *deest* MS.

disputare, et sic de aliis actibus ad quos prime determino me; et nihil impedit me ab alico istorum actuum, cum adhuc non innitor ad aliquem eorum, set expecto temporis oportunitatem, cuius mora non impedit me, eo quod non res[is]tit michi innitenti. Inanimata autem, eo ipso quo intendunt vel appetunt finem aliquem, agunt ad illum finem adquirendum, si cum paribus non fuerint impedita; sicut et bestie executur continue omne quod appetunt, subducto impedimento, quia non possunt consiliari vel raciocinacione sua quietari, ut expectent temporis oportunitatem, et condilectentur in pulcritudine vicissitudinis temporum, cum hoc sit racionali nature proprium, specialiter si appetitus bestiales exuerit.

Now inferior animals never put off doing all they desire, unless they are prevented therefrom; because they have not reason enough to wait.

Ulterius, quoad descripcionem doctoris, patet quod, sive intelligitur in sensu composito, sive in sensu diviso, est patenter inpugnabilis. Constat namque quod contradiccionem claudit quamcumque potenciam, creatam vel increatam, poni cum omnibus disposicionibus previis ad agendum, cum hoc quod non agat.

As for Bradwardine's definition, in whatever sense it be taken, it is questionable.

Nam de deo non potest iste sensus verificari, tum quod absolute necessario agit ad intra, tum quia non est disposicio precise necessaria ad quamlibet accionem intrinsecam; vel si est respectu actus intrinseci, consequenter deus necessitatur ad illum. Nec verificatur de accione dei ad extra; quia disposicio prima necessaria ad quamlibet talem accionem est predeterminacio dei, aut volucio pro certa mensura, quibus repugnat formaliter quod deus non sic agat pro determinata mensura. Non enim potest poni quod in deo sunt multe libertates formaliter, nec potest poni quod ista potencia sit sic libera contradictorie respectu produccionis per-
76a[a] sone vel alterius absolute necessarii. Tota | igitur libertas,

Whether we consider God or the creature, not to act when all conditions for action are present, is self-contradictory. God's internal acts cannot fall under this definition, since all these are necessary. Neither can His external acts: for they are all so predetermined that their not happening at a given time is absolutely impossible.

11. condilectant MS. 21. tamen *(in full)* MS.

27. To make this a little clearer; Wyclif would say: God having determined from all eternity to create A, A must absolutely be created. His adversaries no doubt would answer; yes, but that is not the question. At no time did God make the choice between creating A and not creating A; the choice was made eternally, but it *was* a choice betweeen two opposites, and an absolutely free one. This choice posited, of course A must come into being. — Then comes Wyclif's argument. *Tota igitur*, which bears upon this choice, or, as he calls it, this *actus contingens volitionis*.

If we speak of the acts by which He produces these external things, the definition fails; there are no conditions in the Absolute. The fiction that in God *to be* and *to be conditioned* are identical, is useless here; for there is no freedom: besides, what would *power* mean then? Would the emanation of Persons be an act of choice? God's existence and the object of His will necessitate His act; each volition depends upon another: if God wills that a man attain bliss, He wills his existence. I think Bradwardine restricted the sense of freedom in God to His acts concerning the Contingent. But there are other free acts in Him; these acts are besides necessitated by their object; and this is the cause of God's action. The possibility of 'liberty as to opposites' in the creatures set the definition yet more at fault. Every creature, as Bradwardine implies, is necessitated as to every act,

ut est contradiccionis, stat circa actus intrinsecos contingentes operaciones intrinsecas. Si loquamur de actibus intrinsecis quos ponit maxime contradictorie liberos, dicitur quod non sit possibilis disposicio prima ad illos, sicut nec est disposicio prima illi potencie. Non enim est [ad] naturam divinam vel aliud absolute necessarium disposicio aliqua. Et si dicatur quod, intelligendo ablativum condicionaliter, bene sequitur quod libere potest agere et non agere, eo quod (per impossibile) *esse* est esse disposicionem primam; re vera tunc superflue hoc additur, eo quod eque, positis illis disposicionibus necessariis, deus non potest agere; et tunc non innotescit quid est potencia, contradictorie produceret personam divinam, et ita de aliis necessariis, que absolute necessario deus causat. Secundo patet ex dictis quod deus et obiectum volitum sunt prime requisita et necessitancia deum ad volendum; et 3° patet quod quelibet volucio dei, terminata ad creaturam, habentem creaturam causantem se complete, per se necessitatur ex volucione precedente; ut volucio qua deus vult hominem mereri beatitudinem, et qua vult hominem esse, cum ex illis volucionibus sequntur voluciones posteriores.

Ideo, ut credo, doctor intelligit quod potencia dicitur libera respectu actus quem potest producere et potest non producere, sine hoc quod sit produccionis causa completa necessitans; ut est primus actus volendo contingens, ut ponit 3 libro capitulo 5. Set falsum est quod nullus alius actus volendi est liber preter illum, et falsum est quod illius non est dare causam completam. Falsum eciam est quod stat deum non agere, sicut falsum est quod non est dare causam cum qua non stat non agere datum sibi possibile ad agendum. Multo magis igitur est impossibile quod creatura ponitur cum omnibus disposicionibus previis ad agendum, cum hoc quod non agat; nedum quia sequitur: *illa disposicio est prima necessaria ad finem quemcunque: igitur ille finis est verum:* quia quelibet creatura necessitatur ex supposicione ad quemlibet actum suum, sicut doctor docet. Ymmo, cum quelibet natura creata integra causat de necessitate nature rem convenientem secum in eadem essencia, patet quod quelibet natura intellectualis creata

3. po^t *pro* ponit MS. 6. ad *deest* MS.; *ib.* natura divina MS.
15. dicend' *pro* dictis MS. 36. n~ *pro* MS.

habet memoriam de necessitate nature, causantem racionem vel formam, sic quod deus de potencia absoluta non posset servare memoriam non causantem racionem, sicut non potest servare subiectum non causans eius passionem. Et cum quelibet natura intellectualis habet secundam rem sue essencie satis libere causatam, non oporteret de libertate contradiccionis quod potencia posset cum quocunque priori non agere.

Set hic credo doctorem dicere: nullum actum [in] se esse simpliciter liberum, nisi volucionem dei intrinsecam eternam, ut patet capitulis 5 et 6 libri sui tercii. Quelibet autem potencia creata non habet plene in potestate sua aliquem actum suum. Set istud deficit primo in fundamento, cum non sit dare infinitas voluciones eternas in deo, quarum quelibet sit res absoluta distincta a qualibet relacione, ut ipse dicit capitulo 6°. Tunc enim essent infinite essencie coeterne cum deo, quarum nullam deus potest creare vel adnichilare; et esset processus in infinitum in volucionibus, ut superius tactum est. Ille necessitarent deum ad agendum, cum non potest suspendere acciones earum, vel vices suas per se supplere, et sic non per se creare; ymmo tunc volucio contingens reliqua, liberior volucione absolute necessaria, et una contingens reliqua liberior, cum una habet disposicionem necessitantem. Ymmo iuxta descripcionem tollerent libertatem a natura divina. Est igitur dare voluciones eternas, que sunt relaciones racionis subiectate in deo et terminate ad volita, non ponentes aliquam essenciam preter deum; et illas oportet ponere. Et si ponantur huiusmodi res absolute de genere accionis, et respectu omnium talium volucionum est dare causas vel disposiciones naturaliter antecedentes et necessitantes, ut patet de terminis huius relacionum. Nam primus actus volendi in deo non videtur habere aliquam disposicionem primam; ideo, si intelligat solum de divine
76a[b] libertate | potencie respectu sui actus primi liberi, videtur, ut supra, superflue mencionem factam de disposicionibus sibi previis; quia vel nulla est talis disposicio, vel ponendo talem est dare completam, ex qua formaliter sequitur deum velle quodcunque contingenter volitum ab eodem. Et patet inpugnacio sensus compo-

and even as to faculties, memory necessarily causing reason:

there is no choice here, yet there is freedom.

Bradwardine seems to have thought that the only kind of really free act is God's eternal volition, and that the creature is not in full possession of freedom.

But he posits an infinite number of eternal volitions, absolute entities, and not relations; this is false. For there would exist numberless essences cöeternal with God, which He can neither create nor destroy. And they would necessitate all God's actions; with many other absurdities.

We admit these volitions as eternal relations in God, and having the same essence with Him.

1. me^{ua} *pro* memoriam MS. 7. o3 non o3' *pro* non oportet MS. 9. in *deest* MS. 18. nulla MS. 20. Ille qui MS.

siti descripcionis predicte, cum relacio non terminat agenciam.

If the definition means that a being may act in one way, *or else* in another, this is either begging the question (for if there is a given determination of God's will He cannot absolutely act contrary thereto) or it applies to any creature. Now what might not be (absolutely speaking) might also not act.

Si autem in sensu diviso intelligitur descripcio, ut videntur verba pretendere, patet quod vel *petitur*, ponendo idem in discripcione sui ipsius, vel verius aut eque convenit cuilibet intellectui creato sensus eius sanus, sicut deo. Nam posita quacunque intelligencia vel disposicione in deo, non est compossibile quod agat, quia per se absolute inpossibile est quod agat. Igitur nedum divina potencia cum quibuscunque disposicionibus ponitur, libere potest non agere. Ideo oportet sensum esse quod datum effectum, ad quem est disposicio posita, libere potest non agere. De qualibet autem potencia creata, sicut absolute necessario libere potest non esse, sic absolute necessario libere potest non agere. Ideo de virtute sermonis competit descripcio libertati create et non increate, et illud patet de sensu exposito, intelligendo descripcionem in sensu diviso.

And if a creature (given all necessary conditions at a given instant) only *begins* to act then, it may be said either to act or not to act.

Ymmo, plus accedendo ad sensum, videtur esse possibile pro alico instanti vel creaturam racionalem vel quamcunque aliam poni cum disposicionibus quibuscunque naturaliter previis et addendum cum hoc quod pro alico instanti non agat; quia satis, quod incipiat agere per remocionem de presenti. Non enim est concursus dei vel eius cogencia, disposicio cause secunde scilicet necessaria ad agendum, quia per idem quelibet pars accionis dei vel creature foret disposicio sua sibi necessaria ad agendum, non quacunque accione, set accione illa cuius ille forent partes. Et sic volucio qua deus vult mundum existere haberet quotlibet voluciones quibus deus vult partes eius existere, tanquam disposiciones primas, ex quibus loquitur illa volucio.

What Bradwardine adds about two contradictories being on an equality would make of anything contingent an absolute necessity: for the Contingent *may exist*, and this with absolute necessity. A sufficient definition of

Et quoad additum quod utraque pars contradiccionis equaliter potest stare, videtur quod superfluum, sive ad supplendum, sive ad exponendum descripcionem predictam; quia de quolibet contingenti [fit] ex hoc absolute necessarium, cum omne quod potest esse sit absolute necessarium posse esse. Satis est igitur ad descripcionem potencie contradictorie et licet libertatem contradiccionis, hoc: si sit potens hoc et eius contradictorium libere causare, quocunque dato. Et conformibus

9. non agat *before* quia MS. 10. nondum MS. 36. fit *deest* MS.

mediis potest infirmari descripcio data de actu libero, sive intelligatur in sensu composito, sive in sensu diviso. Ideo, ut credo, error in methaphorica, et verba nimis pompatica faciunt quod multi in penam peccati in errores plurimos sunt prolapsi.

the freedom of Contradiction is: the power of causing one thing or its opposite, under any circumstances.

Intellectus igitur summi philosophi patet ex dictis, sicut et descripcio potencie libere; et indubie omnis potencia que est libera est contradictorie libera, et econtra, cum claudit contradiccionem naturam liberam in contradictorio non posse incoacte.

This makes Aristotle's meaning clear: every faculty that is free has freedom of contradiction; and without any coaction.

Ulterius quoad argumenta que vident[ur] probare nullam creaturam posse necessitare mentem racionalem, non procedunt, nisi vel probando quod non possunt ipsam cogere; vel quod hoc non possunt nisi coefficiendo in virtute dei eternaliter volentis ipsam causam efficienter movere voluntatem creatam, quod non sufficiat cum illis paribus declinare; vel tercio, quod omne possibile non potest movere voluntatem ad actum nephandum, nisi ipsa gratis consenserit: quorum quelibet est verum, ut patet ex dictis. Et isto modo procedunt raciones doctoris, secundo libro, capitulo 3°, ut videtur.

The arguments against any creature necessitating the act of another only prove that it has no coercive power; or if it has, only by the will of God; or that nothing can cause a man to sin, if he has not first abandoned God: which is true.

Sicut igitur motor orbis necessitat solem ad ortum et eclipsim, movendo ipsum usque adeo, eo quod ordinatur a deo sic movere ipsum, proporcionaliter quelibet creatura, movens voluntatem ad assensum, necessitat eum ad assensum, quia omne verum est modo suo necessarium. Non sic tamen quod non stat cum illa inclinancia et pronitate animi, cum istis iuvamentis et impedimentis que de facto sunt posita (tam absoluta quam respectiva) quod melius resistat. Et racio est, quia inter istas causas et disposiciones capitur defectus mentis elongate a deo propter peccatum, in penam cuius indisponitur ad resistendum temptanti. Ideo, cum illud peccatum sit in voluntate libera peccantis mente,
76b[a] est culpandus | ex sua insufficiencia ad resistendum, cum sit in potestate sua resistere omni temptatori quantumlibet forti de possibili, si velit: quia, ut prius dictum est, adherens deo et factus unus spiritus cum eo non potest vinci a malo, nisi gratis consenserit. Ideo tolle precedens peccatum creature racionalis, debiliens ipsam ad resistendum, et appone omnem tem-

Thus one creature necessitates another, just as that which moves the sun's orb necessitates its rising, &c. — because God has ordained it so.

Yet, with all its inclinations, the soul can nevertheless resist successfully; for the defect of backsliding from God is amongst these, and this defect makes it unable to resist, not because it cannot, but because it will not; and is therefore guilty.

Let there be no previous sin on the creature's part;

15. ipsa ca MS.

nothing in the world will be able to vanquish it.

poralem possibilem [potenciam] et non compossibile quod vincatur a malo, quia oportet quod primo ledatur animus a seipso.

Objections. The original sin is not the sinner's act; God was the author of the first consent to sin; and not all the sins of a man are the penalties of a previous sin.

Set obicitur quod peccatum originale non sit a peccante, nec assensus voluntatis ad peccatum fuit principaliter ab animo creato, set a deo; nec tota multitudo peccatorum persone date sit in penam peccati previe, quia sic extra dictam multitudinem esset peccatum eiusdem persone, et per consequens multitudo signata non concluderet omnia peccata date persone.

Answers. I say that original sin belongs to each of us at our conception, not by wrong doing, but by defect: i. e. by our descent from a tainted stock. The cause of sin is like a legal flaw in a man's title, which flaw, though accidental, yet is ascribed to him. But how can a son be held liable for his parent's fault? My answer will not please modern logicians; but their errors should not deter me from speaking the truth. In scripture 'mankind' means all men from Adam to the last man, taken together as one vast multitude. Amongst them there is the unity of our common nature; and

Ad primum dicitur quod quelibet peccans originaliter facit proprium peccatum pro primo instanti sui *esse*, non committendo actum accidentalem difformem, set deficiendo a rectitudine iusticie in hoc quod sic descendit a stipite sic infecto. Nam *facere* est commune ad quodcunque *causare* ad extra, ut dictum est tract[at]u *De accione*. Ideo, sicut homo est presuppositus ad hoc quod deficiat a iure, vel a titulo a regnum (quod est sibi accidentale et peccatum suum) sic est causa peccati. Set multi musitant: Quomodo filius est culpandus pro peccato parentis? Nec sapiet et solucio istius dubii modernis logicis; quia tamen error in logica non debet deterrere veritatem enunciandam, ideo notandum quod genus humanum vocatur in scriptura tota series multitudinum hominum sibi succedencium ab uno principio illius speciei ab Adam usque ad ultimum hominem ante diem iudicii producendum. Illius autem generis nec sunt partes pauciores et nunc plures et incompleta etate mundi, sicut est de ordinibus religiosiorum qui non sunt nisi illa multitudo succedens ab uno principio, militans sub tali lege vel regula, et de tali genere, arbore, vel linea hominum successiva dicta de antiquitate et ceteris passionibus ordinum. Secundo, suppono quod talis multitudo, vel genus hominum, tendit ad quandam unitatem, cum communicant in natura communi, et quodlibet posterius est causaliter in suo principio in quo potest mereri. Patet prima pars ex dictis de universalibus, et secunda pars patet, 5 *Super*

1. potenciam *deest* MS. 2. laudatur MS. 7. precias *pro* previe MS. 23. detegere MS. 25. mlti^co *pro* multitudinem MS. 26. ut *pro* ab MS.

17. *De accione.* I have not been able to identify this tractate of Wyclif; and if it be a mistake for *De anima*, I cannot find therein any passage bearing on this.

genesim ad literam 18. Sicut enim ex stipite et radice fit unum, sic ex patre et filio. Unde, sicut pars inferior arboris humore causat superiorem, sic parens amore plus afficitur proli, quam econtra. Et tercia pars patet ex hoc quod exemplatum a natura. Si enim hoc potest mereri eciam alteri, ex hoc quod potest mereri quod deus ordinet ipsum non habendum prolem, multo magis potest mereri proli sibi contingens, ut gaudium vel aliud bonum. Et indubie ex hoc sequitur quod homo potest demereri sue proli; quia in penam peccati hominis potest esse quod filius indisponitur in naturalibus quod subtrahantur gratuita prolis, ut pater puniatur in filio scelerato, et quod bona que titulo parentis deberentur iure hereditario sue proli subtrahantur propter forisfacturam parentis, cum nemo potest transfundere ius hereditarium in heredem, cum hoc quod ipse habeat ius in se ipso.

Ista non saperent illis qui non ponunt maiorem unionem vel convenienciam hominis ad hominem quam hominis ad asinum, nec parentis ad suam prolem quam quorumcunque collateralium qui non uniuntur causacione. Set talibus non est michi sermo, qui fundant totam rerum convenienciam in conceptibus anime. Est enim naturalis lex quod active causans essenciale causat et naturaliter consequens, ut sicut pater dat esse proli, ita dat risibilitatem, et daret ius ad beatitudinem, cum hoc fuit naturale, secundum institucionem nature primariam. Set impeditur infeccione stipitis viciate, quousque alia radix posita est, ex cuius generacione spirituali oportet totam illam arborem unificari, si florere debet
Io. virtutibus; quia Io. 15° dicitur, *Sicut palmes non potest*
XV, 4. *ferre fructum, ... nisi manserit in vite, sic nec vos, nisi in me manseritis.* Tercio, supposita hostia de prevaricacione primi parentis et descripcione peccati originalis, quod est defectus originalis iuris ad beatitudinem
76b[b] ex peccato | parentis originantis, patet quod quilibet sic peccans facit proprium peccatum origine, licet primus parens longe prius facit illud racione cuius est voluntarium, cum procedit ab actu voluntario. Nec oportet quod faciens inmediate illud peccatum in faciendo agat, quia satis est quod subiective causando peccatum deficiat. Si enim deficiendo sit quodlibet peccatum, ut

each of us is in his forbears as in his cause, so that he may merit by them. For if one man can gain merit for another, much more for his own child;

and if merit, so also demerit. A father is punished by having a wicked son, and the son by the loss of his father's heritage, which the latter has forfeited.

This will of course displease such as admit nothing more common between man and man than there is between man and brute, and consequently nothing in common between parent and child. With these Nominalists I have nothing to do. What causes a given nature must cause all that belongs to it; Adam would have given us a right to bliss, but he lost it, and we with him, until another Root was planted spiritually, to regenerate and unify mankind. Original sin is a flaw in our right to bliss; by our origin we make this sin our own, though Adam

6. esse *pro* eciam MS. 10. sui MS. 11. quia *before* filius MS. 26, 27. p'tuacoη *pro* primariam MS. 31. *no gap before* nisi MS. 34. defectis MS. 41. quod licet MS.

was infinitely more guilty than we, whose sin it is, without any act of ours.

patet per beatum Augustinum, 12 *De civitate*, 9, salvator tamen approbat modum loquendi quod taliter privative causaret sic facere, cum, Io. 8. dicit, *Omnis qui facit peccatum*, et cetera. Io. VIII, 24.

Evidently a man made directly by God, or coming from an untainted stock, could have no original sin. I do not think that mortal sin is a relapse into original sin: such a doctrine would make for rebaptism. Actual sin is composed of the mental act of will and of our depraved inclinations, given by original sin. Parents procreate children in sin, however good they be, because their sanctity is personal, and does not give a hereditary right to bliss, for all must be baptized, to receive the grace of regeneration of the second Adam, Christ.

Et patet ex dictis de peccato originâli quod homo totaliter factus a deo, vel a radice non viciata, non contraheret originale peccatum. Et per consequens nec primus ad intra, nec secundus, cum non habet *esse* coruptibile ex racione seminali parentis infecti, peccat originaliter. Nec apparet michi quod quilibet incidens in peccatum mortale actuale reincidit in peccatum originale, ut dicit dominus Armachanus, quia tunc esset color rebaptizandi. Non igitur est originalis defectus a primo instanti originis illius peccantis sibi inexistentis. Nec oportet, si illud peccatum nunc sit causa agens ipsum, quod non est proprie agibile, set satis est quod sit homo interior causando racionem et voluntatem, et hominem exteriorem ex racione seminali a vicioso parente contractum. In toto namque composito, formaliter primo et principaliter est peccatum huiusmodi, et causaliter in utraque parte qualitativa. Nec sequitur, si parentes sunt mundi a peccato in prolis procreacione, quod proles sit immunis ab originali [peccato], quia mundicia illa est personalis, non revivificans potenciam derivandi ius ad beatitudinem cum parente cui continuatur, cum totum genus hominum salvandum oportet esse baptizatum, i. e. lavatum baptismo flaminis ad hoc quod unificetur. Et talem generacionem spiritualem oportet contrahere ex secundo Adam, sicut oportet contrahere generacionem carnalem ex primo Adam; et hinc necesse fuit primum Adam et totum genus salvatum salvari in fide et virtute secundi Adam, ut docet Augustinus, *Epistola* 48. Et hinc non debet infans baptizari antequam nascatur ex utero, tum quia adhuc est quasi una persona, tum eciam quia hinc occasionaliter credi posset quod baptismus aut meritum parentis sufficeret pro baptismo prolis; et hinc dicunt quidam quod, separato capite et corde ab utero, potest baptizari. Istam sentenciam docet salvator Nichodemo, Io. 3; et apostolus, 1. Cor. 15. Io. III, 5. I Cor. XV, 22.

As we are saved by another, so we were tainted by the guilt of another.

Et condicio istius peccati bene concepta facit scire quomodo iuste potest originaliter peccans salvari fide

9. corruptibilis MS. 19. contractum *twice* MS. 23. peccato *deest* MS. 27. e. *deest* MS.; *ib.* locum *pro* lavatum MS.

et opere alterius, sicut perfidia alterius sine commissione propria inficitur; et quomodo oportet esse spiritualem modum regenerandi ut titulo spiritualis parentis habeatur ius in posterius ad beatitudinem, quia indubie oportet arborem successivam habere principium vel radicem vivam ad hoc quod vivificet succedens genus, sicut est secundus Adam, Christus deus noster. Quilibet enim preter illum habet solum titulum gracie ad beatitudinem, ideo non potest derivare titulum hereditarium in posteros, quia hoc non posset conferre graciam, cum nemo potest hereditarie dare vel cerciorem titulum quam habeat in seipso. Oportet igitur quod gracia et veritas per Ihesum
Io. I, 14. Christum sit facta, Io. primo: ipse enim est absolute necessario heres beatitudinis, cum sit filius dei naturalis. Unde si spiritualiter gignit nos, per graciam facit nos titulo gracie coheredes cum Christo. Et tanta fuit necessitas ponendi istam radicem secundum Anselmum, primo *Cur deus homo*, ca°, quod genus hominum non potuit taliter post prevaricacionem fuisse salvatum, cum iusticia exigebat emendam esse quodammodo infinitam propter delictum finitum contra tantum dominum, quod non posset esse nisi per incarnacionem persone divine. Quelibet enim alia fuit debitrix tocius servicii sibi possibilis pro beneficio creacionis preaccepto; quomodo igitur posset talis natura satisfacere pro toto genere, cum vix sufficiat satisfacere pro seipsa? nec valet dicere quod deus potest simpliciter remittere talem iniuriam vel dimittere impunitam, quia hoc derogaret sue iusticie.
77 a[a] Homo namque docetur | ex evangelio humiliter dimittere peccantibus in eum, recognoscendo deum esse dominum nostrum, contra quem capitaliter delinquitur ascribendo vindictam capere per se ipsum, dum infallibiliter cognoscit quod principaliter deus punit ad regulam quoslibet delinquentes.

And as Christ alone possesses bliss in His own right, so this title cannot become hereditary in others.

Anselm says that it was not possible for man to be saved after the fall, unless by the Incarnation of a Divine Person; any other would already be indebted to God for creation, and could not pay the debt for others.

Nor can we say that God might have pardoned sin without expiation; this would have been derogatory to His justice.

Ex dictis patet quod salvator noster, licet fuit in femoribus Abrahe, racione cuius servus suus iuravit sibi,
Gen. XXIV, 2. ponendo manum sub femore, Gen. 24°, non tamen

And therefore Christ, though in Abraham's loins, did not

1. operare MS. 12. quia *pro* quod MS. 16. facit *pro* fuit MS. 17. ponendum MS. 18. *after* Ca°, *no number* MS. 21. ϑūm *pro* dominum MS.

28. *Derogaret.* Catholic theologians generally say that although God, without being unjust, might have simply pardoned the sin of Adam, yet the plan of the Atonement was far more in harmony with His justice.

pay tithes to Melchisedech, for He was formed in Mary by Divine Power.

secundum racionem seminalem, cum virtus divina subito organisavit corpus sumptum de virgine, et ipsa post active contingeret ad nutricionem et ulteriorem formacionem parcium. Et ideo non fuit congruum decimans causa immunem a peccato in lumbis Abrahe ut docet apostolus, Hebre. 7, ostendens per hoc sacerdocium Melchisedech signare sacerdocium perfeccius levitico, quod racione peccati indiguit decimari in lumbis Abrahe. Non sic autem Melchisedech, cuius genealogia non texitur in scriptura.

Heb. VII.

The assent of man to sin, in so far as it is morally wrong, does not proceed from God.

Ulterius quoad secundum, dicetur posterius quod assensus hominis ad peccandum secundum id difformitatis in eo non sit a deo.

The first sin was that of Lucifer, who failed to love God as he ought, then blinded in his mind, committed evil by a positive act; and men sin in the same manner. The complete cause of sin is made up of many causes, not wrong in themselves. In Lucifer v. g., we have the individual himself, his ability to sin, his contemplation: none of these are evil; but through this contemplation, setting God aside, he fell into sin. And thus his will caused the necessity of his fall.

Et ad tercium dicitur quod primum peccatum est peccatum primi angeli qui cecidit, primo peccando, omissione amandi deum ut debuit. Et exhinc cecatus est in racione, et tercio inordinate volendo positive. Et taliter peccat quilibet homo peccans; primo omittendo inniti voluntarie suo principio. Secundo cecatus racione, eliciendo voluciones obliquas. Et si queratur causa illius omissionis, dicitur quod omittens est causa efficiens et subiectiva, et non deus. Et si queratur causa completa necessitans, dicitur quod est aggregatum ex multis unitis, quorum nullum est per se malum moraliter Unde, sicut non posset [esse] malicia, nisi fundetur in bona natura, ita non posset effici malicia nisi sic efficeretur a pure bonis. Ut (signato primo peccato Luciferi) persona ipsa est causa eius, sicut inferioritas sui arbitrii vel flexibilitas ad peccandum, [et] occupacio eius circa consideracionem rerum in proprio genere: quorum quodlibet est valde bonum. Notentur igitur omnia ista cum omnibus suis habitudinibus poni, nisi sequitur peccatum, ut consideracio rei in proprio genere est bona, si tante ac taliter consideraret rem creatam; non considerando in deum (ut fecit Lucifer omittendo), est malum.

Augustine gives us several examples of evil caused by good things:

Et sic primum malum fuit omissio primarie effecta a pure bono, quia a voluntate creata flexibili que necessitavit seipsam. Nam creature absolute bone, cum suis habitudinibus respectivis, eciam bonis, principiant antecedenter modum malum, vel pocius defectum modi vel

3. contingenter MS. 23. bonos *pro* unitis MS. 25. esse *deest* MS. 29. et *deest* MS. 32. po^{i} *pro* poni MS. 39. bonus MS.

ordinis; ut Augustinus exemplificat in *De vera religione* (37[a], et infra), exemplo quadruplici: primum de bonitate ligni et eius amore; set notetur preceptum cum omnibus aliis absolutis et respectivis positivis, et resultat prevaricacio mala. Secundum exemplum ponit sub hiis verbis: Nec aqua malum est, nec animal quod vivit in aere; nam iste substancie: set mala est voluntaria precipitacio in aquam, et suffocacio quam mersus patitur. Tercium exemplum est de acumine stili bono, cuius punccio vel conscissio sic est mala. Quartum exemplum est quomodo lux solis est bona, et inordinatus aspectus oculi infirmi diutine intuentis est malus. Patet igitur quod ex rebus pure bonis, inordinate anterioratis vel posterioratis, vel aliter propositive se habentibus, modum vel ordinem inficiantibus (ut loquitur Augustinus in *de natura boni*) principiat privacione peccatum. Et ita subtiliter consideranti patebit quod actus malus est prior quam omissio, set non prius est actus malus quam omissio vel defectus. Patet ex hoc quod nichil est formaliter malum, nisi defectu. Ideo defectus est malicia in abstracto; unde peccare est deficere deo.

The tree of knowledge was good, and therefore worthy to be liked; but given the Divine prohibition, evil resulted therefrom. Water is good; so is a living being; but to cast oneself into water on purpose and be drowned is evil. The sharpness of a stylus is good, the prick thereof is evil. Sunlight is good; to weak eyes it is evil. Omission is the result of a bad act, itself the result of a defect; which is evil in the abstract. To fall away from God is to sin.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Ulterius, ad argumenta doctoris profundi, libro 2°, capitulo 30°, dicitur quod ipsa videntur supponere voluciones dei esse essencias absolutas, sicut ponit libro 3°, capitulo 6. Ideo non mirum si variet a ponentibus ipsas de genere respectivorum. Quia tamen ille articulus videtur esse maxime fundamentalis sibi contra 77a[b] pelagianos, et ad | fundandum quod omnia futura eveniunt inevitabiliter quoad creaturas quascunque, ideo discurram per argumenta que videntur mihi maiorem difficultatem includere, non solum generaliter solvendo ipsa, sicut feci superius communiter de argumentis quibus incipitur probare quod nulla causa potest necessitare mentem hominis.

As Bradwardine thinks that God's volitions are absolute, not relative entities, and at the same time his arguments are fundamental, showing the necessity of future events, I intend here to examine some of them with special care;

6. econtra *pro* aqua MS. 10. cōtitaᵗ *pro* conscissio MS. 13. anpoᵗᵒ *pro* anterioratis MS. 14. p9t9ioriᵗᵒ *pro* posterioratis MS.; *ib.* ꝓpoitīe *pro* propositive MS. 15. infū[b]3 *pro* inficiantibus MS. 17. primus *pro* prior MS. 22. Cam 5m *in marg.; initial U large, in outlines to be filled up with red ink* MS. 30. mentaliter *pro* inevitabiliter MS.

noting *first*, that I utterly reject these absolute entities; and *second*, that no volition of God is in any way mutable, for though contingent, it is eternal.

Primo tamen suppono quod fiat limitacio ad voluciones respectivas que sunt relaciones racionis, quia, si non fallor, nec est philosophicum nec catholicum ponere in deo quotlibet voluciones eternas contingentes que sint essencie vel substancie absolute. Et ex ista supposicione patet secundo quod nulla divina volucio est mobilis, et per consequens trahibilis, anullabilis, carnabilis, obediencia regibilis, ducibilis, gubernabilis, fragilis, impotens, vincibilis, frustrabilis, licenciabilis, nec aliqualiter per se activa vel passiva; cum omnia talia sunt suppositorum et non respectuum, ut ostendit dominus Ardia[machan]us, libro 16, capitulo 18, de multis similibus. Non enim potest moveri localiter pocius quam deus, nec potest generari vel corrumpi de dei omnipotencia; quia quamvis sit contingens, tamen, si est eterna, nec potest alterari aut quantitate maiorari. Ideo certum est quod quelibet dei volucio, ordinancia, sciencia et quicquid contingenter ad intra dicitur, est simpliciter inmobile. Nulla autem talis res racionis est per se ens.

This solves all the former difficulties.

A man may and does with the greatest ease cause God's volitions by every meritorious act he produces, and please God more easily than he can any creature.

Et per hec patet solucio ad omnia argumenta facta superius. Quamvis enim dominus terrenus potest causare volucionem et volucionem in servo suo, et econtra, sicut potest aurum vel aliud vile volubile, facilius tamen potest homo causare volucionem in deo, quia eo ipso quod quis meritorie vult, humiliter sapiendo de seipso, causat unam volucionem vel complacenciam in deo. Cum igitur facilius sit homini placere deo quam alicui creature, patet quod facilius est causare complacenciam in deo quam in homine. Non enim aliud est causare complacenciam aut volucionem in deo nisi bene vivere; quia, ut sic, vita illa terminat et causat subiective volucionem in deo, non movendo deum, set indigendo eius prevencione graciosa, ut sic vivatur.

This is the effect of the bounty of God; for Him, good will is sufficient.

Et hoc pertinet magnificencie dei universaliter obligantis quamlibet creaturam quod facillime sibi famuletur, non exigendo nisi pure iustum. Cum enim nihil plus sit in potestate nostra quam bona volucio, in tantum quod nulla creatura racionalis potest privari potestate ad bene volendum, deus contentatur bona volucione pro suo servicio, si non assit facultas alterior. Ideo dicit salvator, M[t] 11 Matth. XI, 30.

1. .1. *in marg.* MS. 5. .2. *in marg.* MS. 8. obedieam *pro* obediencia MS. 12. machan *deest* MS. 34. quantumlibet MS. 36. scit MS. 39. contenditur MS. 40. Nota. *in marg.* MS.

23. *Vile.* Perhaps this is a mistake for *materiale.*

"*Iugum enim meum*", et cetera. Set particularis dominus non sic, quia ex flexibilitate sui arbitrii elicit actus volendi iniusta ultra debitum. Ideo difficile est causare in eo conformitatem volucionum, quia oportet movere eum et aliqualiter perficere; non sic autem in deo. Unde claudit contradiccionem deum posse qualitercunque voluerit et poterit velle, invita qualibet creatura, quia deus non potest velle creaturam non deformare volucionem suam volucioni dei, nec velle quod creatura sic velit: set homo, cuius non oportet volucionem esse generaliter impletam, bene potest. Et hoc non est ex illibertate dei, set ex vehemencia sue libertatis qua nichil potest resistere sue voluntati, et ex [in]ferioritate ac flexibilitate voluntatis humane est quod potest velle quodcunque, invito relico et volente oppositum. Deus igitur non potest velle hoc volubile: *Petrus conformiter vult cum deo, non remurmurando vel difformiter volendo contra deum*, nisi Petro consenciente deo in volucione: Paulus tamen potest velle hoc, et quodcunque aliud, invito Petro, et non consenciente sibi, quia non oportet volucionem creature impleri in omnibus. Et fatuum est negare propter talia volucionem hominis esse volucione dei liberiorem, aut hominem licenciare deum ad volendum, vel volucionem dei esse in hominis potestate, vel hominem posse volucioni dei resistere, ipsam generando, corrumpendo, vel quomodolibet movendo; quamvis homo causet illam, et posset facere illam non esse propter suum gradum facilitacionis ut sibi conformetur; non tamen propter talia, ut patet de vi vocis.

It is more difficult to please creatures, because they demand more than is just, and their will requires to be changed and perfected. God cannot possibly force our will by His own, nor will that ours should be conformable to His in spite of us, not because He is not free to do so, but because He respects our freedom. This is what creatures often desire, because their will has not the omnipotence of God's.

We by no means imply thereby that the creature's will is more free than God's, or exerts power over Him, changing His Will at pleasure: this does not follow, though man can make this or that volition not to be.

Ex istis patet defectus loci asimili de volucione dei et volucione hominis; ut, si Petrus potest velle datum volubile sine hoc quod ego causem volucionem in eo, igitur multo magis deus potest velle illud volubile sine hoc quod ego causem volucionem in deo. Patet quod
77b[a] non | sequitur, (signato illo volubili, "*ego amo deum*" quod Petrus potest velle, sine hoc quod ego causem volucionem in eo; set deus non potest sic velle, nisi causem volucionem in eo; et ita de quotlibet similibus.

We cannot compare God's volition with that of a man, and say: If one man's volition does not principiate another's, still less can man's volition principiate that of God.

5. sicut MS. 13. in *deest* MS.

22 *Negare* ought here to be *affirmare*, I think; but I have left it as in the text, because it may mean that the adversary *denies* what he makes out that this doctrine affirms. 37. *Nisi causem*. 'Without my causing'.

Man would not be free, if he could not change his mind; yet God, though He cannot, is nevertheless free: but what He wills, He wills for all eternity. To say that God is master of his will would imply that it serves Him, and is therefore less than He, and a creature, and God Himself would be mutable. For that reason — because God's will is God Himself — it is supremely free; whereas, man being master of his will, it is less free. I think that it is an abuse of terms to extend the idea of *power* and *mastery* to every cause; many absurdities would follow therefrom.

Nec sequitur: *homo non potest libere velle quicquam, nisi sit dominus sue volucionis, sic quod potest ipsam generare et corrumpere igitur multo magis deus.* Non color in deduccione propter disparitatem volucionum dei et hominis. Deus enim non potest velle aliquid nisi eternaliter velit illud. Ideo summa libertas in deo vetat quod non dominatur sue volucionis. Si enim dominaretur ipsius, tunc ipsa serviret sibi, et per consequens esset creatura, et sic generabilis et corruptibilis. Et sic indubie deus esset mobilis, et per consequens haberet finem ipso perfecciorem, a quo posset moveri; quia non posset elicere novum actum volendi, nec desistere a tali actu sine motu sui. Ideo igitur est volucio dei liberior volucione humana, quia ipsa non potest deo servire, nec fieri nec corrumpi, set humana volucio servit sibi ad sui indigenciam, et est in potestate hominis ipsam corrumpere. Hoc racionabiliter excludit libertatem. Quotlibet conclusiones catholice in ista materia essent per se note theologo bene educato in significacione terminorum et sapienti, scilicet veritates de condicione et perfeccione dei.

Ulterius videtur mihi nimium ampliare potestatem ad omnia que causa aliqua potest facere vel causare. Sic enim filius et spiritus sanctus essent in potestate sui principii. Omnia bona que peccatum posset facere vel causare essent in eius potestate, et sic de aliis privacionibus, de accidentibus et substanciis non racionalibus; quod est nimis magna abusio, cum tunc omnis creatura esset in potestate accidentis vel respectus. Ymmo, in cuiuslibet hominis potestate esset facere celum stare, et alia quotlibet miracula, corpus Christi conficere, absolvere, et generaliter omnia sacramenta conferre; quod nimis derogaret iurisdiccioni ecclesie. Ymmo, nemo posset sic abuti potestate sua, cum sit in potestate cuiuscunque quemcunque reliqum occidere, debitum remittere et dicare. Patet igitur quod non omne in quod potest natura racionalis est in eius potestate, cum homo potest facere solem ac totum celum stare vel retrocedere, et sic de aliis miraculis que homo potest facere, sicut potest ipsa causare (extendendo nomen

20. set *pro* scilicet MS. 30. quodlibet MS. 40. exn̄do in *pro* extendendo nomen MS.

38. *Potest.* By a miracle, of course. 39. *Nomen.* The text, *in*, may be right, but I think that Wyclif's meaning would still be 'widening the signification of *Cause*'.

causa) ut ad instanciam eius deus sic agat, et per consequens esset in potestate hominis purgare seipsum a peccato; et sic de infinitis similibus recitatis.

Ideo videtur michi quod potestas dicit potenciam nature racionalis super rem inferioritate sibi subditam, vel natura, vel racione accidentali; ut submissione vel aliquo huiusmodi, racione cuius habens potestatem dominatur super re sibi subdita, que de tanto servit de quanto subicitur exercicio potestatis.

Mastery, to my mind, means the power of a reasonable being over another which is its inferior.

Ad illud de dei potestate conceditur quod illa est eterna, sicut quelibet sua potencia. Unde non sequitur: *deus habet potenciam dominativam pro eternitate, igitur, pro eadem mensura habet dominium;* potestas enim creature, ut legiste loquntur, non requirit semper illud simul cum illa potestate super quo est illa potestas. Et, ut videtur michi, solum super re que libere potest fieri a natura racionali, vel secundum talem rem, est potestas nature racionalis. Unde deus habet potestatem super omnes creaturas suas, quia omnes illas facit ex nihilo, set non habet potestatem super peccata, quia sunt adnichilative privaciones facte sine ipso. Habet tamen potestatem summam dimittendi peccata, et sic corrumpendi, set non generandi. Ipsa enim non proprie erit potestas eorum, nec habet potestatem super alico eterno a parte ante. Unde sanctus Thomas, prima parte summe, questione 19°, articulo 10°, dicit quod deus non habet liberum arbitrium super illa que de necessitate absoluta vult; nec homo habet liberum arbitrium super illis que de necessitate vel instinctu nature vult, ut respectu talium: *velle bonum diligere*, set respectu talium que libere potest facere et dimittere.

God's power of lordship is everlasting, but not so His actual lordship. Power does not require the actual existence of that which is subject thereto. And as mastery can only be exerted over something that is done by a rational being, and sin is not a thing, God has properly no power over sin in itself; for though He can destroy, He cannot produce it. Nor has He power over anything that is from eternity, as v. g. those things which He absolutely wills to be; nor is man free not to love what pleases him.

Ex quo patet quod deus non habet potestatem super actum suum intrinsecum, quia non potest aliquem talem temporaliter facere vel corrumpere; et multo magis nemo alius habet potestatem super actus dei. Ideo dicit
Tob. Sara, Tob. 3. *Non est* [*enim*] *in hominis potestate con-*
III, 20. *silium tuum.* Cuius racio videtur, quia consilium domini

And if God has no mastery over His internal Act, much less has man power over God's acts,

37. fara9 MS.; *ib.* enim *deest* MS.

25. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I[a] P. qu. XIX, art. 10. *in corp. art.* 30. *Bonum* is here taken in a very wide sense as that to which anything tends, or has appetence: *id quod omnia appetunt.*

oportet stare sine possibilitate alterius infringentis, ut Ysa. 46, *Consilium meum stabit, et* [*omnis*] *voluntas mea fiet.* Isa. XLVI, 10.

although he can make them not to be.

Nec obest isti firmitati concilii et volucionis dei, quod nemo potest | contraire vel resistere, ipsum 77b[b] causari a creatura, potente facere quod non sit consilium, sciencia, aut volucio dei, ut dicetur proximo capitulo. Patet igitur, cum deus habet potestatem a seipso, et non ab alio, quod oportet ipsam esse eternam, ut dicit Daniel. Nec pocius sequitur: *potestas dominativa est eterna, igitur dominium est eternum,* quam sequitur: *potestas iurisdiccionis vel regiminis est totennis: igitur regnum est totenne.* Stat enim potestas ad opus quantolibet tempore, sine opere.

Holy Writ sometimes uses the word *power* for tyranny, especially the tyranny of Satan;

Set ulterius notandum quod potestas aliquando accipitur in scriptura aggregative pro potencia tirannica qua potens usurpat tyrannidem, pretendendo potestatem, ut diabolus dicitur habere potestatem super homines, et specialiter peccatores. Et proporcionaliter dicit scriptura ipsum dominari eis: unde Iob. 41, *rex super omnes filios superbie;* Iob. XLI, 25. et in evangelio, Io. 12 et 14, vocatur rex super omnes filios superbie *princeps mundi huius;* Io. XII, 31; XIV, 30. et isto modo loquitur Pilatus, Io. 19, dicens, "*Nescis quia potestatem habeo*", et cetera. Io. XIX, 10. Salvator tamen, distinguens tyrannidem cum presumpcione a potestate, que indubie, ut huiusmodi, est bona et a deo, dicit, quod *non haberet potestatem adversum se nullam, nisi data esset sibi desuper.* Et ideo dicit apostolus conformiter ad sensum salvatoris, Ro. 13, *non est potestas nisi a deo.* Rom. XIII, 1. Contingit autem hominem abuti potestate sua, ut innuit apostolus I cor. 9; I Cor. IX, 4, 5, 6. quod fit quando quis presumit ultra limites sue potestatis, vel desidet facere secundum exigenciam sue potestatis, sicut faciunt tyranni et ociosi in potestatibus constituti.

Again, it is used in a concrete sense in Holy Writ, for *one that has power.*

Tercio modo accipitur in predicacione secundum essenciam pro habente potestatem: ut luc. 7, dicit ille denotatus centurio: "*nam et ego homo sum*, et cetera". Luc. VII, 8. i. e. sub domino habente in me

2. omnis *deest* MS. 14. *after* aliquando sumitur MS. 30. 2 Cor. MS.

12. *Regnum.* Charles II had the legal power of reigning immediately after his father's execution, but his actual reign began many years later. In like manner, God's right to be Our Lord is eternal; but His actual Lordship began with creation. Before, God had no subjects, just as Charles II had none over whom he could exert his right.

Luc. XXII, 53.

potestatem. Quarto accipitur pro effectu potestatis; ut, luc. 22, dicit salvator iudeis, *hec est hora vestra et potestas tenebrarum*, i. e. effectus tyrannice potestatis sic capere me in tenebris.

Does God observe justice eternally? Yes, since He has in Himself the laws of justice, which are eternal.

Set est triplex difficultas ulterior, prima, si deus eternaliter servat iusticiam; et videtur michi quod sic, cum leges eterne iustissime sint veritates a deo eternaliter custodite; ut quod nulli est iniuriandum, quod deus est ab homine honorandus, et cetera. Verumptamen cum *custodire* aut *servare* dei non infert eius accionem ad extra, videtur quod non sequitur: *deus servat iusticiam vel rectitudinem, igitur exercet rectitudinem*, licet hoc sequatur de creatura; et sic potestas dei absolute necessario est in actu iuste servando debitum, non sic autem potestas hominis, propter possibilitatem abusionis, agendo vel omittendo.

Does mortal sin take away the powers which belonged to the sinner? It seems not; if it did, no one could abuse his powers; and many practical difficulties would spring from such a doctrine. But he that is in mortal sin, though what he does may be just, does it unjustly, and thus continually abuses his powers.

2° dubitatur si potestas stat in racionali creatura cum mortali peccato; et videtur quod sic, cum sit donum dei existens in prelato ecclesie et alio habente superioritatem super alios sibi subditos. Aliter enim non contingeret hominem abuti eius potestate; set sacerdotes et alii habentes iurisdiccionem cessarent habere potestatem incidendo in peccatum mortale, quod nimis confunderet politicam. Verumptamen quicunque existens in peccato mortali, etsi faciat opus iustum secundum potestatem, abutitur continue potestate sua, quia debet iuste facere; et in quantum huiusmodi faciens iniuste facit, quantumlibet iustum faciat. Factum enim non est penale, in se, etsi quis iniuste ipsum faciat. Et per consequens obediencia tyranno est bona, etsi sua abutitur potestate, ut innuit apostolus ro. 13.

Rom. XIII, 1.

God's power is absolute, all others are limited.

Et ex istis patet quomodo potestas dei non potest esse restricta, set ex causa racionabili ligari potest potestas cuiuslibet creature. Sic enim ligantur potestates clavium in multis pro suo perpetuo . . . . quilibet usus ex racionali causa suspenditur. Si tamen causa nova suspenderet sive de esse nove potestatis possent exercere potestatem . . . . . ex quibus convincitur potestatem non extingui. Unde sic significantur potestates coniugatorum quoad

9. eciam *pro* et MS. 17. ut *pro* et MS. 19. ꝑṽ°ց *pro* super alios MS. 27. penis *pro* penale MS. 37. ɔuici°~ *pro* convincitur MS.

21. *Cessarent.* Wyclif, as is well known, answered this question very differently at a later date. 33. *Sic.* The text seems very corrupt here. I have introduced gaps at the places where they seem likely, but there are none in the MS.

sua corpora, quoad multos usus quoslibet positos, solutos habere. Ideo dicit apostolus 1 cor. 7°, quod *vir non habet potestatem sui corporis;* suple, tam libere utendi quoad quoslibet usus ut soluti. Et hinc dicitur uxorem non [habere potestatem] vovendo facere penitenciam sine viri licencia. Et isto modo indubie est potestas pape ligata, tam quoad spiritualia quam corporalia, ut patet alibi. (I Cor. VII, 4.)

We must not confound *power* with *lordship;* the latter implies the former, but not *vice versâ.* The greatest power given to man is complete self-surrender to God; which is incompatible with lordship.

Secundo patet | ex dictis quod non sequitur, si quis habet potestatem, quod habet dominium, quia potestas stat cum peccato mortali, et necessario antecedenter ad dominium; sic quod si est in alico dominium, in eodem est potestas, non econtra. Precipua autem potestas que est homini communicabilis est quod habeat nullum dominium suorum actuum, ut tamquam filius conformet eos beneplacito dei sui, qualiter deus *dedit potestatem quotquot receperunt eum,* per graciam *filios dei fieri;* ut dicitur. Io. primo. (78a[a]) (Io. I, 12.)

How far does the power of a creature extend? This is a very difficult problem. Every righteous man has power, I think, over all inferior creatures.

3° dubitatur quam ampla sit potestas creature; illud autem est grande dubium, et perplexum. Videtur tamen mihi quod quilibet iustus habet potestatem super omnes creaturas ipso inferiores. Unde, Eccli 17: *deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum ymaginem suam fecit illum. Et iterum convertit illum in ipsam, et secundum se vestivit illum virtute. Numerum dierum, et tempus dedit illi, et dedit illi potestatem eorum que sunt super terram. Posuit timorem illius super omnem carnem, et dominatus est bestiarum et volatilium.* In quo dicto patet primo, quomodo homo interior factus est trinus secundum naturam. Secundo quomodo factus est innocens et iustus ad similitudinem sui factoris; quod intelligitur per illud Gen. primo: *Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem nostram.* Tercio limitavit sibi periodum; et quarto dedit sibi potestatem dominativam super creaturas sibi subditas. Tale dominium habet quilibet iustus, ut post dicetur. (Eccli XVII, 1–4.) (Gen. I, 26.)

Created in a threefold nature, innocent and righteous, as his Maker, he has, for a time, dominion over inferior beings.

There are various degrees of power; one, common to all the just, consists in a general use of all things according to God's will;

Est autem dare quotlibet gradus potestatum super huiusmodi causas per diversos gradus usuum; ut quilibet iustus cui complacet ordinacio dei de omnibus usibilibus, habet generalissimum usum omnium; alius

2. 2 *pro* 1 MS. 5. habere potestatem *deest* MS. 12. quid MS.

29. *Trinus.* Soul, body, and compound.

autem, cui administracio libera committitur quoad usus civiles, habet usum ampliorem; ut, Ge. 39, dicit Joseph. [Gen. XXXIX, 8, 9.] *Ecce dominus meus, omnibus michi traditis, ignorat quid habeat in domo sua, nec quicquam est quod non in mea sit potestate, preter te que uxor eius es.* Set preter talem potestatem naturalem vel civilem, est dare potestatem spiritualem; ut prelati habent potestatem super peccatores, racione peccati subdentis eos servituti, et illam vocant nonnulli potestatem clavium vel iurisdiccionis. Et isto modo habet Christus autonomatice potestatem dimittendi peccata, ut patet Luc. 5[a]; [Luc. V, 24.] et ministerialiter atque subautentice in nomine Christi alii sacerdotes ecclesie, ut patet Io. 20, [Io. XX, 23.] *Quorum remiseritis;* et non solum hoc, set potestatem quodammodo faciendi mirabilia, quia salvator dedit discipulis potestatem super omnia demonia et calcandi serpentes; ut patet Luc. 9 et 10. [Luc. IX, 1; X, 17.] Talis autem non est nisi subministracio potestatis, que principaliter ascribenda est auctori qui inmediate facit mirabilia occasione potestatis date homini, ut hoc impetret a deo suo. Ideo in primitiva ecclesia sancti, timentes ne latria eis tribuetur, dederunt deo in cuius nomine hec fecerant potestatem huiusmodi: ut actibus 3, [Act. III, 12.] dicit Petrus post sanacionem claudi, *Quid intuemini quasi nostra [virtute aut] potestate fecerimus hunc ambulare?* Et talem potestatem habent sacerdotes conficiendi corpus Christi, absolvendi, excommunicandi, arbitrandi, et graciam inpetrandi stacionem vel retrogradacionem solis; habent potestatem in hoc, quod est longe minus quam conficere corpus Christi et cetera sacramenta, modo quo sacerdotibus competit ministrare. Ex quibus patet quod non sequitur: *iste potest talia miracula facere, igitur habet potestatem talia faciendi.* Potestas enim quelibet creature limitatur a deo, et tunc donatur. Deus dat sibi carismata, ut ad instanciam sui deus talia faciat. Et probabiliter visum est multis quod talis potestas dicitur figurative communicata sanctis de quanto, tanquam dii, pretendunt vel representant personam dei, in cuius potestate hec faciunt. Unde pharisei concludebant Christum blasphemare, implicando se esse deum quando dixit paralitico: *remittuntur tibi peccata,*

another is more special, and implies the administration of certain things.

A third is spiritual; the power to forgive sins, belonging to Christ in the first place,

and communicated by Him to His disciples, together with miraculous powers;

such as producing Christ's sacramental Body, giving absolution, &c., which are greater wonders than causing the sun to stand.

A man that can work miracles has not properly this power; God grants them to his prayers, and he works them in God's name.

Christ, forgiving sins in His own name, was thought to blaspheme, until, healing

2. Ge. 34 MS. 4. quod in potestate mea non sit potestate MS. 21. dederint MS. 22. att'ꝫ *pro* actibus 3 MS. 24. in *pro* nostra; virtute aut *deest* MS. 35. vilum MS.

the palsied man also in His own name, He showed that He was God. Yet we may say that a man has supernatural power, but merely as God's instrument.

Mt 9. Set salvator arguit eos in facto. Unde pari racione arguerent eum esse deum ex hoc quod nomine proprio miraculose sanavit eum: utrumque enim, ut dicit salvator, esse eque difficile. Potest tamen, conformiter cum scriptura et doctoribus, concedi quod purus homo habet potestatem faciendi miracula, absolvendi a peccatis, et sic de similibus; premissa tamen distinccione de potestate, quod quedam est [per] se primo et inmediate, ut potestas divina, et quidam ab | ipso ministerialiter exhibita, cuius usus consistit in signo cui deus dignatus est regulariter concurrere per se supernaturaliter agendo, quando suus minister facit legittime tale signum, ut patet in ministerio sacramentorum: igitur, et cetera.

Matth. IX, 2.

78a[b]

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Answers to Bradwardine's arguments. He says: If of two things, each of which infers the other, one causes the other, it is prior thereto: which is the case with divine as regards human volition. I admit that the volition of God is infinitely prior to that of man, in duration, but not in perfection, as it refers to man; as it refers to God, it is prior.

Istis premissis, patet via respondendi ad argumenta doctoris.

Sentencia primi argumenti stat in isto quod quandocunque aliqua duo convertuntur [quo]ad subsistendi consequenciam, et unum est causa alterius, digne prius eo dicitur; set volucio dei respectu actus voluntatis convertitur secundum subsistendi consequenciam cum eodem actu, et est causa eius: igitur digne prius ea est. Convenio cum doctore in antecedente, et do plus; quia, ubi ille dicit quod quandocunque est actus hominis, et illa volucio dei est, et econtra; ego dico quod volucio illa est eterna, si est, et sic est infinitum prior voluntate creata quoad duracionem, non quantum ad bonitatem in se consideratam: Nam, ut prius dictum est, relacio non habet bonitatem nisi a suis extremis. Ideo, cum volucio dei terminata ad creaturam sit gracia creature, ut sue, patet quod creatura, ut sic, est ipsa melior et prior in ordine descendendi, quamvis econtra in ordine ascendendi, volucio illa sit prior; et sic causant se reciproce in diversis generibus causandi.

He will not admit a doctrine that makes man more free than God. But this proceeds from his idea of volition as an absolute, not

Secundum argumentum stat in hoc quod ex ista via sequitur voluntatem humanam esse liberiorem voluntate divina, quia voluntas humana in omnibus precederet, ut domina, preëligendo volita tamquam regens, et

14. Cam 6m *in marg.; large initial I in blue ink* MS. 18. quo *deest* MS. 29. ut *pro* non MS. 31. ut suus MS.

voluntas divina necessario sequeretur necessitata ad consensum sui regentis. Set, cum ista evidencia non haberet colorem, nisi intelligendo per voluntates illas naturas absolutas, suppono quod intelligat per illas voluntates naturas absolutas. Volucio enim dicit relativa; non plus regit, eligit, vel consentit, quam proporcio vel quecunque alia relacio: et certum est quod intellecto antecedente de illis naturis, nemo potest probare illud quod assumitur consequenter. Non enim est color, etsi aliqua volucio dei sit aliqua volucione hominis posterior, quod natura divina sit natura humana posterior. Et quod oportet doctorem concedere antecedens, patet sic. Non sequitur, "*ego volo beatitudinem, igitur deus vult beatificare me*"; et sequitur econtra: Igitur, cum utrumque sit ut suppono, sequitur quod prius naturaliter est me velle beatitudinem, quam deum velle beatificare me. Et sic est de quotlibet a deo volitis, que sunt infinitis volucionibus in deo posteriora, cum talis sit ordo volucionum in deo qualis est ordo volitorum ad extra; ut sequitur ex principiis doctoris.

as a relative entity. A relation, as such, neither governs nor chooses, nor consents to anything. You cannot say of the Divine Nature what you can of its volitions.

Now it does not follow that if I desire bliss, God's will is to give me bliss, but conversely; so that my desire comes first in the natural order.

Tercium argumentum maiorem difficultatem includit, assumens quod voluntas humana voluntatem divinam necessitat. Ad quod dicitur quod ipsum potest bene intelligi et male; ideo, exposito sensu sano, secure concedo conclusionem.

The third argument is more difficult; it supposes that man's will necessitates that of God. This I admit in the right sense, which I shall expound.

Potest enim intelligi quod aliquid cit[r]a deum cogit ipsum ad aliquid, quod est summe impossibile, ut dictum est superius de qualibet natura libera quoad actum suum volendi. Potest secundo intelligi quod deus de pura necessitate naturali, vel absoluta, agit aut vult aliquid ad extra; quorum primum est inpossibile, quia tunc non volendo sic ageret; et secundum est inpossibile, quia tunc omne ens absolute necessario esset. Vel tercio, potest intelligi quod aliquid citra deum, non in virtute eius prius necessitatis, necessitaret eum ad aliquid, vel quod creatura eternaliter, si eternalitur, necessi-

We cannot possibly think of God as coërced by His creature, nor as acting by the necessity of His nature, nor as determined to act by any other necessity of which He is not the source.

15. *Naturaliter.* This is what modern philosophers would term *in ordine essendi*, as opposed to the *ordo cognoscendi*. What is prior in one order is, generally speaking, posterior in the other. You must see or hear of a man before you can know him to exist; the sight or hearing is first in your knowledge. But the man's existence is in itself antecedent to your seeing or hearing of him. 35. *Eius*, I think, must refer to God.

tatur ab illa. Quorum primum est inpossibile, quia deus est prima causa cuiuslibet ordinate necessitudinis. Secundum est inpossibile, cum deus non potest habere creaturam secum coeternam.

But there is the necessity which follows from a partial cause that necessarily influences its effect. God, and the creature which His volition intends, together determine the act of His volition. In a creature, the *possibility of being willed* caused God's volition as a good thing; but as this very goodness proceeds from God, God necessitates Himself by means of His creature, giving finally to one man bliss, to another damnation. Such necessity implies liberty, and we cannot infer the contrary. Bradwardine says that God is necessitated by his own volition, infinitely beneath Him; then why not by that of the creature? A man who takes a vow freely obliges himself, and so his acts are free; it is the same with regard to God.

Excluso igitur isto sensu falso de ista necessitacione dei a creaturis, detenendus est sensus verus indubie ex principiis veris doctoris, sicut aliqua causa posita, sequitur suum causatum. Tunc illa est necessitas antecedens respectu sui causati, nedum tota, set pars eius est causa parcialiter necessitans; ut deus, eius volucio, et ignis, necessitant combustibile comburi, modo deus et creatura terminans volucionem divinam sunt causa, ex qua posita sequitur formaliter deum velle ipsam esse, ut patet ex sepe dictis. Ideo volubile, cum bonitate sua qualibet a deo, est causa, in virtute dei necessitans ipsum ad illud volendum. Ymmo, ut placencius loquar, deus libere necessitat seipsum per suam creaturam, dum iuvat eam ad finaliter perseverandum in gracia, et permittit aliam permanere in finali obstinancia: ex quibus | causaliter exigentibus secundum legem pro- 78b[a]
priam, deus necessitat seipsum ad dandum uni premium, et alteri penam eternam. Et talis necessitas ex supposicione arguit graciam et libertatem in deo voluntarie se obligante. Nec est color ex tali necessitate concludere deum aut eius volucionem non esse liberam, ut sepe dictum est. Nam secundum doctorem, volucio dei infinitum inferior ipso necessitat eum ad producendum creaturam, quia claudit contradiccionem illam poni, cum hoc quod non producat creaturam volitam; et tamen ipse non est minus liber, set infinitum liberior ista volucione. Quare igitur non potest creatura, que est finis gracia cuius est volucio dei, necessitare ipsum, sicut et sua volucio. Sicut ergo religioso ex voto necessitante se ad actum observancie regularis non minus libere facit ipsum quam irreligiosus non sic se obligans; sic deus promissione et iureiurando pollicitans premium, (ut loquitur apostolus ad he. 6°) non minus libere dat, Hebr.
quam si non obligaret se promissione, preordinancia, VI, 13.
vel prevolucione alia, set longe liberius.

It is said that in our doctrine, a creature

Quartum argumentum capit quod illa necessitaret deum ad certum volubile non volendum, et prohiberet

2. necūs *pro* necessitudinis MS. 15. quamlibet MS. 33, 34. necessitans MS.

eum ad agendum; set pro isto dicitur quod, sicut deus utitur creatura ex qua posita sequitur eam velle eandem; ita servat veritatem negativam, ex qua posita sequitur ipsum non velle datam negacionem, licet possibilem, et sic necessitate ex supposicione necessitat creatura deum ad non volendum datum actum: non sic tamen quin contingentissime et liberrime potest deus velle oppositum; ut quamvis volucio dei eterna necessitat tam deum quam creaturam, non tamen absolute, set ex supposicione; sic quod tam deus quam creatura potest libere in oppositum. Set non stante illa volucione, sic Petro non merente, sequitur quod deus vult ipsum non mereri; nec stat cum hoc quod deus vult ipsum non mereri, nec stat cum hoc quod deus vult ipsum mereri. Verumptamen contingentissimum est Petrum mereri, et deum hoc velle. Ideo tale non est inpossibile nisi secundum quid, et ex supposicione, modo quo omne falsum est impossibile: set quod creatura prohiberet deum est inpossibile, sicut incolorabile est quod aliquid inhibeat vel impediat deum prohibere; namque dicit preceptivam potestatem vel impedicionem nature intendentis ad finem aliquem. Modo constat quod, posita quacunque negacione contingenti, sequitur quod deus non intendit oppositum. Ideo nichil potest prohibere deum, et sic possit dicere talia verba, "non facias hoc". Hoc tamen est in causa, quod deus scit et vult se hominem non adulterari, quia est in eius libera potestate facere vel causare quod deus non velit hoc.

Quinto assumitur quod homo potest facere deum continuare actum suum, cessare, quiescere, et iterum resumere quotiens [cunque] homo voluerit; quia, homine cessante bene agere et reincipiente, oportet deum proporcionaliter velle. Set miror quomodo hoc haberet colorem penes doctorem, cum primo libro, corollario capituli 23[i], dicit quod nichil potest deus noviter diligere vel odire. Et tercio libro, corollario capituli 50, dicit quod omnem actum cognicionis aut volucionis divine necesse est semper fuisse, et similiter semper fore; sic quod tales actus, quamvis contingentissime possunt non esse (ut dicit, ca° 5° eiusdem tercii), tamen non possunt incipere vel desinere esse. Cum igitur aliud indubie sit

would prevent God from acting.

This prevention is only a necessity under the supposition that God chooses to create the said creature; so that from all eternity He is free, although His choice has been made.

From a posited fact we can infer that God has willed that fact, but neither that He has absolutely willed it, nor the contrary; for the fact is quite contingent, and the impossibility of its contrary depends on its happening, not on the creature forcing God's will.

If a contingent negation is a fact, we know that God is not opposed to its taking place, although He may prohibit it.

If a man changes his mind, it is said that God would follow every change.

I wonder how Bradwardine could have written this, since he distinctly states that there is no possible change in God.

How can man be the cause

15. contin^m *pro* contingentissimum MS. 18. est est MS. 31. cunque *deest* MS.

that God should not will a given thing, or that He should cease to will it? At any moment it is in God's power not to have a given volition, though He cannot cease from having it.

What an absurdity to suppose God's acts consequent upon those of the creature, and depending on them!

It is said that all Divine volitions must be naturally prior to those of man, because some certainly are, and what is natural to an individual is so to the species: an argument by which Aristotle proves that all heavenly bodies are round. But Aristotle speaks only of such qualities as are necessary to any being to attain the end of his existence. For that reason the shape and position of the heart is the same in all men; likewise, since the heavenly bodies move in circles, their shape cannot but be spherical. And in so far as any property

verum, quomodo est color, si homo potest esse in causa, quare deus non velit datum volubile? et si de facto velit ipsum, quod homo potest esse in causa quare deus cesset, aut desinat velle ipsum? Et [quod] iterum reincipiat velle ipsum, si non fallor, nemo potest hoc docere. Ymmo quandocunque creatura quicquam agit [est] in potestate libera dei, nedum ante, set tum et semper impedire ipsam; vel verius, facere quod non agat. Nam pro quocunque instanti deus habet volucionem eternam contingentem, potest non habere illam, licet non possit desistere ab illa. Si autem loquamur de agencia dei extrinseca, quale inconveniens quod ego possum esse causa quare deus cooperatur mecum, quare cessat cooperari, et reincipit proporcionaliter ut causo operacionem meam, cum sit dare aliquam operacionem dei operacione hominis posteriorem!

6°, assumitur quod quicquid est naturale alicui singulari alicuius speciei est naturale cuilibet individuo illius speciei; set naturale est alicui volucioni | divine precedere 78b[b]
naturaliter volucionem humanam, igitur et cuilibet. Maior patet, 2° *De celo* 59, ubi Aristoteles per hoc principium probat quod si unum astrum sit spericum, et quodlibet.

Set hic dicitur quod sensus philosophi est quod si individuum alicuius speciei habet accidens naturale necessarium ad finem consequentem ipsum, ut in tali specie, tunc uno individuo sic accidentato, et quodlibet. Ut, si necessarium sit motum pulsus esse in homine secundum arterias, et ille non posset competere inesse cordi sine pineata figura cordis et posicione in medio corporis, declinando secundum conum ad latus sinistrum, tunc in omni homine est cor taliter accidentatum; sic, si astra sunt circulariter mobilia, et ille motus non foret illis conveniens nisi correspondenter forent figure circulares, consequens est deum ordinare omnia astra figure circularis. Quando autem alii fines non sunt necessarii speciei, set in maiori parte, tunc media sunt

4. quod *deest* MS. 6. causa *pro* creatura MS. 7. est *deest* MS. 26. agi[to] *pro* accidentato MS. 31. acci[t9] *pro* accidentatum MS.

11. *Non possit.* God in His eternity has determined to will that a given thing shall take place in time; this determination being free *and eternal,* at any instant of time He might not have willed it; but as a fact, His volition being eternal, He cannot change it.

illis finibus proporcionabilia; ut habere primo decem digitos, et sic de similibus. Si autem sit accidens naturale non pro fine debito speciei, non est color si unum individuum sit sic accidentatum, et quodlibet illius speciei: ut non oportet, si unus habet nasum simum, aut aquilinum, vel tale accidens naturale, set non necessarium pro fine consequente animal ut in tali specie, quod quilibet sic se habeat taliter accidentatum.

is useful to the aim of existence, it is to be found in a greater part of the species. But to be naturally snub-nosed or hook-nosed, is irrelevant, and not necessary to the species.

Istis visis, planum videtur quod argumentum non concludit intentum, tum quia non est dare speciem aut genus volucionum dei, tum eciam quia, capto communi illarum volucionum pro specie, multa essent naturalia alteri, sicut est de illis naturalibus que non consequuntur illud commune. Et, si capitur quod cuilibet volucioni dei, in quantum talis, consequitur esse prius qualibet volucione hominis vel creatura quacunque, tunc petitur quod intenditur, non probatur. Certum namque est ex principiis doctoris quod prius naturaliter est homo quam est volucio qua deus appropriate vult illum hominem esse, sicut patet exemplo respectu Aristotelis cui doctor frequenter innititur: *Illud est prius a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequencia.* Ymmo, ut supra tactum, aliqua volucio dei est antecedenter necessaria, et aliqua non, et ita de quibuslibet differenciis eorum. Et si queratur de operacione extrinseca producta a volucione hominis, utrum illa sit principalior quam volucio dei, certum est quod volucio dei est principalior quam aliqua creatura, cum sit deus: et si queratur de volucione dei terminata ad actum extrinsecum, dicitur quod ipsa principalior, sufficiencior, et prior est quam volucio hominis respectu illius actus, quia nulla volucio hominis est causa sufficiens (respectu actus) extrinseca, set causa parcialis et incompleta: volucio autem dei est causa necessitans et completa. Nec sunt ille voluciones necessario connexe ad invicem secundum ordinem prioritatis naturalis, cum ex neutra sequitur reliqua.

Thus the argument is inconclusive. God's volitions are not to be classified into species, and no other classification would serve the purpose intended. If you suppose that every Divine volition, as such, is naturally prior to the corresponding one of man, you beg the question. *If a given man exists, God wills it,* but not *vice-versâ;* therefore, according to Bradwardine, man's existence is prior to God's volition. Of course, if we speak of what is produced by the human will, that must be posterior to God's volition; and at any rate God's volition is more perfect than man's.

Set arguitur: si *a*, volucio hominis, sit causa *b*, actus extrinseci, et illud *b* sit causa *c* volucionis dei . . . .

But is man's will the cause of a given act, and this again the cause of God's volition? Yes;

6. aliquilinum MS. 18. doctꝝ *pro* doctoris MS. 38. *no gap after* die MS.

18. *Prius naturaliter.* Because this volition, being eternal, exists at a time when the man does not exist, and you cannot argue from *its* existence at that time to *his*.

but we are do not speak here of that Will which is identical with God, but of His volitional relations with creatures. As to these, I think it very reasonable to assume that they are caused by the creature's will. I will run, and I run: my will causes my running, and God wills that I run, because of the fact in which He concurs.

Conceditur conclusio in casu; nec ex hoc putandum est quod voluntas absoluta causetur ab alia volucione dei relativa, vel a volucione que deus est. Set disputacio nostra limitata est ad voluciones que sunt veritates contingentes formaliter inexistentes naturis volentibus, quarum aliqua in deo est volubile in homine natura posterior. Nec videtur michi inconveniens, set consonum racioni, quod volucio hominis causet datam volucionem dei partialiter, et non econtra; ut volucio qua volo currere est causa parcialis et per accidens cursus mei. Volucio autem qua deus vult illum cursum esse, fit ab illo cursu et parcialiter a volucione mea, et non causat illam. Verumptamen respectu cuiuscunque concurrunt voluntas humana et divina: est voluntas divina prior, quia eterna, et racione sui subiecti perfeccior.

The human will may not attain its end, and so is less efficacious than God's volition. This, though itself of no more entitative perfection than any fictive entity, receives eternity and immutability from God, its subject; from its object, contingency; causability from its cause. It is indeed a most marvellous thing!

Et posita quacunque volucione, causacio respectu actus extrinseci, cum sit frustrabilis, non est tam completa causa et tam efficax sicut volucio dei infrustrabilis. Si autem queratur quante perfeccionis est volucio dei relativa absolute in se, dicitur quod nullius penitus pocius quam chimera, set a deo suo subiecto habet eternitatem, incorruptibilitatem, incausabilitatem, cum ceteris que sunt perfeccionis. Ab obiecto vero habet ex ordinancia dei summam contingenciam ad utrumlibet, causabilitatem a causa, quantumlibet ipsa posteriori eternitate vel | tempore, et posteriori ordinancia nature 79a
respectu illius quod tanta duracione precedit cum aliis condicionibus ex istis sequentibus. Et licet deus fecerit multas mirabiles res, inter omnes tamen ab eo causatas, sua sciencia et sua volucio relativa [sunt] res multum mirabiles.

It is objected that if the act of human will is prior to that of God, then the servant is more free than his Lord (Christ). It is true that all Christ's acts were necessitated; and in His humanity, His volitions caused those of His Divinity.

7° capitur quod, si voluntas humana naturaliter antecedit voluntatem divinam, tunc servus est liberior suo domino. Set minor est inpossibilis. Conceditur tamen cum doctore quod Christus est necessitatus ad quemlibet actum suum humanum vel divinum per voluntatem precedentem. Unde, aliqua volucio divina est posterior actu quocunque Christi secundum humanitatem, aliqua prior, et aliqua econtra secundum convertendi consequenciam; ut puta, illa que terminatur ad accionem Christi, ipsam causans et recausata ab eadem. Nec dubitandum est quin due erant voluciones in Christo

2 absoluta est non causetur MS. 3o. [sunt] *deest* MS.

correspondenter ad duas naturas; et quelibet volucio humana fuit subdita volucioni divine, sic quod absolute inpossibile fuit Christum peccare. Verumptamen contingiter ad utrumlibet ita libere, vel liberius alio homine, fecit omnes actus humanos et causavit in deo quotlibet voluciones eternas, sicut alii homines. Nec fuit possibile quod voluntas Christi rebellaret contra deum, quamvis voluit oppositum quod deus; et ipse voluit, tam voluntate sensus quam voluntate naturali intellectus, cum tristis fuit anima sua usque ad mortem; et non sicut ipse voluit secundum illas voluntates, set sicut pater voluit impletum est, ut patet M^t 26. Ille tamen voluciones erant rectissime et conformes divine voluntati, ut patet ex dictis in principio huius tractatus. Voluntas autem sua divina et voluntas deliberativa humana habuerunt execucionem suam, cum alie voluciones ad oppositum non imperarunt membris exequi suum finem intentum. Ideo non fuit resistencia, rebellio, vel inordinata passio, set propassio, ut dicetur.

Yet He was at least as free as any man;

His human will, though desiring the contrary to the Will Divine, could not possibly rebel against it.

Matth. XXVI, 38, 39.

For His Divine will, and the settled determination of His humanity ruled every motion of His body.

Et ex dictis patet solucio illius Achillis, quo arguitur quod Christus potuit asseruisse falsum, et sic, docendo fidem creditam a beatis, decepisse eos salvatos in fide erronea et false ficta. Et sic non esset credendum assercioni sue tamquam loco ab auctoritate, nisi argumento topico; sicut creditur dictis ab uno fide digno, sic quod cum evidencia stat oppositum. Racio talis est. Simpliciter necessarium est quod Christus sic asseruit, docuit, et provulgavit quod veniet ad finale iudicium, salvando oves, condempnando hedos; et sic de aliis contingentibus futuris. Et si Christus sic credidit, asseruit, docuit, et provulgavit, sequitur quod sicut fuit, est, aut erit, vel quod Christus fuit deceptus aut alios decipiens, et beatificatus in fide falsa. Igitur simpliciter necessarium est quod Christus sic potuit illusisse, vel quod sic fuit, est aut erit. Et cum neutra pars disiunctive sit perti-

This answers the argument made to prove that Christ was fallible. It runs thus: What Christ said or foretold either was absolutely and necessarily true, or His statements merited only the credit given to a trustworthy man,

who may be mistaken and lead others into error.

3, 4. contingit MS. 4. in libero MS. 12. esse *pro* est MS. 16. exequ^em *pro* execucionem MS. 29. edos *pro* hedos MS.

20. *Achillis.* Neither in any of Wyclif's printed works, nor in any other book at hand, have I been able to find mention of such an author, and am inclined to think it is a mistake of the copyist. A conjecture, however, has occurred to me. Zenon of Elea, the famous sophist, made an argument against the possibility of movement, which was termed 'The Achilles'. May not famous later fallacies have been given the same name?

Now, if all that Christ foretold was necessarily to occur,

nens alteri, sequitur quod altera pars sit similiter necessaria; et non secunda, igitur prima. In omnibus namque consequencia bona formaliter est consequens tam necessarium vel magis necessarium quam suum antecedens. Et istud communiter reducitur denegacioni Petri, sic arguendo: Si Christus hoc predixit absolute asserendo, tunc hoc est, fuit, vel erit. Set similiter necessarium est quod Christus sic asseruit, eciam posito quod sumus in tempore intercepto inter prediccionem et negacionem; igitur et consequens est simpliciter necessarium; et sequitur quod Christus necessitavit Petrum ad peccandum; et per idem quodcunque futurum est a deo necessitatum, cum non maioris efficacie necessitative sit assercio Christi secundum humanitatem quam eius preordinancia eterna secundum divinitatem prima cuiuscunque pene consequentis peccatum, vel alterius contingentis.

Peter could not help denying Him; if he could, Christ had been fallible.

And if we say that Christ is infallible, and Peter's denial necessary, all God's decrees and their consequences are necessary likewise.

Here the answer is easy, truth manifesting itself, pressing hard on those who desert it, pressing them even in the grip of Hell, and giving eternal bliss and peace to those who have looked beyond this narrow world, and loved the Universals.

In ista materia est facilimum respondere, tenendo [doctrinam] veritatis constantis sibi ipsi omnibus modis, et coangustiantis eius desertores nexu multiplici. Sic enim habens effectum angustum, desiderando solum se ipsum vel ipsa terrestria, quorum globus est quasi punctus in comparacione ad mundum secundum astronomos, habebit effeccionem eternaliter restrictam in tartaris proporcionaliter ad effectum demeritorium hic [in] via, ubi alii conversantes in celestibus, diligentes universalia secundum latitudinem ambitus tocius terre, habebunt eternaliter in domino universitatis create effeccionem quietam, fruendo in ipso significaturis. Correspondenter et speculantibus illis qui non possunt elevare animum ad cognoscendum totum discursum et vicissionem temporum esse de facto deo presentem, set retrudunt artando singula que sunt in unum instans, illaqueant se, coartando ad quodlibet inpossibilia; et querentes contra conversum subterfugia, involvunt se in inconveniencia | ampliora. 79a[b]

The more the former seek to escape, the more they are involved in absurdities.

Ardmachanus was forced to admit that Christ was capable of error.

Others say: Christ affirmed nothing absolutely concerning the future.

Unde dominus Armachanus, litteris *De conclusionibus Armenorum*, capitulo 2°, fuit adeo coartatus, quod concessit conclusionem reductam de Christo. Alii autem dicunt minus colorate quod Christus non potuit quicquam futurum absolute asserere vel docere; et sic vel nichil scivit simpliciter de contingentibus futuris quoad

5. denominacione *pro* denegacioni MS. 15. p[u] *pro* prima MS. 18. doctrinam *deest* MS.; *ib.* contestantis MS. 19. sicut *pro* sic MS. 23. int'taris *pro* in tartaris MS. 24. in *deest* MS. 29. illi MS. 35. litteras MS.

scienciam humanam, vel si scivit, prohibitus fuit a deo vel actualiter considerare suum scitum, vel ipsum ad extra detegere, ne forte inponat necessitates ex sua consideracione. Et sic non daretur fides eius, quando Io. XIV, 29. dixit Io. 14, *et nunc dixi vobis priusquam fiat, ut cum factum fuerit, credatis.* Quomodo, queso, omnisciens non foret conscius sibi ipsi, si simpliciter doceret fidem quam simpliciter fecit eos credere, et tamen noluit illam simpliciter set condicionaliter asserere? magna indubie foret duplicitas.

But what duplicity would there have been in teaching a faith to be believed simply, and yet considering it in His own mind only as a probability!

Tercii dicunt quod Christus sic asseruit simplici assercione, et iam potest esse quod non sic asseruit, cum eius assercio dependet a futuro, sicut volucio divina; set non sic est de aliqua assercione alterius creature que potest decipi. Istud autem peccat in secunda parte sua, cum assercio Christi secundum humanitatem fuit accidens eiusdem speciei specialissime cum aliis assercionibus hominum, cum fuit actus positive ellicitus. Ideo eque necessarium est ipsam fuisse, sicut aliam assercionem cuiuscunque. Nec potuit pocius fuisse non assercio quam quevis alia, quia aliter modica fides daretur sue doctrine. Nec foret assercio sua per se in aliqua specie; nec tollitur per hoc credulitas absoluta discipulorum suorum quam indubie ipse unicus. Magister eos docebat ad intra, sicut movebat aures ad extra. Et sic potuit decepisse alios in fide quam predicavit, et ita de aliis convertibilibus. Quotlibet tales rimas querunt qui coartant omnia in instantis angustia.

Others say: His affirmation was absolute; but, depending on the future (even as God's volition thus depends), it would not have been made if the event were not to happen. But why not, since any proposition uttered by Christ is of the same nature as those uttered by fallible men?

Extendendo igitur tempus quod deus creator temporis constituit, planum est ex dictis superius quod tam contingens est *Christum fuisse incarnatum* vel quicquam fecisse, quam contingens est quod Antechristus erit.

Understanding by *time* the whole of indefinite time, we say that Christ's Incarnation was purely contingent.

8. voluit MS. 18. illicitus MS. 29. quo MS. 30. causa *pro* tam MS.

26, *Potuit decepisse.* I have given in the side-notes the most rational exposition of the answer; but the end of the paragraph seems to point to another theory, so flagrantly absurd that I have hesitated to give it. It may be *now, at the time of the event happening or not* (*iam* potest esse, *l.* 12) that Christ did not affirm what He did. At the time of utterance, the assertion was indeed made, but if the thing does not take place, the assertion has not been made! This indeed would be exposed to Wyclif's reproach, since the assertion was then made, and was not true, if the event did not subsequently take place.

The proposition: *If Christ foretold a thing, that thing is or will be* is absolutely necessary; but the antecedent is contingent, as also Christ's existence. So is the consequent, but their nexus is of absolute necessity. Therefore whilst both are hypothetically necessary, this does not exclude contingency on both sides.

Ideo indubie absolute necessarium est, si Christus hoc asseruit, ipsum est et erit; set antecedens contingens ad utrumlibet est eum fuisse. Et ita quam certi sumus quod Christus quicquam asseruit, tam certi sumus quod ipsum est in tempore suo, cum veritas conneccionis sit absolute necessaria, utraque extremitatum existente continuitate ad utrumlibet. Et custodiat homo per mille annos, et si non falor, non inveniet solucionem aliquam preter istam, concedendo quod tam antecedens quam consequens est necessarium, neutrum tamen est sic necessarium, quum sit ad utrumlibet. Nec est credendum quod Christus fuit absolute necessitatus ad moriendum aut faciendum quicquid facerat, set tantum ex supposicione necessitatus, advolucione et preordinancia dei eterna, que est necessaria ex supposicione, ut dicit sanctus Thomas prima parte summe, questione 19, articulo 3°.

It was possible for Christ to be incarnate, yet not die, and so of all the other things that He did and suffered. He would not have merited, but not demerited either. Some acts, however, were absolutely necessary; v. g. His vision in the Word.

Ymmo, cum incarnacione Christi stat quod non moriatur, cum potest incarnari stante integra innocencia humani generis; et ita de quacunque passione vel operacione eius conceditur quod summe libere et contingenter ad utrumlibet ipsam causavit, et semper potuit fecisse oppositum. Nunquam tamen potuit, propter vehemenciam sue libertatis, declinasse a rectitudine. Ideo, aliud est facere oppositum actus qui de facto est meritorius, et aliud demereri. Multe tamen species accionum fuerunt sibi inevitabiles, supposita incarnacione; ut visiones in verbo, dilecciones dei et proximi, et multa similia. Unde, sicut sequitur quod beati in patria, in quantum huiusmodi, vident et viderunt futura in verbo: sic et Christus.

Whatever Christ sees in God must take place; if He had foretold anything not about to take place, He would have lied.

Et utrobique sequitur, si aliquis talis viderit quicquam in verbo, ipsum erit. Unde, cum acciones sunt suppositorum, et Christus, si sic simpliciter et determinate scivit omnia, patet quod mentitus fuisset si contra conscienciam dixisset falsum, docendo falsum, quod est inpossibile de beatis in patria videntibus in verbo quodlibet futurum.

Ardmachanus says he never could find a satisfactory answer to this; it was because he had

Unde dominus Armachanus, in *De questionibus armenorum*, li. 16°, capitulo 4, dicit quod studuit 20 annis

2. est contingens MS. 3. deum *pro* eum MS. 5. conneccciones MS. 21. ut *pro* ad MS. 26. et viconeo *pro* ut visiones MS. 32. fuit *pro* sic MS.

7. *Custodiat* = keep on? 15. *St. Thomas.* S^a Theol. loco citato, in corp art.

per vices circa istam materiam, set adhuc propter defectum radicis ampliando verba de presenti dimittit illam materiam ibi insolutam dubitando, si deus potest revelare in verbo veritatem ad utrumlibet de futuro, quia vel videtur sibi quod Christus non vidit talia in 79b[a] verbo, vel si vidit, | necessarium est illa esse tempore suo. Et plana est deduccio ac conclusio concedenda, cum omne futurum sit necessarium esse, ex quo beatus videt omnia illa in verbo: non tamen sunt sic necessaria, quin sint contingencia ad utrumlibet, sicut et quelibet veritas de preterito, et existencia cuilibet tempore.

not learned to extend the signification of the present. Is, to all time.

His conclusion as to the necessity of all events is evident, but they may be contingent at the same (eternal) time.

Et in hoc concordat doctor profundus, set superaddit unum gradum necessitatis quod omne futurum est cuilibet creature inevitabile, in tantum quod omne opus temporale Christi dicit esse sibi inevitabile, ut patet libro 3°, ca° primo, 2°, et 29°. Set, ut patebit, hoc est medium necessitare contingencia.

Bradwardine agrees with us here; but he adds that whatever is to be must be.

Hoc igitur puto sanum, cuilibet catholice credendum, quod si Christus vel alius beatus vidit quicquam in verbo, tunc ipsum erit; et si Christus quicquam docuit, asseruit, vel de libertate credidit, tunc ipsum est. Et sic absoluta necessitas, que est veritas connecionis, est principium fidei christiane, ut docet Augustinus 2°. *De doctrina christiana*. Nam veritas connecccionis est tante necessitatis ut, utrobique extremo existente inpossibili, est veritas absolute necessaria, ut exemplificat Augustinus de argumento apostoli, prima cor. 15: *si mortui non resurgunt, neque Christus resurrexit.*

I Cor. XV, 16.

Every Catholic should believe that what is seen in the Word, will surely take place; and that all that Christ taught is true.

The nexus of a hypothetical proposition is of such absolute necessity, that it does not require the truth of either of its members.

Scio tamen quod sophiste capciosi arguerent contra dicta, ex hoc quod Christus multa docuit: quomodo igitur sequitur: Si christus hoc docuit, ipsum est? Et per idem sequitur argumentum apostoli non valere, cum nunc sit verum quod mortui non resurgunt, et falsum quod Christus non resurexit. Set benedictus deus, qui liberavit a talibus instanciis. Nos igitur versus portum salutis in mari huius mundi navigantes, habemus maximum solacium de absoluta veritate tali: si Christus quicquam asseruit, ipsum erit. Unde apostolus, hebre 6, sic scribit, '*habundancius volens deus ostendere policitacionis heredibus inmobilitatem consilii sui, interposuit iusiurandum: ut per* [*duas*] *res inmobiles, quibus in-*

Heb. VI, 17—19.

I know that sophists will cavil at this explanation, but, thank God! I am above their quibbles.

This belief is our port of salvation in the sea of this world.

Exposition of St. Paul's exhortation to the Hebrews. His words show:

3. inibi MS.; *ib.* qi[n] ſi *pro* si MS. 10. quum MS. 17. m[m] *pro* medium MS. 40. sue hereditatibus MS.; *ib.* inposuit MS. 41. duas *deest* MS.

possibile est mentiri deum, fortissimum solacium habeamus, qui confugimus ad tenendum propositam spem, quam sicut anchoram habemus anime, tutam ac firmam. In quibus verbis patent multa misteria, tam contemplativis, quam scolasticis amplexanda. Primo patet ius hereditarium ad regnum ex promissione divina predestinatis, cum apostolus vocet eos pollicitacionis heredes. 2° patet eternitas divini consilii sine possibilitate sue generacionis vel corupcionis, cum sit ordinancia eterna increata trinitatis, quam ordinanciam nichil potest dissipare vel infringere. Ideo dicit apostolus quod deus voluit ostendere inmobilitatem sui consilii. 3° dicit apostolus quod simplex dei promissio facta Abrahe, de qua gen. 15, et iusiurandum supperadditum, de quo ge. 22°, sunt due res inmobiles: ex quo patet quod distinguntur inter se invicem, et a deo. Patet eciam quod '*res*' est commune ad talia que non sunt absoluta nec per se in genere. Et 3° patet quod ille due res non possunt deficere ab implecione. Ad quod addidit apostolus argumentum quod impossibile est deum mentiri in illis duabus rebus, quod tamen faceret si illas dimitteret incompletas. Ideo 2. thi. 2. dicit apostolus, *fidelis permanet, seipsum negare non potest*; quod tamen faceret, secundum glosum, si promissum dimitteret incompletum.

(1) That the Predestined have a Divine right to their heritage; (2) That it has been promised them from all eternity, irrevocably; that the promise of God, and His oath, are two *things;* so that they are distinct both from God and from each other; (3) That these two volitions cannot possibly fail of their accomplishment;

Gen. XV, 18. Gen. XXII, 16—18.

II Tim. II, 13.

Et ultimo patet quod firmissimum solacium fidelibus qui non sunt conscii sibi ipsis, est in absoluta necessitate veritatum connectionis et in probabili noticia per fidem habita de assumpto.

In ipsis enim fundatur spes, que est quasi anchora navigantibus in mari huius seculi. Mare enim, secundum morales, conformiter ad scripturam, mundum istum significat, quia tumet iste superbia, fervet invidia, mundo mortuos expellit, in ira inportune fluctuans, mundialibus deditos revocat a quiete in deo accidia, insorbet terrenos avaricia, amara fit anime gula, et fetet luxuria. Et, cum omne quod est in mundo, aut est concupis-

(4) And that there is for the faithful the strongest consolation in the absolute truth of the nexus in God's promise and the truth, known by faith, of its antecedent. And upon this we found our hope, an anchor in the sea of this world. This world compared to a sea,

4. cū *pro* tam MS. 10. vel *pro* nichil. 22. est deus *pro* permanet MS. 30. mare enim *struck out* MS. 32. ista MS.; *ib.* fueret *pro* fervet MS.

26. *Conscii.* I suppose that Wyclif means here those who are not conscious of being predestined. The assumption is: *Christ has promised salvation to the predestinate.* If so, they are saved and we hope to be amongst them.

cencia oculorum, concupiscencia carnis, aut superbia vite, ut dicitur prima. Io. 2: non mirum si in mundialibus involutorum, ut pisces, maior potestate tirannica minorem devoret. Ymaginacio igitur apostoli est quod filii promissionis debeant non immergi | set mundum sibi subicere in effectu; quorum navis sit corpus, et nauta, homo interior. Fundamentum autem maris est prima veritas sustentans in se singulas creaturas; ipsa enim est fundamentum terre et *lapis angularis*, ut patet Iob. 38. Anchora autem habet istam absolute necessariam veritatem conneccionis, *si deus quicquam promisit, ipse illud implebit*, pro ferro, deo eternaliter infixam, et pro corda habet duplicem dei promissionem indissolubili funiculo complexam. Ista autem anchora, si navi nostre fuerit debite alligata, preservat amaritudinis periculis quibuscunque.

I Io. II, 16.

79 b^{b}

Iob. XXXVIII, 6.

and the faithful soul to a ship.

Set quomodo, queso, foret illud solacium de securitate fortissimum si vel Christus potuit errasse predicando, vel quoscunque beatos in fide catholica decepisse, sic quod argumentum captum de Christi assercione non sit nisi topicum, differens solum secundum magis et minus a tali: '*Petrus fide dignus asseruit hoc contingens, igitur ipsum est verum.*' Christus enim valet omnes astronomos veridicos vel testes creatos, sicut infinitum distat in modo loci ad argumentum a testimonio: sic quod, quam certus sit aliquis modus arguendi sillogisticus, tam certus locus est: *si auctor nature hoc asserit, igitur verum.* Nam nulla forma sillogistica tenet, nisi de quanto auctor nature hoc asserit illam esse, cum omnis veritas conneccionis dependet ab illo. Si igitur ille posset secundum alteram naturam falsum asserere, cum utraque natura sit deus, ut post dicetur: patet sequi naturam divinam posse decipi et inmediate decipere, et a pari naturam divinam, cum actus extrinsecus sit communis persone et nature.

What power would this hope have to comfort us, if Christ's words had only the value of a mere human assertion?

Christ's words are worth infinitely more than all human testimony, and if His promise be not true, no syllogism is conclusive.

If He, the Man, can deceive, then since He is God, God too can deceive.

5. īūgi *pro* immerg MS. 23. vult *pro* valet MS. 26, 27. sollo^{c9} pro sillogisticus MS. 28. sollo^{ca} *pro* sillogistica MS.

32. *Utraque natura.* Wyclif seems here to assert the divinity of Christ as man; an assertion I have nowhere seen in any of his writings. But note that he does not say: *utraque natura sit divina*, but *deus*. So the sentence may simply mean that Christ the Man is God, because of the personal union: though the expression is indeed somewhat ambiguous.

We must examine this elsewhere more carefully; meanwhile we affirm that both Holy Writ and Christ are infallible; understanding by Holy Writ not dead skins written over with ink, but the interior man, on whom the finger of the Holy Ghost has written His Law.

Ista autem 2. puncta de firmitate auctoritatis scripture et infallibilitate salvatoris indigent speciali scrutinio. Ideo satis est pro presenti quantum ad firmitatem auctoritatis nostre pertinet salvando asserere illum sensum, quod sicut omnis scriptura a deo patre sanccita est infallibilis, sic Christus deus noster non potest deliberative falsum asserere vel docere. Patet prima pars ex hoc dicto salvatoris, Io. 10, intelligendo per scripturam veritatem in libro vite scriptam, et suo tempore provulgatam, non autem pelles mortuas attramento linitas, quas scriptor solvit et colligat quociens libuerit. De talibus enim fuit Christo modica cura, cum non legitur in persona propria sic scripsisse et pellibus mortuorum. set tamquam summus legifer scripsit in homine interiori, spiritu sancto tanquam digito, et gracia ut incausto, illapsus in ipsum tamquam pellem vivam circumdantem. Sic enim omnem creaturam induit ut vestimentum vel accidens substancia supportatum. Et iste est modus scribendi summe perfectus, soli deo potens competere, etc.

Io. X, 35,

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Objection. If man's will is by nature prior to God's, it determines what He shall will, the Eternal is caused by the Temporal, or a thing is cause of itself.

Octavo, capitur quod si voluntas humana sit prior naturaliter voluntate divina, tunc esset causa quare agit aut vult datum volubile; et sic voluntas eterna dei esset causata a volucione temporali creature, vel eius futuricione. Nam, si creatura nunc ageret, tunc idem reciproce causaret seipsum.

This is a fourfold sophism. But we admit that, speaking of contingent volitions, that of man is prior to that of God; and the other conclusions follow. Ardmachanus explains this very well. He says: A thing must *be* in the future

Hic sunt quatuor argucie conglobate. Set posito quod loquamur de volucionibus contingentibus in deo, conceditur quod quelibet volucio hominis est volucione dei prior, et causa quare deus coagit cum data causa agente, credendo, intelligendo, vel opus extrinsecum operando. Et ita conceditur utraque conclusio sequens, ut pulcre declarat dominus Armachanus, libro 16, *De questionibus Armenorum.* Nam prime dicit, capitulo 5°, quod in responsione causali prius est rem esse futuram quam illam presciri a deo. Ideo presciencia dei, in quantum huiusmodi, nullius rei est causa, set est con-

3, 4. auctore MS.; 4. ſalvᵒᵒ *pro* salvando. 6. inſo^l *pro* infallibilis MS. 20. Ca^m {7^m *in marg.; large initial O in blue ink* MS. 25. creaturam MS.; *ib.* agere et MS. 34. ncc'^{lo} *before* capitulo MS.

formitas dei scientis ad rem scitam; et illam vocat sanctus Thomas, questione 19, prime partis summe, habitudinem dei scientis ad scibile, et doctor subtilis vocat eam relacionem racionis: et ego voco eam scienciam relativam, quia talis contingens sciencia et volucio respectiva, et non alia ponenda est in deo formaliter. Et de volucione dei contingenti specificum est tractare. Post capitulis 11 et 12, ostendit quod volucio dei non imponit necessitatem contingentibus futuris, set quod causa secunda, et eius accio aut ommissio, potest 80 a^{a} esse causa quare deus | eternaliter voluit datum volubile, et ita de negacione voluntatis divine.

before God *knows* it, so that prescience is not a cause of things, but a mere conformity between the knower and the known.

Now to will a thing does not cause it: the thing, either done or omitted, causes that God wills it to be or not.

Primum exemplum suum est de celo, quod ponatur gracia exempli secundum philosophorum sentencias esse eternum et causare inevitabiliter omnes operaciones hominum. Tunc, signata libera operacione futura Petri, est in Petri potestate facere quod celum eternaliter fuit causa remota date operacionis, et est in potestate eius, omittendo operari, facere quod non fuit relacio causalitatis inter celum et datam operacionem. Cum igitur *deum esse causam operacionis humane* sit relacio racionis, sicut et causalitas celi, quare igitur non per idem contingit hominem facere quod deus eternaliter fuit causa sue operacionis et voluit eandem?

Suppose that the heavens inevitably produce all human acts; if a man's act is free, then he has power to make the heavens produce or not produce a given act. Put God's will in the place of the heavenly influence, and you have the same conclusion.

Secundum exemplum est, posito quod quis volendo precipiat ministro quod diu post certos cibos in mensa sibi provideat; quo voluntarie preparante in suo tempore, patet quod volucio precipientis est causa preparacionis, et hoc prius tempore, et principalius quam volucio ministrantis. Et tamen volucio posterior potest facere quod volucio domini fuit causa illius preparacionis, et potest facere quod voluntas domini non fuit causa illius preparacionis.

A master orders his servant to prepare certain dishes a long time after; if he does, the master's will is cause of this preparation; if not, not; it depends on the servant to give effect to this will or not.

Tercium exemplum est de hoc quod oracio Christi potuit esse causa quare deus voluit exhibere plus quam 12 legiones angelorum, ut innuitur M^{t}.; et illa oracio, si fuisset temporalis, et volucio simpliciter eterna, igitur etc. Ideo certum videtur doctori quod voluntas humana potest esse causa quare deus vult datum volubile. *Non sic*, inquid doctor, *quod causa sit causa potencie volu-*

Matth. XXVI, 53.

Christ might have prayed to His Father for twelve legions of angels, and thus caused the eternal volition of His death never to have been; thus producing a change of relation between God's power and its effect.

6. aliqua MS. 7. ne *pro* de MS. 26. ceteros MS.

2. *St. Thomas.* S^{a} Theol. 1^{a} P. qu. XIX, art. 3, *ad sextum.*

Lucifer, before his fall, might not have sinned, and instead of God's determination to damn him, there would have been the contrary determination, both eternal. Many passages of Scripture prove this.

cione in deo, set relacionis vel respectus inter potenciam divinam et causatum; quod confirmat ex hoc quod deus vult dampnare luciferum, quia peccavit. Et certum est quod peccatum temporale, et volucio eterna. Cum igitur diabolus ante casum suum potuit facere quod non peccavit, sequitur quod diabolus potuit facere quod deus nunquam voluit ipsum dampnare.

Confirmatur quadruplici testimonis scripture primo ex hoc. Patet 3° Regum. Dicit deus de Salomone, *quia postulasti . . . . tibi sapienciam ad discernendum iudicium, ecce feci* [*tibi*] *secundum sermones tuos.* Et indubie, si postulacio Salomonis fit causa quare deus sic egit, fuit et causa quare sic voluit sic agere. Et Ier. 7, recitata condicione dei de dacione boni aut mali, consequenter subdit, *quia fecistis omnia opera hec, dicit dominus . . . . faciam domui huic . . . . sicut feci Sylo.*

III Reg. III, 11, 12. Ier. VII, 13, 14.

Et Iudicum 2°, dicit dominus, *voluistis audire vocem meam, quamobrem volui delere hostes a facie vestra.* Et Ge. 22°, *quia fecisti hanc rem, et non pepercisti filio tuo unigenito propter me . . . . multiplicabo semen tuum.*

Iud. II, 2, 3. Gen. XXII, 16, 17.

Et sicut nulli est dubium quin, *quia* et *quamobrem* sunt signa circumstanciam cause connotancia; sic indubie, si opus meritorium aut demeritorium potest esse causa quare deus faciet hoc vel illud, consequenter potest esse causa quare deus velit hoc vel illud dependere a futuro.

So all the above conclusions are to be admitted, except that impossible one of a thing that causes itself. It is objected that this doctrine would destroy God's Providence, since His ordinance is caused by what is subject thereto; and also His Omnipotence. But the contrary follows; for God's ordinance is caused by the

Et patet quod omnia superius adducta, preter ultimum, sunt concedenda. Non enim est possibile idem primo causare se.

Conclusio capitur quod iuxta hanc viam res non subiacerent divine providencie, cum ordinacio divina causatur ab ordinato, et per consequens volucio dei regeretur a sua causa. Et sic homo uteretur deo tamquam instrumento suo, nec esset deus omnipotens, cum multos actus hominum non potest facere, nisi homo velit. Ideo indigeret homine ad multos actus suos, cum, homine sibi resistente, non posset agere tales actus.

Set quoad istud planum videtur sequi oppositum. Sequitur enim: tam ordinacio quam ordinancia dei causatur a creatura ordinata, igitur omnes creature

10. *no gap after* postulasti MS.; *ib.* tibi *deest* MS. 11. tibi *deest* MS. 15. *no gap after* dominus MS. 16. *no gap after* huic MS. 19. rem hanc MS. 20. *no gap after* me MS. 28. impossibile MS.

subiacent divine ordinancie. Nec obest istam causam, quecunque fuerit, subiacere divine providencie vel ordinancie, et tamen recausare illam obiective. Non enim est ordinancia illa res cui per se aliquid subicitur, set deo ordinanti de sibi subiecto, racione cuius tante commendatur eius ordinacio. Idem enim est providencia dei et eius concilium, quod vel dicitur concilium, quia a toto (vel trinitate) ordinatum; vel formaliter loquendo, illa ordinancia que eternaliter est, sic est hominibus
Heb. VI, 17. abscondita quousque appareat in effectu. Illud autem
80a[b] concilium est inmutabile, ut patet ad Hebr. 6. | Nec oportet quod concilium, gubernancia vel aliquod intrinsecum gubernetur, quia tunc est errabilis: ideo nulla causa regit ipsam. Nec est color quod homo utitur deo vel non indigeat eius regimine, etsi sit causa obiectiva quare deus regit eum. Non enim causat deum, etsi causet relacionem eius ad creaturam; nec est volucio vel ordinancia dei instrumentum cause ipsam causantis, cum non sit in eius potestate ut per ipsam operetur.

creature, *as He has ordained it to exist;* thus obeying His Providence and yet again determining it as the object determines the act.

If God's counsels were directed from outside, they would be fallible.

Nec tollitur de omnipotencia dei, etsi non posset velle volucionem meam nisi ego voluero, set bene attendenti patet ex hoc racio omnipotencie sue, cui oportet omnem causam esse subiectam, ita quod racio quare homo potest velle quemcunque actum meum, etsi ego voluero et deus non sic, est ista volucio dei tante dominativi; est tam efficax, quod non est possibile ipsam esse, nisi impleatur; set voluntas humana est frustrabilis. Ideo inpossibile est deum velle quod ego velim antecedenter ut dominus moveat me ad volendum, cum sit artifex principalissimus, nullo indigens. Set ad tales habitudines relativas sibi contingentes quibus tante indigent, non ipse requirit creaturas quas ex sua bonitate producit, quod nichilo tamquam causaliter terminantes; nec esset possibile quicquam resistere impeditive eius volucioni, cum resistencia talis presupponit causaliter volucionem cui resisteretur impedimentum sue execucionis. Quod, respectu dei, esset contradiccio in terminis. Ideo, ut sepe dictum est, non est idem resistere volucioni divine, et facere quod non sit volucio divina respectu dati volubilis, ut pulcre declarat

This too takes nothing from God's Omnipotence. He cannot will that my volition shall take place, unless I choose it; but that is precisely because, if He did, I should no longer be a free agent, He being omnipotent.

God, the Maker of all, needing no other being, creating them out of pure nothingness, their material cause (as it were), is never resisted; since to resist His volition would imply that they could be contrary to those of His creatures.

To resist God's will, and to

2, 3. ordinare MS. 7. deo MS. 8. tota MS. 9. si MS. 13. quod gubernetur MS. 26. sic potest MS.

make that God has never had such a will, are quite different things. Thus, God's Omnipotent Will having decided on the existence of free creatures, it must follow that their particular volitions determine His. But they do not resist His Will, He only wills that such and such an event shall not take place. It is in my power to make that God has never willed my damnation, but not to prevent Him from having such a will. If not, sin would be necessary, God's Omnipotence diminished, human freedom destroyed, and with it, the freedom of God.

dominus Armachanus libro 16°, capitulo 15, *De questionibus armenorum*, ubi ostendit quod omnipotencia voluntatis divine exigit ut creatura causam poterit impedire et multa que deus vult, vitare; non impediendo, set faciendo quod deus ipsa non velit. Cum enim deus vult creaturam esse liberam, et multa de facto esse contingencia potentem vitare, resistendo cause ipsam inferenti, patet quod volucio dei exigit pro sua implecione sic esse, ut sentit conclusio quoad primas partes. Set ex hoc non infertur possibilitas talis resistencie voluntati divina, cum hoc posito, de facto formaliter sequitur quod deus nunquam voluit talem penam vel eventum esse. Ideo possum facere quod deus nunquam voluit dampnacionem meam vel aliam quancunque penam quam ego demerior pro peccato existente in libertate mee potencie; set non possum impedire deum ne hoc velit, set cavere possum ne deus hoc velit. Aliter enim esset tanta necessitas ad peccandum, quod omne peccatum esset inevitabile peccatori; nec esset deus omnipotencior, set minus omnipotens, si cuncti eventus creaturis racionabilibus vel aliis forent eis inevitabiles. Tunc enim tolleretur libertas creature racionalis, et per consequens libertas dei. Bene sequitur: si deus libere contradictorie potest movere voluntatem creatam ad utramlibet partem contradiccionis, tunc voluntas creata potest libere evitabiliter [moveri] in utramque partem, Efficax igitur est illa voluntas quam oportet circa omnia semper et ubique esse impletam sine impedimento possibili.

This, however, may be misunderstood, as forcing or changing God's will, or influencing it independently of God's as principal agent.

Scio tamen, ut supra tetigi, quod tales proposiciones, "ego possum facere quod deus velit me salvare aut dampnare", possunt tam sinistre quam sane intelligi; sinistre alico istorum trium modorum: vel quod dominando super deum cogat eum facere, et sic sonat terminus in ydiomate vulgari, ut minitans suo inferiori dicit quod faciet eum sibi servire; vel 2°, quod creatura potest generare vel corrumpere talem volucionem dei, et sic sonat hoc verbum *facere*; vel 3°, quod creatura potest sic facere sine deo principalius faciente. Et omnes hii tres sunt sensus erronei.

It is rightly understood, if we extend *make* to any extrinsic influence;

Quartus autem sensus catholicus est extendere *facere* ad omnem causanciam extrinsecam, (sicut facit beatus

23. σū *pro* bene MS. 26. moveri *deest* MS. 35. mm'a^σ *pro* minitans MS.

Augustinus, questionum questione 28), et concedere quod creatura facit deum sic velle, est concedere quod creatura est causa obiectiva, terminans volucionem dei relativam, qua non possita, deus non sic vellet. Et sic sonat communis usus loquendi respectu talium respectivorum que nata sunt terminare faccionem et non accionem; ut nedum deus, set creatura potest facere quod
80b[a] iste nascetur, et quod iste occidebatur; | que sunt eterna. Talia autem non possunt terminare accionem nisi per accidens, uno aliquo absolute terminante, ut claudit contradiccionem deum facere vel producere volucionem qua velit antechristum esse prius naturaliter, licet longe posterius temporaliter, agendo antechristum. Si tamen volucio illa esset essencia absoluta, accio dei posset terminari ad illam sine intra produccione alterius absoluti a quo non dependeat.

then, if we say: The creature makes God to will this, it simply means that this, being the object of God's will, determines it in a certain way. For a man certainly can be the author of the birth of one person, and of the death of another, though these, as facts, are eternally true.

10. Assumitur quod omnis volucio hominis est donum dei, et per consequens prius naturaliter a deo productum et datum, quam hominem informet. Igitur non est antecedenter ab homine; tunc enim superflue orarent fideles ut deus faceret in illis bonam volucionem. Ymmo aliter sequeretur quod homo posset consequi (antecedendo enim) et eius volucionem, et multo magis antecedendo cooperacionem gracie, quod est heresis pelagiana.

Objection: Every volition of man, being a gift of God, belongs to Him first, and then to man; otherwise we need not pray for a good will, and we fall into Pelagianism.

In isto argumento, sicut in quotlibet similibus, expediret specificare volucionem dei quam intelligitur precedere volucionem hominis; quia, ut ostendit dominus Armachanus in *De questionibus armenorum*, libro 16° capitulo 10, aliqua volucio dei precedit omnem voluntatem creature: sicut volucio qua vult omnem creaturam esse, et quotlibet similes. Ideo nemo, ut credo, ponens multas voluciones in deo, ad tantum desipit quod credit, si volucio hominis volucionem dei precedit, tunc homo vult prius naturaliter quam vult deus; aut quod creature volucio sit prius naturaliter volucione dei. Sic igitur quelibet volucio hominis causatur a deo primo movente intellectum et voluntatem, cum sit donum dei, sicut ostensum est tractatu de accione, ca° 3°, et sic prius est a deo quam ab homine, et tamen homo facit quod est a deo.

But here we must specify the kind of volition; for no one asserts that all God's acts of volition are posterior to those of men, and that man's *will* is anterior to God's.

Nor do we deny that man's volition is caused by God's moving the mind and the will; but man causes this Divine motion.

1. *before* questionum *an illegible word*: (ꝫ3 = decem?) MS. 22. cont'i *pro* consequi MS.

39. *De accione*. See note, p. 160.

Successive steps in the acts of Divine Volition.

Unde, ut sepe dictum est, prius est producencia tocius universitatis create in deo formaliter, et ex illa procedit produccio universitatis, et post sequitur conservancia dei, cui correspondet a posteriori conservacio creature; et 3° in quacunque agencia creature, sive ad extra, sive ad intra, prius est movencia dei faciens creaturam agere, cum non agit aut movet nisi prius naturaliter mota quam est mocio creature ad agendum.

God first moves the creature to act; its action follows, with a consequent volition of God, according to the nature of the action.

Et post illam mocionem sequitur agencia creature cui correspondet coagencia dei posterior natura quam illa agencia; specialiter si illa coagencia non sit per accidens coagencia, ut patet de illis cooperacionibus dei cum creatura que terminantur ad producta que non possunt produci nisi producantur a creatura: ut sunt actus tam intrinseci quam extrinseci. Omnia autem ista sunt pro eadem mensura temporis, et in omnibus istis est deus prima causa inducens omnes dictas relaciones, et quantumlibet prior natura quocunque causato secundo.

Thus, concerning one and the same effect, the acts of God are multiple.

Et sic concedi debet quod deus multiplici faciencia facit idem factibile; ut, conservancia subiecti premovencia subiecti et cooperancia cum eo, facit deus opus extrinsecum, ideo principalius et prius quam aliqua causa secunda, nedum duabus prioribus facienciis, set tercia executiva.

The objection supposes that a man's volition is something apart from him, whereas it is nothing but the man himself, *qua* actually willing.

Unde primum argumentum factum non valet, cum procedit ex falsa ymaginacione quod volucio hominis sit res absoluta, ut anima que posset produci a deo, cum hoc quod non informet: sicut intellectus humanus prius naturaliter est quam informat materiam. Set non est ita, ut patet superius; nam informacio est illa volucio, et sic, si est ordo prioritatis naturalis, prius naturaliter est hominis informacio que est *hominem formaliter velle*, et posterius inseparabiliter consequitur causacio eius a deo tamquam passio [in] proprio subiecto; sic quod non est ordo inter *velle* et *esse volens*, ut doctor asserit, libro 3°, ca^{o} 6°, set idem est omnino *hominem velle* et *esse volentem*, quod et est eius volucio: que indubie est antecedentur ab homine. Homo tamen non sufficit velle, nisi primo moveatur a deo ad volendum. Ideo, — cum libere contradictorie deus

This proceeds in the first place from man, but only

21, 22. p'mo^cia *pro* premovencia MS. 27. precedit MS. 35. in *deest* MS. 35, 36. proprium subiectum MS.

potest facere ipsum bene velle, sic quod non omnis hominis actus vel eius omissio est sibi inevitabile, sicut videtur doctor dicere — religiosum et salubre est orare deum ut inclinet voluntatem ad recte volendum. Hoc tamen esset superfluum sine volucione; tunc enim homo posset consequi antecedendo deum, aut quod volucio hominis est prior volucione dei.

as influenced by God's premotion; it is not always inevitably necessary, and therefore prayer is a good thing.

Ulterius conceditur tamquam necessarium et catholicum, quod quelibet homo meritorie operans antecedit
80b[b] naturaliter cooperacionem gracie dei cum | illo. Patet ex hoc quod cooperacio gracie dei cum homine, si est, presupponit hominem tamquam eius causam: ymmo cooperacio, ut huiusmodi, presupponit operacionem. Hoc tamen esset hereticum, et sine colore prophane dictum, quod deo cooperante cum homine per graciam suam, prius naturaliter et principalius operatur homo quam deus per graciam; et hoc oportuit pelagianos illos modernos dicere, qui ponunt esse possibile quod homo operetur, cum hoc quod deus non cooperetur cum eo. Et super hoc ponunt quod gracia dei sit qualitas absoluta, potens per se esse, sic quod de dei potencia absoluta, set non de lege, homo posset mereri sine tali. Sic enim fantasiantes habent dicere quod homo prius naturaliter operatur operanciam meritoriam quam deus in eo, quod talis operancia non posset fieri, nisi fiat ab illo homine (ut patet, tractatu de accione); et posset fieri ab homine cum hoc quod non fieret a deo per graciam, iuxta superius opinantes. Ideo prius naturaliter fieret ab homine quam a gracia dei; et multo magis prius naturaliter fieret ab homine quam a gracia dei, quia gracia dei non posset coefficere nisi deo coefficiente: set econtra deus posset coefficere sine tali gracia, igitur etc.

Man, when doing any meritorious deed, precedes the coöperation of God's grace, since the latter presupposes his existence, and coöperation, operation. But it were a heresy to say that when God coöperates with man by His grace, man's action is more than God's and has natural priority thereto, as do our modern Pelagianists, who deny the necessity of Divine coöperation, adding that grace is an absolute quality, without which man might possibly have merit, acting without God's coöperation.

Ymmo patet contra quemcunque sic opinantem, quod omnis actus dependens ab homine active prius naturaliter fit ab eo quam ab aliqua gracia dei creata, quia talis actus posset fieri ab eo existente extra graciam, set a nulla gracia sine illo. Set absit a me ista sen-

This opinion is evidently false, and I reject it.

No merit unto life eternal can

1, 2. sic quod — sicut *twice* MS. 5. fī volucio *pro* sine volucione MS. 6. 9t'ri *pro* consequi; *ib.* antedo *pro* antecedendo MS. 14. prophecie MS. 17. in *pro* illos MS.

6. *Consequi.* Supply *volucionem,* or some such word. See p. 123, l. 22. 26. *De accione.* Same remark as previously.

be gained without grace, to which end God coöperates as the chief worker, not first logically, but as the principal cause.

tencia, deus enim de potencia absoluta non posset servare hominem sine speciali gracia nec permittere ipsum mereri vitam eternam sine speciali gracia gratum faciente: et ad omnem talem operacionem deus de gracia sua principalis et prius concurrit quam homo, non prioritate quoad consequenciam, set prioritate causalitatis, dignitatis, vel supereminencie. Nec agit talis gracia proprie, set causando facit multa bona, et secundum illam deus cooperatur cum homine, etc.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

It is objected that by putting our will before that of God, we are prouder than Lucifer, since he would only be God's equal.

Undecimo assumit quod preferentes volucionem suam volucioni divine sunt superbiores lucifero, qui voluit solum coequari deo, ut patet ysa. 14°. et arroganciores illis civibus qui noluerunt regem regnare super se, de quibus luc. 19°, cum voluntas divina curvaret se obediendo voluntati humane per quam duceretur, non econtra.

Isa. XIV, 14. Luc. XIX, 14.

But this proves nothing, since we only put ourselves before the relational volitions between God and the creature, not before that will which is essential to God.

Set talia dicta modicum suadent sciolos medere conclusionem intentam, cum non sit color, si volucio qua naturaliter volo me esse sit prior volucione respectiva qua deus vult me sedere, tunc ego volo esse prestancior deo. Tales enim deducciones non habent colorem, nisi creatura preferat se volucioni que deus est, quod nemo dicit. Set catholicus dicit se esse natura priorem, et finaliter presuppositum ad volucionem qua deus vult ipsum mereri vel puniri. Nec sequitur ex isto quod volucio dei sit curvabilis, frangibilis, odibilis, ducibilis, trahibilis, suscitabilis, aut gubernabilis.

The confusion between God's contingent volition, and His Will, seems to be the source of all these objections. As to man's will bending that of God to his own; we use the term *bending* when speaking of a vice in man to

In omnibus istis argumentis videtur michi quod respicitur ad voluntatem aut actum volendi qui deus est, et non ad tale contingens ad utrumlibet, quod ponitur actus volendi dei. Nichil enim proprie est curvabile, nisi quod ipsum mobile ab uno latere ad aliud, ut corpora flexibilia; et ad proporcionalem sensum dicunt morales potencias esse curvabiles, que possunt declinare active ad vicium, ab uno vicio extremali ad aliud, ut docet Aristoteles, secundo ethicorum ultimo, habituatos in vicio extremali debere curvari

10. Ca^m 8^m *in marg.; initial U in blue ink* MS. 11. proprietates *pro* preferentes MS. 28. fustı^t *pro* suscitabilis MS.

ultra illud quod foret rectum exercitari in operibus, stante modestia habitus virtutis, ut vel sic, per declinacionem ad opera, dignus habitus instanti tendatur ad rectitudinem; sicut volens rectificare virgam curvam declinat eam nedum a curvedine ad rectitudinem, set ad curvitatem in latus oppositum, ut sic, derelicta natura propria, stet in rectitudine. Set quomodo esset hoc pertinens potencie vel actui divino omnino immobili? Ymmo, si hoc competit potencie creature et non actui, quomodo competeret actui indurato qui de dei omnipotencia non posset moveri de frangibilitate vel dissolubilitate divine potencie vel volucionis est sue dissolucionis vel destruccionis post existenciam? quod est
82 aª summe inpossibile de | minima volucione divina, cum quotlibet tales non esse possunt, sed desinere non possunt.

be eradicated, and a virtue acquired.

But how can this be said of God, who is absolutely immutable in all His acts, that may indeed not be, but cannot cease from being?

Unde de fragilitate divine voluntatis declarat dominus Armachanus, libro 16, capitulo 22, quod non potest esse, dicens: fragile dicitur vel active vel passive; active, si illi ultimate agenti facillime restiti possit; passive, si agens illud facillime frangere possit, quorum
Ez. XXIX, 6. neutrum divini voluntati potest competere. Unde Ezechiel, 29, comparatur potencia regis Egipti baculo arundineo, propter fragilitatem et impedibilitatem eius in execucione operis. Que omnia aliena sunt a potencia vel a volucione quacunque divina quam nichil impedire potest. Et taliter vocat ecclesia naturam humanam fragilem, quia faciliter superari potest cedendo hostibus, et specialiter naturam corpoream, ut patet de fragilitate carnis, non ut corporee frangatur, set ut vincatur ad luxuriandum, vel aliter peccandum. Nec est duccio pertinens volucionibus huiusmodi, cum solum natura vel potencia errabilis est ducibilis.

Ardmachanus points out that fragility can in no wise be predicated of God's will, but only of that of man, whose flesh is frail and prone to sin.

Homo igitur potest facere deum velle punire eum demerendo, et potest [facere] deum non velle punire eum, preservando se a peccato, mediante tamen deo graciose preagente, ut ostendit dominus Armachanus libro 16°. *De questionibus Armenorum* multis locis, ut generaliter peccata sunt cause ultime quare [deus vult]

By his demerit therefore, a man may cause God's will to punish him, and by avoiding sin through God's grace, cause the opposite;

3. digitus hitus MS. 30. copeo *pro* corporee MS. 35. facere *deest* MS. 38. conclusionibus (sic!) MS. 39. vlt *pro* ultime MS.; *ib.* deus vult *deest* MS.

13. The foregoing sentence is hopelessly corrupt.

punire peccatores et non vult salvare eos; sicut merita sunt cause quare deus vult salvare eos, ut sonat tam racio quam scriptura. Et hoc est quod sophiste solent proclamare antiquitus, quod deus eternaliter scivit me esse disputaturum, et tamen ego possum facere quod

though it does not follow that God's volition is in my power. The *making of it* is, but the *being made* is a fact, eternal, and in no one's power.

deus nunquam scivit. Nec sequitur: possum facere deum velle salvare me, et possum facere deum non velle salvare me, quasi *deum velle salvare me* aut eius oppositum sit in potestate mea; ut patet ex predictis de potestate. Nam illud *facere* est in potestate mea, set factum cum sit eternum, non est in alicuius potestate, nec est inconveniens eternum eternaliter fieri, sicut doctor concedit de veritatibus affirmativis et negativis.

And it is not in God's power to make Himself will anything, though it is in mine; for my act is temporal, and God's is eternal.

Ymmo videtur (mirabilius!) sequi quod est in potestate mea facere deum multa velle, set non est in potestate dei quod ipse se solo faciat se quicquam velle; quia faccio mea potest esse temporalis, generabilis, et corruptibilis ad nutum meum, set faccio dei respectu sue volucionis non potest esse, nisi fuerit eterna: et per consequens nichil potest [habere] potestatem super

But God has power over my causation of His volition; yet neither He nor any one has properly power over the volition itself, as an eternal fact, only over its causation, which takes place in time.

illam. Nec sequitur ex isto, quod ego possum facere quod deus non potest, aut quod aliquid est in potestate mea quod non est in potestate dei; nam principaliter est in potestate dei quod ego causo volucionem suam, cum ipse facit hoc principaliter, set non eternaliter per se facit se hoc velle, tamquam illa volucio foret in potestate. Nec enim est proprie in potestate dei, nec enim est proprie in potestate alicuius, nisi tale super quo habet dominativam potestatem, et per consequens quod est temporale, ut actus volendi et effectus extrinseci qui possunt effective incipere et corumpi ab habente potestatem super eos. Cum igitur omnis volucio dei sit eterna, non potens de dei omnipotencia incipere vel corumpi, patet quod nulli potest servire, etsi faciat multa bona.

God has not eternal power of producing any act, since an act, if temporal, cannot be produced eternally;

Et si arguatur quod deus habet potestatem eternaliter faciendi volucionem suam, cum habet potestatem temporaliter faciendo eam, cum omne quod potest facere per obiectam creaturam potest se solo, dicitur quod habet eternaliter potestatem faciendi volucionem, non potest habere potestatem eternaliter faciendi illam, quia tunc potestas dei se extenderet ad unum eternum,

18. notum MS. 20. habere *deest* MS. 41. ƀ *pro* non MS.

quod deus non potest facere incipere vel corrumpi; quod est contra racionem potestatis. Nec est possibile quod omne quod deus potest facere potest facere solo; quia, sicut de potencia sua absoluta non potest facere me velle, nisi ego coefficiam cum illo volucionem, ita de potencia absoluta non potest facere se velle antechristum esse, nisi eciam eternaliter faciat illud, et antechristus tempore suo coefficiat illud cum deo. Et patet quod inevidens est, si habeo potestatem faciendi deum | hoc velle, quod habeo potestatem super volucione dei. Nam *me facere deum hoc velle* est temporale, quod ego possum libere facere, incipere, et desinere esse; set sic non potest noviter velle aut intelligere, dimittendo et reincipiendo actum volendi, sicut homo potest. Ita, est de perfeccione dei quod volucio sua non sit in eius potestate, sicut volucio hominis est in sua potestate propter inferioritatem libertatis hominis super actum suum respectu libertatis dei super volucionem suan. Deus enim non potest incipere vel desinere quicquam velle, sicut homo potest propter mutabilitatem sue volucionis.

81 a[b]

and He cannot do by Himself all He can do with the creature, for instance, where coöperation is necessary.

It is God's very perfection of immutability that requires a temporal cause to determine His action, when made in time.

Set, quia restringentes verba de presenti habent concedere deum proporcionaliter incipere et desinere velle quodcunque volubile sicut ipsum incipit vel desinit esse, quereret aliquis utrum contra illos militant raciones predicte. Et videtur michi quod sensus eorum potest catholice sustineri, set verba eorum displicent mihi, sicut et fundamentum. Illi enim, ut michi videtur, habent concedere quod omnis homo habet dominium super quotlibet voluciones in deo et potestatem, ut ipse cause prompte vel prompcius sibi deserviant tanquam sibi subiecte, sicut aliquis actus voluntatis create sibi deservit. Potest enim hoc, secundum sic loquentes, facere quotlibet voluciones in deo infinicies incipere et corumpi, quam faciliter potest quicquam facere, cum ad cuiuslibet creature variacionem sequitur proporcionaliter (iuxta eos) variacio in volucione divina, necessarium quod quelibet creatura potest ipsam intendere vel remittere ad votum. Et sic uteretur homo quodlibet volucionibus in deo, sicut utitur gracia vel operancia dei ad extra; set quia quotlibet talia sequencia

It may be asked, since those who restrict time to the present moment must admit that God's volitions change, whether the foregoing objections hold as against them. I think not, but I do not like the expressions they must use, nor the root of their theory. They would have to admit that man has power over God's volitions, which would change according to the changes of the creature. But I have nothing to do with this doctrine.

28. ut *pro* et MS. 31. causa MS.

ex erroneo fundamento sunt michi impertinencia, ideo non sollicitor quidem contra ipsum.

These volitions can neither begin nor end; they are not creatures, they are not God, yet they have no essence but His. Does man, by acting, rouse God's will to act? No, for this implies possibility of change. As God is the chief agent in all things done by man, He, through man's will, makes Himself to elicit this or that volition.

Sequitur concepto, ut prius, quod nihil de *a* intrinsecum potest incipere vel corumpi. Et sic non sunt creature; nec creator formaliter, set essencialiter loquendo, sum sola racione differunt a deo. Nec sequitur ex isto quod voluntas humana potest suscitare voluntatem divinam, cum suscitare sit commovere vel inclinare mobile corrumpens, et ita deus suscitat tam bonos quam malos ad agendum; set nichil potest suscitare, inclinare, vel movere deum aut eius voluntatem ad aliquod agendum. Nec sequitur aliquod tale ex hoc quod homo est in causa quare sic aut sic vult. Quicquid igitur homo vel creatura facit, deus principalius facit illud; ideo quando homo facit deum quicquam velle, deus facit per hominem se sic velle, ut supradictum est; cum deus in omni accione creature tenet principatum. Set quid obest huic quod aliqua dei volucio sit causata a creatura, cum reciproca causacio sit possibilis?

God never sleeps, therefore none can rouse Him, and it is He who rouses the creatures to act.

Si igitur creatura posset prevenire deum tamquam habitualiter dormientem sine alico *velle* actuali, causando in deo antecedenter et active primam dei movenciam temporalem, tunc creatura posset suscitare deum, sicut deus suscitat spiritum pigritantem. Set antecedens est inpossibile, cum deus non potest habere volucionem vel actum intrinsecum, nisi eternum; nec creatura potest agere nisi preventa a deo: ideo sibi non potest competere suscitacio.

These remarks suffice to refute all possible objections, which come under three heads; some imagining that the volitions and cognitions of God are absolute entities; this we have already refuted; some, misled by analogy,

Et ex dictis, si non fallor, patet via scienti vires verborum, quomodo solvende sunt omnes raciones quibus arguitur nullam creaturam posse causare volucionem in deo. Triplex autem est radix, e qua precipue moventur homines ad credendum quod non est in hominis potestate causare volucionem aut relacionem a deo: prima et precipua, si non fallor, est variacio in methaphisica, credendo quod voluciones et sciencie sunt essencie absolute. Tunc enim non dependerent a duobus extremis pocius quam quantitas aut qualitas. Set ista radix est superius viciata. Secunda radix est comparacio

2. sollicito MS. 3. 9ceto *pro* concepto MS. 18. hoc *pro* huic MS. 27. cum *pro* nisi MS. 39. vicita *pro* viciata MS.

3. *A*, I suppose, stands for any given relative volition of God, as expounded. It is marked *(sic!)* in Mr. Austen's transcription.

volucionis divine ad volucionem humanam cum zelo temerario magnificandi voluciones divinas. Nam respiciendo ad hominem patet quod ipse potest velle quodcunque, me invito, cum nulla volucio sua dependet ab extrinseco quod non est eius causa: ita videri posset decepto per locum a simili vel maiori quod [ita] est de qualibet volucione divina. Set et venenum huius radicis detectum est superius, declarando equivocacionem volucionis divine et volucionis humane et racionem diversitatis sonare ad perfeccionem dei. Tercia radix est error in logica et abusus [in] significacionibus
81 b[a] terminorum relativorum, ut puta, | si temporale causat eternum, eternaliter causat ipsum; et si *a* nunc causatur a *b*, tunc *b* nunc causat *a*; et si video Petrum hic, Petrus videtur a me; si exercicio nunc causat sanitatem, aut pater nunc causat filium — et sic de aliis successive factis — tunc illa nunc sunt causata; et ita de multis similibus superius recitatis. Et de terminis rethoricis sunt multi recitati; ut volucio aliqua est divina ductrix, gubernatrix, et sic de aliis competentibus nature et non respectivis.

fancying that God's volition must be able to do all that man's can do; which we have also refuted;

and others erring by an abuse of relative terms.

Quia tamen iste punctus videtur doctori esse turris precipua contra pelagianos, ideo illam commendat ultra nubes, capitulo 31 secundi libri. Unde verisimile est michi quod equivocat nobiscum secundum aliquem sensum limitatum quod homo prius naturaliter causat quam deus, vel quod homo sit causa volucionis absolute in deo, vel quod volucio in deo noviter elicita consequenter ad volutum producatur aut destruatur per mutacionem factam in deo, aut sic de alico alio sensu michi incognito. Set combinando dicta sua adinvicem, dubito si velit illas relaciones eternas que consequntur voluciones in deo ad aliquid deservire, et si ille causantur a creaturis, ad quas terminantur, aut non. Videtur enim quod omnia argumenta superius facta de volucionibus dei absolutis possunt et fieri de illis respectibus, potissime cum omnes illi ponunt formaliter deum velle datum volubile ad quod terminantur. Et iterum est quod deum velle quodcunque est aliquod *velle*, et cum omne *velle* sit volucio, sequitur quod

Then there are expressions which cannot be literally true of relative terms, and should be understood as metaphors. Bradwardine, intent upon confuting Pelagianism, leaves certain points in his argument undefined; so that it is not quite clear whether the eternal relations which (he says) follow on God's volitions are caused by the creature, or not though his arguments apply to them as well, since God cannot will without relation to a certain object willed.

6. ita *deest* MS. 8. detētum MS. 11. in *deest* MS. 12. rethoricorum *pro* relativorum MS. 17. fuerit *pro* sunt causata MS. 28. illicita MS. 32. set *pro* si MS.

Volition is the best word that can be used to designate these; and since these relations suffice, it is superfluous to imagine any absolute entities, which would endanger free-will.

omne *deum velle* est volucio. Non enim aliud intelligunt rectiloqui per "divinam volucionem contingentem" nisi *deum contingenter velle datum volubile.* Nec habebitur abstractum competencius ad significandum rem verbi *volendi* quam tale verbale *volucio*, ut patet de similibus. Ideo, cum talis respectus sufficit sine absoluto preter naturam divinam, superfluit ponere voluciones absolutas in deo; potissime cum ex illis positis videtur sequi quod omnis creatura necessitatur sibi inevitabiliter ad omne futurum sibi contingens, ut post dicetur, et ut credo. Ad probandum illam conclusionem cum tanta diligencia laboravit doctor ad stabiliendum istam, quia maxima pertinens foret ad alterius induccionem; unde argumenta facta contra alium conclusionem infirmant istam, etc.

CAPITULUM NONUM.

Does God's volition extend as far as His knowledge? It seems not, since His volition extends only to what pleases Him, and His knowledge to all.

Consequenter dubitandum est si eque ampla sit dei volucio ut sua sciencia vel intellectus; et videtur quod non, quia deus cognoscit multa mala que non vult, loquendo de volucione beneplaciti vel approbacionis, qualiter supono tantum continue denotare; et omnia que vult cognoscit. Igitur generalior est sua sciencia, quam sua volucio.

Order of the inquiry.

Pro assumpto oportet videre de concursu dei cum creatura ad actum malum moraliter. Set cum ista convertuntur: *deum causare hoc causabile*, quodcunque fuerit. et *ipsum causari de dei beneplacito*, oportet primo videre quomodo malicia vel peccatum inest creaturis. Set cum malicia inest substanciis mediantibus actibus, videndum est primo quomodo actus se habent ad maliciam, supponendo dicta primo libro, de accione et passione.

No substance, no act is bad by nature. Evil is a privation of goodness; every entity is positive. What belongs to nature is generic or specific, or an essential property.

Primo igitur declarabitur quod sicut nulla substancia, sic nullus actus est per se malus. Patet ex hoc quod malicia, in quantum huiusmodi, est privacio opposita bonitati; set nullum ens per se in predicamento vel quomodolibet positivum, est per se privativum: igitur nulla accio est per se mala. Minor patet ex hoc quod omne quod per se inest alicui, est vel genus, vel species, vel passio subiecti; et omne tale est positivum, et non

16. Ca^m^ 9^m^ *in marg.; initial C in blue ink* MS.

If a privation determined a positive entity, we should have privative categories. These would be good, and not evil.

privacio, igitur, etc. Constat namque quod nulla privacio est per se superius alicui positivo, quia tunc esset dare predicamenta privativa, sicut positiva. Nec proprietas positivi est privacio: quia omnis passio consequitur suùm subiectum positive; ideo malicia per se inexistens esset contrarie et non privative opposita bonitati, et tunc auctor nature haberet illam contrarietatem sibi tamquam sibi inpertinentem, vel principiaret illam maliciam positivam; et cum ens et bonum convertuntur, illa foret bonitas vel subiectum bonitatis: quod est contradiccio. Ideo est conclusio decisa apud doctores,

Were there anything evil by nature, it must be created by an evil God. God, cause of all predicables cannot cause an action essentially bad. Evil destroys itself; if absolute, it were intolerable.

81 b[b] quod si aliquid esset per se | malum, illud esset deus malus contrarius domino nostro, ut dicunt Manichei. Omnis igitur malicia est privacio modi vel ordinis fundata in ordinabili, et per consequens in natura bona positiva. Si enim aliqua accio esset per se mala, tunc tota species illius accionis, in quantum huiusmodi, esset mala, quia perseitas inest prime speciei vel generi, ut patet primo *Posteriorum*: et certum est quod consequens est inpossibile, tum quia omne genus predicabile causatur a deo ut eius causa, tum quia omnis species, ut huiusmodi, est ens, et per consequens bonum; ipsa enim convertuntur, ut patet primo *Ethicorum*, 6°, discurrendo per omnia predicamenta, ut ostendit Averoys. Ideo 4 *Ethicorum*, 12, dicit quod malum seipsum destruit, et, si integrum sit, inportabile fit.

To every natural act corresponds a natural tendency; if this were evil, the Author of nature would be in fault.

Cum igitur ad omnem speciem naturalis accionis ordinatur a deo potencia et appetitus ad intendendum naturaliter pro illa complenda, patet quod si aliquantulis esset per se mala, talis malicie auctorisacio redundaret in auctorem nature: quod est inpossibile. Patet igitur quod malicia est extra racionem cuiuscunque speciei vel generis positivi.

But a predicate may inhere, without being essential; neither size is essential to corporeity, nor degree to quality.

Ulterius est difficultas si aliqua res positiva sit inseparabiliter mala; quia non est idem, rem esse inseparabiliter malam, et esse per se malam. Nam corpus est [in]separabiliter, set non per se, magnum et parvum; qualitas est inseparabiliter set non per se intensa ac remissa, et sic de aliis accidentibus inseparabilius preter passionem subiecti.

Is evil then something accidental?

Cum igitur omni predicamento contingit dare genus, speciem, differenciam, proprium, et accidens, ut patet

7. 9q^{m} *pro* contrarietatem MS. 28. intelligendum MS. 36. in *deest* MS.

Yes, for it is merely a happening; before any sin takes place, there is innocence; and after, it may be blotted out. This is shewn by Bradwardine to be true of all evil acts.

primo *topicorum* capitulo ultimo, probabiliter ponitur quod in omni positivo malo accidentaliter inest malicia: ut quilibet peccator ante peccatum suum actuale potest esse sine peccato tali, et omne peccatum originale potest deleri. Nulla igitur malicia moris est inseparabilis a subiecto. Et quod sic est de accionibus malis quibuscunque, ostendit doctor profundus, libro primo, capitulo 26°, subtiliter et seriose; et libro secundo, 20 et 25.

Of impurity, for instance. The act is the coitus; surely it is a mere accident that this act, on account of certain circumstances, becomes evil.

So too of homicide, which may be justifiable, or excusable through ignorance; and of the external act of idolatry.

Patet autem istud faciliter de actu quocumque extrinseco. Nam omnis fornicacio, adulterium, vel incestus foret idem coitus in numero, servata ydemptitate temporis et personarum, sive fuerint coniugati, sive quomodocunque aliter soluti, cum accidit inpertinens esse coniugati pro tempore actus et solvendo debitum, vel recta intencione prolis procreande coire. Sequitur quod quilibet talis actus potest esse moraliter bonus, et per consequens nullus inseparabiliter malus. Quid, queso, refert quoad naturam actus extrinseci quod agens sit sacerdos, solutus vel tali accidente formatus, quale non variat naturam agendi? et idem est argumentum de occisione cuiuscunque persone; nam contingit hominem mereri occidendo quemcunque alium, vel quia alius peccando est dignus occidi, et occidens potest cum hoc habere sub precepto occidere; vel quia ignorancia excusante occidit. Et idem est argumentum de quacunque ydolatria corporali, quia quecunque talis agencia, ut genuum curvacio, manuum elevacio, aut quecunque mocio corporis, posset tam bene quam male fieri.

None of these is by itself or always evil, since its righteousness or its iniquity depend on the Will.

That our will is prone to evil changes nothing in the indifference of the act itself, which is always of the same nature, just as

Ex quo patet quod nulla talis est inseparabiliter malus, cum nullus talis sit iustus aut iniustus, nisi per correspondenciam ad iusticiam vel iniusticiam que foret in suprema potestate racionalis creature; que potencia est vis volutiva. Cum igitur nichil habet per se aut inseparabiliter predicacionem que inest sibi ab extrinseco accidentaliter respiciente, sequitur quod nullus actus extrinsecus sit sic malus. Quilibet enim actus extrinsicus posset fieri idem in numero, etsi voluntas fuit viciata, cum vicia non individuat actum extrinsecum quoad naturam actus, set quoad genus moris. Sicut enim religiosus et [laicus] sunt eiusdem speciei nature, licet sint diversorum generum quoad ritus nature acci-

13. accidens MS. 37. non fuit MS. 40. laicus *deest* MS.

dentales, sic actus moralis et viciosus quod naturam actus convenit, licet discrepent in genere moris. Hoc autem est illis accidentale, ut patet ex circumstanciis bonificantibus actus moraliter esse quotlibet.

a religions and a layman are only accidentally different.

Eciam [de] actu simplici intrinsece patet idem. Nam non est color aliquem actum esse per se malum, nisi fuerit actus voluntatis, quia nullum *intelligere* est sic malum, cum planum sit quod *intelligere quodcunque malum* inest deo sine peccato. Et sic indubie tam intelligere
82 a quam scire quodcunque | malum potest in quocunque homine sic circumstanciorari, quod sit bonum et non malum; quia quicquam alia vis fecerit, non imputatur ad malum, nisi ipsa domina inordinate consenciente. Ideo, si alicui actui per se aut inseparabiliter inest malicia, hoc potissime foret in voluntate creature cuius voluntas aut volucio foret sic mala. Set contra, nihil potest esse volitum, nisi aparendo esse bonum; set nulla volucio terminata ad volubile secundum illam racionem potest esse inseparabiliter mala; igitur nulla volucio potest esse sic mala. Maior patet ex hoc quod volubile, in quantum huiusmodi, est bonum vel apparens bonum. Cum igitur primum et adequatum obiectum voluntatis est volubile, sequitur maior. Et minor probatur, sic: sit *a* volucio terminata ad *b*, que sit inseparabiliter mala; contra, *b* potest esse bonum; igitur *velle b* potest esse bonum: igitur non est inseparabiliter malum. Maior patet ex dictis posterius, quod nec intellectus creatus nec increatus potest ferri, nisi in illud quod potest esse; nec voluntas, nisi in illud quod potest esse bonum. Confirmatur ex hoc quod ampliissima voluntas possibilis est voluntas divina: illa non potest fieri nisi in bonum; igitur nec aliqua alia.

So too of internal acts, considered simply as such; we cannot say any of them is bad, unless there be an act of the will. Any thought may be so conditioned by circumstances, that it is not evil. All depends upon the will; and therefore if any act is necessarily and always evil, it is that of an evil will. Now no volition ever takes place, save as tending towards some good, real or apparent, for ability to be willed is the very definition of goodness. Suppose the volition A of an object B which is always evil. This is absurd, for B, as the object of the mind, must have entity; and as that of the will, goodness.

Dicitur forte quod *velle b* est bonum, sicut velle equari deo est bonum, cum hoc competit Christo
Phil. II, 6. secundum illud apostoli Phil. 2°, *cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam*, etc. Verumptamen non omne *velle b* est bonum, sicut velle equari deo modo quo Lucifer voluit non est bonum. Verumptamen non est per se malum, quia tunc competeret toti speciei illius volucionis, in quantum talis species; quod est falsum, cum Antechristus voluit, conformi specie volucionis,

It may be said that a given object of the will, B, may be good in itself, but in certain cases is always bad. To make oneself God's equal is good in the person of Christ, but always evil in any other, v. q. Lucifer or Antichrist.

5. de *deest* MS. 36. eciam *(in full) pro* etc. MS.

suum suppositum equari deo. Sicut igitur iste nasus inseparabiliter est simus, licet non per se, sic volucio luciferi inseparabiliter est mala, licet non per se.

But if B = to be God's equal, this is either possible or not. If possible it has objective truth, entity and goodness, so it is not inseparably evil. If impossible, it cannot be willed.

Contra illud sic: signo illud volubile quod Lucifer voluit per *b*, ut prius; et noto gradum quo voluit illud, et quero utrum fuit possibile *b* esse bonum sub gradu proporcionali ad *b* volubilem. Si sic, possibile esset quod cum aliquibus circumstanciis *Luciferum velle b* sub dato gradu esset bonum. Igitur, *ipsum tante velle b* non est inseparabiliter malum. Si dicatur quod *b* non potest esse proporcionaliter bonum ad volucionem Luciferi, tunc sequitur quod volucio Luciferi sit impossibillis, quia aliter appetit qualiter non potest esse; quod supponitur esse impossibile. Quamvis enim voluntas sit inpossibilium secundum quid, per accidens aut quoad nos, ut patet 3° *Ethicorum*, tamen nihil potest velle absolute impossibile, tum quia non potest apparere esse bonum, tum quia non potest inclinare ad sic volendum; potissime unus angelus tam sciolus ut Lucifer, non deceptus in penam peccati precedentis, non voluerit esse deus. Tunc enim error incolorabilis intellectus Luciferi precederet primum peccatum suum in voluntate. Ideo sentencia catholica Anselmi in *De casu diaboli*, capitulo 6°, est quod Lucifer voluit unum bonum sibi possibile, set inordinate, et in hoc peccavit.

Lucifer's mighty mind, as yet without sin, and consequently not blinded in punishment thereof, could not commit such an error as to desire the Impossible. St. Anselm concludes that Lucifer desired a thing possible but desired it inordinately.

Duns Scotus thinks otherwise, for three reasons.

Set contra istud est doctor subtilis super secundo *Sentenciarum*, divisione 6, ubi solvendo 4 argumenta in oppositum, tenet tamquam probabile quod primus angelus voluit simpliciter esse equalis deo, et facit ad hoc tres raciones.

(1) Our will extends to all that is good, as our intelligence to all that is true. *To be God* is good. But though we cannot understand what *I am God* would mean to us, we can still desire that its meaning should be realized.

Primo, voluntas creata est tam ampla ut racio, [que] intelligit omne bonum; igitur voluntas potest concupiscere sibi omne bonum sibi possibile. Cum igitur *esse deum* sit summe bonum, sequitur quod voluntas creata potest appetere esse deus. Set volucio istius patet ex supradictis de equalitate subiectorum 3 potenciarum anime. Potest enim voluntas creata concupiscere sibi deum, set non potest intelligere aut velle esse deus vel equalis deitati, etsi intelligat et velit sic esse ut ista proposicio significat. Unde sicut dicentes se experiri

19. decipiens MS. 20. voluit MS. 21. incolo[1] *pro* incolorabilis MS. 29. fuerit *pro* facit MS. 31. prima MS.; *ib.* que *deest* MS. 34. cum sit MS.

quod volunt se non esse, errando menciuntur, sic et dicentes quod vellent deum non esse, aut esse meliorem, vel se esse attendentes ad simulacra in anima et bonum creatum quod confuse cupiunt, et male nominant illud quod terminat concupiscenciam eorum per signa impossibilia, ut patet ex supradictis.

The statements: *I wish not to exist*, or *God not to exist*, or *to be better than He is*, are all lies, but they represent a desire.

Secundo arguitur sic. Si equalitas dei esset compossibilis angelo, tunc posset angelus ipsam appetere, set inpossibilitas non prohibet quim sic posset, cum voluntas sit inpossibilium: igitur, etc. Set, supposito quod $82a^{b}$ intelligitur per impossibilitatem ista negacio | absolute intellecta, *nullus angelus potest equari deo*, patet quod minor est falsa. Deus enim limitat quamlibet volutivam creatam proporcionaliter ad volutivam dei quoad obiectum. Set, sicut deus semper vult omne bonum secundum *esse* intelligibile, sic creatura, si aliquid vult, ipsum est aliquid illorum. Ille igitur qui dicit se velle aut imprecari quod sit deus, voces aut signa aliqua intelligit, et vult bonum in communi. Set nec intellectus nec affectus attingit ad hoc volubile, *hoc esse equale deo*, cum omne quod creatura potest velle, directe potest et deus velle.

(2) To be God's equal, though impossible, may be desired, since we can desire things impossible. But this is not true, for when a thing is absolutely impossible, it is just as unintelligible, and if not thought, not willed. Such is the case with the notion of a creature equal to God.

3° sumitur quod dampnati odiunt deum, volendo ipsum non esse, et hoc est inpossibile, igitur etc. Assumptum videtur, quia Psalmo 44, dicit dominus de peccatoribus vel dampnatis, *odio habuerunt me gratis:* Io. XV, 23. Et Io. 15, *qui odit me, et patrem meum odit.* Et talia multa sunt dicta scripture qui sonant generaliter peccatores odire deum secundum divinitatem, quia secundum humanitatem videtur certum quod iudei ex odio occiderunt eum. Cum igitur omne *odire* sit velle malum deo inesse, sicut (et summum) videtur quod creatura potest velle deum adnichilari, vel simpliciter non esse.

(3) The damned hate God, as Scripture shows. Now this is to wish an absolute impossibility; for to hate God is to wish evil to Him, even that greatest of evils, annihilation.

Pro isto dicitur quod quadrupliciter loquitur scriptura de odire, scilicet de odio personali, et odio bonorum adiacencium, de odio explicito et implicito: et utrumque membrum capit subdivisiones. Quandocunque igitur scriptura dicit creaturam odire deum, intelligit de odio in bonis deo adiacentibus.

Here we must note that hatred is of four kinds: personal, indirect, explicit, and implicit. Whoso hates God, hates Him indirectly, i. e. in that which appertains to Him; the sinner chiefly hates himself.

13. limitans MS. 18. si *pro* sit MS. 26. hodio MS.

26. *Odio.* The text as given here is word for word in Io. XV, 25; in Ps. XXIV, 19 and XXXIV, 19, with some variations; but it is not to be found at all in Ps. XLIV.

Or implicitly, by committing sin, which would harm God, if not otherwise prevented.

Et sic peccator in talibus principaliter odit seipsum, qui est bonum dei. Concedo eciam creaturam odire deum odio implicito, quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur creaturam facere peccatum oppositum rectitudini, que est deus: quod peccatum, si remaneret aliunde inpunitum, destrueret primam rectitudinem, que est deus. Sic enim dicitur unus odire alium implicite, de quo nunquam cogitavit explicite, quando facit quantum in se est aliquid quod esset malum alteri, nisi per aliud esset cautum. Et tali modo implicite et antecedenter diligeret iniquitatem qui diligit actus inordinatos, ex quo sequitur ipsum esse iniqum. Iniquitas enim non potest in se et immediate appeti, sicut non potest in se habere racionem boni; ut post dicetur.

Iniquity cannot be loved for itself, but for certain aspects which are good, for goodness is always the motive of our acts, and iniquity only willed accidentally.

Ideo, sicut homo implicite et antecedenter vult talia peccata, sic deus vult ipsa esse punita, et bonitate extrinseca bona. Nec aliter posset homo alico modo velle ipsa, cum volucio hominis non potest excedere volucionem dei. Unde, cum claudit contradiccionem naturam quicquam appetere, nisi appetat bonum ut finem gracia cuius facit media, patet quod malicia, si appetitur, hoc est valde per accidens et implicite, ut natura non intendit corrupcionem, nisi forte per accidens; eo quod consequitur ad generacionem forme quam principaliter intendit.

The sinner therefore, desiring the evil of God, though accidentally, is said to hate Him, for sin, if unpunished, would destroy God. Some deny that this is hatred of God, on account of the difference in meaning of the term.

Et isto modo quicunque diligit ipsum secundum aliquam racionem boni, et consequenter, ac per accidens, dicitur diligere maliciam, et de tanto odire primam rectitudinem, quia indubie quelibet talis adnichilaret deum. Set talis iniquitas remaneret sine decore vindicte. Unde propter equivocacionem appetitus talis per accidens, multi negant eum. Videtur tamen michi liberius ipsum concedere ex opposito sensu, conformiter ad scripturam, Relinquitur igitur quod deus de potencia sua absoluta non potest dimittere aliquod peccatum, vel pro instanti temporis, inpunitum, ut patet 3° *De libero arbitrio*, 24.

God is hated indirectly, when any one hates what belongs to Him, and wishes harm to it; which God cannot suffer to be unpunished.

Et correspondenter dicitur quod quis odit alium, quando nedum sibi set suis vult malum. Nam per eum non stat quin possessor in seipso habeat malum. Set deus ex summitate potencie non potest in se sufferre malum ex contingencia malicie suis causatis, set ex ineffabilitate sue potencie retorquet in omne facinus malum,

2. Concedit MS. 27. dei *pro* dicitur MS.

maliciam propriam, principaliter in se. Et ad proporcionalem sensum dicitur deus odire peccatores, de quanto vult illis malum pene, et ut sic tamquam pius pater amat eos, sic quod omne odium dei est amor, cum non potest odire aliquod eorum que fecit, nisi volendo sibi malum pene, quod est bene velle sibi bonum, et per consequens est amare. Et sic intelligitur hominem odire animam suam, quod debet velle sibi, secundum racionem qua animat corpus, malum pene sensus, ne ex petulancia prosiliat contra spiritum; Luc. IX, 24. iuxta decretum salvatoris Luce 9, *qui voluerit animam* 82b[a] *suam salvam facere, perdet illam;* Io. | 12, *qui odit ani-* Io. XII, 25. *mam suam in hoc mundo*, etc. Et iuxta hoc instructus I Cor. IX, 27. apostolus dicit, prima Cor. 9, "*castigo corpus meum*", etc. Cum enim anima principaliter sentit penam, patet quod ipsa principaliter oditur odio amoris, que est volucio pene bone.

In this sense God is said to hate sinners, when He hates and punishes their sins out of love for them; and a man is said, in Christ's words, to hate his own soul, which animates this evil body. But this is in fact a loving hatred, being the will to suffer for one's own good.

Non igitur possibile est aliquid odire deum odio explicito personali. Claudit enim contradiccionem aliquid velle bonum nisi sub quodam involucro velit deum. Dampnati igitur volunt deum non esse ultorem peccatorum suorum; sicut iudei volunt istam humanitatem non esse; quorum utrumque est possibile. Set valde remotum est ex istis inferre quod voluit deum non esse.

Personal hatred of God is impossible, for the very desire of any good whatever implies a reference to God.

Ulterius, quoad soluciones doctoris, quando distinguit de eleccione, quod quedam est speculativa, qua post deliberacionem creatura vult finem aliquem sine hoc quod velit practice inniti pro illo fine exequendo; et quedam est practica, qua post sillogismum practicum intenditur prosequi pro fine dictato possibili): intelligenti placet de distinccione. Nam prima eleccio vel volucio est condicionata, ut alias dicetur. Nec video quod sit possibile angelum plene apprehendentem inpossibilitatem equalitatis sui ad deum, sine passione vel perturbacione eius per ignoranciam, simpliciter

Scotus gives a good distinction as to choice, which may be either speculative (choosing an object without acting to attain it) or practical; the first is only a conditional choice.

I think it impossible for Lucifer, fully knowing the absurdity of a creature being God's equal, to have chosen such a volition absolutely; for if so, it must

12. eam *pro* illam MS.; *ib.* 13 MS. 27. pecu^na^ *pro* speculativa MS. 29. exequi *pro* pro illo fine MS. 31, 32. illi^ti^ *pro* intelligenti MS.

26. *Doctoris.* I have put Scotus in the side-notes, but it may be Bradwardine, and the *soluciones* referred to, his answers to the arguments of Scotus. 33. *Conditionata.* The 'speculative' choice would seem to amount to this: *I choose B, if it be possible to choose it.*

have been through blindness, the punishment of a former sin. We can find no sufficient cause for this; for there are things which are not absurd, and yet can hardly be desired, because there is so little of apparent good in them; and what is impossible cannot appear good. Every man (unless struck with mental blindness) knows that a creature, God's equal, is not good, even apparently: *a fortiori* Lucifer knew that. But he may have desired it conditionally.

illam velle; potissime cum non sit possibile penam esse priorem peccato, et talis volucio non posset carere obliquitate: igitur non potest esse primum peccatum. Quis igitur principiaret illam volucionem simplicem? Oporteret quod tam deus primarie necessitando, quam volubile in racione apparentis boni, saltem in *esse* intelligibili. Preterea, aliqua creduntur intelligibilia que non possunt appeti, propter defectum apparencie bonitatis, ut hominem adnichilari, vel ipsum non esse, secundum Augustinum, 3. *De libero arbitrio*. Set omnia simpliciter impossibilia eque non possunt apparere esse bona: igitur omnia talia non possunt esse volita. Cum igitur quelibet homo non errans primarie in intentu scit quod creaturam equari deo non potest habere apparenciam boni, ymmo si esset, foret summe malum; sequitur quod non sit possibile, potissime creaturam non primarie errantem, id appetere; cum claudit contradiccionem hominem quicquam appetere, nisi ad minimum appareat sibi esse bonum: ut si simul appetit, apparet sibi simpliciter possibilitas ad illud, et sic illud esse bonum possibile; si condicionaliter appetit, ut imprecantes appetunt, tunc condicionaliter apparet sibi esse bonum intelligibile. Terminatur tam actus intelligendi quam actus volendi ad res significatas per partes simulacrorum quibus sit apprehensio, sic quod non est dare unum inpossibile primo et principaliter apprehensum totali significato; set ex parte signi est inpossibilitas, propter hoc quod inpossibile est significatum primarium sibi sic significanti correspondere. Nam si signum non habet significatum primarium, et significat modo suo significandi aliter primarie, tunc est ipsum inpossibile, ut dictum est superius.

Lucifer still remains in his first sin of pride; but he surely does not now wish to be God, so he never can have wished it. Scotus' conclusion does not really differ from that of St. Thomas, though he contradicts the latter's argument.

Ideo ex illo dicto philosophi sequitur quod *creaturam equari deitati* non potest appetere angelus sibi, creatus in clara sciencia, sine fantasmatibus terminantibus sensus suos interiores, ut contingit in homine non potente sic fantastice componere. Nam adhuc manet continue obstinatus in eadem superbia; et certum videtur quod non continue appetit esse deus, set semper appetit esse non deus: igitur nunquam appetit esse deus. Ideo

5. pe neciϑo *pro* primarie necessitando. 13. pe *pro* primarie MS. 16. pe *pro* primarie MS. 24. et *pro* ad MS 34. appeti angelos MS. 36. pote MS.

doctor more suo contradicit probacioni sancti Thome et aliorum doctorum, et non contradicit conclusioni, quin angelus non voluit ita manifestam contradiccionem.

Gen. III, 5. Unde diabolus temptans mulierem ge. 3. quando in toto deditus fuit mendacio, addidit istum terminum *sicut*, ne mulier, percipiendo impossibilitatem dicti sui, illud non appeteret. Dixit enim, *nequaquam morte moriemini: scit enim deus quod in quocunque die*, ecce primo mendacium contra divinam sentenciam, "nequaquam", etc. Ecce secundo callidi implicacio quod deus propter invidiam prohibuit esum ligni: *Scit enim dominus*, etc. Et patet tercio palliacio ad credendum per addicionem adverbii similitudinis: *Eritis*, inquid, *sicut dii*, etc., i. [e]. angeli non restricti aliqua inhibicione, nec serviliter subiecti, set scientes sine instructore quid vobis proderit aut nocebit. Si ergo mulier scivit quod non potuit converti in aliam naturam, multo magis dyabolus hoc scivit.

This is borne out by the Genesis narrative of the Temptation. He does not tell Eve 'ye shall become gods', since she, knowing that one nature could not possibly become another, could not have been tempted; he said: 'As gods', i. e. like the angels who are not subject to any prohibition.

Ideo, si diabolus appeteret esse par deo, hoc appet- 82 b[b] eret gracia finis quem principaliter appeteret. | Set illud foret mirabile medium, quod non potest intelligi sub ente vel bono. Finis inponens necessitatem rebus foret valde inportunatus tali volucioni medie ut finis habeatur. Relinquitur igitur quod diabolus voluit unum bonum sibi possibile, et per consequens volucio illa poterit esse bona.

We cannot admit that Lucifer desired what he knew to be absurd, and therefore, his volition was of a thing possible, and so possibly good.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM.

Habito quod nullus actus est per se aut inseparabiliter malus, cum multi actus sunt mali, restat videre quomodo malicia inest rei. Pro quo notandum quod omnis malicia, formaliter dicta, est privacio boni. Ideo, quot sunt maneries bonorum privabilium, tot sunt maneries maliciarum, ut aliquod est malum pene, aliquod est malum subiective, et aliquod effective, et aliud significative. Et videtur mihi quod omnis malicia, dicta formaliter, sonat in privacionem modi vel ordinis, et econtra. Ideo, ut dictum est superius, quando aggre-

If an act cannot be evil in its own nature or in all cases, how does it come to be evil? Evil is in general a privation of goodness.

All evil, in the proper sense, is (I think) a lack of proportion or harmony; first, in the will of

10. calidi MS. 13. e *deest* MS. 15. perderit MS. 26. Ca[m] 10[m] *in marg.; initial H in blue ink* MS.

1. *Doctor*. Here Scotus is evidently meant. He is known for having opposed St. Thomas, whenever it was possible to do so. *Frater Thomas sic dixit: ego vero contra.*

the creature, then in its object, and what proceeds therefrom. There are ever so many acts that God is absolutely unable to make righteous.

gatum caret rectitudine vel ordine, tunc inest sibi malicia vel peccatum, quod primo est in voluntate creata, et consequenter in obiecto, et in procedentibus aut scitis ab illo. Unde quotlibet aggregata contingit assignare que deus de potencia absoluta non posset eximere ab iniusticia, ut aggregata ex habitibus, et in proporcione operum procedencium ab illis, respectu circumstanciarum persone sic habituate; et illa aggregata vocant philosophi et vulgares vicia. Et aggregatum ex carencia credibilis et sensibili diccione assertiva instanti est mendacium; quod si huiusmodi assercio sensibilis fuerit cum iuramento, tunc est periurium, et talia aggregata non posset deus de potencia absoluta facere carere iniusticia.

A credible but untrue proposition, assertively stated, is a lie; if sworn to, perjury.

Note that philosophers often call vices qualities contrary to virtues.

Et sic diligenter notanda est equivocacio signorum quibus disputantes utuntur in ista materia, quia vicia vocantur apud philosophos qualitates contrarie virtutibus, ut patet ca° *De qualitate* in libro *Predicamentorum*, et in processu libri *Ethicorum*; et hoc contingit dupliciter sane intelligere. Vel intelligendo terminos personaliter, ut significant habitus positivos inclinativos ad actus tales simplices operandum, et ad illum sensum concedendum esset vicium posse esse virtutem, et econtra. Ut habituatus ad dandum quocunque gradu, (vel agendum quibuscunque actibus simplicibus ad intra vel ad extra) posset sic circumstanciorari quod habitus ille virtuose inclinaret, ut patet specialiter communicante prudencia talem habitum, et proporcionali adiacencia facultatum. Et sic intelligendum est de quocunque habitu; quod si sit malus, hoc est per accidens. Set secundo modo contingit intelligere terminos huiusmodi ut simpliciter significant aggregata ex multis habitibus vel habitudinibus positivis et privativis, in quibus oportet obliquitatem fundari ut, posito quod quis inclinetur ad dandum, ut 10, et habeat affeccionem ex defectu prudencie vel alterius virtutis ad dandum histrionibus vel non indigentibus, etc.: totum hoc aggregatum ex habitu ad tante effectus et talibus dandum cum aliis circumstanciis et privativis vocatur simpliciter vicium, et qualitas habitualis propter sensibilitatem sue partis notabilioris, et sic conceditur vicium inseparabiliter esse

This may be rightly understood in two different ways.

There may be positive habits which incline a man towards certain acts; and these may be virtuous in certain cases. A prodigal may act virtuously in following his bent, especially when this inclination is moderated by prudence. Such a tendency may be evil, but only as a happening. If on the other hand, we take this inclination together with a certain circumstance, v. g. if a man is prone to give prodigally to the

3. procedentibus aut in MS. 7. precedencium MS. 9. aggregatum et MS. 9, 10. ex t° ꝯnce *pro* ex carencia. 35. effeccionem MS.

vicium, licet simplex habitus posset esse non vicium. Et talia aggregata sunt in genere qualitatis et genere accionis, sicut et in aliis generibus.

undeserving, this is simply a vicious inclination, and always evil.

Et isto modo glosandi sunt auctores, quando dicunt aliqua de se sonare in malum: ut invidia, furtum, mendacium, mala voluntas, et quotlibet similia.

When a writer says that this or that is always evil, we must understand him in the latter sense.

Intelligunt enim quod talia simpliciter vel aggregative intellecta non possunt carere malicia, ut philosophus, *Ethicorum* 7°, dicit quod quedam confestim nominata convoluta sunt malicia, ut gaudium de malo, et verecundia, invidia, adulterium, furtum, etc. Augustinus eciam, 12 *De civitate* dei, dicit, *Nemo igitur causam efficientem querat male voluntatis*; *non enim habent causam efficientem, set deficientem.* Intelligit enim simpliciter per malam voluntatem maliciam in voluntate fundatum, ut patet per exempla que ponit de privacionibus corporalibus. Sicut enim videndo tenebram nichil video, et audiendo silencium nihil audio, sic faciendo malam |
83 a* voluntatem nihil facio, set deficio; cum malicia sit defeccio. Quotquot talia dicta auctoris intelliguntur, vel de inordinate aggregatis, vel simpliciter, quando malicia, ut mala voluntas, potest simpliciter intelligi, ut dicit *substanciam esse albam*, quod est albedo; ut patet ex supradictis.

Thus Aristotle says that the very name of certain acts implies evil, and Augustine speaks of a bad will, meaning the will together with the evil based thereon.

And thus a bad will means the malice of the will, just as *whiteness* means *a substance being white.*

Et secundum talem equivocum modum intelligendi concedunt auctores, nunc quod talis actus aut habitus non potest esse bonus, et nunc quod potest deficere a malicia vel iniusticia et esse bonus, sicut Aristoteles nunc dicit quod musicus desinit esse quando subiectum desinit habere musicam; et nunc dicit, licet raro, quod musicus potest esse non musicus. Et illo modo intelligendus est Anselmus in *De concordia*, 13, ubi expresse dicit iniusticiam non esse qualitatem, set privacionem iusticie, que vicium est; et idem dicit in *De casu diaboli*, 19, et in *De conceptu virginali* 4. Unde sic scribit in *De concordia* 13, "non est enim iniusticia qualitas aut aliqua essencia, set tantum absencia debite iusticie, nec est nisi in voluntate, ubi debet esse iusticia". Quod dictum intelligo quod non est in operibus extrinsecis, nisi prius fuerit in voluntate. Unte patet quod Aristoteles, vocans iniusticiam et alia vicia qualitates,

This explains certain apparent contradictions, as when Aristotle now says that a musician ceases to be when he ceases to know music, and now that a musician may become a non-musician. Likewise Anselm and Augustine call injustice a privation, whilst Aristotle, in another sense, calls it a quality; in his eyes, justice only concerns our duties towards man.

8. causare MS. 9. et Ethicorum MS. 23. que MS. 29 musicum MS. 32. musicum MS. 35. virgilii (sic) MS.

equivocat ab Augustino, Anselmo, et aliis doctoribus, qui intelligunt talia privative. Unde Aristoteles non diceret infantes natos in originali peccato statim esse iniustos, nec heremitas, nec eciam desides ad faciendum quod debent, esse iniustos, set tantum adultos qui ex hastucia generata ex iniustis operibus iniuste agunt vel iudicant, ita quod iniustia respiciat iniuriam homini factam per actus positivos.

But theologians take a higher view, and consider in the first place our duties towards God. A child in God's grace is just, yet has no moral virtues; the most upright man, if his life is not pleasing to God, is unjust.

Econtra autem theologi alcius et reccius loquntur, concedentes quod iusticia et iniusticia principaliter respiciunt rectitudinem aut obliquitatem vite quoad deum, ita quod infans pro primo instanti sui *esse* est iustus et in gracia, etsi careat virtute morali; et quomodocunque iuste vivens preter divinum beneplacitum est iniustus, cuius iniusticia est carencia rectitudinis vite, et sic opponuntur contrarie. Unde, quamvis quoad consideracionem humanam possent homines esse neutri quoad propositum politicum, tamen quoad deum non est neutralitas.

As no being can be evil in itself and always, since evil is a privation, the first sin must have been in the will, either of man or of an Angel.

Istis premissis, planum est quod nullum ens per se in genere est inseparabiliter malum, cum omnis privacio sit defeccio extra genus, et nullum ens predicabile est malum, nisi tali malicia. Primum igitur malum, cum non potest inesse deo formaliter, nec alicui corpori extrinseco, inest voluntati. Quodlibet enim extra voluntatem malum non [est] huiusmodi, nisi in comparacione ad voluntatem, eo quo privacio, que [in]iusticia dicitur, non potest inesse primarie nisi illi cui primo inest flexibiliter esse iustum, quod solum est homo vel angelus secundum potenciam volutivam.

Not of man, for then, sinning without being tempted, he could not have been redeemed, and no being could have tempted him; therefore it was in the will of the Angels who fell.

Set promissio dei et ordinancia de pena eterna videntur exigere quod non primo peccavit homo, tum quia, primo homine peccante sine diabolo instigante, videtur peccatum suum fuisse irremediabile, ut peccatum primi angeli, et sic tota species humana periiset ab incepcione; tum eciam quia natura inmunis a peccato non posset primo movere hominem ad peccandum; ut multis videtur quod error invincibilis non posset

4. aut *pro* eciam MS. 12. innocens *pro* infans MS. 14. iniuste MS. 23. materia *pro* malicia MS. 26. est *deest* MS. 27. est iusticia *pro* iniusticia MS. 35, 36. intuicione MS.

12. *Infans.* I suppose *baptizatus* should be supplied. Wyclif nowhere says that children are not born in original sin.

precedere peccatum. Oportet igitur peccatum esse pure liberum, sine causa primo inpellente: illud inest angelo peccanti, sine ignorancia excusante.

Cum igitur summus gradus malicie non potest homini competere, relinquitur quod diabolo insit; et ultra sequitur, cum quelibet res dicit se vel sensibiliter vel insensibiliter, quod quelibet natura peccatrix mentitur, cum secundum ymaginacionem vel naturam dicit se esse bonam, servando rectitudinem, et perverse vivendo false dicit oppositum. Illud autem primum *dicere*, cum sit pure naturale, non tollitur per adventicium. Dicit igitur se servire deo continue et desiderando mentitur, ut ostendit venerabilis Anselmus in *De veritate*, 9 capitulo, et in *De similibus* 156, dicens quod brevius dicit homo facto vel naturali signo quam artificiali verbo. Quod ostendit sistemate tali: si medicus unam herbam saluti-
83 a[b] feram egroto verbis | diceret, et aliam mortiferam, realiter gustando, plus actu quam verbo illam commendandum suadet; sic (ut dicit) quicunque ordinis vel religionis gerit officium fidelis servi dei, cuius signa sunt naturalia dona et spiritualia carismata; cum igitur in actu falso aut declinante a rectitudine vixerit, patenter mentitur. Ideo dicit salvator de primo angelo
Io. VIII, 44. peccatore Io. 8°, quod ipse *mendax est, et pater* vel origo mendacii simpliciter in communi. Mendax autem simpliciter non est nisi mendacium.

Cum igitur diabolus . . . . mendacium et peccatum ex sentencia salvatoris, querit Anselmus solicite in *De casu diaboli*, quomodo primum peccatum suum ortum habuerit, et cum diabolus non posset eciari a volucione, cum non sit natura passionibus impetrata. Et oportet primo esse obliquitatem in potencia volutiva, et sibi manifestum quod primus defectus fuit in actuali volucione, et cum nichil potest velle nisi iustum vel utile, set nichil peccat volendo iusticiam, patet sibi quod diabolus primo peccavit volendo sibi bonum utile. Et ultra, cum non iniuste vellet, si solum bonum utile sibi datum a deo vellet, cum iustum sit omne tale

Every sinner lies; since he pronounces himself to be good, and yet by committing evil, says the contrary.

This first pronouncement is that of his own nature; and this remaining together with its opposite, he tells a continual lie. Should a physician recommend a wholesome herb in words and another, a poisonous one, by tasting it, the latter persuasion would be more efficacious. And when a man holds an office in God's service, and falls therefrom by his acts, he is a living lie. And the devil is the father of lies.

Causes of the fall of Lucifer, according to Anselm. As he had no passions to combat, the first cause must have been a moral obliquity; the desire of something advantageous to him, which he did not

16. fiste *pro* sistemate MS. 27. ppat *after* diabolus MS.

30. *Eciari.* This word is marked *(sic!)* in Mr. Austen's copy, but I have nowhere been able to find anything like it, nor can I suggest any alternative word. *Ociari* does not seem to make much sense here, beyond that of a theologically correct assertion.

possess, and desired in wrong manner, not according to God's will, refusing to submit, and implicitly wishing thus to be God's equal, and even above God.

velle, patet quod voluit sibi aliquod bonum utile non tunc habitum ab eodem; et per consequens, inordinate volendo commodum quod nondum habuerit, extendit appetitum extra iusticiam, volendo ut non debuit. Cum igitur voluit implicite voluntatem propriam non sequi vel subici superiori voluntati; quod cum proprium sit deo, voluit implicite similiari deo. Ymmo, voluit quodammodo implicito esse maior deo, volendo illud quod deus ipsum habere noluit, nec modum volendi causavit.

It was such opposition to God's will that Christ rebuked so severely in St. Peter.

Et sic implicite voluit voluntatem dei retrocedere suam. Ideo salvator increpans Petrum volentem tam salutiferam mortem Christi non esse, quasi contrarie anteriorando audivit exprobacionem acutissimam domini, *vade retro, Sathana;* quia informatus est conformare volucionem suam volucioni dei ut regule precedenti et non modo Sathane, superbiendo velle precedere.

Anselm concludes, saying that Lucifer lost the innocence he had by unjustly desiring what he had not, whatever that might be.

Ex istis concludit Anselmus quod diabolus gratis omisit velle quod debuit habuisse, et sic iuste amisit innocenciam quam habebat, iniuste volendo quod non habebat. Totam illam sentenciam inculcat capitulo 4, et post in fine capituli sexti querit quod fuit illud bonum commodi quod diabolus voluit ante tempus habuisse, Et respondet, "quid illud fuerit non video, set quicquid fuit, sufficit scire quod fuit aliquid ad quod creature poterunt, quod non habuerunt, quando creati sunt"; quia, ut dicit ante, ca° 4°, "diabolus non fuit ita obtuse mentis, quin satis scivit nichil aliud par deo cogitari posse".

The first sin was therefore in the will, that commands all the other faculties; and it implies to accept what pleases, and to reject what displeases the will.

Et potest ista sentencia declarari, supposito quod primum peccatum sit in suprema potencia imperante aliis. Nam in illa sunt duo genera actum, scilicet *velle* et *nolle. Velle* est actus quo voluntas acceptat obiectum conveniens, et *nolle* est actus positivus quo voluntas resilit ab obiecto disconvenienti. Et est duplex *velle;* vel sic, quod voluntas velit bonum alteri . . . . quod potest vocari *velle* commodi vel concupiscencie. Prima autem istarum volucionum est *velle* quo voluntas vult bonum esse in communi. Et in hoc primo vult deum esse,

1. sibi quod voluit MS.

34. *Quod potest.* There is no gap before these words in the MS. But Wyclif speaks of a two-fold will, and he only mentions one. The distinction besides, between the *voluntas benevolentiae* et the *voluntas concupiscentiae,* is well-known in Scholastic literature. It is the former that *vult bonum alteri;* after which part of the sentence is no doubt missing.

quamvis particularium volucionum volucio affeccione commodi videtur precedere volucionem affective iusticie; set subtilioribus videtur quod omnis affeccio commodi concupiti est propter bonum cui commodum appetitur finaliter. Et cum finis habet prius racionem diligibilis quam media ad ipsum, videtur quod prius sit affeccio iusticie, ut nemo diligit commodum sibi nisi propter bonum naturale predilectum.

To reject presupposes that the will has accepted something else.

All other sins presuppose pride in like manner. And so pride was the first sin; though it was also a sin of greed, which is the root of all evil; greed, that is, not of temporal but of spiritual things.

Ulterius patet quod omne *nolle* voluntatis presupponit aliquod *velle*, cum voluntas nichil refugit nisi propter repugnanciam eius cum alio quod affectat; ut avarus vult expedire propter affeccionem quam habet ad pecuniam. Ideo dicitur communiter quod oportet superbiam precedere alia peccata, sicut *velle* precedit *nolle*. Invidia enim et ira consistunt in volucione inordinata; et hinc tenet Augustinus 14, *De civitate*, 13, quod
Eccl. X, 15. superbia fuit primum peccatum, iuxta illud ecclesiastici, 10. "*Inicium omnis peccati superbia*". Nec repugnat huic
83 b[a] dictum apostoli prima | thi. 6°, quod *radix omnium*
I Tim. VI, 10. *malorum* [*est*] *cupiditas;* quia appetitus inordinatus Luciferi respectu commodi in ordine ad seipsum potest vocari cupiditas. Non enim appetiit temporalia vel carnalia affeccione sui commodi, quia non affectatur talibus. Cum igitur omne quod est in mundo aut est concupiscencia carnis, aut concupiscencia oculorum, aut
I Io. II, 17. superbia vite, prima Io. 2. patet quod peccatum diabolicum est superbia.

What was it that Lucifer desired? Some think that in a vision of the Incarnation he desired to be united to the Divine nature, instead of Humanity. Many, however, think this improbable.

Others suppose that in his

Quid autem dyabolus voluit, est dubium. Quidam autem dicunt quod vidit in verbo deum assumpturum naturam humanam, et in videndo voluit quod assumpsisset naturam suam. Set hoc non est multis verisimile propter duo. Primo, quia cum visione clara tante bonitatis non stat invidia; secundo, quia (a probabili) Christus non fuisset incarnatus si homo vel diabolus non peccasset. Vidisset igitur implicite casum suum, et sic vel doluisset pena precedente peccatum, ipsum casum volendo, vel nolendo casum suum fuisset peccator, ut arguit Anselmus in *De casu diaboli*, 21. Aliqui autem putant quod actus Luciferi fuit noticia creaturis in qua

20. est *deest* MS. 23. affirmatur *pro* affectatur MS.

12. *Expedire.* Probably a mistake. It may be that the original had: *non vult expendere.* 39. *Noticia.* Bossuet, in his *Ele-*

contemplation of creatures, he negleced to praise God; others say that the wished to be confirmed in grace sooner than it pleased God. But all these explanations concur to say that righteousness is conformity to God's will, and sin is the contrary.

fundabatur omissio resurgendi in deum laudandum, sicut fecerunt angeli confirmati, faciendo mane secunde diei. Alii autem putant quod voluit confirmacionem suam accelerari, et sic omissio volucionis vel complacencie in dono dei tunc habito, causata ex cupiditate alicuius quod non debuit habere, principiavit illud peccatum. Et sic de multis modis dicendi, qui omnes recte sencientes in isto conveniunt quod iusticia est conformitas vite racionalis ad voluntatem increatam; que quidem conformitas rectitudo dicitur, iniusticia autem, malicia, vel peccatum, est difformitas actus nature racionalis ad voluntatem vel regulam increatam; et omnis talis fundatur in substancia et actu bono.

But the act itself by which Lucifer sinned was not essentially evil, for (1) it was of the same kind as another act that might have been right, proceeding from another Spirit of like nature. Now, if one raven is always black, because it is its nature, all ravens are always black for the same reason.

Quod autem primus actus simplex peccati Luciferi non sit per se aut inseparabiliter malus, patet tripliciter. Primo ex hoc quod omnis talis est eiusdem speciei specialissime cum actu terminato ad conforme bonum et fundamento in conformi natura intelligibili. Set aliquis talis, vel de facto, vel de possibili, est iustus; igitur ille non est inseparabiliter malus. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod non est dare variacionem ex parte obiecti, racione cuius inseparabiliter inesset uni, actui malicia pocius quam cuilibet sue speciei, sicut est de nigredine in corvo et ebano. Ipsa enim consequitur complexionem mixti naturaliter, ex qua resultat forma superaddita. Ideo, si mixtum non potest carere tali temperato, tunc non potest carere nigredine convertente, et ita de aliis accidentibus inseparabiliter quibuscunque. Cum igitur non sit dare talia principiancia maliciam talis actus, sequitur quod malicia non est ab ea inseparabiliter.

God might have granted Lucifer's wish at the very moment he wished it, and

Item, si deus daret Lucifero illud volubile quod inordinate vult, et hoc pro eodem instanti pro quo ille actus obicitur, tunc esset illa volucio iusta, quia complacencia in dei dono; et tunc esset idem actus qui

2. ma MS. 22. uni esset uni MS. 29. principia MS.

vations sur les Mystères, adopts this view. Lucifer, he says, absorbed in the contemplation of his own beauty, scorned to give glory to God. 32. *Daret.* This sounds as if God could even now grant the desire of Lucifer; and the end of the paragraph indicates it yet more pointedly. But then, what should we make (setting aside the boldness of the assumption) of *pro eodem instanti pro quo ille actus obicitur?*

nunc, quia idem volitum, idem volens, idem tempus produccionis, et eadem racio volendi, qui sufficiunt ad individuacionem actus. Igitur, si contingit assumptum verificari, sequitur possibilitas consequentis, possibilitas assumpti. Patet ex hoc quod omne quod deus umquam [potuit], necessario summe faciliter nunc potest.

then, this wish being fulfilled, he would have righteously enjoyed God's gift. The act would have been just the same in itself.

Item, creaturam velle habere datum volubile nunc aut tunc nedum convenit cum omni tali volucione in specie et subiecto, set videtur esse summe accidentale tali actui; igitur, cum propter limitacionem temporis quo voluit anteriorare suum commodum infuit volucioni sue obliquitas, sequitur quod summe accidentaliter fuit illa volucio iniusta. Minor videtur ex hoc, quod lapso tempore pro quo noticia racionalis appetit commodum, labitur *velle* illud commodum pro tunc, cum nemo vult simpliciter tempus revocari, et non oportet volucionem desinere esse. Igitur contingit eidem actui accidere quod terminetur ad volubile tunc aut nunc volitum, vel si fuerit volucio singularis terminata a dato instanti, adhuc non negabitur quin deus potest dare volitum pro dato instanti. Et confirmacio huius est quod illa volucio est creatura dei ab ipso causata: igitur deus potest facere ipsam sine malicia, sicut potest quamcunque animam originali peccato fedatam facere iustam. Cum igitur omne quod deus potest sit contingentissimum, patet quod nulli actui inseparabiliter inest malicia.

It is quite accidental to an act of the will, if we desire to have a given object now or at another time; and it was precisely this determination of time which caused the act to be wrong.

And even this would not have been wrong, had God chosen to grant it then.

It was in God's power to rectify this volition, as it is in His power to cleanse any one from original sin; and so, as it would have been the same volition, it cannot be essentially evil.

Certum est, quicquid prius peccator voluit primo peccando, quod illi volucioni | 83 b[b] infuit una circumstancia, que propter iniusticiam quam involvit deo displicuit, et sic defectus iusticie, in actu bono fundatus, fuit primum peccatum. Et patet quod aversio a deo est proprius ac prius de racione peccati quam conversio ad creaturam. Et hoc est quod dictum est superius, primum peccatum esse peccatum omissionis, nedum quia diabolus omisit servare iusticiam, et ut sic peccavit; verum, quia omisit velle quod debuit, propter cupiditatem inordinatam, voluit quod tunc velle non debuit. Et sic aggregatum ex tali actu et malicia fuit inseparabiliter malum. Fuit enim unus actus quo inseparabiliter voluit esse beatus, sicut necessario vult omnis natura racio-

In this first sin there must have been one point which displeased God through its moral obliquity, and a falling away from God was the first factor therein (a sin of omission); but his inordinate desire produced a positively unlawful volition.

The act, taken together with its unright-

6. potuit *deest* MS.; *ib.* etc. *deleted after* potest MS. 11. fuit *perhaps* infuit MS. 24. fedatam potest MS. 25. 9tin[mū] *pro* contingentissimum MS. 27. est quod MS. 37. quia MS.

eousness, was essentially evil, the first of all sins, and the exemplar of all others.

For sin cannot be without volition, nor in the act itself; so it must be in the inordination of the act, and that as regards our ultimate end.

As error in reasoning is in the relation of the premises to the conclusion, so sin consists in the relation of the premises of the mediate things willed to the end to which every volition must tend, as when we look for happiness in pleasure, wealth or glory. Each of these may be wished for without sin, but only in so far as they help us towards our goal. These correspond to our three enemies: the world, the flesh, and the devil.

nalis; et fuit alia volucio posterior voluptuosa inproporcionata ad finale intentum, et in illa improporcione consistit peccatum primum, sicut et cuiuslibet peccatoris peccatum exemplatur ab illo.

Non enim est possibile creaturam racionalem actualiter peccare, nisi inordinate voluerit quoad volucionem beatitudinis. Patet ex hoc quod non est possibile naturam volutivam deficere ab intendentis volucione, ut hoc supponitur: set non est possibile ipsam peccare, nisi volendo peccaverit, ut patet ex dictis: igitur non est possibile ipsam peccare, nisi ex inproporcione volucionum pecaverit. Ideo, ut post dicetur, sicut omne peccatum speculacione arguendi consistit in [in]proporcione mediorum ad conclusionem finalem, sic omne peccatum moris consistit in [in]proporcione mediorum ad volucionem finalem, gracia cuius est quelibet alia volucio. Ideo error in eleccione medii est in causa cuiuslibet culpe, ut quando eligitur voluptas, ut bene sit eligenti quoad peccata carnis, vel bona temporalia quoad concupiscenciam oculorum, vel excellencia inordinata quoad superbiam vite. Quamvis enim quelibet harum trium simplicium concupiscenciarum potest esse sine peccato, cum defficiente proporcione mediorum ad finem peccatur, ut dicit beatus Io. (prima Io. 2[a]) reducens more suo 7 imum numerum peccatorum ad trinitatem, correspondenter ad trinitatem hostium. Et eandem sentenciam intelligit beatus Iacobus, capitulo tercio, per scienciam terrenam, animalem, et dyabolicam. Iac. III, 15. Terrena, qua homines sciunt callide negociari decipiendo proximos, ut fiant divites quoad mundum; animalis, qua sciunt inproporcionabiliter ad beatitudinem machinari media ut voluptuose vivant quoad carnem, et diabolica, qua sciunt supplantando proximos, inproporcionatos honores appetere. Homo enim, propter duplicem naturam, habet tres maneries hostium: diabolo peccante solummodo per se ipsum; corpore inproporcionabiliter appetente divicias et voluptates (set hoc est inpertinens diabolo, racione incorporitatis); racione in-

13. in *deest* MS. 15. in *deest* MS. 24. reducciones *pro* reducens MS. 25. 7 unum *pro* 7 imum MS. 30. mundi MS. 36. a corpore enim MS. 37. appetere MS. 38. racio inordinato MS.

34. *Homo*. From here to the end of the paragraph, the copy appears to be mutilated. I have, however, done my best with it as it stands.

ordinata, appetitus honoris gignens superbiam et iram vocatur peccatum diabolicum.

Et videtur quod hodie sunt iste hastucie vocate sapiencie antonomatice; quia cum iudicium consequitur affeccionem, cum mundus sit discrasiatus, affectando indebite istos fines, non mirum si commendet sciencias mundialibus, quibus fines huiusmodi perhibendi respondent. Nam talis dicitur bene litteratus homo, vel magnus clericus; et indubie talis litteratura vel sapiencia reddit communicantem continue minus potentem ad servandum rectitudinem; quod Psalmista attendens, Psalmo 70 dicit, *quoniam non cognovi literaturam, introibo in potencias domini*, ubi alius textus pro *litteraturam* habet *negociacionem*. Non enim intendit psalmista quod illiteratus vel ignarus divine sapiencie sit eo disposicior ut atquirat potenciam a deo, vel accipiat dignitatem in ecclesia; set sapienciam mundi, que est literatura cum similacione iudicans, detestatur. Ideo vere sapiens memoratur iusticie dei solius. Nam nichil est iustum simpliciter, nisi respectu prime regule, que est deus; set sapiens mundi plus memoratur ius civile vel aliud humanitus adinventum quam legem dei.

Ps. LXX, 15.

To-day a knowledge of these is called wisdom by worldlings, saying, Such a one is a learned clerk; though his learning certainly turns him away from righteousness.

Yet ignorance, on the other hand, does not make a man more fit for the Church.

True wisdom is that which takes account of God's justice alone; whilst worldly wisdom thinks more of civil law or other inventions of men.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM PRIMUM.

Istis premissis, restat videre si deus complacenter vult peccata.

Set, ne fiat labor in equivocis, notandum primo quod peccatum multipliciter accipitur in scriptura. Nam quandoque accipitur materialiter, et quandoque formaliter. Si materialiter, hoc vel pro subiecto peccante, ut 2ª Thess., 2ª vocatur antechristus intransitive | *homo peccati*. Et ista significacio est famosa apud eos qui ponunt omne accidens positivum aut privativum esse subiectum sic se habens.

84 aª

II Thess. II, 3.

Secundo modo accipitur materialiter pro sacrificio peccati, ut Osee 4. dicit deus de sacerdotibus et levitis, "*peccata populi mei comedent*", et illi modo loquendi alludit apostolus 2 Cor. 5, loquens de christo, *eum qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis fecit peccatum* deus pater.

Osee IV, 8.

II Cor. V, 21.

Is God pleased by sin? Various meanings of *sin*. It is taken either (I.) *materially*, meaning either (1) the sinner, (this agreeing with the system that makes every accident to be identical with the subject thus or thus modified); (2) a sacrifice for sin;

7. medicinalibus MS.; *ib.* py' rnt̃ *pro* perhibendi respondent MS. 23. Caᵐ 11ᵐ *in marg.; large initial I in blue ink* MS. 30. et *pro* 2ª. 36. 4 *pro* 5 MS. 37. patem MS.

(3) the thing through which sin has been committed;

Tercio modo accipitur pro illo materiali extrinseco in quo peccatur, ut Deut. 9. alloquitur Moyses populum in hec verba, *peccatum autem vestrum quod feceratis, i. e. vitulum, arripiens igne combussi.*

Deut. IX, 21.

(4) Any word, act, or desire contrary to God's law (this being Augustine's famous definition, which includes sins of omission);

4° modo accipitur pro dicto, facto, vel concupito, contra legem dei, ut diffinxit Augustinus peccatum. 22. *Contra Faustum.* Et iste modus loquendi est famosus, vocando actus tam intrinsecos inordinatos peccata. Unde, Prov. 24, "*cogitacio stulti peccatum est*". Ideo Augustinus, 3 *De libero arbitrio*, dicit quod iniuste aliquid facere peccatum est; et non solum hoc, set quelibet omissio et quilibet modus habendi positivus aut privativus, racione cuius inest homini iniusticia, vocatur peccatum.

Prov. XXIV, 9.

or (5) the propensity towards sin which we all inherit;

5° modo accipitur peccatum pro fomite ex peccato parentum causato, inclinante ad peccandum; de quo loquitur apostolus, Ro. 7. *Non ego operor illud, set quod habitat in me peccatum* originale contractum et maioratum ex primis parentibus.

Ro. VII, 20.

Or again, (II.) *formally*, meaning either (1) any defect in nature: as in monsters and mutilated beings, and even in inconclusive syllogisms;

Peccatum vero formaliter dictum est defectus, cum peccare sit deficere, et est duplex: scilicet peccatum nature, et peccatum moris. Peccatum nature est defectus rei naturaliter debite inesse; ut defectus substancie vel cuiuscunque naturalis accidentis. Et isto modo omnis substancia peiorabilis [est] peccabilis. Sic enim peccant monstra, ab ordine et proporcione parcium mutilata vel colobon a sufficiencia parcium. Et ad istius similitudinem dicunt logici sillogismos peccare in materia vel forma.

or (2) a lack of actual justice or uprightness, which goes by various names; or (3) a lack of grace which is a punishment of foregoing sin, may also be called sin, though in a very different sense from the others, since every penalty is just, and not

Peccatum autem moris solum creature racionali potest inesse; et est, formaliter loquendo, defectus iusticie vel rectitudinis actualis. Et illud peccatum vocat beatus Io. prima Io. 3, *iniquitatem* dicens; et peccatum est iniquitas, et est defectus equitatis vel rectitudinis; et illum vocant quidam obliquitatem a iusticia, quidam aversionem a summa veritate, et quidam falsitatem, quidam corrupcionem boni; et sic de quotlibet variis nominibus.

I Io. III, 4.

Set 3° modo formaliter vocatur carencia gracie, (que est pena peccati prioris) peccatum: et illa valde equi-

3. fecerat MS.; *ib.* e *deest* MS. 16. operior MS. 24. est *deest* MS. 29. tempore *pro* creature MS.

21. *Defectus.* The lack of something which ought naturally to be present. 26. *Colobon.* I have met with this word more than once in Wyclif; it seems to imply a want or defect.

voce dicitur peccatum respectu carencie iusticie, quia omnis pena est iusta et volita a deo, non solum permissa, set positive ordinata. Set nullum peccatum secundo modo dictum est pena peccati. Et istam racionem facit Augustinus, primo *Retractacionum* 25. Item, omnis pena est micior et minor [quam] malum pro quo infligitur, cum deus punit citra condignum. Set iniquitas in quam homo incidit in penam peccati prioris est communiter magis mala quam iniquitas precedens: igitur, ipsa non est formaliter pena a deo inflicta. Item, omne peccatum formaliter dictum, quod est iniquitas, est voluntarium, ut dicit Augustinus; omnis pena est involuntaria, ut dicit Anselmus in *De conceptu virginali*, 4: igitur nulla pena est iniquitas: tunc enim iniquitas esset equitas, vel econtra. Longe igitur differunt *hominem esse iniustum*, et *ipsum carere amore dei;* quia peccatum est causa secunde pene sequentis. Cum igitur sit dare ultimam iniquitatem que non punitur iniquitate ulteriori, et omnis iniquitas sit infinitum peior quam pena, sequitur quod si aliqua iniquitas sit pena alterius, peccata valde inproporcionabiliter puniuntur a deo. Ideo certum est quod valde equivoce dicuntur iniquitates et pene peccatorum esse peccata.

only tolerated but ordained by God; but the sin itself, understood as in (2) cannot be the punishment of a sin, for that is generally worse than the former, and God never punishes even so much as one deserves; besides, iniquity is voluntary, which a punishment cannot be. So unrighteousness in a man and his lacking the love of God, are widely different things. It is thus that when we say, Sin is the punishment of sin, we use the word in two different senses.

Unde quotquot auctoritates sonant peccatum esse penam peccati, omnes intelligunt equivoce in predicacione causali, vel analogice, ut quelibet defectus boni nati inesse dicitur esse peccatum. Sic enim vere vocare possumus peccatum penam dampnati, que est defectus amoris dei. Iniquitas autem contingit homini in penam peccati precedentis. Pena enim que est defectus amoris dei facit peccatorem, frustratum divino auxilio, superari a temptatore, et sic incidere in graviorem iniquitatem, et ita significat ista proposicio in circumstanciam cause, quando dicitur quod in penam peccati quis incidit in peccatum.

And it is thus that this *dictum* should always be understood.

Damnation, being a deprivation of God's love, may be called sin. As for iniquity it is a punishment in this sense, that one sin taking away God's grace, we fall into another and a more grievous one.

Et istam distinccionem inter iniquitatem et penam
84 a[b] dampni | oportet diligenter notare. Pena autem consequitur ad iniquitatem, sicut reatus et obligacio ad penam. Qui igitur ignorat istam distinccionem, ignorat quid est absolvere a pena et a culpa. Scio tamen quod aliqui intelligunt per culpam peccatum propter quod

This distinction is most important, and must be noticed, to understand what absolution from fault and penalty means, though some understand them diversely.

6 ɪɪcior MS.; *ib.* minus; quam *deest* MS. 7. qua MS.

creatura est culpabilis. Alii autem intelligunt per *culpam* culpacionem passivam pro iniquitate precedente, et omnis talis est iuxtaposita, sicut obligacio ad penam.

Sin, in the sense of an unrighteous deed, implies the possibility of a rational creature to act conformably to God's law; its duty always to do so; and, if it does not, the alternative of losing the state of righteousness which is contingent to it, and depends on this conformity of its actions.

Igitur, ad habendum rectam intelleccionem de peccato formaliter dicto, quod est iniquitas, oportet concipere creaturam racionalem esse libere potentem ex imperio voluntatis ad active causandum actum conformem regule superioris. Secundo, quod continue debet sic facere, cum sit creatura dei pro suo commodo ad hoc creata. Et 3°, si hoc non faciat, vel omittendo vel committendo difformiter ad voluntatem superioris regule, tunc statim est in ea carencia iusticie actualis; quia, ut patet ex supradictis de iusto, quelibet natura essencialiter est iusta, set creatura racionalis debet habere iusticiam sibi contingentem, agendo conformiter ad primam regulam: ita quod non sit obliquitas qua actus exeat ab extremis, scilicet, iusta voluntate dei, et iusta potencia voluntatis create; set conformetur ad tantum volucioni dei quod non aliter fiat quam deus vult ipsam fieri. Talis autem equitas aut inequitas est actualis et accidentalis creature, et talis actualis equitatis.

It is true, however, that sin may be taken either thus, or together with other elements, so as to be called transgression, delinquency, debt, necessity, or harm *(noxa)*

Scio tamen quod peccatum, sicut et alia similia, possunt nunc sumi precise pro talibus formis, et nunc aggregative pro multis disparium racionum. Et secundum hoc dicuntur peccata habere multas species, ut dicunt aggregata ex actibus prevaricantibus, cum modus obligandi et committendi tales actus; ut prevaricacio dicitur esse date legis transgressio, delictum est peccatum omissione causatum, quando derelinquitur illud quod debet fieri. Peccatum, secundum aliquos, appropriatur ad defectum in actu fundatum [in] offensa dei, sub racione qua deus offenditur vel irascitur modo suo, vindicando sine passione. Debitum dicitur, sub ea racione qua facit hominem debere penam subire. Unde M[t]. 6, *dimitte nobis debita*, etc. Necessitas vocatur sub ea racione qua homo in penam peccati est necessitatus in via ad habendum aliquam rugam peccati, saltem venialis, ut Augustinus elicit ex illo psalmo 106, "*De necessitatibus meis eripe me*". Noxa vocatur, quia solum illa vel

Matth. VI, 12.

Ps. CVI, 6.

18. tantam volucionem MS. 31. in *deest* MS.

38. *Psalmo 106.* The quotation is somewhat different in the text. *De necessitatibus eorum eripuit eos.* Perhaps Wyclif confused this with some other passage.

racione illius nocetur homini, dicente Augustino in *De natura boni* 11°: Nec nature dei omnino noceri potest, nec alicui nature sub deo noceri iniuste omnino potest. Et ex hoc videtur quod deo non potest esse bonum utile, quia *nocere* (oppositum utilitati) non potest sibi inesse, et opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem. In *De moribus Manicheorum*, quarto capitulo, scribit: Nature summe noceri nullo pacto potest, quia nocere est privare bono.

Quotlibet sunt talia nomina peccati in scriptura, quorum aliqua secundum racionem nominis, et aliqua secundum sensum misticum peccato conveniunt; set inter omnia nomina peccato moris formaliter dicto competencia est iniquitas, ut beatus Iohannes loquitur, maxime appropriatum. Ideo scriptura crebrius utitur illo nomine speciali quoad peccata mortalia explicanda; solum enim talia videntur esse iniquitates. Quod autem iniquitas sit privacio accidentalis iusticie, et non essencialis, patet sic. Omnis essencialis iusticia est essencialis bonitas, cuius privacio, si inesset alicui, patet quod illud esset et non esset, quia in quantum [inesset] nulla creatura haberet bonitatem essencialem, et in quantum careret bonitate essenciali, non esset. Ideo patet quod est inpossibile quod aliquod peccatum destruat bonitatem essencialem, set bonitatem accidentalem, que est rectitudo voluntatis.

Of these and many other names, *iniquity* is most frequently used in Scripture, generally for mortal sin.

This is a privation of accidental, not of essential goodness and justice; for the privation of what is essential to any being could not coexist with essential goodness, and if not, it would not exist at all.

Set contra istud tripliciter arguitur. Primo videtur quod omnis iniquitas sit privacio gracie, quia contradiccionem claudit quod illa insit cum gracia gratum faciente. Igitur repugnat tali gracie, et non aliter quam privative; igitur illa est privacio gracie. Confirmatur. Omne donum dei est gracia, omnis iusticia accidentalis creature est donum dei; igitur omnis talis iusticia est gracia: et per consequens, si aliqua sit eius privacio, ipsa est privacio gracie.

To this it is objected: *a)* Iniquity is a privation, of grace, since it cannot coexist therewith, and all righteousness, being a gift of God, is a grace.

Item, ex isto sequitur sive sequi videtur, quod pena sit longe peior quam peccatum ipsam causans; quia quelibet privacio est eo peior, quo bonum quod formaliter privat foret melius. Set gracia, si distinguitur a iusticia, est melior iusticia que est medium ad illam:
84b[a] igitur et eius privacio, que est pena, est longe | peior

b) If we distinguish grace from righteousness, the deprivation of grace is a greater punishment, and explains

7. Monachorum *pro* Manicheorum MS. 9. noīa pc͡ca *pro* nomina peccati MS. 10. quarum MS. 11. peccata MS. 20. inesset *deest* MS. 21. aliqua habet e' *pro* creatura haberet MS.

how this can exceed the sin which it punishes, taking away eternal bliss.

quam est iniquitas, que est privacio iusticie. Et illud habet maiorem colorem de privacione beatitudinis, que est pena dampni. Constat namque quod beatitudo que est premium ultimum creature est melior quam quodvis donum. Et ex isto arguitur communiter quod paupertas, que est carencia pecudinii, est peior quam carencia iusticie, eo quod omne unum est melius non uno, set specialiter accidente; quia tunc mutilacio esset peior iniquitate. Item iuxta dicta, videtur quod nec peccata distinguntur specifice, nec unum peccatum reliquo gravius, cum sit simplex privacio que non suscipit magis aut minus pocius quam originale peccatum, quod consistit in indivisibili, secundum Anselmum in *De conceptu virginali*, capitulo 14. Primum videtur ex hoc quod omne peccatum mortale est privacio eiusdem iusticie; igitur tante conveniunt ut peccata originalia. Et secundum patet ex hoc quod inpossibile est aliquid plus carere iusticia tali quam [esse] simpliciter sine tali. Et tercio sequitur quod post unum peccatum actuale non est possibile reincidere in aliud, quia non superest iusticia actualis quam noviter privaret.

c) The above doctrine would remove all distinction between sins, all being a deprivation of righteousness, and as such being alike. *Not to have*, as also *to lack*, do not admit of *modes* greater or less in intensity: it would therefore follow that all sins were equal.

Answer to *a)*. Grace is a gift of God, but not every such gift makes one worthy of bliss. It is this that we are deprived of as a punishment.

Ad primum, patet ex dictis de gracia quod equivoce valde sumitur; unde quamvis bonum donum sit gracia, non tamen omne tale donum est forma qua creatura racionalis est grata deo, ut habeat vitam eternam. Et talis gracie privacio est peccati pena, quam oportet precedere privacionem iusticie; sicut oportet meritum precedere talem graciam, licet simpliciter gracia precedat omnem actum bonum creature.

Thus unrighteousness is not directly opposed to grace; but by destroying righteousness it causes grace to disappear.

Ulterius notandum quod, licet iniusticia repugnet gracie, non tamen formaliter, set efficienter, quia repugnat alicui, quo non habito, non inesset gracia talis, sicut privacio actuacionis anime non repugnat formaliter risibilitati, set vite hominis; verumptamen efficienter repugnat, cum facit privacionem risibilitatis. Sic in proposito.

Answer to *b)*. These two evils are very different; one cannot be good in any case; the second, if it exists, is good; man should

Ad secundum dicitur quod longe equivoce dicuntur talia duo peccata mala, et sic primum est infinitum magis malum quam secundum, cum non potest ab intrinseco esse bonum, sicut oportet secundum esse,

4, 5. aliquod donum vis MS. 6. pecudinij MS. 8. quod *pro* quia MS. 18. esse *deest* MS. 23. $q^{u}m$ boe *pro* quamvis bonum MS.

si est; homo eciam debet voluntarie sufficere secundam privacionem, et non primam ex aliqua obligacione possibili. Ymmo primam maliciam non committeret pro aliquo bono possibili, ut puta pro infinitis mundis salvandis, aut deo preservando ab adnichilacione, si posset fieri. Magna igitur malicia est in tali peccato ultra penam que est racionaliter sufferenda pro decore universi. Assumptum patet sic. Si Petrus debet committere vel subiectare iniquitatem pro aliquo bono signabili, sit quod pro *a*, et faciat hoc ut debet ex ypothesi. Contra, nemo in faciendo ut debet pecat; set Petrus, eligendo et faciendo racionaliter, [facit] ut debet: igitur non peccat, et per consequens non committit peccatum, ut admittitur. Et ex istis videtur, cum omne *mentiri* necessario includit peccatum, quod nemo debet mentiri pro infinitis mundis salvandum, et per consequens non pro fama propria, vel amicitia servanda illesa.

choose the second evil, and never the first, not even to save infinite worlds, or to prevent the annihilation of God. For suffering conduces to the good of the universe, and iniquity does not. Suppose a man ought to commit a given sin for a good purpose: whoso does what he ought does not commit sin: therefore sin is never to be committed.

Ex istis patet quod non solum attenditur malicia privacionis penes bonitatem positivi quod formaliter privat, set oportet attendere ad circumstancias faciendi privacionem quoad voluntatem et finem intentum. Nam mors Christi fuit privacio vite benedicte humanitatis Christi, et tamen fuit mors gloriosissima, quamvis fuit mala penaliter, si continuum componitur ex non quantis. Mors autem iniusti fuit longe peior in aliquo genere, sicut et est quodlibet peccatum peius quam aliqua pena; ita quod ista tria se habent in ordine, peccati iniquitas, pena dampni gracie, et pena sensus.

Primum enim est infinitum peius quam secundum, et secundum infinitum peius quam tercium, eo quod cum omni pena sensus stat beatitudo, ut patet de Christo; set omne tale dampnum primum privat formaliter beatitudine. Ideo, cum iste malicie sint conformis racionis, patet quod quante delectacio sensus est minus bona quam delectacio beati quoad animam, tante peior est privacio unius quam privacio alterius.

We must not say that a thing is evil only on account of the deprivation which it entails, but also in relation to the will and the intention. Christ's death was an immense privation, yet most glorious; the sinner's death, in another way, is far greater, and every sin is worse than its punishment so that sin is infinitely worse than damnation, and the loss of God infinitely worse than all the other pains of Hell.

Set quantum ad tractatum de paupertate dicitur quod illa est necessaria ad bonitatem vel maliciam moris;

As concerns poverty, it may be good or evil;

9. propinquo *pro* pro aliquo MS. 12. facit *deest* MS. 27. peccatum MS. 33. beatitudinem MS. 37. dei *pro* dicitur MS.

24. *Si — quantis.* I cannot understand what this phrase makes here. It is an allusion to Wyclif's theory that the world is made up of indivisible points, as explained in Logica, III. *Int.*

and evil not only as a punishment, but as giving occasion for sin.

admitto tamen, cum sit possibile, quod paupertas sit mala, non solum quoad penam, set occasione male accepta quoad | peccatum. Et admitto quod omnis (84^b) natura viva est melior non viva, ut dicit Augustinus, 11° *De civitate dei*, capitulo 16°. Verumptamen virtus vel gracia est quantumlibet melior homini quam omnia temporalia mundi. Pro cuius declaracione notandum quod privacio dupliciter dicitur privare aliquid, vel formaliter inmediate, vel efficienter et mediate. Unde, cum habitus diviciarum sit una res de ultimo predicamento, patet quod paupertas formaliter et inmediate privat illam, et consequenter ac mediate pecudes ac alia temporalia quorum sunt habitus. Et dicuntur iste privaciones si .... posite, cum prior privacio non compatitur suum privatum secum esse, cum sint forme opposite; set secunda privacio compatitur suum privatum secum esse, cum non sequitur; *sum depaupertatus, igitur bona mea sunt destructa.* Nam satis est quod sunt a me quomodolibet privata. Nunc dicitur quod gracia est quantumlibet melior quam habitus diviciarum, sicut deus habitus ut amicus per virtutem et graciam est quantumlibet melior temporalibus quibuscumque.

Poverty deprives a man of riches by the fact of its existence, and indirectly of those particular good which his riches consist of.

Grace is far better than any riches, and its loss worse than the loss of any member.

Et patet quod non est color inferendi mutilacionem esse peiorem vicio, cum gracia sit melior habitu membri, et deus plus quam membrum. Et istam racionem innuit salvator, M^t. 6, dicens: *nonne anima plus est quam esca,* etc. Et M^t. 5°: "*Si oculus tuus* [*dexter*] *scandalizet te, erue eum, et proiice abs te*". Generaliter enim, actualiter peccando preponuntur minus bona magis bono, scilicet ut voluptas operacionis oculi, vel alterius membri, preponitur delectacioni eterne eiusdem membri ditati, cum tamen melius esset carere hic in via talibus delectabilibus membrorum, ut claudus vel debilis, quam cum vita voluptuosa mitti in iehennam. Discamus igitur, a deo accepte res ut sunt bone, [quod] mala eleccio vel affeccio sit in culpa, plus appreciando cibum aut vestimenta, quam perpetuas dotes corporis et anime.

(Matth. VI, 25; Matth. V, 29)

As sin comes from preferring a lesser to a greater good, we should prefer the loss of the pleasure any member gives us to the loss of God's grace.

Answer to c). Privations can be known only

Ad tercium dicitur quod peccata, cum sint privaciones, sicut non possunt cognosci nisi per noticiam

9. inmediate *pro* mediate MS. 14. si si MS. 27. dexter *deest* MS. 31. delectacione eterna MS. 35. quod *deest* MS.

14. *Si* .... This is probably some logical term beginning with *syn,* which I have not been able to identify.

suorum positivorum, sic nec possunt specificari nisi per formas positivas illis oppositas. Cum enim non habent per se species, eo quod non sunt per se encia, sunt per reduccionem in eadem specie in qua sunt sua positiva peccata. Igitur possunt dici defectus rectitudinum aggregatorum ex actubus intrinsecis et extrinsecis, et sic vocantur homicidium, adulterium, et talia peccata, que potissime specificantur ab actibus extrinsecis. Vel aliter, possunt dici simpliciter obliquitates volucionum, et sic variantur conformiter ad variacionem volucionum, que debent esse media ad amandum summum bonum. Ideo, quot sunt tales voluciones inordinate quibus implicite postponitur amor summi boni, tot privaciones vel malicie insunt illis volucionibus, que omnes sunt peccata. Ex quo patet quod non oportet ad *esse* iniquitatis quod privet voluntatem rectam que quondam infuit, set satis est quod ponat carenciam recte voluntatis pro mensura pro qua deberet inesse; ut unus qui nunquam iuste voluit, set continue amat terrestria inordinate, tot peccata committit quot voluciones inordinatas elicit; et quodlibet tale peccatum privat iusticiam que debet inesse nunc active, set ponit formaliter eius carenciam. Et patet quod, cum adultus debet habere maiorem iusticiam quam infans, quod gravius peccat vel omittendo vel committendo; et specialiter si actus plus inordinantes eliciat, vel quando ex debito plus obligatur ad illud quod omittit. Ut si Petrus vixit per totam vitam suam in voluptatibus et nunc noviter elicit novum actum volendi inordinatum, tunc novo peccato mortali peccat; quia ista volucio habet specialem obliquitatem, que est speciale peccatum. Et illud peccatum ponit carenciam iusticie quam debet nunc habere, quam iusticiam deus satis cognoscit secundum *esse* intelligibile suum. Unde patet quod dampnati
85 aª semper peccant, quamvis non semper — — — —
— — — — — — — — — — —

by their positive contraries, and must be classified thereby; so that, each act of sin corresponding to an act of the opposite virtue, if these virtues are of different kinds, they are so too, or we may say that they are classified according to the volitions which they render evil.

The defect of an evil deed does not destroy the volition, but its rightness, its being as it ought to be. Each time a man sins, this defect is repeated in a new volition, making it formally a new sin.

And if one sins when a child and when a man, since in the second case it is more his duty not to sin, the moral obliquity is greater in the act.

And God knows well what amount of righteousness every act ought to contain.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SECUNDUM

Desideratur.

5. dicere MS. 9. dicere MS. 30. qm *pro* quia MS.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERCIUM.

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"copulata perfecta sunt. Ideo, sive in statu, sive in motu, pulchra senciantur, tota consideranda sunt, si recte volumus iudicare. Unde, sicut niger color in pictura in toto sit pulcre, sic illum totum agonem decenter odit inquinabilis divina providencia, aliud certantibus, aliud victoribus, aliud peccatoribus, aliud quietis, et solum deum contemplantibus tribuens." Ecce hic videtur dicere quod ad completam pulcritudinem universitatis requirit deus aliquos esse bonos, et coiniquos malos propter fines nobis absconditos. Unde, si possemus comprehendere totam vicissitudinem temporum cum eventibus in eisdem, et comparare ad unitatem dei secundum raciones proprias, possemus tunc percipere pulcritudinem universitatis. Ideo, *Enchiridion*, 7°, sic scribit: "In universitate idem quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, in loco suo positum, eminencius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint dum comparantur malis." Et in *De natura boni*, 16, sic scribit: "Privaciones in universitate nature sic ordinantur ut non indecenter habeant vices suas. Nam et deus circa loca et tempora non illuminando, decenter tenebras facit. Sic enim nos, continendo vocem, decenter interponimus silencium in loquendo. Quanto magis ille quarundam rerum privaciones decenter, sicut rerum omnium perfectus artifex!" Unde in ympno 3 puerorum, lux et tenebre laudant deum, i. [e.] eius laudem in bene considerancium cordibus pariunt.

Augustine says that there must be good men and bad, for the complete beauty of the universe, which we should perceive, if we could see all times at one glance. Evil in its proper place does but enhance the beauty of what is good.

God makes darkness at certain proper intervals, as we make pauses in speaking, but to an infinitely nobler end.

Dan. III, 72.

Et per ista patet responsio querencium quare deus voluit creare creaturas racionales quas scivit perpetuo

Why then did God create those whom He knew would be damned perpetually?

7. ĩquin^{nl} *pro* inquinabilis MS. 12, 13. possimus MS. 24. docenter MS. 28. e *deest* MS.

3. *Copulata*. Mr. Austen notes on the copy that three leaves are wanting here. The pagination was made after these leaves were cut out, and takes no account of them; but the end of Chap. XI, the whole of Chap. XII and probably the greater part of Chap. XIII, are irreparably lost, since the Trinity MS. Cambridge, is the only known one that contains this tractate. 9. *Tribuens*. This is evidently the end of a quotation that I have left as it is, being unable to understand it in the least. No doubt it is from Augustine, as the sequel of the text shows.

dampnandas. Nam large melius est illis esse sic dampnatas quam non esse. Ideo facit illis magnam graciam et multiplicem, et plus appreciatur pulcritudinem unitatis sue quam bonitatem privatam alicuius persone private. Unde *De civitate dei*, 18, sic scribit Augustinus: Nullum deus hominum vel angelorum creasset, quem malum futurum esse prescisset, nisi pariter nosceret quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordinem sanctorum tamquam pulcherimum carmen a quibusdam quasi antitetum. Sunt autem antiteta locucionis decentissima que latine appellantur *composita*. Sicut igitur ista contraria, contrariis opposita, sermonis pulcritudinem reddunt, ita quadam, non verborum, set rerum eloquencia contrariorum opposicione seculi pulcritudo componitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in Ecclesiastico hoc modo: contra malum, bonum, et contra mortem, vita; sic consequenter contra pium peccator."

Because even their damnation is far preferable to their non-existence. God would never have created any being that He foreknew as wicked, unless He also knew how to employ him for good, and make of him a beautiful contrast to the Saints.

Eccl. XV, 18.

Ex istis videtur esse de intencione Augustini quod privaciones bonorum accidentalium faciunt ad pulcritudinem universi, sic quod universum non foret ita pulcrum sicut est modo, si quelibet pars universi foret pulcra sine mixtione malicie, sicut est in pulcritudine corporali: aliter enim ens non haberet plene suas species.

This is Augustine's doctrine, that accidental failures in goodness make for the beauty of the world, which, if it were without any admixture of evil, would be less beautiful than it is.

Oportet igitur ad mentes philosophorum, et non solum sophistarum, quod si unum oppositorum sit in actu, et reliqum est in actu, ut dicitur . . . . . Nam, si est albedo vel caliditas, tunc oportet quod tempore suo sint nigredo et frigiditas; et ita de gaudio et pena. Sic igitur, de pulcritudine universali et decencia in agmine domini videtur esse, quod habeat infernum, cum suis carceratis, potissime si tot erunt beati quot fuissent si non peccasset homo; quia indubie universitas quodammodo perficitur per dampnatos, cum sint valde boni natura.

Philosophers say that if of two opposites, one exists, the other must exist also. So Hell must exist; especially if there will be as many Blessed as would have been had man not sinned.

Ideo non est credendum quod deus umquam proposuit salvare totam speciem, set eternaliter proposuit dampnare singulos prescitos ad decorem universi. Nec

God never intended to save all mankind; His eternal intention was to damn all the 'foreknown'.

10. antiteticis (?) MS. 17. 9[m] *pro* consequenter MS.; *ib.* p'm *pro* pium MS. 20. universali MS. 21. universali MS. 26. *Before* nam, *a gap of one-third of a line* MS. 30. agm[e] ꝯm͡ *pro* agmine domini MS. 34. bona nature MS.

36. *Proposuit dampnare.* This is a foreshadowing of Calvin's doctrine of reprobation, condemned by the Council of Trent.

The differences which exist in our world make for its beauty; if they were absent, many a being would be impossible.

video quod perfeccius foret universi corporali totum esse terram, animal, vel aliud corpus simplex quam esse ethrogenium ut est modo: nam si tota spera sublunari esset aqua vel aliud diaffanum, quid terminaret influencias celestes in centro mundi pro generacione mixtorum? si totum esset terra, quid vivificaret et continuaret iuxta? si totum esset corpus neutrum, ubi foret materia capax formacionis generalis? Perirent igitur multe species substancie, | sicut et motus ac alia genera 85 a[b]

So, if all men were saved, it would be better for each part, but not consequently for the whole of the universe.

accidencium. Et ita videri potest quod universum non esset tam perfectum ut materia, si omnes essent salvati, quia non sequitur: *iste partes essent meliores in se quam modo, igitur essent meliores in ordine ad universum;* quia iuxta illud sequeretur quod melius esset totam mundi machinam esse solem vel hominem. Melius igitur et pulcrius est sic esse sicut iuxta sentenciam apostoli, prima Cor. 12; homo qui est minor mundus non esset perfecte corporeus *si totum corpus* esset *oculus*, spiritus, vel aliud quodcunque membrum simplex. Hoc autem totum indiget speciali tractatu de mundo.

I Cor. XII, 17.

God eternally ordains the existence of those advantages which follow from sin;

Ex istis patet talis racio colligi: Omne bonum [quod] facit ad decenciam universi a deo eternaliter ordinatur, set omne bonum ex peccato proveniens est huiusmodi: igitur etc. Set omne bonum ex peccato proveniens a deo eternaliter ordinatur; deus non potest quicquam ordinare, nisi ordinet ipsum secundum ultimum sue ordinabilitatis; igitur sic ordinat deus de bonis que ex peccato proveniunt, et per consequens ordinat plene, ex quibus [cunque] peccatis quomodocunque proveniunt. Ex quo sequitur quod ordinat peccata, [ut] media ad taliter causandum. Cum igitur peccata de tanto sibi placent, sequitur quod velit peccata de tanto esse. Non enim videtur quod tam omnipotens dominus permitteret in suo dominio aliquid esse, nisi ipsum sibi serviret et foret utile ad finem qui non appetit, vel aliunde placeret; ut puta terminando volucionem sue promissionis, vel aliud

It follows, since His ordinance is never incomplete, that He ordains the happening of those sins: He would not permit them to be, if they could not be useful in His world,

2. aīem *pro* animal MS. 21. quod *deest* MS. 28. cunque *deest* MS. 30. ut *deest* MS.

20. *De mundo.* I cannot find the title of such a tractate anywhere in Shirley's catalogue, even amongst the lost works. If, however, Logica is posterior to *De Ente*, it may be that Wyclif changed his mind, and put in *Logica* (Vol. III) all he intended to put in *De mundo.* See Log. Vol. III. Int. IX—XXV.

bonum faciendo in virtute dei. Non enim potest deus concurrere cum peccato, concausando tam multipliciter effectus, nisi placeret deo de concursu et de *esse* illius cum quo concurrit. Et confirmacio illius est quod deus necessitat omnia peccata ad *esse*, eo quod omnia que evenient de necessitate evenient, iuxta dicta. Set nichil de necessitate evenient quod non a deo necessitante evenient: igitur deus omnia peccata necessitabit ad *esse*. Et hoc habet maiorem evidenciam penes eum qui ponit deum necessitare ad omnem actum secundum omnes eius circumstancias. Deus autem non necessitat nisi ut causat, et non causat nisi ut vult. Ideo indubie, si necessitat peccata ad esse, de tante vult ipsa esse, etc.

much less concur in the act of their production.

And since all that happens, happens necessarily, and all things proceed from God, it is He that makes them thus necessary. Therefore, sin is a result of the volition of God.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM.

Videtur igitur, ex dictis michi probabile, quod sicut omne intellectum a deo est cognitum ab eodem, sic et omne cognitum a deo ab eodem est volitum, et utrobique reciproce econverso, sic quod . . . . . sicut omnimode sunt partes in perfeccione et essencia, sic sunt partes secundum habitudines relativas, que sunt intelligencia, sciencia, et volucio trinitatem abditam ex ceteris exemplantes; ut et sic partes ymaginis create, que sunt memoria, racio, voluntas, parificentur in suis propriis actibus et obiectis sicut parificantur ydemptitate in eadem essencia singulari. Quia, si in aliquibus caperent instanciam, hoc esset potissime in illa maledicta trinitate, vel pocius tercĩa malicia cuius nullum membrum alteri coequatur, scilicet iniquitas, pena dampni, et pena sensus.

It follows that God's volitions extend as far as His knowledge, so that, besides the Trinity of Persons, we have one of relative attributes: God's intelligence, knowledge, and volitions, a created Trinity of goodness — memory, reason, and will, and a Trinity of evil, — sin, damnation, and the physical suffering of the damned.

Set cum deus vult omnem iniquitatem quoad *esse* eius, secundum consequens est, per locum *a maiori*, quod vult omnem penam dampni vel sensus sequentem, et multo magis omnem substanciam, accionem, vel quodcunque aliud per se ens in genere tali malicie substratam.

God, having willed that evil should exist, must still more surely will its punishment, and the existence of the substance which underlies it.

14. Ca^m^ 14^m^ *in marg.; initial in blue ink* MS. 16. est est ab MS. 18. pe ϑie *instead of gap* MS.

13. *Vult.* The reader, in order not to be unfair to Wyclif, who puts here somewhat crudely what he has elsewhere elaborately explained, must remember that in his theory, God's volitions are determined by those of man. And he elsewhere explains that *will* means here *toleration*.

But to answer the numerous objections urged against us, we must note that God may be said to will evil in six ways: (1) By creating a being, a substance, an act, capable of being evil.

Set pro obiectis scripture et doctoris que videntur expresse sonare oppositum, est notandum quod 6 modis potest intelligi deus facere aut causare malum.

Primo modo, quod faciat per se ens in genere et substratum malicie, ut substanciam, accionem, aut quodcunque aliud per se in genere, licet accidentaliter, fuerit malum. Et hoc non habet difficultatem quoad substanciam vel naturam rei sic accidentaliter malam, licet aliqui inaniter sophisticantur, concedentes quod tale malum deus facit, set non facit tale. Contingit enim intelligere tam sane quod deus facit actum malum aut animam peccantem, sicut et tale malum deus facit. Sicut enim video illum | episcopum, odio illum iustum, 85b[a] et causo filium meum sacerdotem, licet non secundum racionem qua est episcopus ipsum videam, nec alterum sub racione qua est iustus odiam, vel tercium sub racione qua est sacerdos gignam, vel causem, sic deus facit positive rem malam, et si non sic faciat eam sub racione qua mala est. Et sicut contingit intelligere predicata simpliciter ut connotant relacionem casus talis accidentis, ita contingit intelligere subiecta. Ideo decet theologum esse liberum, ut utrobique possit faciliter loqui, facta limitacione secundum exigenciam sensus.

It is silly to say: God makes this evil thing, but not *qua* evil. For *I see a Bishop, I hate a righteous man, I beget a son who will be a priest*, may all be true propositions, though I neither see, hate nor beget them as such. Thus a theologian may say, *God creates an evil thing*, with the proper restrictions understood.

(2) By His punishments, which, though evil in a sense, do please Him. This is the general explanation of certain texts of Scripture, in which God is said to create evil, creation being an attribute of His glory.

Secundo modo dicitur malicia fieri a deo: quod non habet difficultatem de malicia dampni vel pene, cum placet deo ex supposicione quod illud infligatur. Ideo sic intelligit Ieronimus cum aliis doctoribus illud 3. Regum, 9 et 21, quod dominus induxit [super] peccatores ipsum delinquentes omne malum, et illud Amos. 3, "*si erit malum in civitate quod dominus non fecerit*". Ymmo Ysa. 45, sic scribitur, *Ego dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans ..... malum.* Ecce quod creancia attribuitur pro nominibus que laudant deum, ut dicit Augustinus in *De natura boni*, 16, ut supra. Et indubie per idem pene peccatorum fuerint a deo, dicente Augustino in *De natura boni* 7°: "Ordinacio suppliciorum peccancium, quia eorum nature non competit, ideo pena est; set quia culpe competit, ideo iusticia est". Quia, ut dicit infra, 9° capitulo: "Melius

Reg. IX, 9; XXI, 21. Amos III, 6. Isa. XLV, 7.

Augustine says that the pains of sinners are evil, in so far as these are not suited to their nature; but just, in so far as they are suited to their faults.

1. obiectibus MS. 8. male *pro* malam MS. 22. docet *pro* decet MS. 29. super *deest* MS. 31. est *pro* erit MS. 32. alter deus MS. 33. *no gap before* malum MS. 36. fuerit MS.

ordinatur natura ut iuste doleat in supplicio quam ut inpune gaudeat in peccato." Ideo nulli debet verti in dubium quin deus facit omnes penas.

Pro faccione igitur iniquitatis notandum quod potest quadrupliciter sane intelligi fieri a deo. Primo modo sinendo, dum deus posset illam imperare ne fieret; et isto modo concedit Anselmus in *De casu diaboli*, capitulis primo, 18 et 19; et in *De predestinacione*, 17, quod deus facit omnia mala, hunc inducendo in peccata in penam peccati prioris: que omnia sonant quod deus iuste permittit talem cadere, et placet sibi secundum quid de casu, de quanto ille casus proficit. Aliter enim non pocius diceretur dominus facere talia que permittit, quam facit talia permissa in que non potest.

(3) By *causing* iniquity itself, either by permitting it, v. q. as a penalty for past sins;

Secundo modo dicitur quod deus facit talia mala in suis causis, creando naturas bonas, et dando illis libertatem arbitrii flexibilis, dum scit quod talia sunt facturi; et iste modus superaddit primum. Et sic specialiter dicitur deus facere actus malos, nedum quoad substanciam actus, set quoad defectus singulares et universales; ut genus actus est bonum ordinatum a deo, ubi eius species vel individuum propter defectum modi vel ordinis est oditum.

or (4) by creating beings that have free will, and that He knows will use it to commit sin: in this sense God not only causes the act, as an act, but also as it is this particular act;

Tercio autem modo, plus ad propositum, dicitur deus velle aut facere iniquitatem, eo quod sit secundum eius beneplacitum quoad *esse secundum* quod deo deservit, ut aliquod trium bonorum inde proveniat, de quibus proximo capitulo dictum est; — scilicet, bonum pene peccantis, bonum exemplare merendi, et cavendi peccata aliis, et bonum delectabile, plus sapide laudandi deum, ut patet in beatis: — secundum talem racionem boni dicitur deum velle et facere iniquitatem quoad *esse secundum*, set non quoad *esse primum*. Quod tantum sonat, ac si diceretur deum velle tales iniquitates proficere in sua universitate, set non vult beneplacite quod homo peccet vel sit iniquus; et sic de aliis formaliter predicatis. Nec est putandum quoad ista quatuor quod unum potest esse sine alio in deo, set quod omnes iste raciones diverse consequuntur ad permissionem qua deus permittit peccata fieri.

or (5) by choosing that it shall take place as an existing thing, in order to punish the sinner, to give an example to others, and joy to the Blessed in praising God; which does not imply that sin is essentially pleasing to Him.

All these modes of willing that sin shall be, coexist in God, and proceed from His permission thereof;

15. dicitur quidam MS. 20. dictas *pro* defectus MS. 22. eius est eius MS 27. set *pro* scilicet MS. 29. lapide MS. 32. pret *pro* predicatis MS.

or (6) by eternally willing sin, as such, and as an ideal; which is clearly absurd, since then He would love sin for its own sake.

Ultimo potest intelligi quod deus vult et facit eternaliter talia mala secundum *esse intelligibile*, et sic plane patet quod contradiccionem claudit deum quicquam intelligere nisi et cognoscat et velit beneplacite idem illud, ad minimum secundum *esse intelligibile*, et perfeccionem secundam.

So it does not follow, though God's will is that such and such a sin shall take place, that His will is that a man shall commit this sin. St. Thomas, speaking of God's knowledge of sin, points out the fallacy of inferring thence that the sin proceeds from God.

Ex istis patet quod non sequitur: deus vult hoc peccatum, et hoc peccatum est *illum hominem peccare*, *declinare a rectitudine*, vel *deum offendere* etc. (et sic de aliis predicatis formaliter quoad *esse primum* peccati): igitur deus vult istum hominem peccare, declinare | a 85b[b] rectitudine, vel deum offendere, etc. Unde sanctus Thomas, ut superius dictum est, prima parte summe questione 16, articulo 5, negat istam consequenciam: Omnis veritas est a deo: *istum hominem fornicari*, est veritas: igitur *istum hominem fornicari* est a deo. Set est, ut dicit, fallacia accidentis, quia in maiori implicatur veritatem que est peccatum esse a deo secundum *esse secundum*, et in minori correspondenter capitur quod illud fornicari est veritas racione *esse secundi* quod habet respectu noticie divine; set in conclusione, racione predicati formaliter predicantis *esse primum* peccati, implicatur quod placet deo quod iste fornicetur vel peccet, sicut in *assimili* dictum est de intellecto a deo, et cognito. Nam, sicut non sequitur: Omne intellectum a deo est cognitum ab eodem; set *filium meum existere* est intellectum a deo: igitur *filium meum existere* est cognitum ab eodem; ita non sequitur: Omne cognitum a deo est volitum ab eodem, set *me peccare mortaliter* est volitum ab eodem. Et specialiter, si predicatum conclusionis predicatur formaliter ad hunc sensum quod deus vult me peccare. Nam, si hoc, tunc deus vellet *esse primum* peccati; quia si *me peccare* supponat essencialiter et non formaliter pro peccato, ad illum sensum quoddam *peccare* mei, aut peccatum meum, est volitum a deo, concedenda esset conclusio. Set, sicut *existere* aliqua predicata formaliter ipso inferiora limitant ad *esse existere*, sic infinite oraciones predicte formaliter pro peccato limitant ad *esse primum* peccati.

In like manner, from God's volition of the fact of sin, it does not follow that He wills it *as* sin.

God wishes me to sin may mean that it is His will that this fact shall take place; and this is true. But such expressions mostly mean that God is pleased with sin itself, and should be denied as heretical.

14. 7 *pro* 5 MS. 37. peccata *pro* predicata MS.

12. *St. Thomas*, S. Theol. I[a] Pars, qu. XVI, art. 5: Ad Tertium.

Unde negandum est tamquam impossibile et hereticum quod deus necessitat hominem ad peccandum mortaliter [et] placet deo quod homo peccet.

We must understand Augustine in this sense, and carefully note what Aristotle calls the Fallacy of Accident.

Et sic intelligende sunt quotquot auctoritates beati Augustini, quarum alique dicunt quod deus non vult, set permittit homines peccare, et aliqui dicunt quod peccata non placent, set displicent deo, sicut nec homo in quantum peccator, quod subintelligendum est quoad *esse primum* peccati. Unde defectus talis argucie est diligenter memorie commendandus. Nam sicut non sequitur (iuxta Aristotelem): tu cognoscis venientem, Coruscus est veniens, igitur tu cognoscis Coruscum; ita in proposito. Intelligit enim philosophus argumentum ad hunc sensum, indistincte cognoscis quod hoc est veniens, et hoc est Corruscus, igitur distincte cognoscis quod hoc est Corruscus. Certum est quod est fallacia accidentis, cum *hoc esse Coruscum*, et "*hoc esse veniens*", sunt duo accidencia disparata in eadem persona unita. Ideo non oportet, si cognosco ipsam sub racione qua veniens, quod cognoscam eam sub racione qua Coruscus.

You may know indistinctly that some one is coming; it does not follow that you know distinctly who he is. *To be coming* and *to be such and such a person*, are two quite separate things, that are one merely by accident.

Just so with the preceding fallacies. They correspond exactly to the conclusion that God wills that a man shall sin, because He wills the sin as a fact: a comparison of these with each other proves this clearly.

Ita quodammodo est hic: omne intellectum a deo est cognitum ab eodem; *filium meum existere* est intellectum a deo: igitur est cognitum ab eodem. Sicut enim *esse Coruscum* et *esse veniens* sunt raciones diverse eidem inexistentes, sic *esse intelligibile*, et *esse vel existere actuale* possunt eidem inesse, non ut accidencia, set ut raciones distincte, qua una potest esse sine altera. Unde idem genus fallacie accidentis peritissimos potest fallere. Et correspondenter [non] sequitur, *Omne veniens cognoscitur a te; Corruscum esse "est veniens; igitur" "Corruscum esse" cognoscitur a te.* Ita non sequitur: *Omnis veritas causatur a deo; "istum peccare" est veritas, igitur "istum peccare" causatur a deo.* Verumptamen utrobique contingit sic abusive intelligere terminos quod forma teneat, set supponitur quod sensus prime questionis sit *te cognoscere distincte* quod data persona sit Coruscus, vel cognoscere eum sub racione qua Coruscus; quod idem est. Et tunc non est color in argumento, sicut indubie est in proposito. Sicut

3. et *deest* MS. 23. dicit *pro* sicut MS. 28. fi^e = figure MS. 29. non *deest* MS.

16. *Hoc. This something*, whatever it may be. Or possibly a mistake for *hic.*

enim *omne veniens cognoscitur* a te, licet sub quacunque racione, sic *omnis veritas est volita a deo*, licet non sub quacunque racione, quia solum sub racione qua peccatum profuit, et est bonum, ipsum a deo volitum. Et hec racio, licet sit posterior *esse primo* peccati, non tamen potest peccatum esse sine illa. Ideo peccatum non potest esse, nisi sit a deo volitum; set quando dicitur deum velle hominem peccare, inplicatur quod esse primum peccati placet deo.

If one of two things tantamount each to the other is willed by God, then the other is willed; if the antecedent of a consequence then the consequence is willed.

Secundo patet quod, si unum convertibiliter est volitum a deo, tunc et reliqum; et si deus vult antecedens cuiuscunque | consequencie, vult et consequens, et quod 86a[a] respectu cuiuscunque significabilis deus habet actualem volucionem, sicut et habet actualem noticiam aut intelleccionem; et, si simpliciter vult quicquam, tunc non vult contrarium, et econtra. Primum patet ex hoc quod necessario omne verum est volitum a deo; igitur repugnat quod unum convertibilium sit volitum a deo, et alterum non volitum: quia tunc aliquod verum non esset volitum a deo.

Peter Lombard cannot be rightly quoted against me, for be does not say that the ideal essence of sin proceeds from God, but only the fact that sin truly exists.

Et, si dicatur quod magister, primo sentenciarum, distinccione 46, capitulo 15, dicit quod hoc est sophisma deo odibile, *omne verum est a deo; "peccatum esse" est verum: igitur "peccatum esse" est a deo;* dicitur quod textus Magistri aliter habet; nam vere dicit quod hoc est sophisma deo odibile, credere quod *mala fieri*, vel *hominem peccare*, (quod Magister habet pro eodem) [sit] a deo, ex hoc quod hoc verum, *mala fieri*, est a deo. Hoc enim verum, sicut et quodlibet aliud, est vel deus, vel est a deo, quia tunc *esse primum* peccati placeret deo i. [e.] placeret deo quod creatura peccat mortaliter, quod ego non audeo dicere.

Bradwardine indeed attacks him for saying this, supposing that he goes so far as to deny the latter proposition, but I do not see that he does. No doubt the existence of sin,

Et si dicatur quod doctor profundus, libro primo, capitulo 34, infranite reprobat magistrum in hac parte, dicitur quod equivocat cum magistro, capiens magistrum velle negare quod *peccatum esse* est ex deo; set non vidi hoc argumentum in textu magistri. Certum namque est quod *peccatum esse*, secundum *esse intelligibile*, est

16. illud *pro* contrarium MS. 27. sit *deest* MS. 31. e *deest* MS. 34. infiuite *pro* infranite MS.

21. *Magister sentenciarum.* Peter Lombard. 35. *Infranite.* Possibly a mistake; there exists an adjective *infraenis*, unbridled. This sense would agree with p. 239, l. 9—11.

a deo, sicut et peccatum esse, quoad *esse secundum:* set a deo non est quod homo sic peccat. Et iste est sensus magistri; quem sensum concludendo ex communibus mediis, est fallacia accidentis, vel fallacia figure diccionis seccundum alios; ut magister exemplificat, sic arguendo: *Deus prohibet furtum fieri; et "furtum fieri" est verum: igitur deus prohibet verum.* Nam illud verum, quod est *furtum fieri*, est volitum a deo, cum sit *esse secundum* peccati, et tamen deus non vult hominem furari. Et quod illud quod doctor exprobrando dicit responsionem et similitudinem magistri indigniorem responsione, non video efficaciam in talibus dictis. Nec video quod *prohibere* includit negacionem, ut doctor capit, cum legifer potest in genere prohibere multa eiusdem speciei, et alia eiusdem speciei non prohibere: ut legislator prohibet homicidium, et tamen non precipit ne fiat homicidium, set quodlibet iniustum homicidium in sibi subditis precipit non fieri. Ideo autem distribucio in talibus est racione huiusmodi adverbii, *ne*, equipollentis huic termino composito, *ut non*: ut iudex prohibet furtum, si precipit quodcunque furtum a sibi subditis non fieri. Unde nimis esset extensa potestas, si iudex vel curatus [aut] si privatus in Anglia prohibet furtum, vel fornicacionem prohibet; nec scit aliquis inpugnare istam consequenciam, *Petrus prohibet furtum ab istis tunc aut ibi: igitur Petrus prohibet furtum;* quia satis est ad *prohibere furtum*, precipere furtum non fieri, et patet quod non sequitur: *Petrus prohibet furtum; hoc est furtum: igitur prohibet hoc:* et sic de singulis furtis intelligibilibus.

as a purely rational entity, is of God; but this does not mean that man's guilt proceeds from God: and that is what Lombard means to deny, as is clear from the context.

Bradwardine's strong language on this subject goes too far, and is beside the mark. *To forbid* is not a negation but a positive command not to commit v. g. any unjust homicide. *Ne* is a particle corresponding to *ut non*, and therefore what follows, if universally distributed, cannot be prohibited by a private person, or one that has not universal jurisdiction.

Notandum tamen quod oportet paululum declinare a verbis magistri, sicut et a verbis doctoris. Nam concedendum est quod deus vult mala tam esse quam fieri, nedum subiecta mala, set tam penas malas quam iniquitates malas, cum *velle peccata* sit *velle ipsa esse.* Set non sequitur: *deus vult peccata fieri et esse; igitur deus vult subiecta peccare*, licet magister habeat pro eodem, ut patet in exemplo suo de *prohibere.* Unde concedendum est quod, sicut verum est prohibitum a deo, sic deus prohibet verum, et sic falsum est ab eo preceptum. Nam omne peccatum est a deo prohibitum;

Yet both Peter Lombard and Bradwardine express themselves somewhat wrongly. Against the first we must say that it is God's will that evil shall take place; though not that any individual shall commit sin: which Lombard supposes to be the same thing. God may prohibit a thing

4. ut figura fi^e MS. 18, 19. distribuendi MS. 23. aut *deest* MS. 37. obiecta MS.

that is true and right, as when He forbade the blind men to speak of His miracle; and again He may command a thing which He intends shall not be done; as in the case of Abraham's sacrifice. In the first case, He merely gave us an example of humility, and it was right to disobey Him.

omne peccatum est verum: igitur verum est a deo prohibitum. Patet illud in exemplo Mt 9°, ubi, illuminatis duobus cecis, dixit eis salvator, *Videte ne quis sciat: illi autem exeuntes diffamaverunt eum in totam terram.* Sicut enim deus precipit fieri, que non vult fieri, ut experiamur obedienciam, sicut patet de Abraham, Ge. 22, sic precipit sic non fieri, quod tamen vult fieri, ut doceamur nos non nimis excitare ad propriam laudem; ut patet in exemplo evangelico de duobus cecis, qui narrando miraculum placuerunt deo, ut videtur sanctis doctoribus. Nam et si unus sanctus ex simplicitate dixerit michi quod non revelem | magnalia dei, contravenirem, eciam si Christus sic precipit (specialiter si illustraverit me utrumque fieri debere) sine hoc quod sapiat peccatum; quod Christus potest facere sine duplicitate.

Matth. IX, 30.

86 a[b]

Thus we reconcile the seeming discrepancy between the two Doctors.

Patet igitur quomodo apparens repugnancia doctorum in ista materia potest reduci ad concordiam. Nam sicut homines resistunt deo, celum angelo, ymmo unus alteri, ut patet Danielis 10, sine repugnancia vel difficultate, ita contingit ex equivocacione inter dicta doctorum. Alique particule patent ex radice predicta.

Dan. X, 13

It is the general custom to distinguish God's permission from His will. The one is eternal, the other temporal. For God does not permit sin, save at the moment when a man actually commits it.

Tercio patet quod generaliter dei permissio et eius volucio distinguntur. Nam quelibet volucio dei est eterna, quelibet eius permissio temporalis, igitur conclusio. Non enim est permissio dei, nisi quando res est permissa, ut deus non permittit hominem peccare antequam homo peccat, set tunc solum quando homo peccat, et deus non impedit dum possit. *Permittere* enim non dicit actum intrinsecum sicut *velle.* Nemo dicit quod ipse semper permittit hominem fornicari, aut dampnari in inferno, etsi continue hoc velit permittere: igitur non est diuturnius quam permitti.

Notwithstanding this, whatever is permitted is willed by God.

Hoc tamen est verum, quod omne quomodocunque permissum a deo est volitum ab eodem. Patet sic: omne permissum a deo est volitum, inquantum huiusmodi est ens, et verum. Omne tale est volitum a deo: igitur conclusio.

All that takes place either is by God's permission, or is His doing, as Augustine says; therefore, if it takes place, He wills it to take place,

Ideo significanter dicit Augustinus, *Enchiridion* 66, "Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo." Ex quibus verbis bene notatis, patet primo quod sequitur: *deus permittet hoc fieri, igitur*

4. existentes MS. 7. fit fieri MS. 19. ce[m] *pro* celum MS. 23. promissio *pro* permissio MS. 28. aute hoc *pro* quando homo MS.

deus vult hoc. Aliter enim permissio dei non esset signum infallibile proporcionalis volucionis. Patet secundo quod non sequitur: *deus permittit illum fornicari, vel aliter peccare mortaliter; igitur deus positive facit illum sic peccare.* Quotlibet sunt talia dicta sanctorum, distinguencia inter *sinere* dei et eius *velle.*

though sin is not positively His doing;

Et ex isto corelario sequitur quod, si deus vult aliquid permissive, tunc vult aliquid beneplacito; et per consequens, si vult aliquid, tunc placet sibi, sicut ipsum diligit secundum aliquam racionem.

and so what He wills must certainly be pleasing to Him.

Set obicitur tripliciter. Primo per hoc quod deus vult istam proposicionem esse veram, *iste blasphemat,* cum illam esse veram non sit peccatum aliquod, et per consequens deus vult ita esse ut ista primarie significat. Et cum ista primarie significat istum blasphemare, sequitur quod deus vult istum blasphemare. Confirmatur ex hoc, quod si unum convertibilium est volitum a deo, tunc et reliqum, ex secunda noticia; set blasphemia illius est volita a deo, cum sit ens et verum, ut patet ex dictis: igitur, "quod iste blasphemat" est volitum a deo. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod ista sunt convertibilia: *blafemiam illius esse,* et *illum blasfemare.*

Three objections. (1) In my theory, *This man blasphemes,* may be a proposition willed by God as true, since its truth is no sin. Now its primary meaning is 'this man's blasphemy'; so his blasphemy is willed by God. Willing the one, He wills the other.

Hic dicitur, concedendo quod deus vult illam veritatem quam data proposicio primarie significat; et illum sensum exprimunt logici per illum terminum compositum, *ita esse significantem,* sub habitudine accusativi casus, cum impertinens dicto esset intelligere quod deus vult illo modo esse, quo proposicio illa significat. Nam eque vult deus esse omni modo quo quecunque proposicio possibilis significat. Illud igitur *ita* est blasfemie, quod deus vult propter bonum ex eo sequens; set non sequitur ultra: *deus vult ita esse, ut ista primarie significat; et ista solum significat "illum blasfemare": igitur deus vult illum blasfemare.* Nam satis est quod deus vult *blasfemare* (vel blasfemiam) illius, quod est verum. Quando enim dicitur quod deus vult eum blasfemare, intelligitur quod deus vult actum primum *blasfemare*; et quando deus vult *blasfemare illius,* indifferens est sive deus velit illud secundum *esse primum,* sive quoad *esse secundum.* In *assimili:* deus cognoscit omnes cursus

I answer that the truth signified by the proposition is indeed willed by God, and that it does not matter how it may be expressed in words; but He does not will that the man shall blaspheme, only the fact of his blasphemy.

These are two different things.

18. nota *pro* noticia MS. 22. ita *pro* illum MS. 30. inpossibilis MS.; *ib.* i[a] *pro* ita MS. 33. i[a] *pro* ista MS.

40. *In assimili.* That is: *in argumento a simili.*

possibiles, et tamen non cognoscit anima cursiva currere, et tamen id est cursus illius, et *hoc currere*, quocunque currente significato. Et patet quod non sequitur, si unum convertibilium est volitum a deo, igitur et reliqum: igitur, si blasfemia illius est volita a deo, et illum *blasfemare* est volitum | tamen, quia idem est. Et per con- 86b[b] sequens non sunt convertibilia, nec ista signa simpliciter convertuntur, cum respectu alicuius verbi refert ponere unum aut reliqum, propter modos significandi. Conceditur tamen quod *hoc* est volitum a deo (demonstrando primarie significatum huius significacionis, *iste blasfemat*).

(2) In my theory, the essence of sin is something, therefore true, good, and willed by God. Separate the malice of the act from the act itself; is that malice willed by God? Again, separate the fact of its occurring; is the malice, as something intelligible, willed by God? There must at last be something in sin that God does not will. I answer that sin has no essence distinct from itself as a fact; its essence is all in the thing itself, which indeed is willed by God (and in that sense we must admit that sin is essentially thus willed); but malice is a mere privation, and (as such) not distinct from its subject.

Set secundo obicitur sic. *Esse primum* peccati, eo ipso quod est, [est] verum; et omne verum, ut huius [modi], est bonum: igitur *esse primum* peccati est bonum; et omne bonum ut huiusmodi, est volitum a deo: igitur *esse primum* peccati est volitum a deo, et per consequens peccatum, secundum *esse primum*, est volitum a deo. Nam omnis racio essendi vel deessendi est vera, et per consequens a deo volita. Sicut igitur excoriata fuit malicia ab actu, et quesitum si illa malicia in abstracto sit a deo beneplacito volita, sic subducamus *esse secundum* peccati, et gravemus totam difficultatem super *esse primum* peccati. Et cum non sit processus in infinitum in talibus abstraccionibus, videtur quod deveniendum est ad talem maliciam vel racionem malicie in abstracto, que non est deo beneplacita.

Ad istud [respondetur] quod *esse primum* peccati non distinguitur ab ipso peccato, sicut nec peccati informacio vel racio eius quecunque. Ex quo sequitur quod omne ens, quod est *esse primum* vel racio peccati, est volitum a deo, et per consequens, equivocando in predicacione secundum essenciam, concedendum esset quod *esse primum* peccati cuiuscunque est volitum a deo. Malicia autem, cum sit privacio, [non] distinguitur

13. peccatum *pro* peccati MS. 14. est *deest* MS. 15. modi *deest* MS. 21. materia MS. 28. respondetur *deest* MS. 35. non *deest* MS.

1. *Anima.* This must be a mistake, and I am unable to rectify it. It is all the more regrettable, since this analogical argument *(a simili)* would help us to understand the distinction Wyclif makes, which to my mind is rather obscure. 6. *Tamen.* I would suggest, *quia tamen idem non est.* Or perhaps *cum* instead of *tamen,* omitting *quia* and adding a negative.

a subiecto; et quocunque positivo iniusto est dare, et quorum primum est auctorizatum a deo, ut natura positiva, et aliud, licet sit volitum a deo; et tamen *esse primum* eiusdem peccati, licet sit idem peccatum, non est formaliter volitum a deo; quia, sicut prius limitatum est, idem est dicere "*esse primum* huius peccati est sic volitum a deo", et: "deus vult quod iste peccet". Ideo, ut supra, notatum est hoc argumentum; hoc peccatum est volitum a deo, et hoc peccatum est *illum peccare*, igitur *illum peccare* est volitum a deo. Sic in suo convertibili est negandum: hoc peccatum est volitum a deo, et hoc peccatum est [*esse*] primum illius peccati: igitur *esse primum* illius peccati est volitum a deo, limitato sensu conclusionis. Nec pocius est unum sillogismus expositorius quam relicum, sicut plane patet, resolutis proposicionibus in sua convertibilia; ut patet, sic arguendo: Placet deo quod hoc peccatum sit, de quanto placet sibi quod proficiat vel exinde fiat bonum, et non est possibile hoc peccatum esse, nisi iste peccet: igitur placet deo quod iste peccat.

So that sin cannot, in its essence, be formally willed by God.
If you mean by 'sin willed in its essence' that God wishes a man to commit this sin, then I deny that God wills this sin thus.
God, intending a certain good, wills that a sin from which this good proceeds should be committed; this cannot be, unless such and such a one commits it; and in so far it pleases Him that he does so.

Ex istis patet quod prima consequencia non valet ad sensum limitatum, pocius quam sequitur: ex peccato isto provenit bonum, igitur bonum est *illum peccare*. Set ex premissis illis bene sequitur quod omne quod est *primum esse* peccati sit bonum, quod est concedendum. Falsum igitur est quod "hoc verum non est volitum a deo", quodcunque signetur; set verum est quod *illum peccare* non est volitum a deo formaliter, et patet de sillogigacionibus et contradictoriis proposicionum; et ista materia [est] notata prima noticia, dicta superius.

You cannot conclude that sin is a good thing because good proceeds thence.
That which constitutes the essence of sin is good; yet God does not directly and formally will that any one should sin.

Omnia enim talia currunt sub eadem forma fallendi. Istam veritatem deus vult, et ista veritas [est] *primum esse* huius peccati, vel *illum peccare* (et sic de aliis predicamentis formaliter a limitantibus ad actum primum); igitur *illum peccare* deus vult". Et ita de quotlibet similibus, sive sumatur racio essendi peccati, sive in-

All these arguments proceed from the fallacy of confusing between the commission of sin as an entitative act, and its malice or defect of entity.

12. esse *deest* MS. 30. est *deest* MS. 32. est *deest* MS.

3. *A deo.* Perhaps the translation of this very crabbed sentence should run thus: Any given positively unrighteous act implies both that of which God is the First Author (as of something belonging to real nature), and something else besides, though this too is willed by God.

formacio prima, sive racio malicie vel quomodocunque nominaliter nominetur: deus vult omne quod *est* illud. Et si ponatur deum vel creaturam facere peccatum sine bonitate convertente, dicitur, ut supra, quod deus non potest hoc. Ymmo deus non potest intelligere peccatum nisi cointelligat penam eius, nec creatura hoc potest, licet distincte et explicite possit intelligere peccatum non sic, set implicite intelligendo eius penam. Et si limitetur difficultas ad *esse primum* peccati, adhuc non minus, quandoque queritur si deus vult peccatum, conceditur, cum propter extraneam imposicionem non est varianda responsio ad veritatem. Et si queratur color huius; *si deus vult bonum consequens ad peccatum, deus vult peccatum*, dicitur quod antecedens ponit peccatum esse bonum, cum claudit contradiccionem puram maliciam esse sine bonitate, quia tunc a contrario correspondet summe bonitati, non privative, set contrarie, | ut dixerunt manichei. Cum igitur omne bonum, ut sic, 86b[b]
sit a deo volitum, sequitur quod peccatum sit a deo. Et si dicatur quod pari argumento concedendum esset bonum esse hominem peccare, et per consequens a deo volitum, vel econtra [ad] eundem sensum quem pono hic: *Deus vult hominem peccare*, posset quis racionaliter ponere hic: *deus vult peccatum:* fateor utrumque. Unde doctor profundus videtur concedere primum, et quotquot dicta auctoris negancia quod deus vult peccatum intelligunt quod deus non vult creaturam peccare. Ideo expedit discutere sensus per combinaciones auctoritatum huius nature, eligendo logicam recciorem.

Tercio obicitur sic: aliquod verum, vel saltem aliquam proposicionem esse vetitam a deo, ut patet de esu ligni vetiti; et omne verum est bonum, et deo beneplacitum: igitur aliquod deo beneplacitum est a deo prohibitum. Assumptum patet, quomodocunque catholicus loquatur.

Hic dicitur concedendo conclusionem, ut superius. Notandum tamen quod valde extraneum videtur quod deus prohibeat proposicionem esse veram, vel quod ista proposicio verificetur de te: *tu es fur aut mechus*, quia modica fuit sollicitudo dei, et inpertinens sue prohibicioni existencia talium signorum. Ex quo patet quod esus ligni, furtum, et talia, sunt a deo prohibita. Et

By whatever name you call it, all that *is something* in sin is willed by God. I deny that any sin can be committed, from which good does not follow. Does God then will sin? Yes, in our true sense; whatever the adversary may mean by that. If it be said: God, intending the good consequent on sin, intends sin: then sin is good, since good flows therefrom, and it is not evil that God intends, as did the God of the Manichaeans. And in this sense God is the author of sin; and likewise He intends man to sin, and intends sin itself. Those who deny this mean: He wills not the sinner's malice. (3) Adam's eating the forbidden fruit was a true fact, and beloved by God, yet He forbade it. I answer that this is true. God takes little heed as to the verification of a proposition; for this is irrelevant to His prohibition itself. He does not forbid any sin

10. mi9 *pro* minus MS. 12. v̄ianda modo *pro* varianda responsio MS. 22. ad *deest* MS. 24. huc MS. 29. rectorem MS. 31. veram *pro* vetitam MS.

ultra sequitur, cum deus nichil potest prohibere, nisi possibile, quod deus nichil potest prohibere, nisi quod vult esse secundum *esse intelligibile*; ymmo, quod potest velle actualiter esse. Ideo nunquam fuit aliquod peccatum prohibitum a deo, quin deus voluit illud idem; non quia voluit aliquem peccare, set quia voluit convertere illud peccatum in bonum; quia aliter indubie non fuerit illud *esse*, nec gravando ad prevaricacionem prohiberet tale peccatum quod sciret esse committendum. Ipse enim facit quodcunque opus suum propter melius.

unless He intends to turn the evil of that sin into good, knowing it will be committed.

Et si queratur quare deus prohibet peccata, cum vult ipsa fieri? dicitur quod ideo, quia iustum esset quod homo non peccaret, nec potest esse racionabile vel iustum quod homo peccet. Tunc iustum esset iniuste agere, et quilibet, in quantum iniuste ageret, placeret deo; et tunc peccatum non esset obliquitas, cum quilibet, in quantum peccans, conformaret voluntatem suam voluntati divine. Et revera, si tantum placeret deo quod homines peccant, ipse posset illis precipere quia peccarent, et remunerare eos eciam beatitudine quia peccarent, cum necessitat eos ad peccandum, sic quod non est in potestate eorum resilire ne portent, ut dicunt sic opinantes: et revera nec Augustinus, nec Hugo de sancto Victore, nec aliquis sanctorum doctorum ausus fuit ista asserere. Bene concesserunt quod deus vult peccata et mala culpe, set nunquam dixerunt quod deus vult creaturam peccare, vel necessitat eam ad peccandum, quia hoc racionaliter refugit pia mens.

Why then should He forbid what He intends shall come to pass? Because it is not right for man to sin; if it were, wrong would be right.

For if sin could have pleased God in that sense, He might have commanded man to sin, and made it a necessity.

Such a doctrine is absolutely contrary to all the Fathers, who never admitted that God desired man to sin.

Et ex istis patet quod modicum est deum esse causam quare ista proposicio est vera, *iste peccat*, cum hoc non plus iniquitatis includit formaliter quam cogitacio dei est vera, qua cogitat luciferum peccare, ut patet tam de signo representante, quam de comprehendente. Peccatum igitur non est in signo. Quare igitur non foret deus causa quare signum est verum? Set valde inpertinens est ad inferendum quod deus est causa quare homo peccat. Nec sequitur, si deus est causa peccati aut veritatis huius proposicionis extra istam proposicionem, ideo sit causa quare homo peccat. Unde necesse videtur michi conservare aliquos terminos quibus exprimatur odium quo deus odit peccata. Quibus

That God is the reason why the proposition; *This man sins*, is true, only means that His mind sees it to be true; and that is not the cause of the iniquity of the act itself, nor the reason why the man sins.

I say, therefore, that God hates

6. aliquid MS. 15. quelibet MS. 23. ut *pro* nec MS. 39. et ideo MS.

sin as sin, and though He wills it to take place, yet man displeases Him in committing it.

Once I admitted that God willed sin even in its essence, though not as having that essence, urged by an argument which I now find inconclusive, since a similar one may be used against the Holy Trinity.

non video apciores et modis loquendi sanctorum consonanciores quam tales: deus odit peccatum secundum *esse* suum primum, vel secundum racionem qua peccatum vel iniquitas (et ita de similibus), et tamen istam iniquitatem vult, licet non velit subiectum peccare, aut illud sub racione qua peccatum vel iniquitas; et sic *esse* primum peccati vel racionem eius non vult, licet omne quod est tale *esse* vel talis racio, velit. Aliquanto autem concessi quia informacio peccati, [*esse*] primum eius, et omnis racio talis, est volita a deo, set deus non vult peccatum secundum talem racionem; quia sillogismus expositorius videtur inferre quod racio talis, vel *esse* primum peccati, est volitum | a deo. Set 87a
responsio ad illa patet ex solucione argumentorum, quibus probatur patrem esse filium. Sicut enim non sequitur: *omnis natura divina est filius, omnis pater est natura divina, igitur omnis pater est filius*, ita non sequitur: *omnis veritas est a deo, omne esse primum peccati est veritas, igitur omne esse primum peccati est [a] deo.* Et sicut non sequitur, "Ista essencia est pater, et illa est filius, igitur pater est filius"; sic non sequitur, "Istud peccatum est volitum a deo, et istud peccatum est *esse* primum peccati, igitur *esse* primum peccati est volitum a deo". Nam, iuxtaponendo raciones defectuum arguendi, invenietur ad sensum expositum par racio utrobique. Contingit tamen intelligere per signa talia, ad sensum equivocum intellecta, discursus optimos, etc.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM.

To make the foregoing doctrine clearer, let us compare it with that which says that God is pleased that man sins, and necessitates him thereto, but distinguishes between to will simply, and to will in a certain respect.

A merchant's will in a

Ut autem ista responsio magis appareat, iuxtaponenda est alia responsio, que, respondendo ad obiectus, concedit quod deus vult beneplacite quod homo peccet, sicut et antecedenter necessitat ad peccandum. Et eternaliter ordinat omnes peccatores peccare, cum placet sibi quod peccent: distinguit tamen de duplici *velle*, simpliciter scilicet *velle*, et *velle* secundum quid, ut facit Aristoteles, 3° *Ethicorum* in principio. *Velle simpliciter* est quo quis absolute vult volubile, sicut mercator in naufragio vult salutem, set *velle secundum*

1. a pecatores *pro* apciores MS. 8. tales MS. 9. esse *deest* MS.
19. a *deest* MS. 28. Ca^m 15^m *in marg. initial large U in blue ink* MS.

quid est *velle* ex supposicione unius finis, qui non potest haberi nisi per illud volitum, nisi simpliciter illud medium sit volitum; ut proicere merces in mare, gracia salutis. Et tales voluciones dicit Augustinus, *De spiritu et litera*, 26, esse voluciones, eciam si invite sit quis inductus ad sic volendum. Ideo Aristoteles dicit quod sunt mixti ex voluntario. Unde propter talem equivocacionem in volubili dicitur Proverbiorum 13°,
Prov. XIII, 4. *Vult et non vult piger.* Unde et iure dicunt coactam voluntatem. Et istam distinccionem ponit doctor, libro primo, ca° 33°, per quam solvit scripturam et doctores.

shipwreck is to be saved; he throws his goods into the sea, unwillingly in respect to them, yet willingly in respect to his safety.

Set patet advertenti quod oportet ulterius dividere [in] volucionem *secundum quid*, aut volucionem *per accidens;* cum notum sit deum non posse quicquam velle nisi velit istud simpliciter et summe libere, sicut non potest quicquam scire vel ordinare, nisi sciat et ordinet eternaliter et simpliciter illud idem.

But it is clear that as we have accidental will, opposed to simple will and nothing accidental is in God, this distinction cannot hold.

Item, omnis volucio "*secundum quid*", de qua loquitur philosophus, ponit violenciam, anxietatem, aut volucionem simpliciter sic voliti secundum quid, set nullum tale potest deo competere eternaliter: igitur deus non habet talem volucionem secundum quid.

Besides, this 'will in a certain respect' is caused by violence, anxiety, &c. and in God all this is impossible.

Item, ex veris principiis doctoris, omne quod deus ordinat, eternaliter sic ordinavit: sed deus ordinat] quod homo peccabit: igitur eternaliter sic ordinavit. Set quid, rogo, cogeret vel incitaret eum ad sic eternaliter ordinandum? Numquid credimus quod deus posset attingere finem quem simpliciter appetit sine tali medio volito, et volito secundum quid? Si dicatur quod simpliciter melius est illud peccatum esse quam non esse, quare, rogo, non vult deus simpliciter illud peccatum esse, cum universaliter vult volubilia ut sunt bona?

And if God eternally ordains that man shall sin, what motive can force him thereto?

If sin is in itself better than not-sin, why should God not simply will that it shall be?

Item, si deus habet volucionem respectu peccatorum, racione cuius non simpliciter vult illa (cap. 9°), secundum quam racionem debet habere volucionem circa peccata, non secundum racionem qua nocent, cum placet sibi eternaliter ordinare quod noceant? Ymmo, cum potissima racio deo odibilis sit *esse* primum peccatorum, secundum quod denominat subiecta sua peccare et deo displicere; set iuxta principia doctoris placet deo quod subiectum peccet, et sibi displiceat: sequitur, per locum

If the evil of sin pleases God so that He eternally ordains this evil as such, how is it that His will has not this evil directly for its object?

11. scripture et doctoris MS. 13. in *deest* MS. 24. ordinat — ordinat *deest* MS. 35. habet MS.

It should be so according to Bradwardine's principles. He tries to elude this in various ways;

a maiori, quod nulla sit racio secundum quam deus non vult peccatum. Cum igitur deus vult peccatum, eciam secundum omnem racionem sui, sicut sequitur ex principiis doctoris, palam videtur quod deus simpliciter vult omne peccatum. Ideo (c° 34°) sequente, dicit doctor quod deus non vult peccatum diligendo aut approbando, tandem finaliter premiando, et sic (ut dicit) peccatum vel deformitatem simpliciter, intellecto universo; set tantum secundum quid respectu causarum inferiorum, non respectu dei. Unde dicit: scriptura sepe negat *velle* a deo respectu eorum que omnino principaliter vult; vel aliter negat deum velle aut auctorizare peccata culpabiliter quoad ipsum.

but I think them feeble subterfuges. Surely God must, according to his theory, love evil equally with good.

Set revera, salvo iudicio meliori, videtur michi quod quelibet istarum quatuor glosarum sit nimis exilis. Nam quoad primum, planum est, si deus vult peccatum et ordinat ipsum ad tantum sic deserviens, quod tunc diligit ipsum, eo quod vult et ordinat sibi | tantum 87a[b] bonum; et de tanto approbat ipsum, cum omne bonum, ut bonum, est volitum et approbatum a deo, a quo habet illum titulum.

And to say that God does not approve sin, because approbation is only for rational creatures, would subvert the meaning of many a text of Scripture.

Et nimis leve dictum videtur quod deus non approbat vel finaliter premiet peccata, quia sic solum approbat racionales creaturas. Ideo sic diceret scriptura deum non diligere aliquam substanciam preter racionalem aut aliquam virtutem, vel aliquam creaturam suam; et cum auctoritates scripture concedunt deum diligere sine odio vel reprobacione omnes creaturas non racionales, peccatum excipiendo, oportet igitur esse alium intellectum auctorizatum si pertinenter sint dicta.

The deformity of sin is simply deformity in God's eyes; and if there is no such thing as mere deformity, then there is none at all. We cannot simply infer that a substance is white, from its being white to a certain extent; and the same applies to evil. Everything that we consider in

Ulterius patet quod impossibile est peccatum vel deformitatem esse, nisi sit talis simpliciter, et principaliter quoad deum; nam nihil suscipit inde predicacionem alicuius, nisi illud quod est simpliciter tale. Igitur, si nulla est difformitas vel iniquitas simpliciter, tunc nulla est talis. Non enim sequitur: *hoc est album secundum quid, igitur hoc est album.* Per idem non sequitur de illo quod plus habet bonitatis quam malicie: *hoc est malum secundum quid, igitur hoc est malum.* Ymmo, capta tota malicia distincta a bonitate, invenietur quod-

7. tanquam *pro* tandem MS. 8. deformitas MS.; *ib.* into *pro* intellecto MS. 12. actorizare MS. 15. exillis MS. 17. si MS. 22. ut *pro* vel MS. 28. peccati MS. 29. intel[m] auctot[u] *pro* intellectum autorizatum; *ib.* ꝑti[tz] *pro* pertinentes MS.

libet significandum *esse* secundum se totum, et sic omne peccatum esset simpliciter pure bonum: aliter enim esset in eo aliqua malicia que non esset bona. Oportet igitur omne tale per accidens reduci ad aliquod per se; nec vertitur in dubium quin, si aliqua sit difformitas vel peccatum, est principaliter quoad deum contra quem principaliter peccatur, et cuius est librare res sicuti simpliciter sunt. Nichil igitur debet esse turpe quoad causam secundariam, nisi quod est turpe in oculis creatoris, sicut nec iustum nec bonum; cum eiusdem sensus sit primo et principaliter iudicare de privativo cuius est iudicare de positivo. Ideo, ut credo, in isto equivocat doctor, vocans illud deforme simpliciter, quod ad nichil esset bonum vel ordinatum; quod est impossibile de peccato, cum melius esset toti universo, licet non isti private persone, quod peccata essent, quam quod non essent: et sic approbaret peccata, ut alias creaturas, ut consequens esset sibi dicere.

what is evil is an entity, and therefore good. Only that is evil, which is so in God's judgment; and if we say that nothing is absolutely wrong, save what is of no use in the universe, then sin is not absolutely wrong, and God approves it.

Ulterius quoad dictum, patet quod iuxta hunc sensum negandum esset deum velle aliquam creaturam, cum nullam talem vult, nisi gracia sui solius principaliter voliti, tamquam finis. Nusquam tamen sequitur quod deus sic vel vult, aut non vult aliquid, nisi vel peccatum vel racione peccati, set bene sequitur econtra de deo quod nichil odit eorum que fecit, Sapiencie 11; (Sap. XI, 25.) et quod propter voluntatem dei, universaliter se extendentem ad omnia que causat, sunt ipsa efficaciter sicut causata. Ideo certum est ex dictis quod deus vult omne bonum ordinatum ad summum bonum, cum scriptura solum peccata, vel res racione peccati, excipit a dei volucione, ut Psalmus 5 Davidis dicit, "*mane astabo* [*tibi*] *et videbo*", etc. (Ps. V, 5.)

God intends all things for Himself alone: and so, if a thing thus intended is not approved by God, then we must deny that He approves any creature.

Istis igitur duabus glosis deiectis, restat iuxtaponere glosam Lincolniensis predictam, qua deus huc usque non dedignatus est ostendere mortalibus meliorem, scilicet quod omne bonum, sive peccatum, sive quodcunque aliud, est a deo volitum. Et sic deus vult omne peccatum quoad eius *esse secundum*, et non quoad *esse primum;* i. e. deus non vult aliquem peccare aut esse iniqum, set vult quod iniquitas puniatur, et de tanto vult quod iniquitas illa fiat, et facit ipsam permissive,

Grosseteste's view of the matter is that God intends sin to be, as an existing fact, but not in its essence; that He intends no one to sin, but causes sin in so far as He permits iniquity in order to

8. secuti MS. 23. scit *pro* sic MS. 32. tibi *deest* MS.

punish it, or produces its causes, or makes it work for good.

God is not the Author of sin, but only of that which in its essence pleases Him.

This is the doctrine of Augustine,

dum possit; vel secundo in suis causis, vel tercio in ordinando ipsam ad bonum. Et ad illum sensum dicunt Augustinus, *Enchiridion* 55, Anselmus, et alii doctores, quod iustum est peccata esse, et quod deus vult ipsa permissive ad illum sensum. Et dicit Augustinus, 83 *Confessionum*, confessione tercia, et confessione 21, quod deus non est auctor peccati. Nullius enim causabilis ad extra est deus auctor, nisi illius cuius *esse* primum placet sibi, et per consequens est ab eo. Et omne tale temporaliter effectum, et solum tale, est creatura dei. Et sic intelligendus est Augustinus, in libello *De confutacione hereticorum* 16, falsa cavilla sibi imponencium; ubi, responsione quinta, dicit quod a deo prorsus non est peccatum. Et exponit illud dictum statim post per hoc, quod nullius peccati auctor est, set nature creator. Et infra in eodem frequenter dicit quod deus non facit aliquos ad peccandum. Et ista dicta, de virtute sermonis vera, exponunt sensum aliorum doctorum, quibus dicitur | deum non velle peccata; suple secundum *esse* 87b suum primum.

which explains certain other Doctors' expressions.

If man is so made that he must sin, he owes it to his nature to sin, and therefore does right; but this is blasphemy; so man cannot be eternally and principally ordained to commit sin, nor necessitated thereto, for then he would be merely obeying God's eternal law.

The old philosophers used to say that nothing evil was in the first intention of nature.

Unde 3. *De libero arbitrio*, 26, sic arguit Augustinus ad probandum eandem conclusionem: "Hoc debet quisque quod accepit; et sic, si homo factus [est] ut peccet, necessario hoc debet ut peccet. Cum igitur peccat, quod debet facit; quod si scelus est dicere, neminem natura sua cogit ut peccet" Ecce intencio istius sancti est quod, si homo sit eternaliter ordinatus ad peccandum, tunc meretur, faciens ut debet, in peccando. Et revera ista racio est michi valde evidens: si deus eternaliter et per se principaliter ordinavit et voluciones prescitos sic peccare, ut universitas decoretur, et veniente tempore necessitat ad peccandum, palam videtur quod ipsi peccando faciunt quod iustum est ipsos facere, eo quod faciunt sicut debent ex lege et ordinancia dei eterna, sicut et bestie et omnes alie creature faciunt ut debent. Et per consequens, sic faciendo, serviunt deo ut debent de eius ordinancia et beneplacito. Non sic dicunt antiqui, quod nihil malum nature vel culpe est de intencia primaria dei vel nature, set solum bonum nature vel moris principaliter intendunt; et deus, sciens omne malum, ordinat de ipso bonum, et sic illud malum facit

12. cal[a] = capitula (?) MS. 23. est *deest* MS ; *ib.* peccentur (sic!) MS. 31. et *pro* ut MS.

per accidens, sicut nature corrupcionem vel peccatum nature, ut declarat sanctus Thomas, 3° contra gentiles, capituli 100 et 105. Non enim dampnificaretur dampnatus ex pena eterna iuxta istam viam, ut non est malum homini quod non habet alas vel aliud sibi inpossibile; nec est malum homini quod non habet capillos flavos aut aureolam virginis, doctoris, aut martiris, etsi natus est habere illam, et non habet: set solum illius carencia est mala homini, quod homo debet habere et non habet, ut dicit sanctus Thomas. Cum igitur quilibet [pre] scitus non debet habere vel mereri beatitudinem, set oppositum, plane videtur quod non dampnificatur plus quam beatus qui non habet tantum quantum potest, vel creatura que non tantum perficitur accidentaliter sicut potest. Unde Egidius, super primo *Sentenciarum*, distinccione 36, declarat eandem sentenciam ex processu Dionisii, *De divinis nominibus*, capitulo 4°, ubi ista materia de malo tractatur ad unguem: "quamvis," in quid Egidius, "malum non habet simpliciter racionem boni; per accidens tamen, racione bonorum que inde eliciuntur, habere racionem boni, non est inconveniens."

It not, it were impossible to be damned, for sin would no longer be evil.

And a 'foreknown' ought no more to be punished than one of the Blessed whose merits might under other circumstances have been greater.

Evil is accidentally good, but not so in itself.

Non igitur videtur catholice sustinendum quod homo debet peccare ex hoc quod deus ad perfeccionem sui universi ipsum ordinat ad peccandum: hoc enim esset docere peccatores ad excuciendas excusaciones in peccatis. Unde Augustinus, *Enchiridion* 18, tractando de causacione rerum, concludit in fine: "Nequaquam dubitare debemus rerum quo ad nos pertinet bonarum causam esse bonitatem dei; malarum vero, ab inmutabili bono deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, et hominis postea." Et idem sentit utrobique ubi tractat conclusionem, unde malum: quod nulla malicia reducitur in deum causantem *esse* suum primum, set sistitur in creatura flexibili quoad illum modum causandi. Et ultra reditur ad deum causam cuiuscunque talis peccati quoad *esse* suum secundum. Et illum plane

The doctrine that man ought to sin, because God, has ordained this for the perfection of the world, seems therefore heterodox.

The cause of good is God's goodness; that of evil, the mutability of the creature's will, falling away from God, the immutable good.

4. pene MS. 7. laureolam MS. 11. pre *deest* MS. 29. causarum MS.

2. *Sanctus Thomas*. The chapters referred to have nothing to do with the question. But lib. III, from cap. 3 to cap. 14, especially Cap. 4, *Quod malum est praeter intentionem in rebus*, and Cap. 14, *Quod malum est causa per accidens*, have a direct bearing on the subject. See also Cap. 6.

detegit Anselmus in *De concordia,* 6°, ubi sic: "facit deus in omnibus voluntatibus et operibus bonis, et quod essencialiter sunt, et quod bona sunt. In malis vero non quod mala sunt, set tantum quod per essenciam sunt."

Thus, though it is true that there are things morally evil, God is not the cause of their being morally evil; or, as Grosseteste says, of their evil essence.

Ecce plane quod, licet verum sit aliqua esse moraliter [mala], non tamen est a deo [quod] sunt moraliter mala. Et hoc vocat lincolniensis *esse* primum malicie.

All unrighteousness is a deviation from God's will; if unrighteousness pleased God, it would no longer be a deviation.

Et potest istud ex supradictis sic ostendi. Omnis iniusticia, in quantum huiusmodi, est declinacio a voluntate prima regulante; ideo vocatur obliquitas, deformitas, et corrupcio, aut privacio equitatis, ut sepe dictum est; set si bene placeret deo quod quicunque peccat, quantumlibet graviter, tunc ut sic peccans, conformaret voluntatem suam voluntati divine, et non obliquaret in alico; igitur non placet deo quod homo sic peccat. Nec ad alium sanum sensum possunt iniquitates et mala esse odita a deo, nisi quia deus odit et reprobat quod homo peccat.

Otherwise sin would be a merit, and be rewarded.

Si enim deus placatur in hoc quod homo peccat, tunc posset statuere hominem mereri in hoc quod peccat vel male agit, et per idem premiare hominem quia peccat. Consequens contradiccio | in terminis, quia 87 b^b
tunc peccans, ut sic, bene et meritorie ageret, et per consequens non peccabiliter aut defective.

God cannot make man to sin, for no wise man wantonly ruins what belongs to him, and sin ruins man.

Unde Augustinus, 83 Confessionum, confessione 3, evidenter arguit ad eandem conclusionem: "nullo homine sapiente fit homo deterior, deus est quolibet homine sapiencior, igitur deo non fit homo deterior", non enim potest sonare in sapienciam: quod dominus, habens in potestate sua plene vel deteriorare vel meliorare rem aliquam, gratis deteriorat vel peiorat eandem, diceretur inexcusabilis stulticia."

God, besides, is supremely good, and cannot therefore be pleased to see man deteriorate.

Cum igitur deus sit summe bonus, non est hoc suum peiorare creaturas suas, eo quod tunc velit eas esse sic peiores; et per consequens plus amaret minus bonum quam magis bonum; cum, ut dicit Augustinus, "si deus vult hominem esse deteriorem, deus est auctor deterioracionis sue". Unde sic scribit: "Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur."

This view seems preferable.

Et hec videtur glosa melior quam glosa doctoris, scilicet quod deus non est auctor alicuius culpe, cum

5, 6. mortaliter *pro* moraliter MS. 6. mala *deest* MS.; *ib.* quod *deest* MS. 18. approbat MS. 26. fuit MS. 28. fuit MS. 38. voluntate MS. 40. creature *pro* culpe MS.

pro nichilo potest mereri vel demereri. Si tamen aliquis culparetur propter hoc quod homo peccat, si ipse facit et vult quod homo peccat, potissime deus, qui est tam principalis [causa] quare homo peccat, foret in culpa, cum deus sit tam principalissime volens et ordinans quod homo peccet: quid igitur esset homini imputandum, quem deus eternaliter ordinavit et necessitat ad peccandum? Nec bene sapit quod homo operatur ex precepto dei, solum ut deus vult placenter ipsum operari, et tamen deus non potest premiare ipsum pro labore tam placente.

Bradwardine says that God is not the author of guilt; but if God is not in fault, who then is? since He would be the main cause of man's guilt.

Nor can I admit that a man's sinful acts please God, yet cannot be rewarded.

Propter talia multa racionaliter dampnatus est error quartus parisiis, quia concedit quod deus facit aliquem peccare vel esse peccatorem, vel quod voluntate beneplaciti vult quod aliquis sit peccator. Et alius qui dicit quod nullus peccat volendo aliter quam deus vult eum facere voluntate beneplaciti, et tamen peccat; et quintus qui dicit quod peccatum est magis bonum quam malum. Set iste dampnaciones non plus urgent nos anglicos quam dicta doctoris dicta non autentici. Verisimile tamen est et topice evidens quod tam venerabilis cetus doctorum tam deliberate non dampnaret talia sine evidencia satis magna. Ideo aliquos articulos dampnant, ut simpliciter erroneos, aliquos autem ut suspectos, et aliquos ut male sonantes. Nam octavus error est quod deus facit malum et peccatum esse, quod ego concedo. Set articulus 29^{nus} ponit sensum huius, qui dampnatur sub ista forma, quod deus est causa peccati vel mali in quantum peccatum vel malum. Ideo vere dicit Hugo, *De sacramentis*, parte 4, 13, "cum dicitur: deus vult malum, grave est auditui; quia concipitur quod dominus approbat peccatum esse. Ideo, "ut dicit," pia mens refugit quod deus vult malum, non quia quod dicitur, non bene dicitur, set quia quod bene dicitur non bene intelligitur". Et sic indubie est de multis dictis, ut in canonico Gregoriis de benediccione cerei paschalis, dicitur quod *peccatum Ade* fuit *necessarium*, et *culpa*

Several errors of like nature were justly condemned by the Council of Paris.

This Council has no authority in England, yet we may suppose it would not pronounce such condemnations without reason.

Some articles were condemned as ill sounding merely; as v. g. this, "That God makes sin to be", which I uphold; but further it is put in the form of "sin *quà* sin". *God wills sin*, though true, is liable to misconstruction.

Thus certain expressions in the Church Ritual may also be misunderstood. Adam's fault is there termed *happy;* which is false or

4. causa *deest* MS. 15. aliqua *pro* alius MS. 17. 9^{9} *pro* quintus MS. 25. modo *pro* male MS. 31. esse *pro* est MS.; *ib.* bonus *pro* dominus MS. 32. pnu *pro* peccatum MS.

31. *Dominus.* My correction of the MS. may be wrong; but if so, the text is probably mutilated. 36. In Officio Sabbati Sancti; Missale Romanum.

true, according to the sense it is taken in.

valde *felix;* quia, si intelligitur "habere utilitatem, bonitatem, aut felicitatem intrinsecam" erroneus esset sensus: si autem intelligitur quod utilitate et bonitate extrinseca fuit bonum, sive benefaciens multos felices, et sic a deo ordinatum et volitum, (quod vocatur perfeccio secunda), sanus est sensus. Ad illum intellectum

We must explain in this sense certain passages of Scripture, which seem contrary to our doctrine.

Osee VIII, 4. Ier. XIV, 14.

concordanda sunt dicta scripture, ut Osee 8 dicitur, *ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me*, et Iere. 14, *falso prophete vaticinantur in nomine meo, non misi eos.* "Nam accipiendo *regnare*", tirannizare, patet quod nemo tyrannizat, et quod prophecia mentiretur. Ipse indubie auctorizaret, et mitteret homines ad sic faciendum; et isto modo glosandum est illud Ezechielis 18. *Numquid voluntatis mee est mors impii*, i. e. ego non volo quod impius spiritualiter moriatur, recedendo a prima vita per peccatum. Et conformiter intelligitur illud scripture, sapiencie primo, *Deus mortem non fecit, nec letatur in perdicione* | *vivorum.* Oportet enim talia intelligi sine repugnancia, cum Eccli. 39, dicitur quod *fames et mors . . . . ad vindictam creata sunt.* Et si loquamur de morte spirituali, que non est peccatum set dampnacio eterna, certum est quod deus facit illam, cum sit iusta, dicente Augustino in *De natura bona*, 11°: "Nec nature dei omnino noceri potest, nec alicui materie sub deo noceri iniuste potest." Deus igitur summe letanter infligit tales penas, quia Proverbiorum primo, de sapiencia increata dicitur. "*Ego . . . . in interitu vestro ridebo.*" Nec mirum, quia Psalmo 103, dicitur: *Letabitur dominus in operibus suis;* et Deut° 28, dicitur; *Letabitur dominus, et disperdens atque subvertens vos*".

Ezech. XVIII, 23. Sap. I, 13. 88a[a] Eccli. XXXIX, 35. Prov. I, 26. Ps. CIII, 31. Deut. XXVIII, 63.

Otherwise they would contradict other passages.

Augustine denies that God is not the author of any evil, being the author of all that is, and of the punishments of the wicked, which however would not exist were it not for

Unde Augustinus, primo *Retractacionum*, 26, sic scribit, retractando dicta 83 *Confessionum.* Recolit enim ipsum dixisse in confessione 21, quod deus mali auctor non sit, ubi "videndum est", inquid, "me male intellexisse; quod dixi, *mali auctor deus non est*, quia omnium que sunt auctor est, que, in quantum sunt, bona sunt; et ne hinc putetur non ab illo esse penam malorum, que utique malum est hiis qui puniuntur: set hoc ita

7. scriptura MS. 8. falsi MS. 9. et non MS. 20. *no gap before* ad MS. 27. *no gap before* in MS. 29. omnibus operibus MS. 34. intelligitur MS.

4. *Multos.* My transcription has *multas.* The right text may be: *bene faciens multas felicitates.*

dixi, quemadmodum dictum est *deus mortem non fecit*, cum alibi scriptum sit [quod] mors nec dampnacio dicuntur institucione nature, aut inmediate esse a deo, eo quod talia non fierent a deo nisi intercidente culpa, cuius deus non est auctor." Et sic loquitur Anselmus, *De concordia*, ultimo, et Augustinus 3° *De libero arbitrio*, 4; et in *De sentenciis Prosperi*, 381[a], "Deus", inquid, "ad peccandum neminem cogens, previdet eos qui propria voluntate peccabunt, cum non iudicat iustus que fieri cogit prescitus. Sicut enim memoria tua non cogit facta esse que preteriere, sic deus presciencia sua non cogit facienda que futura sunt. Et sicut tu quedam que fecisti meministi, nec tamen que meministi omnia fecisti, ita deus omnia quorum ipse est auctor prescit, nec tamen omnium que prescit ipse est auctor; quorum autem non est malus auctor, iustus est ultor." Ecce in prima parte auctoritatis dicit Augustinus quod deus non iuste puniret pro peccato ad quod faciendum excitat. In secunda parte patet quod omnia futura que non placent sibi quoad *esse* primum, scit esse futura, et tamen non auctorizat talia; et sic extensior est sciencia quam auctorizacio sua.

sin, whose Author God is not.

God, foreseeing future sin, no more forces the sinner to commit it, than my memory, looking on past facts, forces them to have taken place; but though not the author of crime, He is the just avenger thereof.

Quotlibet talia dicta sane intelliguntur secundum glosam predictam, quod volucio dei non fertur super *esse* primum peccati. Et sic intelligendus est textus apostoli [ad] Romanos secunda, 9. et 6, ubi ab intento nititur excusare deum ab iniquitate, non obstante quod facit de malis bona. Quidam autem, audientes illud Psalmo 50, *tibi soli peccavi, et malum coram te feci*, concludebant quod deus indiget ad manifestacionem sue iusticie peccato et mendacio hominum. Ymmo cum peccatores reportant tot bona ex malis, "faciamus", inquiunt, "mala, ut veniant bona"; set "*Absit*", dicit apostolus. Et (ad ro. 9) dixerunt, "ex quo deus ordinavit eternaliter uni pena, alteri beatitudinem, secundum eius voluntatem, non expedit nos niti facere bonum, aut fugere malum, cum tota causa peccati sit in deo principaliter". Set "*Absit*", dicit apostolus. Et idem dicit capitulo 11°. Unde, quia communitas hominum est prona ad eliciendum sinistrum sensum ex tali preordinancia dei, ideo sancti patres plus sedule exposuerunt istos textus, ne credatur deum necessitare ante-

Rom. IX, 14. Rom. VI, 1. Ps. L, 6. Rom. IX, 19. Rom. XI, 11.

St. Paul shows that though God makes good out of evil, evil does not proceed from Him.

Some men, concluding that sin is necessary to the manifestation of God's justice, thought that they might do evil that good might come therefrom; and since men were either predestined or foredoomed, it mattered little what they did: which St. Paul denies. As men are prone to understand this question in a wrong

2. quod *deest* MS. 15. omnia MS. 25. ad *deest* MS.; *ib.* 11 *pro* 6 MS.

sense, the Fathers have taken great care to point out that man is not inevitably forced to sin by a Divine impulse.

cedenter et inevitabiliter homines ad peccandum. Tunc enim apparuit illis quod deus, et non homo esset in culpa, si que foret. Ideo dicit Ambrosius super textum apostoli, "manifestum est, si ad gloriam dei proficit mendacium hominum, ut ipse solus verus appareat, peccatores non sunt dicendi qui peccant, quum non voluntate set impulsu eius videbuntur peccare; quod

A castaway does not become so through God's intention and decree; for He neither creates nor wills that man should commit sin.

absit". Et Augustinus in *De predestinacione*, sic dicit; "qui absque predestinacionis gracia sunt alieni a proposito dei, et perdurant in operibus malis, sic eciam ex hac migraverunt vita, ut vos pe- | lagiani putatis; 88 a[b] non eos dicimus a deo hominum opifice ordinatos ut perirent, tamquam ipse mores male vite creaverit, et ad omne opus mortis invitos preoccupaverit: absit hoc a divino proposito. *Non enim deus volens iniquitatem* est, nec mandavit cuiquam impie agere." Ps. V, 4.

If He did, it were unjust to condemn man for sinning.

Quotquot dicta talia sanctorum vitant deum vel facere vel velle primum *esse* peccati, i. e. quod subiectum peccet. Unde glosa, super textum apostoli ro. 3, "erant quidam heretici qui dicebant deum velle nos peccare, et tunc sine dubio iniquitas est, si dampnat peccantem": et post: "quidam perversi non intelligentes, ad reprehendendum proclivos, cum audissent de Paulo et aliis predicatum: *Ubi habundavit delictum, superhabundavit et gracia*, inposuerunt eis quod predicarunt faciendum esse mala ut eveniant bona, quia deus vult ut peccemus, ut habeat quid dimittat, et ipse misericors appareat; Rom. V, 20.

St. Paul was accused of saying that God intends us to sin, in order that His mercy towards the predestined and His justice to the foredoomed should be praised;

id est *blasfemia*". Si igitur deus vult nos peccare (ut superior responsio dicit) et non propter ipsum *peccare* finaliter, igitur vult sic, ut medium gracia alicuius finis: et cum non sit racio quare deus vult nos peccare gracia alicuius finis boni inde consequentis, quin per idem gracia cuiuscunque finis inde sequentis, sequens est quod deus vult homines peccare ut aliqui dampnentur, [et] ut alii a peccatis revocentur; ut ipse gloriosius

but let him affirm this who dares!

laudetur, et ut universitas decoretur. Tales enim sunt fines, gracia quorum deus vult et permittit peccata, ut patet ex dictis. Set dicat ista qui audet!

The truth of the last theory (Grosseteste's) is thus evident. God's will is that X's sin shall take place, but not that X shall sin.

Patet igitur ex iuxtaposicione glosarum evidencia responsionis predicte. Non igitur sequitur; "Deus vult omne verum; *istum peccare* est aliquod verum: igitur deus vult istum peccare"; set satis quod deus [vult]

35. et *deest* MS. 42. vult *deest* MS.

peccatum illius; quod conceditur, ut supra. Et revera inter omnes errores videtur michi magis necessarium destruere opinionem qua creditur quod facienda sunt mala ut bona eveniant, quia isti radici omnes peccantes, explicite vel implicite, innituntur. Omnis enim mediate agens pretendit bonum finem, cuius gracia temptat malum medium: ut preficientes ineptos in quocunque officio ecclesie militantis, pretendunt vel colliganciam affinitatis vel sanguinis, ablacionem favoris ivel meriti, servilem timorem brachii secularis, vel al quod tale malum, per quod pallíant facta sua; dicentes quod magis malum contingeret, nisi facerent huiusmodi mala. Set si homo non debet pro infinitis mundis salvandis committere vel leve mendacium, numquid credimus quod debet pro nummis vel bono quolibet temporali persone vel communitatis, perficere, eligere, vel quomodolibet agere quod racio iudicaret oppositum equitati? Ymmo cicius pateretur omnia predia ecclesie militantis destrui per tyrannos, omnia membra ecclesie quantumlibet laniari, et totam Petri naviculam committi altis maris fluctibus divino remigio gubernandam. Et antequam sint tales qui in praxi cognoverunt quod non sunt facienda mala ut bona eveniant, nunquam solidabitur ecclesia a procellis tribulacionum inconcussa, etc.

The other opinion would lead us to think that we may do evil that good shall come of it: a most pernicious error, which is all too frequent in the distribution of Church benefices wrongly given for fear of temporal harm, or for tempora, advantages. We should not even to save countless worlds, tell the slightest lie;

so we should permit all the estates of the Church to be ruined rather than act against reason and justice. Until we follow this rule, the Church will never be safe.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM.

Set videtur quod ista via non discrepat a priori reputata erronea, nisi tantum in verbis, sine variacione reali. Ideo restat isti vie omnia argumenta solvenda que militant contra priorem.

It seems that this theory is only verbally different from the former.

Videtur enim tantum esse inconveniens quod deus vult peccata esse, sicut quod vult naturam peccare, cum idem sit. Videtur enim quod peccatum pro aliqua mensura est pro qua non sit volitum a deo, quia omne peccatum prius habet *esse* primum quam *esse* secundum; set pro nulla mensura sui primi est volitum a deo; igitur pro aliqua mensura est pro qua non est volitum a deo, et tamen pro omni mensura qua est ens, et per

Is it not the same thing whether God wills the fact of a man's sin, or wills that this man shall sin? God wills sin as sin, not as sharing in truth and goodness. For God (it is said) does not will sin as it is essentially; but what it is essentially is an

9. favor vel meritus MS. 15. nūmūf *pro* nummis MS.; *ib.* quodlibet MS. 25. Ca^m 16^m *in marg.; large initial S in blue ink* MS.

entity, and therefore truth and goodness.

consequens verum et bonum; sequitur quod non ut verum et bonum est a deo volitum.

Augustine says that whatever is, is good; so God is the Author of every thing.

Confirmatur tripliciter: primo ex dictis beati Augustini superius recitatis, primo *Retractacionum* 26., ubi dicit quod omnia, in quantum sunt, bona sunt. | Ideo om- 88 b[a]
nium que sunt auctor est deus.

Sin is willed by God in so far as it is good; and it is good in so far as it has any essence at all. If God wills sin on account of any goodness, then the essence of sin which causes this goodness, must itself be good.

Item, peccatum, in quantum est bonum, est a deo volitum; set in quantum est ens est bonum, et in quantum est ens est a deo volitum. Patet consequencia ex hoc quod quicquid est causa cause est causa causati. Igitur, si bonitas sit causa quare ipsum est a deo volitum, tunc entitas peccati, causans eius bonitatem, est causa quare ipsum est a deo volitum, et per consequens racione entitatis est peccatum a deo volitum. Sicut enim peccatum proficit, *esse* primum peccati proficit, et per consequens *esse* primum peccati est a deo volitum.

Either God wills that sin *be* sin (i. e. sin as sin, or in its essence) or that it be not sin.

Item, deus vult peccatum esse, per concessum; igitur vel vult peccatum esse peccatum, vel vult peccatum esse non peccatum. Set cum non potest velle peccatum [esse non peccatum], sequitur quod vult peccatum esse peccatum: et sic vult primum *esse* peccati.

Now the second alternative is impossible, since God wills sin to be as a fact; and God's will is never indeterminate like man's, desiring either alternative indifferently; so the first only is admissible.

Et confirmacio illius est quod idem est peccatum esse et peccatum esse peccatum. Nec potest sophisticari cum deo, quod ipse potest velle distinctionem et neutram eius partem; sic enim haberet unam volucionem confusam circa volubile, ut homines: quod est superius improbatum. Si igitur deus vult hoc peccatum esse peccatum vel non peccatum, ipse eligit quam partem ipse vult; et cum non sit dare quod ipse vult hoc peccatum esse non peccatum, relinquitur quod ipse vult hoc peccatum esse peccatum, sicut et vult antecedens, et convertibile ad hoc.

To answer this, note that *entity* and *essence* have not the same meaning when predicated of sin and of positive beings, or of those privations of which God is the Author. For other privations are

Pro solucione illius oportet diligenter notare quod ens equivoce convenit peccatis et aliis positivis. Ymmo, dispariter ab omnibus privacionibus aliis quarum deus est auctor; quia omnes tales habent *esse* suum primum a deo, et convertibiliter *esse* secundum. Econtra autem peccatum non est volitum a deo secundum *esse* primum; ideo, quamvis omnis privacio sit defectus, deus tamen vult et approbat quod causa racionalis deficiat a multis

7. de peccato *in marg.* MS. 15. si *pro* sicut MS. 21. esse non peccatum *deest* MS.

bonis nature et fortune. Set non vult quod deficiat a iusticia vel a bonitate moris; et sic deficere est *esse* primum peccati. Ideo illud nec est pure univocum cum ente positivo, nec cum aliis privacionibus; ut dictum est superius, quomodo peccatum est nichil.

the direct result of God's will, but sin is a defect contrary thereto.

Unde Dionisius, *De divinis nominibus*, capitulo 8°, attribuit 8 proprietates male culpe, scilicet quod est preter viam, preter naturam, preter causam, preter principium, preter finem, preter diffinicionem, preter voluntatem, et preter substanciam.

Non enim potest peccatum esse via naturalis ad rem generandam sicut est motus; nec potest esse alicuius nature vel speciei, cum sit speciei et ordinis corrupcio, nec potest esse positive set defective causatum, nec potest reduci directe in deum ut suum principium, nec debet fieri gracia alicuius finis. Et per idem, cum non sit per se in genere vel specie, patet quod peccatum non est diffinibile. Et per idem, cum voluntas dei non directe fertur super peccato, cum non habet exemplar in deo, est preter voluntatem. Et cum non sit natura, substancia, vel quid positivum, patet quod est preter substanciam. Ideo vere dicit Dionysius, quod est non existens, unde infinitum debilioris entitatis quam genera positiva.

Dionysius says well that sin is outside the way of natural production; has no nature of its own, being a mere corruption of nature; is not the effect of any positive cause; has not God for its direct principle; has no rational end to justify it; cannot be defined; is beyond the intention of God, and is neither a substance nor anything existing.

Ad primum argumentum dicitur quod peccatum secundum *esse* suum primum est extra omnem mensuram, modum, et ordinem naturalem; ideo vere assumeretur quod peccatum pro aliqua inmensuracione est pro qua non est volitum a deo, quod conceditur pro *esse* primo peccati: nec prius naturaliter set prius innaturaliter habet *esse* primum quam *esse* secundum, et prius innaturaliter est defectus ab ordine quam occasionaliter faciat bonum. Extendendo tamen nomen mensure et nature, modo inproprio quo placet sophistis, conceditur quod peccatum pro aliqua mensura est, pro qua non est verum, bonum, aut deo placitum. Peccatum enim non est per se bonum, sicut sunt deus et singule creature. Ymmo, est per accidens, licet inseparabiliter, bonum.

We answer then that sin is in its essence irrelated to any natural measure or order, and in this irrelation it is not willed by God. Its essence is not natural, but unnatural.

But if we understand 'measure' and 'nature' more widely, then sin in this measure is also not willed by God.

Ad illud beati Augustini patet quod ipse concederet peccatum esse nichil et non proprie esse, set deesse. Ideo non mirum si ipse intelligens *esse* positive, con-

Augustine would simply have said that sin is mere nothingness, and a defect, and when he

7. 6 *pro* 8 MS. 8. vitam (?) *pro* viam MS. 23. in *pro* quam MS.

17*

says that God is the Author of all, he means 'of all positive entities'. If therefore the essence of sin is a lack of goodness, its essence, different from all other entities, cannot be good. Had sin any intrinsic goodness, its entity would be identical with its goodness. If sin is good, this comes only from God's Almighty power, not from its essence. I deny that God intends any one to sin, therefore it is not His will that sin be sin. What then does He will sin to be? To be nothing at all; or if you ask How does He will sin to be? I answer, To be punished. Thus the argument fails completely, and the reasons by which it is urged fail also.

cedat omnia in quantum sunt, (*suple, positive, a deo exemplata*) bona esse; et omnium talium deum esse auctorem. Peccatum autem non diceret fore aliquid positive, set unum *deesse* a bono ordine. Et per hec patet responsio ad secundum. Nam *esse* primum peccati est deficere a bonitate; igitur non in quantum est ens est bonum, ut est de aliis positivis; et sic primum *esse* peccati, quod est defectus a bono ordine, non est in alico genere causa sue bonitatis. Si tamen peccatum haberet bonitatem intrinsecam, tunc en | titas peccati 88b[b] causaret eius bonitatem, sicut subiectum suam passionem; vel verius, foret illa bonitas. Unde res positivas malas deus econtra vult secundum *esse* primum, et non vult secundum *esse*, vel pocius *deesse*, secundum. Unde non est possibile quod *esse* primum iniquitatis proficiat, quia tunc prodesset homini quod est iniquus, quod idem est. Ex universalitate igitur omnipotentis dei est quod peccatum est bonum, et non ex *esse* suo intrinseco.

Ad tercium negetur consequencia; nam deus non vult aliquem esse peccatorem, et per consequens non vult peccatum esse peccatum, ut superius allegatur ex Anselmo et aliis doctoribus. Et si queratur quid deus vult peccatum esse, patet ex dictis quod nichil deus vult peccatum esse. Ideo pertinencius esset querere cuiusmodi deus vult peccatum esse, et tunc dicitur quod deus vult peccatum esse punitum, et aliis multipliciter proficiens, et de tanto vult ipsum. Nec sequitur (ut superius patet): *Idem est* peccatum esse, *et* peccatum esse peccatum; *set deus vult peccatum esse, igitur vult peccatum esse peccatum.* Et per idem non sequitur disiunctim quod deus vult peccatum esse peccatum vel non peccatum. Et ad instanciam de convertibilitate et antecedencia dictum est superius. Namque omne ens est veritas, et omnis consequencia est volita a deo; et si antecedens quod est unum convertibilium est volitum a deo, tunc et reliqum. Set aliena sunt ista ad inferendum quod deus vult peccatum esse peccatum vel non peccatum.

Another difficulty. Suppose one of the elect to have seen a future sin of his in a vision of God, which he never forgets;

Set secundo principaliter arguitur sic. Si ponatur quod Petrus predestinatus videat in verbo quod deus velit et ordinet peccatum suum esse propter bonum

22. quod MS. 33. namque quod MS. 35. que MS.

utile inde proveniens, et maneat continue memoria illius visionis in Petro, tunc videtur quod Petrus, veniente tempore peccandi sibi noto, debet velle peccare: nam quilibet deliberatus super illo quod est in potestate sua, quod eciam sit *esse* de divino beneplacito, debet conformare in hoc voluntatem suam voluntati divine, ut patet ex dictis. Set Petrus est in illo casu respectu peccati sui; igitur debet peccare, sicut debet velle peccatum suum esse. Consequens contradiccio; quia, ut sepe dictum est, contradiccionem claudit aliquam debere peccare.

when the time of that sin comes, will he not commit it in conformity to God's will that he knows, and for the good which he has seen will result therefrom? Sin would then be a duty; which is absurd.

Pro solucione illius, considerandum est quod hec via differt a priori plus in sentencia quam in verbis. Quia tamen oportet verbis uti ad exprimendum sentenciam, ideo iuxta rectam logicam sanctorum conceditur quod deus vult peccata, set non vult aliquem sic peccare vel esse iniqum. Et sic ordinat deus peccata, set non ordinat quemquam esse iniqum. Nam nulli catholico licet negare quin peccata multipliciter proficiunt, ut patet ex dictis, et per consequens bona utilia, et ut sic a deo volita et ordinata. Set quando dicitur quod deus vult et ordinat quod homo peccet, limitatur sensus, et volucio dei terminatur ad actum primum peccati; set non sic, quando dicitur deum velle peccatum esse. Ideo non potest esse idem: deum velle *peccatum esse*, et: deum velle *hominem peccare*. Idem tamen est *peccatum hominis esse* et *ipsum peccare*; et sic omne quod est *hominem peccare* est volitum a deo, et tamen nullam creaturam mortaliter peccare est formaliter volitum a deo, ut sepe dictum est. Unde, casu posito, conceditur quod Petrus debet velle peccatum suum esse, sicut sancti gaudent de entitate illius felicitatis culpe primi parentis: ymmo, de omnibus peccatis que ipsi commiserunt, cum oportet eos cognoscere illa peccata, nec respectu illius cogniti ab illis possunt esse neutri. Ideo, cum non eternaliter gaudebunt de illis, sic enim timentibus deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, et cum *gaudere de re* sit *placere quod illa est vel fuit*, patet quod quilibet peccator, cum fuerit beatus, habebit complacenciam quod peccatum suum est aut fuit. Nullus tamen gaudebit post vitam suam quia peccavit, set de omni quod est *ipsum peccare vel peccasse* gaudebit. Non igitur, si peccatum beneplacet sibi, sequitur quod [placet sibi]

It may be answered that God's will is not that any man should sin, only that the sin shall take place; for we cannot deny that many good consequences are made to flow therefrom.

But here it is supposed that God ordains that such and such a man shall sin. These cannot be the same; and yet a man's sin and the man *qua* sinning, are identical ideas.

The said predestinate therefore ought to desire the happening of his sin, even as the Blessed rejoice over the happening of Adam's sin, the occasion of their bliss. And every sinner that is saved will rejoice in the fact of his sins having taken place, but not in his *having sinned.*

33. et *pro* nec MS. 42. placet sibi *deest* MS.

The fact will rejoice him, but not the wickedness itself of the fact. But it may also be denied that any such elect would rejoice in his own sin, because that would be taking pleasure in its wickedness; and I prefer this answer, simply adding, for such as will understand my meaning rightly, that sin pleases God. Formerly, when I knew less of Scripture and and the Fathers, I denied this, saying that God only intends the punishment of sin; and that sin, though a true fact, was not caused by God as such; which agrees with the literal sense of many Scripture texts. But I now find that the former view is easier to maintain. The man in the case in point ought to conform his will to God's, who wills the existence, but not the wickedness of that man's sin. In my former view the Blessed have no will at all as to their own sins, and God does not will that they shall take place.

ipsum peccare vel quod ipse peccat; i. e. placet sibi de hoc quod est *ipsum peccare*, et tamen non placet sibi *ipsum peccare.*

Alius autem logicus diceret quod nemini placet de hoc quod aliquis | peccat, quia tunc placeret sibi de *esse* 89a* primo peccati, et placeret sibi quod aliquis peccat: et nulla talis placencia potest esse iusta. Et isti logice innitor ego, cum satis michi videtur concedere quod peccata placent deo: set hoc dico coram scientibus, qui sane conciperent sensum expositum. Unde, quando minus intellexi verba scripture et sanctorum doctorum, concessi deum velle peccata puniri, et multipliciter proficere, et negavi quod deus vult peccata vel culpas esse, et ita non omne verum dixi esse iustum aut a deo volitum, vel ab eo causatum. Ymmo unum convertibilium dixi a deo volitum, et reliqum non esse a deo volitum; nec, si deus vult consequenciam esse bonam et velit antecedens, quod vult suum consequens: et ita de multis consimilibus. Et sunt pro ista via multe scripture sanctorum ad literam. Set post videbam me percipere quod alia responsio sit convertibilior, facilior, et actoribus conformior. Peccatum enim non esset verum nisi esset bonum, et de tanto a deo volitum. Ideo negandum esset iuxta hanc viam quod peccatum sit a deo ordinatum, alicui proficiens, vel faciens aliquem iuste puniri; quod ego non audeo nunc negare.

Dicitur igitur quod Petrus in casu posito debet velle peccatum suum esse quoad *esse* secundum, non quoad *esse* primum. Ideo non debet velle peccare, quia aliter non conformaret voluntatem suam voluntati dei, qui non potest velle hominem peccare, licet velit peccatum; et cum hoc odire peccatum, sicut debet quilibet iustus secundum racionem duplicem sepe dictam. Cui autem placeret tenere proximam logicam, dicendum esset quod sicut deus mala nec vult, nec vult sic beatus, nec habet volucionem circa peccata sua, set circa alia peccata; quia,

9. nec *pro* set MS. 19. multa MS. 23. Ideo — ordinatum *twice* MS. 32. odit MS. 36. volucionem nec volucionem MS.; *ib.* ad *pro* alia MS.

22. *Actoribus.* This, I suppose, is a reference to those who had to defend a thesis in public *Acta* or theological discussions. *Auctoribus* would perhaps contradict the previous assertion about *Multe scripture sanctorum ad literam.* 32. *Odire.* In substituting this word instead of *odisse,* I have followed Wyclif's usual way of writing.

ut videtur, si quis vult peccatum suum esse, ipse vult esse quod ille peccat; si vult peccatum fieri, ipse vult quod aliquid fiat peccatum. Unde propter tales significaciones posset concedi quod deus vult peccata, set nec esse, nec fieri. In omnibus istis satis est michi quod deus vult *esse* secundum peccati, et non *esse* primum; quod ego exprimo per proposiciones sepe recitatas.

But my standpoint is as I have said.

Et si queratur quid debet talis velle, videns in verbo deum velle dampnacionem suam esse cum omnibus circumstanciis, dicitur quod semper debet velle non peccare, cum scit deum non posse velle quod ipse peccet. Et sic volendo conformaret voluntatem suam voluntati divine, set tamen vellet peccatum suum esse quoad *esse* secundum, scilicet profectus ex peccato illo; hoc tamen intelligitur de peccato temporali et non de peccato finali obstinacie. Diabolus enim videtur ita superbus quod non vult humiliare se ut complaceat sibi de sua dampnacione propter perfeccionem universi et pulcritudinem, aut bonum inde proveniens. Tunc enim videretur esse in caritate, iuste et recte volendo; et inter alias causas hereditate hec ponitur una sue finalis obstinacie, cum deus punit citra condignum, et solum ex pena et non ex merito alieno recipisceret. Ideo pena minor non potest humiliare eum, superando superbiam maiorem. Non igitur sequitur: *iste debet in casu isto velle peccatum suum esse: igitur debet velle peccare,* quia nec hoc sequitur de deo. Unde non conceditur cum doctore quod iustum sit hominem peccare.

Even if one knows by revelation that he will be damned, he ought still to wish not to sin.

Peccatum igitur est bonum utile et nocivum, cum subiecto solo noceat, et aliis prosit. Ymmo videtur prodesse subiecto proprio quoad iustam inflicciomem pene, qua universum in subiecto peccati decoratur; nec repugnat ista: *Hoc prodest et nocet michi simul et semel,* ut patet de pena peccati, quam nemo audet negare esse iustam, et per consequens bonam. Cum facit accidens non eque primo et inmediate bonificans universum, oportet quod primo et inmediate decoret subiectum suum primum, quod ordinat servire deo secundum leges tam sanctas et honestas. In tantum quod quelibet dampnificatus, in adopcione (per inpossibile) positus: utrum velit peccatum suum esse inpunitum vel iuste

Sin is both useful and hurtful; useful to the world, hurtful to the sinner; and good for him also in its punishment, since he thereby contributes to the beauty of the world;

so that, if a lost soul were allowed to choose to suffer or be free, it ought to choose to suffer.

3. faciat MS. 14. profecte MS.

And the contrary (and perhaps necessary) attitude of its will is an eternal sin; otherwise the punishment would be voluntary, which it is not. This question of sin is analogous to that of the 'Insolubles', and whoso can solve the one, can solve the other. If God commands the damned to desire their damnation, and they cannot, then sin is more powerful than God. If they can, and do, then damnation exists no longer; having what they desire, and for eternity, they would be happier than we are on earth. Yet conformity to God's will is a duty.

punitum? deberet pocius velle secundam partem. Unde, quia non vult, sicut forte non potest velle, penam talem, cum hoc quod sit dampnatus, ideo continue peccat, et obligatur ex peccato ad sibi incompossibile. Oportet enim peccatum | esse voluntarium et penam involuntariam 83 a[b], secundum Augustinum et alios sanctos; et cum oportet deum velle penam peccantis et oportet ipsum ipsam nolle, patet quod peccatum includit repugnanciam.

Ideo, qui sciret bene respondere ad materiam de peccato, sciret respondere ad omnia insolubilia. Cum enim in scriptura sacra continetur omnis veritas, nusquam pertinencius, si non fallor, patet solucio insolubilium quam solucio peccatorum; sicut patet iuxtaponendo obiecciones et soluciones. Videtur enim aliquibus quod peccatum sit deo potencius obligare hominem ad simpliciter impossibile. Ex alio latere videtur quod si dampnatus sic vellet, tunc non esset sibi pena, quia sicut peccatum, ut huiusmodi, fundatur in complacencia, sic pena, ut huiusmodi, fundatur in displicencia. Qualis, queso, pena esset hominem habere *esse* eternum, et quicquid aliud vult habere, sine *velle* malo? Revera hoc esset perfeccius quam beatitudo vie, et per consequens talis non esset dampnatus, set graciose premiatus. Set quod quilibet dampnatus obligatur sic velle, videtur: quia scit quia hoc est iustum de dei beneplacito ac sanctorum, et ad decorem universi; igitur debet sic velle sub pena amissionis iusticie. Videtur eciam peccatum esse verum, quia ens; et videtur esse falsum, quia difforme intellectui a quo caperet veritatem, si quam haberet; et sic de iusto et iniusto; ita quod argumenta sunt hinc inde de peccato, sicut de insolubilibus.

Just as the Insolubles are false as to the independent truth they are supposed to have, true as to the want of truth which they imply, so it is with sin. It too is false, since in God's primordial Truth it has no existence, yet it is true, as being reduced to

Videtur igitur michi quod, sicut voluta insolubilia contingencia affirmativa sunt falsa quoad *habere veritatem* independentem quam ex inposicione primarie signant, et ex hoc sunt vera de quanto implicant carenciam talis veritatis, correspondenter peccata sunt falsa quoad primum, cum deficit illis quoad hoc intencio vel adequacio in veritate prima. Et eo ipso sequitur

5. de peccato *in marg.* MS.

10. *Insolubilia.* See Logica, vol. II, towards the end of the Introduction.

quod sunt vera, cum sequitur veritatem primam ordinare ipsa ad bonum pene, et aliud utile universitati sue. Exemplum primi, sic dicto, *Sor dicit falsum:* in communi casu, illud dictum est verum, quia ens significans naturaliter se et deum. Set consideret homo veritatem ex iusticia significatam extra proposicionem (propter quam, secundum Aristotelem, proposicio est vera, et non per mutacionem factam in ipsa, ut patet capitulo *De substancia*) et inveniet carenciam talis veritatis, et per consequens inveniet illam, ut sic, falsam; et eo ipso fundatur in ipsa proposicione quedam veritas que est *illam esse falsam.* Et sic omnia peccata, sicut et vocata insolubilia, sunt simul vera et falsa, non contrarie, set equivoce.

order and good by that same Truth which is God. The proposition: *Socrates is telling a falsehood* (spoken by himself) is true, since every thing truly means itself and implies God's existence; but with no external truth corresponding to the proposition itself; and in so far it is false.

Insolubilia autem negativa sunt aliter falsa. Unde Aristoteles, 2 *Elenchorum*, reducit omnia talia ad falaciam secundum quid; et simpliciter intenciones, quod sunt secundum quid vera, et secundum quid falsa.

As to negative insolubles, they belong to another sort of fallacy.

Ulterius videtur michi quod nemo debet velle dampnacionem suam vel penam essencialem in particulari simpliciter, set in communi, sicut debet velle esse iustum. Debet tamen in via velle penam temporalem accidentalem; et ita, ut videtur, debet eternaliter velle illud quod deus eternaliter vult, sic quod deus non potest obligare eum ad illud volendum in particulari simpliciter, quod tamen deus vult tamquam iustum, sicut et quilibet beatus. Nam si quis vult, et debet se velle dampnificari, tunc deus obligat eum ad sic volendum. Et cum deus non obligat viantem ad bonum finem, nisi obliget ad media ad eundem, sequitur quod homo debet velle peccare; quod nemo potest debere, cum quilibet sine dispensacione possibili debet non velle peccare.

No one ought to wish damnation in particular, but in general, in so far as it is just. As to any just temporal punishment, it may be desired in particular.

If it could be any man's duty to conform to God's will as regards damnation, he ought to sin: which is absurd.

Unde videtur quod dampnatus debet eternaliter nolle dampnacionem suam, et licet eternaliter sic nolit, tamen propter materiam insolubilem in qua est positus, volucio sua est iniusta et beneplacito dei difformis, quia vult demeritum vel peccatum, et vult iustam penam eius. Ideo deus nec vult ipsum velle istam dampnacionem, nec vult ipsum sic nolle eandem, nec vult ipsum non velle eandem. Debet tamen non velle, et alico modo nolle

It would follow that the damned ought not to desire their own damnation; but this again is contradictory, as with the 'Insolubles'.

Other contradictions.

3. scilicet *pro* Sor MS. 31. quia nichil *pro* quod nemo MS. 40. vel *pro* nec MS.

penam illam, a quo modo factus impotens continue peccat. Et patet defectus argumenti quo probatur illum debere velle dampnificari; nam quando fuit in gracia debuit nolle dampnacionem suam, et media quecunque ad illam. Nec est deobligatus ut non debeat nolle suam dampnacionem racione peccati libertantis: igitur continue | 89b debet nolle dampnacionem suam. Unde tali voluntati divine non potest voluntas sua in particulari conformari, volendo in particulari illam dampnacionem quantum deus iuste vult, sicut in multis similibus. Nam deus potest velle quemcunque non iuste velle se confirmare voluntati divine. In aliquo tamen potest hoc iuste velle in universali se dampnari, sicut vult quilibet prescitus existens in gracià, volendo omne iustum esse. Deus eciam potest velle hominem facere, aut petere aliquid ignoranter, quod deus non vult ipsum impetrare; set homo non posset velle hoc in particulari, sicut nec potest velle se non esse, quod deus satis potest velle.

Can God make it the duty of any rational creature to wish to be deprived of bliss?

Difficultas igitur stat in isto, si deus potest sic obligare creaturam racionalem, quod velit in particulari ipsam privari beatitudine pro ordine completo universi integrando.

For a time, yes; but not for ever.

Et videtur quod sic, quia in tali statu erant sancti patres in limbo. Hic videtur mihi quod racionabiliter debet homo velle ad tempus carere beatitudine, set deus non potest obligare hominem ad sic volendum dampnacionem perpetuam.

For if, being satisfied with his state, he was damned nevertheless, we might say that the Blessed, who are satisfied likewise, are punished for every degree of bliss they have missed. In reality there would be neither damnation on one hand nor punishment on the other. There is an inseparable nexus between

Nam pari evidencia qua talis quietatus habens quicquid vult, et nichil mali vult, foret dampnificatus, sequeretur quod in parte quilibet beatus cui deficit gradus beatitudinis quem posset naturaliter habere, esset eciam punitus. Utrobique enim quiesceret talis, contentus iuste de illo quod deus sibi dedit, nec deficeret alicui tali quid deberet habere, et tunc non dampnificatur iuxta dicta, sicut nec sancti patres in limbo qui se feliciter fruebantur. Ille igitur qui vult dampnacionem suam habet satis possibile ab eo volitum, set deficit a modo volendi: ideo est difformis volucioni quam debet habere. Ideo deus et peccatum obligant eum ad sic volendum. Racio autem quare debet sic nolle est inseparabilis obligacio qua debet servare

7. de peccato *in marg.* MS. 22. per *pro* pro MS. 36. felici (*sic!*) MS.

iusticiam. Ideo debet velle non dampnari; quod est consequens *unde;* quia eternaliter vult deserere iusticiam, iustum est quod eternaliter volendo subeat penam. Si igitur esset de dei beneplacito quod peccaret, tunc posset deobligari ab observancia iusticie.

Et si obicitur pro libertate dampnatorum per illud apostoli, Ro. 6, "*cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis* Rom. VI, 20. *iusticie*"; est liber iusticie in tantum quod quilibet dampnatus est sub non gradu obligacionis iusticie proprie; et quelibet creatura, ut melior, est iusticie obligacior; quia secundum Gregorium, cum crescunt dona, raciones eciam crescunt donorum". Et patet quod quilibet dampnatus, etsi sit simpliciter liber, i. e. deobligatus iusticie universali, et iusticie que deus est, cum habet *esse* naturale a deo (et proporcionaliter si servit placendo, et debet in universali velle omnem iusticiam adimpleri; et miro modo videtur quod scit in particulari iusticiam exigere quod ipse dampnetur, et tamen, ut videtur, non debet in particulari velle, set solum in universali, quod dampnetur): est igitur obligatus ad consequenciam et ad maiorem; scilicet quod iusticia exigit se dampnari, nisi forte in universali. Ymmo ad dampnacionem suam est in particulari obligatus, et non ad sic volendum eam. Conceditur igitur quod quanto quis est a deo elongacior est iusticie liberior, set de tanto subeccior et simpliciter illiberior, quia peccati servitor; quod est illiberius quam servire iusticie. Solum igitur videtur obligare hominem ad volendum in particulari datum consequens consequencie volite, cuius antecedens scitur in particulari, ut dampnificatus scit in particulari iustum esse quod sit punitus, et non potest invenire in corde suo particulariter illud velle; quia, cum illud foret maxima pena sua, plene complacendo in illo haberet gaudium sine mistione tristicie. Et revera sic non habet viator in maxima delectacione sensus vel intellectus propter corruptibilitatem corporis.

Tercio principaliter arguitur sic: quodcunque creatura racionalis scit esse de dei beneplacito et non implicans suum dampnum, debet deliberative velle; set omnes tyrannides vel peccata aliorum scit quilibet illius opinionis sic esse de dei beneplacito, igitur deliberative

sin and damnation; and since the damned love sin eternally, they ought as a consequence to be satisfied with the result; but sin is against God's will, and the result of sin is against their own.

Is a lost soul more free than others, because there is no longer a debt of obligation to pay, whilst all other creatures are the more under obligation, the higher they are placed? It is indeed free from this obligation, but not from its consequence; though not obliged to be satisfied with his lot, he is forced to undergo it: so though he is free from justice, he is the slave of sin and this obligation causes his being unable to acquiesce in his punishment, though he knows it to be just.

It is again objected that if consistent we ought to approve of all sins and never to resist wrong, since we know these, *as facts*, to be God's good pleasure.

8. liberior MS. 10, 11. obliꝫ *pro* obligacior MS.

debet complacere sibi de omnibus talibus; et per consequens de omni tyrannide vel peccato contra personam propriam vel communitatem commisso debet cuilibet complacere. Et per consequens nemo resisteret peccatis, nec niteretur quodcunque malum im̄pediendo, cum scit omne factum et omnem defectum | modi, sicut et modum 89b[b] faciendi, esse de dei beneplacito, cum deo placet iniquitas in abstracto.

I answer that all sin ought both to please and to displease us; the former as a fact, the latter because it is wrong.

Pro isto dicitur quod cuilibet homini debet placere et displicere de omni peccato, sic debet velle omnia talia peccata esse quo ad *esse* secundum: set non est possibile aliquem debere velle aliquid *male agere*. Quilibet igitur debet inniti destruere peccata, tam propria quam aliena, in quibus opinatur possibilitatem remediandi. Et patet quod omnes conclusiones preter ultimam, que non sequitur, sunt concedende. Nam per idem argumentum sequeretur quod quilibet inniteretur destruere peccata, quia scit hoc opus esse bonum de genere, et scit quod si hoc facit, opus suum placet deo, et ex sibi dubio deus ordinavit quod sic faceret: nec scit esse de divino beneplacito quod illud peccatum duret ulterius. Unde igitur sibi evidencia ad fovendum illud peccatum ulterius? Hoc tamen est superfluum sibi de peccato quod scit esse, inniti quod non sit, set innitatur ne sit perpetuum, vel ulterius durans.

But it does not follow that we ought not to resist wrong, or not to strive to redress it, since we know that such action is good in itself, and we do not know how long God's will is that this evil is to endure.

We cannot strive to destroy the wrong that is, but to shorten its duration.

Should any man see by revelation that a certain evil is to last, or certain men are to be damned, I think such a one ought not to strive either to redress it, or to convert them; but being ignorant, we are justified in rying to do so, though against God's will.

Quod si quis videt in verbo unam communitatem in penam peccati sui esse dampnandam vel ad tempus obstinatam, sicut forte vidit apostolus de populo iudeorum, loco quorum inserte sunt gentes spirituales filii Abrahe (ut patet Ro. 11); videtur mihi quod si viderit Rom. plene de omnibus illis personis cum suis circumstanciis, XI, 19. non debet inniti ad eos convertendum. In hoc tamen facit deus ignoranciam prodesse nobis, ut innitendo et volendo illud quod deus non vult, mereamur. Debemus tamen dolere de hoc quod tales peccarunt, et gaudere de iusta pena ac profectu inde surgente. In omnibus enim peccatis, post privacionem primi parentis, contingit simul videre penam et culpam.

We should at any rate grieve for sin and rejoice at its punishment.

Tyranny and oppression should make

Unde, considerando tyrannidem aut deieccionem populi vel persone, videtur mihi quod homo debet letari de paciencia, cum scit deo placere quod sic paciatur,

12. a quid MS. 23. quid MS. 28. obſtı[tam] *pro* obstinatam MS. 35. tamen dolere *twice* MS.

set debet dolere de causa huius, scilicet quod paciens peccat, vel quod tyrannus iniuste punit. Deus enim *mutat tempora et etates, transfert regna, atque constituit*, ut dicitur Dan. 2º. Unde equinamiter tollenda est suppressio regni, communitatis, vel persone, cum ignoratur si sit ad purgacionem peccati prioris, vel ad causacionem premii futuri, vel ad augmentum meriti ex paciencia, vel ad divinam gloriam ostendendam. Scimus enim quod deus permittit tam prelatos quam homines seculares iniuste preesse, flagellando subditos iniuste in penam peccati communitatis, sicut et in penam tyranitatis. Unde, Iob 34, dicitur quod deus regnare facit *ypocritam propter peccata populi*, et Ecclesiastici 10, dicitur quod deus *regnum a gente in gentem* transfert *propter iniusticias*, [*et*] *iniurias* [et] *contumelias, et diversos dolos;* set talia oportet sane intelligere quod deus non vult tales peccare, set permittit, faciendo secundum eius beneplacitum alios puniri. Unde, cum quelibet persona communitatis potest tam mereri quam demereri, cuilibet patet quod quilibet de plebe potest concausare demerendo quod habeat regem iniquum, vel prelatum, sicut econtra communiter iniquus potentatus facit communitatem iniquam. Talia enim reciproce se causant: ut bona communitas bonum regem facit, et econtra in malo. Eciam mala communitas meretur habere malum prelatum, et econtra peccator presidens demeretur communitati sibi subiecte. Unde, Ezechielis 3, dicit dominus Ezechieli, *linguam tuam adherere faciam palato tuo, et eris mutus, nec quasi vir obiurgans; quia domus exasperans est;* ecce quod propter peccatum domus Iuda propheta fuit prohibitus ab efficiencia exortacionis.

Dan. II, 21.

Iob. XXXIV, 30.

Ecclus. X, 8.

Ezech. III, 26.

us rejoice at the patience wherewith they are borne,

whether to expiate past sins, or to have greater merit, or to show forth God's glory.

We know from Scripture that this is God's will; but He does not wish men to do evil, and only permits it.

But communities may be punished or rewarded by having a good or a bad chief;

and a bad chief again brings a curse on the community which he governs.

Et sic forte in penam peccati utriusque partis sunt hodie manifestissimi abusus patrimonii Christi, ut pinguiorum

It may be for the sins both of the governed and their rulers that there are now such manifest abuses in the church;

3. et *pro* atque MS. 4. equemımtʳ *pro* equinamiter MS. 7. peccati *pro* premii MS. 11, 12. tyranitatis *in full* MS. 15. et *deest* MS.; *ib.* multos *pro* diversos MS. 33, 1. pıguı̃n ecc *pro* pinguiorum ecclesiarum MS.

33. *Pinguiorum.* See preceding note, p. 126. If it be not too fanciful a supposition, we may imagine that Wyclif, when he wrote the words alluded to in the above note, was worn out by weary waiting for the benefice in question, and now was informed that it had been bestowed on another; hence this outburst, such as is seldom to be met with in his philosophical works. Note too, a few lines further down . . . *principalis*

benefices, for instance, given to undeserving men, who long but for the revenues.

ecclesiarum redditus nunc papa vel cardinales, nunc regulares possessionati, nunc clerici secularium dominorum, et nunc ignari officii rectores avare sibi accumulent pro fructibus corporalibus inhiantes, set de dispensacionibus providis huiusmodi temporalium vel fructibus spiritualibus non curantes. Et potest contingere quod principalis defectus sit in capite: cuius esset, remote speculando, | de talibus periculis providere. Nec video 90a quin quilibet catholicus debet tales abusus cum diligencia et moderamine prepedire, vel orando, vel cum violencia vocando, vel potentibus evidenciis exortando; quia cuiuslibet qui est de corpore Christi mistico res agitur, quando generalis concentus, que foret in sanctitate ecclesiasticorum, precipue prepeditur.

Perhaps the source of all these evils is in the Head, who should provide against such dangers. Every Catholic ought to protest against these abuses;

but take care not to blaspheme by ascribing such sins to God.

In omnibus igitur istis cavendum est ne blasfemando dicamus quod deus inducit aliquos ad peccandum. Nam Ecclesiastici 15. scribitur, *Non dixeris* quod laus *per deum abest: que enim odit ne feceris. Non dicas: ille me implanavit; non enim necessarii sunt ei homines impii.* (Ecclus. XV, 11, 12.) Et post, declarata libertate arbitrii, predicator addit, *nemini mandavit* deus *impie agere, et nemini dedit spacium peccandi.* (Ecclus. XV, 21.) Non enim sequitur: "Deus dedit michi hoc tempus vel aliud donum, quo aducendo, ego pecco: igitur dedit michi illud ad peccandum. Unde, iacobi primo. *Nemo cum temptatur dicat quoniam*, etc. (Iac. I, 13.)

There are two kinds of temptation; one directly leading to evil, and that cannot but proceed from an evil cause; the other, merely making trial of the heart by proposing some external act; this may be done rightly, and God is thus said to tempt men, who if they fall, do so by their own will. God positively wills and

Ideo dicunt doctores communiter quod est dare duplicem temptacionem, quarum prima est inducencia ad peccandum, et illa non potest [nisi] diabolo vel malo competere; et secunda est probacio habitus intrinseci per excitacionem ad opus extrinsecum, et taliter temptat unus scienciam vel pacienciam alterius. Quod si facit ordinate, gracia boni finis, ut ad augendum habitum vel accumulandum meritum, tunc est temptacio laudabilis; et talis competit deo, ut sepe legitur deum temptasse Abraham (Ge. 22) et alios sibi caros. (Gen. XXII, 1.)

Unde Augustinus in libello *De confutacione hereticorum*, responsione 10, dicit. "Non perseveraturi, cum

1. ut *pro* vel MS. 2. non *pro* nunc MS. 3. rectore (*sic!*) MS. 13. 9t^e *pro* concentus MS. 17. ne *pro* non MS. 18. ne *pro* non MS. 20. peccator MS. 28. nisi *deest* MS. 35. 21 MS.

defectus . . . in capite, which I take to be an allusion to the Pope, though *potest contingere* goes before to minimize the effect of the words. All this, however, is mere conjecture.

a pietate deficiunt, non ex dei opere, set ex sua voluntate deficiunt."[c] Et si capiatur tota perfeccio quam universitas habet ex peccatis, patet quod deus vult et ordinat illud bonum, sicut et omnia media positiva quibus ipsum bonum perficitur; ut omnes substancias, omnes acciones, vel alia accidencia principiancia tale bonum. Set non credimus deum velle hominem peccare pro bono sequente. Scit tamen et permittit quoscunque peccatores peccare, set non vult sic, ut ordinet peccata in bonum.

ordains the good that comes from sin, and all positive means thereto, but not the sinfulness of wrong actions, which He only permits negatively.

Unde negandum est quod deus ordinat peccata ad illum finem ut puniantur, vel ut proficiant, set ordinat ea absolute, dum servat mundum in suo ordine per penam peccati. Ideo *ordinare* est equivocum ad *disponere ut res fiat,* et ad *disponendum de facto ut non impune noceat;* ut exemplo familiari, pius pater non ordinat ut filius suus forisfaciat, set cognoscendo forisfacturam disponit ad eam sanandam. Et tali ordinancia, consequente et non precedente, ordinat deus peccata quecunque. Et si obicitur quod Augustinus, 14 *De civitate*, 13, dicit quod expedit hominem incidere in manifessistima peccata, ut superius allegatur, dicitur quod non est intencionis Augustini quod expedit mortaliter peccare; set tam pena essencialis quam accidentalis proficit ad graciam occasionaliter merendam. Et quod sic intendit Augustinus, patet ex probacione quam adiungit de psalmo 82, ubi dicitur, *Imple facies eorum ignominia*", etc. i. e. fac peccatores ignominiose et publice exprobrari, et tunc *querent nomen tuum*, qui presens preposuerant nomen suum. Ideo, primo *Confessionum*, 10, dicit Augustinus quod deus est creator et ordinator omnium rerum naturalium, peccatorum autem tantum ordinator. Vide ultimum librum Augustini *Super Ge. ad literam*, pro ista sentencia.

Ps. LXXXII, 17.

Does God ordain the existence of sin, to the end of punishing it, etc.? Here we may understand *ordain* either as arranging for the happening of a fact, or for its doing no harm when it has taken place. A father does not arrange for his son to get into trouble; but if the latter does, he arranges to get him out of it. God ordains sin in the latter sense. Augustine indeed says it is expedient for a man to sin; but he explains his meaning elsewhere. Of all other things God is (he says) the Creator and Ordainer; of sin, only the Ordainer.

Et si queratur quare permittit homines peccare, cum posset vetare, dicitur quod propter inmensitatem sue proinde bonitatis qua disponit universitatem suam esse plenam omni statu perfecto, ut statu cui repugnat peccatum, et statu stante cum peccato. Non enim esset homo in statu merendi, si deus non posset dare ho-

Why then has God permitted sin? Because He chose that creatures should exist, not only in a perfect, but in an imperfect state.

18. ordina• MS. 27. 13, 2 (?) MS.

30. *Presens* is of course wrong, but I can suggest nothing else.

God permits sin; but His permission does not cause sin; and if He gives men free-will, He gives it for their good, though knowing that they will abuse it.

mini potenciam secundum quam poterit defective agere *a*, qualiter agendum deus nec potest media ordinare, nec necessitare. Quemlibet igitur peccantem permittit | deus peccare finaliter propter suam iusticiam et bonitatem, cum iustum sit sic permittere: set cum permissio dei non sit causa quare peccatur, videtur quod peccatum sit causa quare deus permittit hominem peccare. Scit igitur deus et non ordinat homines peccare, nec dat illis arbitrium vel aliam potenciam ad peccandum, set dat illis solum ad bonum, sciendo tamen quod abutentur bono dato ad malum, etc. 90 a

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEPTIMUM.

God is the author of every act in the world, since an act is something created.

Acts may happen to be evil; but this does not take away their essential character of created things; They are evil, because of their defect; yet God makes them to be, though evil. If adultery, etc. be taken simply for the wickedness contained in a given act, then God is not the author of this, otherwise than of sin in general; i. e. negatively.

Ex istis faciliter perpendi potest quod deus facit omnes actus mundi, quantumlibet difformes. Nam omnem creaturam facit deus; omnis actus est creatura: igitur omnem actum facit deus. Totum antecedens patet ex dictis. Nam omne positivum malum, sive substancia, sive accio, qualitas, si est malum, ipsum est accidentaliter malum; set nullum accidentale eximit a creatura quod non fiat a deo, igitur omnis accio fit a deo. Et tamen non sic sola; defectus facit malum, et malum deus facit, ut patet. Ex dictis planum videtur quod deus facit, sicut et vult, omnem actum malum; sive actus extrinsecos, ut adulterium, homicidium, ydolatriam eciam, sive actus intrinsecos, ut invidiam, odium, et quoscunque tales actus. Si autem termini tales supponerent simpliciter pro deformibus actibus inessencialibus, sive pro aggregatis, negandum esset deum positive facere aliqua talia, set correspondenter velle et facere, ut vult et facit peccata. Et sicut non sequitur: "deus vult illud peccatum; et istud peccatum est *istum peccare;* igitur deus vult illum peccare; ita non sequitur: "deus vult istam fornicacionem; et ista fornicacio est *istum fornicari:* igitur deus vult istum fornicari"; ut patet ex dictis superius.

However great the sin, it consists of acts which are not guilty in

Item, quantumlibet enorme opus extrinsecum habet quotlibet partes inculpabiliter actas; set ad omnem talem accionem concurrit deus: igitur ad omne opus extrin-

4. deus *twice, ending* 90 a[a] *and beginning* 90 a[b] MS. 12. Ca[m] 17[m] *in marg.; large initial* E MS. 21. det[9] *pro* defectus.

secum concurrit deus: et cum multa sunt enormia opera peccatorum (ut patet de martirizacione sanctorum, de incestibus, et aliis operibus detestandis) sequitur per locum *a pari* quod ad omnem actum extrinsecum concurrit deus. Patet assumptum ex hoc quod membra hominis sic peccantis habent legem naturalem agendi, que non possent sic agere, nisi deus essencialiter illapsus conservaret ipsa in agendo, et approbaret finem quem natura intendit sic agendo; quia aliter non esset accio naturalis. Cum igitur hoc sufficit ad hoc quod deus faciat tale opus, (non enim plus peccat manus a potencia anime mota ad movendum gladium, quam gladius secundum proporcionem inpulsus cum sua acucie, duricie, et ceteris disponentibus ad scindendum) peccat in scindendo subiectum dispositum. Set quis non diceret deum concurrere cum gladio sic scindente, potissime cum foret miraculum si, post nisum hominis in passu dispositum, impediret gladium ad scindendum, eo quod deus est primum movens in omni accione naturali? Deus igitur, faciendo tale miraculum, subtraheret concursum suum, et cum omnis accio corporea sit extensa, partita subiectis naturaliter agentibus, planum videtur quod, sicut omnis talis accio est naturalis secundum se totum, sic sit a deo.

themselves, to which God's concourse is necessary and given, as it is to every external act. For our members follow a natural law in their movements, which would be violated if God refused His concourse to suspend their action. There is no sin in the hand that strikes, nor in the sword that cuts, only in the disposition of the subject from whom the movement proceeds. All these parts of the act (v. g. of murder) are natural, and God could not prevent them without suspending His concourse by a miracle.

Item quecunque accio simplex, sive intrinseca, sive extrinseca, potest esse non mala moraliter, ut patet ex dictis; et omnem talem potest deus facere: igitur generaliter, omnem accionem potest deus facere. Set deus nichil potest facere nisi cuius potest esse per se causa et essencialis; igitur omnis accionis deus potest esse per se causa et essencialis: set contradiccionem claudit quod deus vel aliud sit per se essencialis causa alicuius cum hoc quod ipsum potest esse non causatum ab eo: igitur nulla accio potest esse, nisi sit causata a deo; et cum nichil cuius totum *esse* est *in fieri* potest causari ab aliquo nisi causetur ab eo ut efficiente, sequitur quod deus efficaciter causat omnem accionem. Et minor assumpta patet ex hoc quod deus nichil potest temporaliter facere nisi creaturam. Et certum est quod

If any act, as we have shown, may be free from sin, it may as such be caused by God, and if so, as a prime and essential cause and this implies that the effect comes from Him, as an efficient cause.

28. *after* set deo MS. 32. nichil *pro* vel MS. 36. antiquo MS.

13. *Acucie, duricie.* These words are marked *sic!* in the transcription. I suppose *acucies* is Mediaeval Latin, coined on the model of *duricies.*

No creature can be a cause without God's concourse, and everything temporal is a creature.

nulla creatura potest dicere deo, "ego possum causare sine te", et loquor de *dicere* reali, modo quo quelibet creatura dicit deum. Repugnat igitur creaturam causari nisi a deo causetur; quia aliter deus causando per | accidens in virtute alicuius per se et principalius cau- 90b
santis . . . . Minor eciam secundo assumpta patet ex

An essential cause is that which is requisite for a given thing to come into being.

diffinicione *quid nominis* essencialis cause. Nam causa accidentalis rei est causa que non requiritur ad hoc quod data res causetur, et causa essencialis, que requiritur: ut anima est causa hominis, et deus, lapidis aut alterius cuiuslibet creature.

Now suppose a man obliged under penalty of mortal sin to meditate for the first half of an hour, and under the same penalty to do afterwards something incompatible with meditation; and that he continues to meditate after the first half hour: the same act will be meritorious at first and sinful afterwards; surely God's concourse is present all the time.

Istud videtur patere, posito quod *a* (actus contemplandi et diligendi deum) precipiatur sibi sub pena peccati mortalis per primam mediantem, scilicet hore, et quod [post] sub pena peccati mortalis precipiatur sibi vacare vite active, vel uni operi incompossibili cum tali contemplacione: quem casum quilibet admitteret qui non est de genere begardorum. Ponitur tamen quod Petrus continuet *a* actum per secundam medietatem hore, omittendo facere quod debuit, et ex merito. Et patet quod deus conservavit et fecit *a* actum in prima medietate hore, et adhuc manet idem actus; igitur deus adhuc conservat eum. Non enim potest res aliqua successiva vel permanens esse tam difformis quoad deum quod secundum partem fiat a deo et secundum partem non fiat ab eo, aut quod nunc dependeat ab eo, et nunc sit independens ab eo; ut patet de dyabolo et anima que est peccatrix pro primo instanti quo a deo

t matters not whether an action happens to be evil all the time, since evil, as an existing fact, proceeds from God, and being a just penalty, must please Him.

producitur. Per idem igitur non obest nature accionis quod ipsa semper mala a deo producitur, potissime cum peccatum in abstracto habet *esse* a deo (secundum enim *esse* secundum). Ymmo pessimus actus punit iuste suum subiectum; igitur placet deo quod sic puniat, et per consequens quod sit; et cum fuit positive aliter quam peccatum, sequitur quod deus facit ipsum ut creaturam suam, sicut sunt alii actus eiusdem generis boni moraliter.

4. De peccato *in marg.* MS. 7. *no gap before* minor MS. 14. principiatur MS. 15. personam *pro* primam MS. 16. post *deest* MS.; *ib.* principiatur MS. 17. vocare MS. 36. peccata MS.

18. *Begardorum.* Condemned for exaggerated mysticism by the Council of Vienne (1312). "Ils prétendaient qu'arrivés à cette perfection . . . . *ils n'étaient plus soumis aux commandements des hommes.*" (Henrion, Histoire de l'Eglise, liv. XLII, p. 473).

Ista sentencia videtur mihi igitur tenenda; set non sequitur ex isto quod deus facit hominem ydolatrare, luxuriari, periurare, vel aliter delinquere. Set cum quibuscunque verbis non implicantibus delicta talia, conceditur quod deus facit illum hominem occidere alium, procreare filium, et loqui datum; et sic de similibus. Et istam sentenciam tenet maior pars doctorum, quod omnem accionem intrinsecam vel extrinsecam facit deus, set non deformitatem eius; suple quoad *esse* primum.

Yet I do not infer thence that God makes a man to be an idolater, an adulterer, etc. only that He makes him, v. g. slay, beget a child, speak certain words— and so on.

Set quia dominus Ardmacanus contradicit isti sentencie (17, *De questionibus Armenorum*, 20) ideo exponam sentencias, ut veritas magis appareat. Videtur enim primo quod deus necessitat homines ad peccandum, quia positive facit quod iste homo nunc velit illum occidere, et prevenit necessitando, cum paribus positis, ut opere exequatur. Et sic [contra] deum principaliter constiparentur militibus ad sui custodiam, ne forte deus inpellat hostes, prius nolentes, ad irruendum in eos; et illud nephas principalius timerent quam facinus inimici, quia faciunt homines non posse ipsos invadere, nisi impellantur a deo previe necessitante ad taliter invadendum. Et sic mariti principaliter adhiberet custodiam uxoribus, ne forte deus inpellat adulterum prius nolentem concumbere cum uxore. Et generaliter politici penas statuerunt, non principaliter contra homines delinquentes, set contra divinam preoperacionem qua necessitat ad cuncta scelera facienda. Ex istis videtur multiplicari quod deus sit culpabilior cunctis racionalibus creaturis, cum generaliter ad omnia scelera perpetuanda sit promptissimus voluntate eterna, prius movens animum, et post efficacissime preveniens ad inplendum.

Ardmachanus denies this. In our theory, since God positively makes men to commit a certain act, He makes them to sin. All human precautions taken would therefore be taken against God, who impels enemies to slay, and adulterers to commit their act;

so that God would be more guilty than any creature can be.

Pro isto dicitur quod sentencia doctoris est negare deum ad tantum necessitare creaturam quod faciat eam inevitabiliter et non libere contradictorie operari, vel quod, [cum] deus velit aut moveat creaturam ad quomodocunque peccandum, movet ad illos actus perficiendos, non autem ad deformitates in illis: vult tamen omnes illas deformitates esse, propter bonum inde con-

But Grosseteste's theory is that God does not necessitate the creature to the detriment of free-will, and that He does not impel it to commit evil, though He indeed intends that evil, on account of the good which He will bring forth therefrom.

3. premiari *pro* periurari MS. 5, 6. procurare MS. 16. contra *deest* MS. 34. mentaliter *pro* inevitabiliter MS. 35. cum *deest* MS.

32. *Doctoris*. Since in a preceding chapter Wyclif quotes Grosseteste's theory on this point and seems to approve of it completely, I suppose Grosseteste is the Doctor alluded to.

Sinners may indeed try to use this doctrine to excuse themselves.

But they are inexcusable, since God has given them precepts and counsels, and free-will which He never forces, but only helps to form its act, whatever that may be.

sequens. Scio tamen quod peccatores possent ex talibus dictis occasionem capere ad excusandum se in peccatis, dicendo quod placet deo de accione qua adulter producit creaturam dei, eo quod non possit ille actus fieri nisi deus preveniat, volendo ipsum fieri; nec vult deus quod fiat in coniugio, vel quod expectetur circumstancia actum bonificans. Quamvis autem omnia ista sunt vera, verumptamen non ex hoc datur occasio ad peccandum, set pocius redditur homo inexcusabilis qui habet omnia precepta et consilia dei sibi detecta, et deum tam paratum ad dandum sibi libertatem arbitrii | in quo- 90b[b] cunque velit flectere per actum, ad conservandum, et positive cooperandum cum [eo]; breviter quod nullo modo inpellat, set quemlibet actum naturalem perficiat, dans formam secundum exigenciam accionis.

God is like a teacher who tells a well-beloved pupil that he leaves him perfectly free to do as he pleases; that he counsels him not to act thus and thus, for his own good; but that he is always ready to help him, whatever may befall.

Any other attitude of God towards a free being would be unbecoming, and it is thus depicted in Holy Writ.

Exemplum potest esse tale; si magister dicat discipulo predilecto, "Ecce consulo quod talia non facias propter dampnum et periculum inde proveniens: verumptamen in potestate tua constituo vel bonum vel malum facere. Tante autem te diligo tamque sum tibi necessarius, quod quorsumcunque converteris assistam, conservans et cooperans, paratus semper ad iuvandum ad bonum, si tu ipse volueris. Nec aliter decet quod faciam inplendo ad merendum, quia tam liberum te constitui quod quicquid volueris velle, libere possis, sine aliquo impellente." Ecce ista videtur sentencia Ecclesiastici 15, ubi sic; *Deus ab inicio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Adiecit mandata [et precepta sua: si volueris mandata] servare, conservabunt te et in perpetuum fidem placitam facere. Apposuit tibi aquam et ignem: ad quod volueris, porrige manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum; quod placuerit* [*ei*], *dabitur illi.*" Ecclus. XV, 14—19.

Et subditur causa illius ordinis: *Quoniam multa sapiencia dei, et fortis in potencia, videns omnes sine intermissione.*

Man is free, yet not totally left to his freedom, since God is ready both to aid and to punish.

Ecce, si attendis, ex sapiencia dei positus est homo in huiusmodi libertate; nec ex hoc est in maligno positus, quia fortis est deus in potencia ad iuvandum contra singulos adversarios, nec est immemor ad puni-

13. eo *deest* MS.; *ib.* leviter *pro* breviter MS. 22. adnichilandum MS. 23. docet MS. 28. mandata — mandata *deest* MS. 29. conservare MS. 30. servare *pro* facere MS. 32. voluerit MS. 33. ei *deest* MS. 35. et videns MS.

endum, si male egeris; quia *sine intermissione* videt omnia: ut superius exposui. Nec est mihi inconveniens, set consonum veritati quod deus velit cooperari cum homine quoad omnem substanciam actus, et tamen non vult coefficere cum homine deformitatem ut peccatum quoad *esse* suum primum: et sic eundem actum quem facit,
Zach. VIII, 17. odit, ut allegat doctor: Zacharie 8, "*unusquisque malum contra amicum suum ne cogitetis . . . . et iuramentum mendax ne diligatis; omnia enim hec que odi, dicit Dominus*, "et Apoc. 2°: *Ego odi facta Nicholaitorum*".
Apoc. II, 6. Nec moveret hoc ad negandum deum producere huiusmodi opera; quia psalmo 5 dicitur,
Ps. V, 7. *Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem.* Et nulli dubium quin deus producit animam quam odit primo instanti sui *esse*, cum tunc sit peccatrix peccato originali; ymmo, quod plus est, deus producit quoslibet prescitos quos eternaliter odit; set nullam creaturam sic odit quin ipsam diligit. Ideo, propter bonum nature vel gracie quod diligit, creaturam producit. Sic igitur conceditur quod deus vult et facit illum necessario, cum omnibus paribus positis, facere talem actum, et tamen culpat eum racionaliter pro eodem, eo quod non impellit aliquem ad agendum quodcumque opus voluntarium, set ponitur in potestate sua agere vel non agere indifferenter, licet necessitet ex supposicione: neminem tamen necessitat ad peccandum, licet necessitat peccatum ad *esse* secundum.

I see no inconsistency in admitting that God coöperates with man in producing the substance and not the wickedness of an evil act; that He therefore hates an act which He Himself creates;

for certainly He hates the soul which He creates in sin, and hates the foreknown eternally: and yet He loves them all.

Also He makes him to act necessarily, yet He is right to impute sin, since the act depends on His creature's free-will, and this necessity is merely hypothetical.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM.

Secundo obicit doctor quod deus, si agit omnes actus nequicie sue universitatis, tunc esset auctor peccati, et culpabilis propter accionem suam; potissime cum deus nedum sit causa actus, set causa deformitatis in actu, quem vult esse deformem.

But is not God the cause of wickedness, if He chooses that a wicked deed shall be done?

Confirmatur tripliciter. Primo ex hoc quod deducat tales actus non debere fieri, et ipsemet contravenit principaliter et inmediate precepto proprio: igitur ipse est potissime increpandus, tamquam inprovidus, cum simul prohibet actus et movet generaliter, necessitando

(1) He forbids it to take place, and is the first to violate His own precept.

2, 3. inconsonum MS. 7. quilibet *pro* quisque MS. 9, 10. odivit anima mea *pro* que — dominus MS. 14. pro *pro* primo MS. 28. Cam 18m *in marg.; large initial S in blue ink* MS. 35. convenit MS.

(2) Any creature that knowingly causes evil, is guilty; much more God, if He does so.

(3) Any bad man might rightly say:

"I am doing God's will; He chooses that I act thus for the good of the universe."

ut fiant. Secundum confirmatur ex hoc, quod si angelus vel quecunque alia creatura scienter moveret ad actus malos, tunc indubie peccaret. Cum igitur in deo summe bono operacio deformis videtur michi culpabilis, multo magis videtur ipsum esse culpandum propter opera mala que facit, sicut est laudandus propter opera bona que facit. Tercio confirmatur ex hoc, quod mirabiliter male sonat quod deus concurrit cum quotlibet scorto, necessitando ipsum ad sic agendum, et ita de homicidis, latronibus, et quibuscunque iniuste aut iniuriose agentibus. Quid coloracius possent peccatores dicere quam quod "Nos non sumus | culpandi, cum deus vult 91 a ad decorem universi nos taliter facere? ideo nos debemus sibi obedire, cum iustum sit qualitercunque deus vult fieri".

Answer to (1) God is the Author only of that which He approves of *in itself*: therefore evil cannot be imputed to Him.

Nor can He be guilty in any way, since there is none above Him, and so all that He does is good.

Even man can do evil well; how much more then can God!

If God did evil, He would act against His own will; which is absurd.

God produces the act of fornication; but we cannot say that therefore He fornicates; since that means a sin. But God produces the act of murder; therefore He kills, and kills justly,

Ad primum dicitur quod primo conclusio non sequitur, cum ex sepe dictis solum illius deus sit auctor, cuius *esse* primum extra se approbat; quod non facit de peccatis, cum neminem mandavit peccare. Omnes tamen actus malos auctorizat quoad substanciam vel naturam actus, set non quoad eorum deformitatem; nec sequitur ipsum ideo esse culpandum, set summe laudabilem. Cum autem deus non potest sibi mereri, quomodo poterit sibi demereri, cum non potest alicui servire, et per consequens non potest habere superius ipsum premians? set quicquid facit, hoc facit pure graciose de propriis, summe iuste faciens quicquid facit. Si enim stat hominem facere malum bene, quanto magis stat hoc de deo exemplante? Non enim esset color increpandi deum propter faccionem actus mali moraliter, nisi ipse formaliter faceret actum malum: quod est contradiccio, cum tunc deformiter faceret actum malum, quod est contradiccio, cum tunc de vi vocis male ageret moraliter. Non igitur sequitur, si deus facit actum fornicacionis, quod fornicatur, quia tunc formaliter subiceret se actui peccando. Verumptamen, si deus facit actum homicidii, tunc occidit, quia nichil potest occidi vel mori, nisi hoc iuste faciat; nec implicat *occidere dei* actum eius corporeum, cum instrumentis bellicis ex

34. fidelis *pro* si deus MS.

28. *Malum bene.* No doubt Wyclif means here an action in itself evil, but done without a wrong intention.

inordinata passione irruendo in occisum. Hoc enim aggregatum est in homine actus peccati; set *occidere dei* est separare secundum legem nature animam a corpore in disposito ad ipsam subiectandum; quod oportet iuste et naturaliter fieri a deo. Ideo, ut supra dixi, deus semper ultimate iuste necat, interficit, vel occidit.

since the separation of body from soul is His deed.

Ulterius videtur michi quod deus, cum facit illos actus inordinatos quos scit implicare deformitates, est causa huiusmodi difformitatum quas vult esse, cum ipsas *punire*, *proficere*, et *consequi* secundum legem eternam ex actibus inordinatis. Nullam tamen deformitatem vult deus esse quoad *esse* primum, nec aliquam facit aut ordinat quoad illud. Ideo nullum actum vult esse deformem, cum nullum peccatum vult esse peccatum, ut dictum est superius.

And as to all wicked deeds, God causes them to exist, not because of their wickedness, but for a good purpose.

Ad primam confirmacionem dicitur quod aliud est dictare actus deformes non debere fieri quoad *esse* suum primum, vel "neminem debere peccare", quod idem est; et aliud est precipere ne fiant, vel ne peccetur. Primum enim dictamen racionis cadit super veritate absolute necessaria, que est ista negacio: nullos actus debere fieri deformes. Set preceptum presupponit dictamen, et terminatur ad *contingens existere*, scilicet, ad istam veritatem et *esse* possibile, licet non habeat *esse* actuale: nemo faciat actus sic deformes. Preceptum autem vel mandatum dei quandoque sumitur materialiter vel causaliter pro illo quod precipitur; quandoque pro notescencia qua deus notificat non esse sic faciendum; et quandoque pro aggregato. Et hinc explicantur precepta domini communiter per oraciones imperativas vel optativas que implicant veritatem in *esse* potenciali actualiter implendam, et precepcionem domini ut sic fiat: ut preceptum domini est ne quis iniuste occidat, et ita de aliis negativis et affirmativis.

To say that no one ought to sin, and to forbid the fact of sin, are two different things.

Now God's commandment may be understood in either way, or in both, as imperatives,

Et ex hoc patet quod proposiciones logice non sunt precepta, ut tactum est tractatu *De veritate*. Secundo patet quod *coagere* vel non *coagere* dei nunquam cadit sub precepto, cum deus non potest precipere nisi crea-

and not as mere logical statements of fact. God's concourse does

24. acit MS.

37. *De veritate.* There is no such work to be found in Shirley's catalogue, even amongst the lost tractates.

not come under this precept, since He only commands creatures. It is ridiculous to say that God, forbidding sin, forbids Himself to permit sin by His concourse.

ture sue iure, sibi obediencie, sibi notum possibile ad utrumlibet. Et sic patet quod nihil precipitur nisi quod, volendo aut perficiendo, contingit proficere; que omnia sunt aliena a deo. Ideo ridiculum est dicere quod dominus precipit ne ipse concurrat ad talem vel talem actum inordinatum. Et ex istis patet tercio quod deus non potest contrarie iure precepto proprio, cum non potest ortari, subicere obligacionem, vel prohibere seipsum quoad aliquod signabile ex summitate sue

He may forbid His creatures, and yet choose that what He forbids shall take place.

libertatis. Nichil tamen obest deum prohibere aliquid, et tamen velle illud fieri, et excitando ac preveniendo necessitare ut fiat; cum generaliter precipiendo unum de contradictoris prohibet reliqum, et econtra; ut precipiendo non mechari, prohibet mechari, et econtra; sic, quia de similibus | quibuscunque. 91 a[b]

It follows that God commands certain things which He does not intend to take place; as in the sacrifice of Isaac; others, which He intends shall take place, yet not without punishment of him that desobeys the commandment; and this disobedience is the usual form of sin; others, which He intends shall be done, to the merit of the doer; and others (as some say) that He neither means to be done nor intended; as when He commanded Osee to take a wife of fornication.

Ex quibus et aliis veritatibus patet quod deus aliqua precipit que vult non fieri, set obligatum vult mereri, et non faciendo illa precepta, ut patet de immolacione filii Abrahe, Ge. 22. Aliqua autem precipit que, licet velit non fieri, vult tamen omittentem exinde puniri; ut patet de non comestione fructus vetiti, que fuit precepta, Ge. 2; et deus semper voluit illam comestionem fieri. Set cum fuisset racionale quod non comedissent ex quo tam facile possent abstinuisse, et tam obligati fuerant obedire tanto domino non revocanti mandatum, sicut fecit cum Abraham, racionaliter puniti sunt contraveniendo precepto. Sic enim generaliter peccatur contraveniendo precepto, vel prohibicioni faciendo oppositum, quando ipsum manet non posterius revocatum. Set tercio precipit deus aliqua que vult fieri, et faciens exinde mereri: ut patet de omnibus preceptis que deus scit meritorie implenda. Quarto, putant aliqui deum yronice precipere que nec vult obligatum velle nec perficere, ut Osee primo precipitur prophete, *vade, sume tibi* Osee
uxorem fornicacionis et fac [tibi] *filios fornicacionum;* I, 2.
ut Ge. 3 dixit deus angelis, *Ecce, Adam factus est quasi unus ex nobis, sciens bonum et malum.* Que locucio est yronica, cum factus est insipiens. Ideo Adam debuit

13. unde contradictoriorum MS. 16. De peccato *in marg.* MS. 18. inclinacione MS. 20. omittens MS. 21. venti MS. 34. et sume MS. 35. tibi *deest* MS. 36. et *pro* ut MS. 38. incipiens MS.

15. *De similibus.* First words of an old Scholastic axiom: *De similibus et contrariis eadem est ratio.*

recognoscere quomodo diabolus mentitus est sibi in promissis, et non amplius parere suggestioni sue. Eciam quoad illud Osee, dicitur quod deus non potest precipere quicquam fieri quod, si fieret, esset iniustum. Ideo communiter exponitur quod uxor quam deus precipit sibi capere fuit ydolatra, sicut et filii eius, et hoc non fuit peccatum matrimonialiter iungi tali ex precepto dei ad prophetandum in facto, sicut 3 filii sui prophetice figurabant.

But this is generally understood as a command to marry an idolatrous woman,

Et sic tam matrimonium quam procreacio sunt legitima, et sic tam uxor quam filii erant mali. Potest igitur probabiliter dici quod si veritas manet eternaliter si semel precipitur, non tamen convenitur precepto aggregato, nisi precipiatur a deo pro mensura qua fuit oppositum. Deus enim precipit semper quando creatura debet facere veritatem que prius sibi innotuit.

and such a marriage was not illicit.

Et ex istis patet responsio ad confirmacionem secundam; nam indubie nulla creatura posset pure univoce movere vel coefficere talem actum cum deo. Ideo propter equivocam faccionem operis est homo vel angelus increpandus, quum proposito facit actum malum moraliter in seipso, vel movet alios ad *male facere*, quia non posset a proposito sic movere alios, nisi subiceret se actui inordinato informanti, de genere accionis. Deus autem nulli accidenti per se in genere potest subici. Ideo oportet theologum purificare oculos mentis, et non sensibiliter comparare deum homini vel alteri creature, que inpellit ut excitat ab extrinseco ad agendum. Accio enim sua cum quelibet creatura non ponit nisi ipsam creaturam conservatam a deo, dum sic agit, et actum productum, placere sibi cum consequentibus. Eo ipso enim quod sit deus, coagit cum creatura, cum non plus ponit coaccionem dei cum creatura, nisi illa que consequntur. Ideo non est ymaginandum quod dominus innititur vel applicat virtutem suam ad producendum effectum. Applicacio namque est agentis, quod potest improporcionari ex defectu disposicionis: quod alienum est a deo, quem oportet illabi cuilibet creature.

God's act, in the making of evil, is not of the same nature as that of the creature; the latter alone is to blame when it does evil. Theologians should not compare thus God with creatures. God's coöperation with creatures means no more than that He sustains them in existence with all its consequences. There is no application of force; God merely pervades His creature's being.

Nec male sapit bene intelligentibus quod omnes actus inordinatos quos deus prohibet fieri, quando actualiter fuerint, deus vult fieri. Si tamen deus urgeret, inpelleret,

Well understood, there is nothing wrong in the doctrine that God forbids evil acts which He chooses may

7. ıu'gi *pro* iungi MS. 26. peccare (sic!) MS. 31. conȗtib3 *pro* consequentibus MS. 38. alibi MS. 40. o *pro* quando MS. 41. fuerit MS.

take place when they actually occur.

vel inevitabilitaret ut tales actus fierent, ego non video quomodo propter tales actus essent aliqui moraliter increpandum. Set longe aliter senciendum est habentibus gustum anime non infectum. Deus enim necessitat creaturam, preveniendo ad omne positivum in peccato, et ad *esse* secundum peccati; set creature prevenit deum quoad *esse* primum peccati; et utrobique habet liberas habenas, sic quod cum necessitacione potest libere contradictorie agere sine inevitabilitacione possibili ad quemcunque actum positivum, sicut et ad faciendum peccatum. Ideo non est color inferendi quod in deo sit inprovisio vel culpa ex tali concursu, pocius quam infertur quod deus sit iniustus, ex eo quod substanciam actus mali approbat et sustentat.

He only coöperates in the positive aspect of sin, and in its negative aspect (sin as a fact), whilst the creature quite freely consents to the wickedness thereof.

There is no more ground for blaming God for His coöperation in sin, than for his maintaining the sinner in existence.

Et isto modo potest doctor exponi, quod deus non applicat virtutem suam nitendo pro | ducere tales actus 91b
per actum sibi proprium de genere accionis, quod est valde verum, ut dictum est alias de modo agendi dei. Et istum sensum innuit doctor, distinguendo sex modos agendi. Unde concedit quod deus applicat virtutem ad producendum quicquid per se sine creatura producit, sicut et ad producendum substanciam vel accidens absolutum permanens, que cum agente secundo comproducit. Set licet deus aliter facit illud quod per se facit, quam illud quod coefficit, ego non video quomodo applicare potest virtutem; nec video quomodo deus conservat talem actum, et tamen non producit eundem, quod doctor nititur differencia declarare.

Thus it is very true to say that God does not coöperate in any sinful act by any special action which corresponds to its sinfulness, for there is special action only when God operates without His creature.

But nevertheless, if God sustains this act in being, He surely produces it.

Conceditur igitur quod mundum deus vult disponi secundum omnes acciones, sicut et omnes defectus consequentes deus vult esse: nec dubium quin omnes huiusmodi sunt iuste, et creature debent illis omnibus obedire. Et si queratur ad quid deus multiplicat tot precepciones circa talia que vult non fieri, et prohibiciones circa talia que vult fieri, potissime cum, illis subductis, non forent peccata tam gravia, quia lex *subintravit ut habundaret delictum,* secundum apostolum ro. 5, dicitur quod Rom. V, 20.
utrobique sequitur deum esse laudandum, cum omnes precepciones dei sint iuste et bone, et omnia ex illis sequencia sunt eciam iusta et bona, in tantum quod inclusive usque ad peccata sunt omnia bona; ut patet

All defects in God's universe depend on His will, and are just.

Why did God give commandments which He did not intend to obeyed? Because they are just and good in themselves and in their consequences, even as to sin, as has been explained.

15. de peccato *in marg.* MS. 23. quas (sic!) MS 28. drā *pro* differencia MS.

ex dictis de equivocacione bonitatis et iusticie. Et per consequens non tantum bonum creatum esset sub dicta lege, ut modo; quia tunc communitas mundi plus peccaret, et legis dacio deesset.

Ideo, etsi lex aliquibus personis ex occasione male accepta nocuit, plus tamen communitati profuit. Ideo, cecata natura humana, necessarium fuit detegere legem eternam ut noscatur habundancia delicti et sic generetur horror peccandi. Ideo apostolus, iuduens personam talium stolidorum, dicit, *Concupiscenciam nesciebam* esse peccatum, *nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces.* (Rom. VII, 7.)

The law has been for many an occasion of sinning, but it has done good to more, producing horror of sin.

Et ex istis patet ad tercium quod non male, set bene sonat habentibus aures anime non infectas, quod deus concurrit cum turpissima meretrice, cum sceleratissimo fure, (et sic de omnibus actibus quantumlibet deformibus), non peccando, luxuriando, vel furando, set graciose conservando, dum creatura dei perpetrat tales actus. Unde videtur michi quod sicut omnipotencia dei manifestissime ostenditur viatori intime speculanti ex parcitudine et misericordia, ut canit ecclesia, et superius tactum est, sic et eius omnipotencia, patiencia, et benevolencia evidencius ostenditur ex concursu dei cum peccatoribus, cum peccant; non ad compeccandum cum illis, set ad conservandum et eosdem. Omnipotencia enim dei exigit quod illabatur creaturis, conservando ipsas essencialiter et omnes generaliter, eo ipso quod sunt, cum sine ipso nichil possunt facere. Quomodo igitur non ostenditur generalitas huius omnipotencie ex hoc quod ex universali bonitate illabitur eciam peccatoribus, conservando eos dum peccant? Et si enim aliquibus negaret influenciam aut conservacionem, potissime talibus hoc faceret; set cum omnibus talibus communicat influenciam benevolam, patet ex hoc generalitas sue benigne omnipotencie. Et conforme argumentum facit apostolus, Ro. 5°, ad ostendendum superhabundanciam gracie dei, ex hoc quod reconciliarii sumus dei per mortem eius, cum peccatores essemus. (Rom. V, 10.) Deus igitur, universaliter bonus, nemini negat conservanciam, et de tanto coagenciam, si ipse voluerit agere.

To the right-minded there is nothing ill-sounding in the doctrine that God coöperates with the greatest sinners in their worst sins, not committing them, but sustaining His creature in being whilst it sins. God's power is best shown by His mercy, and (together with His patience and goodness) appears best when He thus coöperates in the act of sin; for without Him nothing whatever could be done, and His universal bounty pervades even the being of the wicked, to whom He might refuse His coöperation, which however He denies to none.

Ulterius eciam patet summa providencia dei ex hoc quod tam sceleratos actus convertit in bonum; quia

This, too, manifests God's Providence, since only Infinite Wisdom could bring good out of evil.

20. p̄titune & m̃ia *pro* parcitudine et misericordia MS.

It were not better that God should withdraw His influence when men sin; if it were *all* withdrawn, the creature would at once sin and be annihilated, i. e., not sin; if only the coöperation, then there would be no merit in doing good.

God shares all temporal gifts equally among the good and the bad; if He did not, the bad would be excused for not striving to attain bliss.

In like manner, God mercifully holds out an equal helping hand to all, and coöperates with the good and the bad alike; otherwise there would have to be a world quite different from what ours is.

As to those who will perversely take occasion to err by misunderstanding this doctrine, there were such even in St. Paul's time,

indubie hoc non posset facere, nisi esset summe sapiens et summe providens. Et si dicatur quod melius esset deum subtrahere influenciam suam quandocunque creatura voluerit peccare, dicitur quod hoc claudit contradiccionem, cum sequitur: si creatura vult peccare, tunc peccat, et si deus subtrahat conservanciam suam ab illa, tunc adnichilatur. Ideo creatura tunc peccaret et non peccaret. Et, si dicatur quod melius esset deum subtrahere se in racione conservantis actus et vires accidentales quandocunque homo vel angelus peccaret, dicitur quod tunc homo non mereretur declinando a malo vel faciendo bonum, nec esset liber ut modo. Set, sicut Augustinus dicit, primo *De civitate dei*, capitulo 8, quod melius est | deum partiri temporanea 91 b^b
tam bonis quam malis communiter, quam solum appropriare illa bonis, vel solum malis; quia, ut dicit, "si solum bonis daret, iniqui excusacionem haberent quod deficit eis organum adquirendi beatitudinem, et bona illa putarentur merces ultima aliis abiectis scandalose, ut reprobis et aliis occasionaliter indignanter gloriantibus". Ideo misericordius modo disponuntur temporalia, communicata bonis et malis, postposita accepcione personarum, ut dicit salvator, Mt. 5, quod pater celestis *solem* Matth.
suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super V, 45.
iustos et iniustos. Sic largius, misericordius, et ut michi videtur, melius facit coagendo cum bonis et malis, generaliter conservando omnes. Quod si generaliter subtraheret se a malis, ut credo, oporteret universitatem novam et legem novam statuere, si sic faceret, cum homo non posset esse, nisi esset liberi arbitrii.

Nec obest quod male concipientes capiant occasionem errandi ex dictis scolasticis veridicis, quia sic fecerunt pseudo apostoli, ut patet, Ro. 6, in eadem materia ex Rom.
dictis apostoli; et idem patet, 2° Petri, 3, ubi sic; VI, 1.
carissimus frater noster Paulus secundum datam sibi sapienciam scripsit vobis sicut [et] *in omnibus epistolis loquens* [in eis] *de hiis in quibus sunt quedam difficilia intellectu que indocti et iustabiles depravant.* Per hoc igitur quod apostolus est carissimus frater Petri et

24. facit oriri MS. 28. quia ut MS. 31. ma *pro* male MS. 36. et *deest* MS. 37. in eis *deest* MS ; *ib.* hiis que sunt difficilia MS.

28. *Ut credo.* I have omitted *quia* for the sense; but it may be that some words are wanting after *malis.*

aliorum principalium, patet quod non est reiciendus pro eo quod non conversatus est cum Christo (ita [ut] persequendo arguerunt) et per hoc quod in omnibus suis epistolis loquitur secundum datam sibi sapienciam, patet quod non inmiscet falsa veris; et per consequens illud quod sinistre conceperunt, Ro. 5, "*ubi habundavit delictum, superhabundavit et gracia*", non est hereticum, ut dixerunt. Nam imposuerunt apostolo quod induxit homines ad frequenter ac graviter peccandum, ut habundancior gracia consequatur: set apostolus dicit, *Absit*. Tercio patet preciositas sensus apostoli, cum infert ex spiritu sancto quedam difficilia ad intelligendum. Hoc enim redderet legentes benevolos et attentos. Quarto vero patet condicio hereticorum depravancium scripturas, quia sunt indocti in philosophia et sacris literis, ac instabiles in fide et moribus. Sic eciam ex factis et dictis salvatoris ceperunt reprobi occacionem ad errandum in via veritatis et moris, ut patet de sinistra interpretacione miraculorum et doctrine; ut patet ex decursu evangelii.

and such were expressly condemned by St. Peter, who took St. Paul's defence.

That St. Paul's words were hard to understand, yet inspired, should make us all the more eager to listen to them.

And those who accuse him are unlearned and instable in faith and morals.

Ideo, sicut demonstracio universalis non inducit in errorem, set male audiens, sic sensus scripture non inducit ad falsum credendum, set sinistre concipiens: quod valde faciliter contingit in puncto proposito peccatoribus. Igitur allegantibus (ut supra) pro excusacionibus in peccatis, econtra allegandum est quod deus neminem impellit vel necessitat ad peccandum, set econtra multipliciter precipit et consulit ne peccetur; tam liber tamen est, et tam graciosus quod a volente peccare non subtrahit graciam conservandi, ponens in sua potestate libera non sic agere, quando velit. Et si obiciunt quod non possunt abstinere, certum est quod hoc est inpossibile. Quod si dicant illas difficultates, dicitur quod hoc est in penam peccati; semper tamen servata libertate arbitrii, quia deus non potest permittere hominem temptari ultra illud quod potest; set si dignificat se, facit cum omni *temptacione proventum*, ut dicit apostolus
I Cor. X, 13. prima Cor. 10. Ymmo, et si aliqui sint difficultati ex naturalibus, cum omne quod habent ex gracia dei habent,

It is not the demonstration of a universal truth, but the misunderstanding thereof, which leads into error, and this doctrine is but too easily misunderstood by sinners.

We deny that God impels any one towards sin; on the contrary.

But He leaves man free to sin, should he choose to do so.

'I cannot help sinning' is an inadmissable plea.

It may be hard to refrain; this is a penalty for past sin; and God never suffers us to be tempted beyond our power of resistance.

If we are less favoured by

2. ut *deest* MS. 2, 3. p̄fendo *pro* persequendo MS. 17. ne ad MS. 29. gratus *pro* graciosus MS. 33. quid MS.; *ib.* illos MS.

21. *Universalis* may possibly be a mistake for *universalium*.

nature than others, we should not accuse God; for we should receive both good and evil at His hands, as did Job, when tempted by his wife to blaspheme.

et naturalia sine titulo meriti, quis color culpandi deum? Unde sanctus Job, 2°, non ferens blasfemiam uxoris incitantis eum ad male dicendum deo, dixit: *Quasi una de stultis*, &c. Concipit enim uxor eius quod reputati a Job blasfemi pessimi, undique prosperati. Unde arguebat sibi a contrario sensu, ut blasfemando moreretur; quia, ut uxor erronee putavit, sicut deus non potest benefacere nisi bonis, sic non potest punire nisi malos. Blasfemando | igitur incurreret summum gradum malicie; et sic, extincta vita pena subita, minus cruciat diuturna. Unde vel derisorie vel yronice propter errorem blasfeme dixit, *benedic deo, etc.*

Iob. II, 10. — 92 a[a] — Iob. II, 9.

Explicit tractatus compilatus A. M. J. W. de volucione dei etc. Incipit tractatus eiusdem de personarum distinccione.

1. causandi *pro* culpandi MS. 4. reputi *pro* reputati. 10. mmmo *pro* minus MS.

Fragmentum de Annihilatione, ex tractatu de Potencia productiva Dei ad extra excerptum.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SECUNDUM.

Habito quod deus est creativus, restat videre si sit adnichilativus. Et videtur multis quod par sit racio utrobique, quia equalis distancia. Set deus de facto creavit mundum: igitur est adnichilativus. Confirmatur sic. Facilius est destruere quam construere; deus igitur potens in maius, potest in minus. Secundo confirmatur ex eo quod aliter videtur derogari potencie divine, ut patet ex multis dampnacionibus posicionum negancium possibilitatem adnichilacionis, et communi testimonio loquencium modernorum, qui omnes dicunt concorditer quod deus non esset plenus dominus creature, nisi ipsam possit adnichilare. Ymmo, negare a deo possibilitatem adnichilacionis esset tollere eius omnipotenciam. Tercio, confirmatur de facto: nam videtur multis, quod materia prima divisa in athomos, recipiendo particulariter formam substancialem, sit adnichilata, et illud videtur de lumine aut specie in medio; et evidencius de gracia in anima post adventum peccati corrupta. Gracia enim, cum sit res absoluta potens per se esse, nec remanet secundum aliquid sui, nec corrumpitur in impotencia materie, cum non educitur de potencia materie, set creatur: et loco eius succedit privacio

Arguments for annihilation. God, if capable of creating, is also capable of annihilating; for it is easier to destroy than to make; a denial of this would limit God's power, has consequently been often condemned, and is contrary to modern opinions; and besides, as a fact, primordial matter is at times annihilated, and grace must be so, when a man falls into sin.

For grace is an absolute entity, and being created must be annihilated when it no more exists in its subject.

4. Ca^m 12^m; Capitulum *deest*; nota quod deus potest adnichil. are, *in marg.* MS. *large initial* H *in blue ink* MS. 9. .1. 3x confirmacio *in marg.* MS. 10. .2. *in marg.* MS. 12. passionum MS. 18. .3. *in marg.* MS.

5. *Habito.* This twelfth chapter begins on f. 135a b, Trinity Coll. Cambridge, towards the end of the first page.

sola, scilicet peccatum vel pena dampni. Tales evidencie multe excogitate sunt propter quas creditur quod deus sit adnichilativus.

Arguments against annihilation. If it was anything, it would be either God, or caused, either by God or a creature; but it is neither. It cannot be God, for then the annihilation of a creature would be as good a thing as God's existence. And many acts of annihilation, if we suppose them possible, must necessarily be distinct from God. It cannot be a creature, for everything created is positive, or God would have to create a Universe of annihilation, corresponding to each positive being destroyed. Nor is it a privation or a negation, which, to exist, require an existing subject: for here the subject is supposed not to exist.

Set contra istud sic. Impossibile est ens aut veritatem esse, nisi vel deum vel 'causatam a deo mediate vel inmediate; set adnichilacio nec potest esse deus nec causata a deo; igitur non potest esse. Assumptum patet ex dictis de veritate et de peccato, que non possent permitti a deo, nisi causarentur a deo vel a creatura eius. Et minor patet ex supposito quod adnichilacio passiva, si est, distinguitur a deo, quia aliter tam bonum, tam permanens, et tam simplex (aut unum) esset quod ista res adnichilatur, sicut et deus est. Ymmo econtra, qualitercunque esset quod ista res adnichilatur, esset quod deus est; cum tamen multe sunt de possibili adnichilaciones instantanee, vel temporales, penales, et non optime; et | sic de aliis, que videntur distinguere 135 b^a
deum ab adnichilacione, si ponatur. Habito igitur quod adnichilacio non sit deus, probatur quod non potest poni creatura vel creature inexistens, quia omnis creatura est ens predicabile positivum, quod non potest adnichilacioni competere: igitur nec est creatura. Si enim esset creatura, tunc deus de potencia absoluta non posset adnichilare [nisi] succedet universitas adnichilacionis, et multitudo omnium creaturarum est descriptive universitas creata, ut supponitur de vi vocis; igitur non posset adnichilare universitatem, nisi crearet aliam priori oppositam. Quod autem [non] sit privacio aut negacio: omnis privacio presupponit suum subiectum cui insit; nulla adnichilacio potest esse in subiecto: igitur nulla adnichilacio potest esse privacio. Minor patet ex hoc, quod si quid adnichilatur, tunc ipsum pro mensura adnichilacionis non est: ymmo, si successive adnichilatur, tunc quamdiu pars eius manet salvata, non subiectat adnichilacionem; ideo adnichilacio, quia tunc esset eterna et rediret post sui corrupcionem, non presupponens subiectum, nec potest poni aggregatum ex hiis, cum privacio illa non potest fundari.

Augustine points this out,

Et istam racionem tangit Augustinus in *De natura boni,* 20, ostendens quod dolor est melior quam cor-

4. .I. nota raciones quod deus non potest aliquid adnichilare *in marg.* MS. 5. cata *pro* causatam MS. 17. opti^{me} *pro* optime MS. 24. nisi *deest* MS. 25. e^{t} *vro* erit MS. 28. non *deest* MS. 39. angl. *in marg.* MS.

rupcio; ideo infuit corpori Christi, et non corrupcio, iuxta illud, psalmo: *Nec dabis sanctum tuum videre corrupcionem.* (Ps. XV, 10.) Set nec dolor nec corrupcio potest esse, nisi fundata in natura bona: Unde sic loquitur Augustinus: "Ipsa putredo, si habet aliquid quod apte consumat bonum, in mundo crescit corrupcio; quod si peremptus absumpserit, sicut nullum bonum, ita nulla natura remanebit, quia iam corrupcio quod corrumpat non habet; et iam ipsa putredo non erit, quia ubi sit omnino non erit." Ecce Augustinus vult omnem corrupcionem esse aliquando et fundari in natura boni. Et istud argumentum induxit philosophos ad racione convincendum materiam primam, quia antecedenter non esset dare subiectum generacionis et corrupcionis. Materia igitur prima est natura que generatur ut sit ignis, et corrumpitur ut sit aqua, et sic subiectat ignietatem post aquietatem. Adnichilacio igitur, cum sit forma, requirit subiectum quod formaliter denominat, cum sit accidens correspondens adnichilancie; et certum est quod deum [non] potest informare, nec absolutam creaturam: non igitur potest esse divisibilis aut indivisibilis aliquando subiectata, sicut oportet esse de creacione, [que] subiectatur positive in creatura.

saying that corruption could not exist if there was nothing to corrupt.

This is a proof of the existence of primal matter, as the subject of generation and corruption.

Annihilation is therefore an accident which can be neither in God, nor in any creature.

Item, deus non posset adnichilare substanciam aliquam, nisi adnichilet totam universitatem creatam; set illam non potest adnichilare: igitur nichil penitus potest adnichilare. Maior probatur ex hoc quod ad cuiuscunque substancie nichilacionem requiritur cuiuslibet partis adnichilacio de vi vocis; set cuiuslibet singularis substancie pars quiditativa est genus substancie, sicut et alia genera ac species; igitur, adnichilata substancia qualibet singulari, adnichilaretur genus substancie, et per consequens non maneret post adnichilacionem existens in alico singulari: totum igitur genus substancie destrueretur ad cuiuscunque substancie adnichilacionem.

God cannot annihilate any substance, without annihilating the whole universe; for this would imply that it is totally destroyed, even in its generic Universal, Substance, which goes to make up its being; and the latter destroyed, the whole universe disappears.

Confirmatur per locum *a maiori*. Substancia panis in eukaristia non adnichilatur propter remanenciam accidencium, licet ipsa corrumpatur secundum totam formam. Set maior est conneccio partis quiditative ad eius partem subiectivam quam cuiuscunque absoluti accidentis ad suum subiectum: igitur multo magis, corrupto subiecto

In the Eucharist the bread is no more, yet it is not annihilated, because the accidents remain: *a fortiori*, if the essential genus of a thing is not

2. nam *pro* nec MS. 20. non *deest* MS. 22. que *deest* MS.
24. 2ª racio *in marg.* MS.

annihilated, you cannot say it is annihilated. Its universal essence is more united with it than the accident with the substance, for it is identical with each of its individuals, which it causes, whilst the accident is quite different from its subject, and caused thereby.

And if a being can be annihilated, though still existing in its causes, then every destruction of a thing is annihilation. We may go farther. Annihilation, properly so called, would imply the destruction even of its ideal nature, which exists eternally in God, and is God; therefore it would destroy God.

God, who is Being, cannot be contrary to, nor destroy Being.

secundum quamlibet eius partem accidentalem integralem, servata parte quiditativa, non simpliciter adnichilatur. Istud tactum est superius, et videtur habere colorem ex hoc quod propinquior est pars quiditativa suo individuo, quam est accidens aliquod suo subiecto. Est enim quelibet pars quiditiva individui idem essencialiter cum eodem individuo essencialiter causata ab eo, materialiter, quiditative, et finaliter, ac concausante eam subiective et intrinsece naturaliter. Accidens tamen est una natura omnino separata a subiecto, et accidente taliter causata ab eo. Unde igitur color quod subiectum totaliter corruptum non adnichilaretur propter remanenciam | unius nature omnino essencialiter separate et 135 b
per accidens ab eo causate, quum multo magis non adnichilaretur ipso servato in suo genere, quod est eius causa essencialis, idem in essencia cum subiecto? Simul enim substancia singularis fuit producta, et habuit quoddam *esse* et suis causis secundis originalibus, ut tactum est supra. Ita remanet sibi quoddam *esse* in suis causis originalibus ipsis remanentibus, quia aliter quelibet corrupcio, et specialiter accidentis, foret adnichilacio.

Ymmo ulterius ordinando videtur quod ad simpliciter adnichilacionem requiritur ydee corrupcio, que est idem essencialiter cum causa existente; et cum talis ydea sit essencialiter deus, cui quelibet creatura magis essencialiter adheret quam accidens subiecto, videtur quod ad cuiuslibet creature adnichilacionem requireretur adnichilacio sui subiecti. Adnichilacio enim dicit, de vi vocis, corrupti (secundum se et quamlibet sui partem) corrupcionem. Et ex hoc capiunt quidam [quod] res non possit adnichilari nisi tam deus quam racio ydealis eius desineret esse; quia utrumque istorum est essencialiter idem cum reliquo, saltem secundum *esse* intelligibile.

Et ex hoc capiunt philosophi evidenciam quod deus, qui est purum *esse*, non potest esse contrarium, non potest causare corrupcionem, nisi forte per accidens, gracia melioris positi. Et capitur ista sentencia quod Augustinus in *De moribus Manicheorum*, capitulo primo, ubi dicit quod deus habet summe *esse*, quia semper

1. audi[a]3 *pro* accidentalem MS. 9. materialiter MS.; *ib.* tunc *pro* tamen MS. 14. q͡m *pro* quum MS. 28. obiecti MS. 30. quod *deest* MS. 35. angl. *in marg.* MS.

eodem modo, nunquam corrumpi vel mutari potest. Cui si contrarium queras, inveniri omnino non potest. [Esse] enim non habet oppositum nisi *non esse*. Et cum omne corruptum corrumpitur a suo contrario, patet quod fundamentum nature a nullo potest corrumpi, sicut nulli potest contrariari; et ex ista consideracione dicit quidam doctor quod deus non posset de potencia absoluta plus exaltare rem quam ipsam adnichilando, quia ut sic ydemptificaret eam pure deo, nec plus posset rem parvipendendere quam eam creando, quia ut sic diversificat eam a deo. Set turpes equevocaciones sunt huiusmodi, cum res secundum *esse* intelligibile non possit sic deo ydemptificari. Hoc tamen sane sentenciant sic loquentes, quod res non posset adnichilari nisi prima per se causa coadnichiletur cum illa cui est ydemptificata, saltem in transcendente. Ideo maior est conneccio dei ad substanciam quam substancie ad accidens; et per consequens, sicut accidens non potest adnichilari, nisi adnichilata substancia, sic nec substancia nisi adnichilata deo, cum ydemptificat se cuilibet creature, non potens ipsum destruere sine causa.

As Augustine shows, nothing can destroy Being, save its contrary; and its contrary does not exist. It is wrong indeed to say that annihilation would identify the creature with God;

but on the other hand, God would annihilate Himself by the annihilation of any creature, which depends on Him more closely than the accident on the substance.

Confirmatur tripliciter; primo sic. Omne *fuisse* vel *fore* rei presupponit *esse* eiusdem tamquam prius naturaliter; set deus [non] potest adnichilare *fuisse*, vel *fore;* igitur nec *esse*. Minor sic patet quod deus de potencia absoluta non potest facere pretericionem adnichilare, cum adnichilacio dicit formaliter desicionem adnichilati, et per idem sequitur quod futuricio, eo quod desinit esse, adnichilatur; et sic quelibet creatura posset adnichilare. Vel aliter sequitur quod nulla futuricio potest adnichilari. Tales veritates credo deum nobis patule reliquisse inadnichilabiles, ut cognoscamus bonitati sue repugnare quicquam adnichilare. Si enim veritatem posteriorem in natura non potest adnichilare, quanto magis veritatem priorem, que est finis illius, non potest adnichilare? Constat autem ex dictis de extensione temporis quod sequitur: *si creatura fuit vel erit, ipsa est*, et non econtra. Quicunque igitur possit adnichilare consequens superius, posset et adnichilare antecedens inferius; ut si quis posset adnichilare genus, vel aliquam per se causam causati, posset et adnichi-

To have been, and *to be about to be*, necessarily imply existence. Now God cannot annihilate a thing's *having been* nor its *being about to be*; therefore He cannot annihilate its existence.

Every thing that was or will be, is, as has been shown. If existence can be annihilated, so can preterition and futurition as well.

3. esse *deest* MS. 24. non *deest* MS. 40. aliquid *pro* si quis MS.

lare suum causatum. Set *esse* rei est per se causa pretericionis et futuricionis eiusdem; igitur etc.

Creation is the production of anything out of pure intellectual entity; annihilation would be its reduction to the same. For contrary changes must be expressed by contrary terms.

Item, omnis creacio proprie dicta dicit produccionem rei a puro *esse* intelligibili ad existenciam actualem. Igitur, per idem, omnis adnichilacio, si est, dicit corrupcionem rei ab actuali existencia ad purum *esse* intelligibile. Patet consequencia ex hoc quod motus oppositos | sibi correspondent ex opposito quoad terminos, 136 a[a] ut patet de generacione et corrupcione. Aliter enim posset quod quandocunque aliqua res corrumpitur, sic quod nulla res quantitativa illius manet, tunc adnichilatur.

Now, if annihilation be supposed, the thing annihilated would still *have been* an existent, and therefore not a mere intelligibility.

Tunc dicunt aliqui equivocantes in termino . . . . . Ad evacuandum igitur dictam equivocacionem, supponitur dicta significacio *quid nominis* termini; et tunc probatur quod deus non potest quicquid adnichilare, quia adnihilato manet adhuc *fuisse* eius cum *esse* intelligibili. Manet eciam potencia activa vel passiva in causa secunda ad causandum. Igitur non est corruptum ad purum esse intelligibile.

It may be objected that according to this definition God creates nothing that is caused by other causes; yet these cannot create, and creation does take place together with them. *Creation* is a term less properly used in some cases than in others.

Et si obicitur ex hoc sensu sequi quod deus nichil creat quod causa secunda potest causare in suis causis originalibus, non pocius diceretur creare forma materiam quam causa secunda, nisi propter agenciam priorem natura, qua producit causam originalem, materiam vel universalem materialis. Et talem agenciam non potest deus communicare creature, ideo nec creanciam, ut dictum est. Accio igitur primo divisibilis dei facit ipsum, large loquendo, creare creaturam cuius produccionem communicat alii creature: cuiusmodi sunt forme materiales. Intelligenciam vero, animam, et materiam proprio in suo supposito creat deus, set adhuc in illis sunt gradus; et licet solus deus potest facere aliquod talium, tamen materia divisibilis requirit communicacionem suarum parcium, et anima hominis preexigit disposicionem fetus. Ideo non tam proprie creantur, sicut

Matter and angels are more

3. 3[a] racio *in marg.* MS. 8. set correspondere *pro* sibi correspondent MS. 20. objeccio *in marg.* MS. 22. creature *in full pro* creare MS. 30. Responsio *in marg.* MS.

12. *Termino.* I suppose there should be a gap here, though there is none in the MS. 25. *Universalem.* The Universal of Matter. I think a sentence is wanting between *est* and *accio* a little lower down, as this sentence evidently belongs to the objection and the next to the answer.

materia punctalis vel angelus. Sicut igitur claudit formalem repugnanciam deum facere aliquid non fuisse, cum hoc quod ipsum fuit, quia non potest facere talem negacionem, [vel] eternaliter facit illam, sic claudit contradiccionem formalem deum quicquid adnichilare, quia tunc post existenciam relinqueret purum *esse* intelligibile eiusdem adnichilati.

strictly said to be created than the soul, which requires a certain predisposition of matter.

Item, si deus potest mundum adnichilare, tunc et quodlibet eius accidens potest adnichilare, cum, destructa quomodocunque per se causa, destruitur propterea et suum causatum. Set quotlibet accidencia mundi deus non potest adnichilare; igitur nec mundum. Minor patet de motu, tempore, et quotlibet similibus, que deus de potencia absoluta non potest corrumpere antequam naturaliter corrumpantur, cum nec tempus potest accelerare vel tardare; ut patet de tractatu *De tempore*. Ideo non dubium, quin si unum tale adnichilatur, nullum tale posset nisi adnichilacione corrumpi, cum semper uniformiter corrumpitur, nec posset aliter corrumpi. Ymmo, capto tempore eterno, patet quod ipsum non potest desinere de dei potencia absoluta; igitur multo magis non potest adnichilari. Assumptum patet sic. Si desineret, tunc haberet finem in utroque extremo, et tunc non foret idem tempus quod in principio signatum fuit esse eternum, set eius pars. Cum igitur pars non potuit ydemptificari suo toti, patet illud tempus, quod ponitur posse esse eternum, non posse destrui, set pars eius solum naturaliter corrumpi. Cum ergo tempus sit creatura dei, ut patet tractatu *De tempore*, et ipsum non potest adnichilari, multo magis nec eius subiectum permanencius.

If God can annihilate the world, He can annihilate any of its accidents; but this is not possible. For instance, movement, time, &c. cannot be annihilated;

and if a part of eternal time was annihilated, it would no longer be eternal. Time changes indeed, but only by the course of things; and I have already proved it to be a creature.

Considero quod [sunt] multa assumpta in istis racionibus, que maior pars scole negaret hodie: set quia superius declarata sunt et concessa, nec debet homo semper redire ad stabiliendum principia, ideo procedens ille obligat se ad consequendum sequencia. Nam qui dicit unum, dicit implicite omnia sequencia. Ideo etc.

In these arguments there are many thing which are denied by modern philosophers; but I cannot continually be repeating the proofs I have already given.

4. vel *deest* MS. 8. 4ª racio *in marg*. MS. 15. nec tempus nec MS. 27. potest *pro* posse MS. 32 sunt *deest* MS. 36. illa MS.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERCIUM.

If a part of the universe could be reduced to nothing, so might the whole, Christ and the Blessed included.

Item, si aliqua pars universitatis adnichilari potest et non accidens per se, cum servata substancia accidens suum non adnichilatur, relinquitur quod aliqua substancia adnichilari potest. Et idem est iudicium de toto mundo; igitur totus iste mundus per totum adnichilari potest. Et cum humanitas Christi et omnes beati citra deum in celo sunt pars universitatis, sequitur quod omnes illi possunt adnichilari.

This were against God's justice, for He would punish sinless creatures.

It is by this reason that St. Thomas proves that the Word, once Incarnate, will never abandon Christ's Humanity. Now each part of the world is so connected with and of such use to every other, that the loss of one part would be an undeserved loss to the whole. This connection and utility is proved by the doctrine of Universals.

Illud videtur multipliciter esse falsum. Primo, quia repugnat divine iusticie puniri vel dampnificare creaturam sine peccato hoc previe exigente; set humanitas Christi, sicut nec beati in celo, possunt post hoc demerere: igitur non possunt amplius puniri vel dampnificari. Per idem argumentum | probat sanctus Thomas de 136a[b]
Christo quod deus non potest dimittere naturam humanam, eo quod non potest demereri ut tante dampnificetur. Cum igitur quelibet creatura lucrificat cuilibet alteri, sequitur quod nulla pars mundi posset adnichilari sine dampnificacione cuiuslibet partis remanentis, si aliqua foret talis; et cum quotlibet non possunt demereri, sequitur quod nulla potest adnichilari. Tanta namque est communicacio et prodessencia creaturarum, quod nulla illarum posset esse, nisi, communicando cum qualibet, prodesset eidem; ut plane patet de communicacione cuilibet sapide ponenti universalia. Et de prodessencia patet ex hoc quod res maxime nociva homini prodest sibi quoad finem, cum integrat universitatem, sicut homo, inseparabiliter hoc appetens et intendens. Et nemo dicit quin una res iuvat reliquam, quando concurrit cum eadem, concausando eundem finem quem reliqua intendit et appetit; quem finem non sufficeret per se attingere.

All creatures aid man, by turning him from evil and towards good;

Secundo iuvat quecunque alia creatura hominem, eo quod iuvat causam hominis, vel causando mundum vel perficiendo species hominis exemplo doctrine, tardantis

1. Ca[m] 13[m] *in marg. large initial I in blue ink* MS. 33. .b. *in marg.* MS. 34. causandum MS.

15. *Sanctus Thomas.* I have not been able to find this proof in any of St. Thomas' works that were at hand. But the proof is well known, and the axiom: *Quod Verbum semel assumpsit, nunquam dimisit.*

a malo et iuvantis ad bonum; de quanto recipit partem pulcritudinis universitatis, que quidem pulcritudo primo fundatur in omnibus, parcialiter in singulis. Ordo namque quantumlibet remotarum parcium facit reciproce ad mutuam pulcritudinem; et per consequens ad utilitatem, cum formositas naturalis sit necessaria. Patet iste sensus per exemplum apostoli arguentis ex mutua necessitate membrorum corporis naturalis, mutuam necessitatem membrorum corporis Christi mistici. Et indubie idem est argumentum de mutua communicacione parcium universitatis in reciproco profectu eciam inmutancium et contrariarum.

by the beauty of the universe, which every part goes to make up.

Tercio confirmatur ex hoc quod maxime elongatum a profectu hominis foret pena vel peccatum in homine; set omnis pena peccati proficit peccanti de quanto ordinat, et pulcrificat universitatem per decorem vindicte, ut tactum est superius; igitur multo magis quelibet alia creatura dei. Sic enim habet iustus usum omnium parcium mundi, sicut habuisset homo in paradiso usum omnium vivorum. Patet igitur quod repugnat tam sapientem agricolam plantare vel permittere quicquam in suo campo, nisi quidlibet creatum cedat cuilibet ad profectum. Quo habito, patet quod deus iniuriaretur cuilibet residuo, adnichilando aliquam partem universitatis; set hoc non potest esse, cum sit per se iustus: igitur nec adnichilare.

What is least useful to man is surely sin and its punishment; yet these too are useful; much more all other creatures.

So wise a Husbandman has nothing useless in His fields, and would wrong Himself by annihilating anything.

Hic dicitur, cum deus plenissimus dominus cuiuslibet, non iniuriaretur alicui, eciam beato, ipsum adnichilando. Revera verum dicitur, quod si sic faceret non iniuriaretur sibi, quia nec ante adnichilacionem nec post hoc discutit si deus potest adnichilare. Ideo probatur quod deus adnichilando iniuriaretur sibi et cuilibet creato residuo, si quod foret. Nam inpossibile est dampnum precedere demeritum; set oportet econtra, si dampnum infligitur. Set, posita adnichilacione priori, dampnum infertur, sine [de]merito precedente. Igitur adnichilacio non est possibilis.

This is answered by saying that God, the Master of all, cannot wrong any one, and indeed, this is true, supposing annihilation to be possible. We therefore prove that God would wrong Himself and the rest of creation by such an act, for it would inflict an injury on the universe which was not merited; and therefore it is not possible.

Minor, etsi fuerit famosa apud antiquos sanctos, tamen necesse est hodie ipsam persuadere propter tria,

But the statement that God cannot

1. et nu'at℮ a malo et mu'at℮ ad MS. 8. membrum MS. 12. .c. *in marg.* MS. 14. puncto *pro* peccanti MS. 22. nota *in marg.* MS. 25. iniustus MS. 26. Responsio quedam *in marg.* MS. 30. posset *pro* post MS.; *ib.* non discutit MS.; *ib.* nota racionem *in marg.* MS. 35. de *deest* MS. 37. m^or *pro* minor MS.

29. *Sibi* here refers, I suppose, to the 'Blessed one' whom God might annihilate. But the next *sibi* (l. 32) refers to God.

inflict an unmerited injury, seems not only opposed to annihilation, but to God's Omnipotence, and to the fact that animals in Paradise, though innocent, would have died; we must therefore defend it.

quia primo videtur inpugnare adnichilacionem (cuius possibilitas creditur esse necessaria) et repugnare libertati divine potencie. Et tercio videtur repugnare statui innocencie, cum tunc fuissent bestie corrupte, et per consequens morte punite sine suo demerito precedente. Igitur non repugnat penam precedere culpam. Sic enim potest salvator, assumendo carnem, punivisse se in corpore pro merito nature augendo, etsi nemo peccasset: sicut multi sancti puniuntur non pro peccatis, set pro premiis augendis.

The assertion certainly goes against annihilation,

Quoad primum, certum puto quod assumptum principium inpugnat possibilitatem adnichilacionis.

and proceeds from the eternal law of supreme justice in God, together with liberty.

Quoad secundum, dicitur quod illud principium emanat de lege indispensabili eterna, ponens in deo summam libertatem et inmutabilem iusticiam.

Nothing can be injured by losing what is not due to it by nature;

Quoad tercium, dicitur quod nichil dampnificatur vel punitur in carencia illius quod non est natum habere ex primaria institucione nature; ut nemo dampnificatur vel punitur | in hoc quod non est deus; nec corpus 136bª sublunare dampnificatur in hoc quod transmutatur alteracione, dislocacione, vel corrupcione naturali secundum

so, if animals die, their death is no injury to them; and certainly they had less to suffer before than after the Fall, which did harm to the whole world, as Christ's merits on the contrary wrought its welfare.

primam ordinacionem nature. Et patet quod mors bestiarum non est eis penalis pocius quam passio inanimati est ei dampnificabilis, potissime si non discucientur propter peccatum hominis ultra hoc quod paterentur, homine stante innocenter. Hoc tamen credo, quod quelibet pars mundi sit dampnificata ex peccato hominis, sicut econtra meritum Christi lucrifecit proficiens quamlibet partem mundi, ut ostendit Lincolniensis in sermonibus *De cruce*.

For by the Cross all creatures are restored to their former duty of serving mankind.

Per hoc medium quelibet creatura citra hominem per ante impellata ex divina iusticia ad serviendum homini iuste deo obedienti, est per crucem racione passionis Christi in ea ad illam perfeccionem restituta, et per consequens perfeccio secunda est sibi adquisita.

Before the Fall, they obeyed him, and praised God through him;

Si enim creature tales erant primarie ordinate ut leviter ministrarent, et servirent homini obedienti deo, ac corde et ore deum laudanti pro illis creaturis (quod fuit idem quod illas creaturas laudare deum per hominem): patet

1. .1. *in marg.* MS. 2. .2. *in marg.* MS.; eciam *pro* et MS. 3. .3. *in marg.* MS. 11. .a. *in marg.* MS. 13. .b. *in marg.* MS. 16. .c. *in marg.* MS. 32. impeta *pro* impellata MS. 36. ne *pro* ut MS. 38. illud *pro* idem MS. 39. *after* deum, laudanti — creaturas *a second time* MS.

quod dampnificate sunt, frustrate ab illa perfeccione secunda ad quam ordinate sunt, dum converse sunt homini in flagellum et blasphemiam, ipsas insensate colenti, iuxta illud, Sapiencie 5°, *Accipiet armaturam zelus illius, et armabit creaturam ad ulcionem inimicorum.* Et sequitur: *Pugnabit cum illo orbis terrarum contra insensatos.* [Non] omnino quod talia inanimata sensitive cognoscunt peccata hominum; set quod, tam iusta dei movencia, quam inprovida hominum utencia, naturale sit eis cum datis paribus agere ad hominum nocumentum. Nec credo quod aliquis dubitat quin, sicut officium et ordo primarius cuiuscunque creature foret ad eius perfeccionem, tollens hunc ordinem facit ad eius inperfeccionem; quod sic non esset, nisi omnes creature communicarent in conspectu [dei]. Patet igitur quod omnis pena inanimate creature [est] propter peccatum ipsam originans, cum ordinacio primaria creature sit quod quelibet cuilibet conferat, nisi ponat obicem, delinquendo delictum. Igitur est principium originans privacionem communicacionis commodi, et per consequens causans quodlibet nocumentum.

Sap. V, 18, 21.

afterwards, man blasphemously adoring them, they became his scourge.

It became natural for them to harm man,

who by destroying the right order of things, had taken from their perfection.

Thus all we suffer from inanimate nature is a punishment of sin.

Unde Ysa. 28, dicit propheta, quod opus punicionis est deo alienum et peregrinum, quia preexigitur demeritum a quo causetur: Sic enim scribit propheta: *In valle que est in Gabaon irascetur, ut faciat opus suum.* Et quia posset credi quod pena posset peccatum precedere, nunc subdit: *Alienum opus eius; ut operetur opus suum, peregrinum est opus eius ab eo:* quasi dicat quod accidentaliter et occasione data punit deus, quia aliter non caperent hec verba sanum sensum. Nunquam enim legitur penam iuste inflictam, nisi propter peccatum, ut patet volventi scripturas. Unde non video quod stat cum iusta ordinacione iustum puniri, vel ad augmentum meriti, vel ob quamvis aliam causam, nisi peccatum precedens quodammodo sit in causa; quia infligens penam vel prius peccaret, vel foret de primaria ordinacione nature quod ita fieret, et per consequens non esset pena, set debita perfeccio secunda, cum pena, ut huiusmodi, dicit privacionem alicuius tunc debiti inesse. Aliter enim nihil esset per se iustum, set deus

Isa. XXVIII, 21.

Now Scripture says that to inflict any punishment is alien to God's nature, an accident which only happens after sin has been committed, and never before, or without sin; for a mere defect of nature is not a punishment.

7. non *deest* MS. 10. si *pro* sit MS. 14. sicut quod MS. 15. dei *deest* MS. 16. ine *pro* inanimate MS.; *ib.* est *deest* MS. 27. non *pro* nunc MS.; *ib.* alienum est MS. 28. q. d. *pro* quasi dicat MS. 35. qui *pro* quia MS. 36. ut *pro* vel MS.

Otherwise God could without injustice inflict harm on those who did not deserve it.

posset facere malum sine causa exigente in paciente illud malum. In statu igitur innocencie potuit fuisse opus delectabile et perfeccius ex primaria ordinacione nature, set non penalitas.

The source of punishment, to be just, must lie in the delinquent, either in his person or in his race, as is shown in the Book of Job; though Job was unjustly treated by Eliphaz, who supposed him to be personally guilty.

Oportet igitur quod incepcio punicionis incipiat a delinquente, ut patet de racione pene. Quomodo, queso, posset aliquid esse debitum, cum hoc quod nunquam ordinaretur a deo, vel in specie vel in supposito? sicut tangitur contra, Job 4[to] et 5° capitulo, quod [dicit] Eliphaz Themanites, quamvis equivocavit cum Iob, putans quod oportet quemlibet punitum peccare in persona propria proporcionaliter ad penam. Quod non est verum, licet nec Christus nec Iob fuisset punitus, si nullum peccatum precederet. Iob. IV, 5.

God always punishes mercifully, less than we deserve; punishing one who has not demerited, He would be merciless.

Confirmatur tripliciter, primo per hoc quod deus non potest punire, nisi misericorditer puniat; quod vocatur ab aliquibus punire citra condignum. Set si puniret sine demerito creature, tunc nec puniret ad condignum nec citra condignum, quia deficeret racio puniendi: igitur sic non potest punire, igitur non adnihilare. |

If this could be, why should not God tempt man beyond his power, and thus be the Author of sin?

Item, si deus posset sine demerito hominem temptare, 136b[b] et cum non sit dare gradum finitum usque ad quem precise potest temptare hominem, sequitur quod ultra hominem potest naturaliter ferre, potest deus temptare hominem, et per consequens cum non iuste potest culpare hominem propter illa que non sunt in hominis potestate, sequitur quod deus potest esse per se auctor peccati, vel aliter omnis modus agendi potest esse non peccatum.

Every punishment inflicted by God is just, and given for the amendment of man, setting to rights the wrong done by sin;

Item, inpossibile est penam esse, nisi fuerit a deo inflicta, et sic iusta, ut patet per Augustinum, primo *Retractacionum*, 26. Set inpossibile est penam esse iustam, nisi de quanto inponit peccanti emendacionem peccati; igitur inpossibile est penam esse bonum nature vel moris, set bonum honestum de quanto ordinat peccatum; et cum non potest esse a deo, nisi sit bonum, non potest esse a deo, nisi vindicando ordinet peccatum.

and as sin implies punishment, so the latter implies the former.

Sicut igitur deus non potest sinere peccatum esse sine vindicta, sic nec vindictam sine peccato. Unde apud Augustinum et alios sanctos fuit quam per se notum principium, quod deus non potest punire creaturam

9. dicit *deest* MS. 10. Eliphat themanitem MS. 33. peccati MS. 39. vindicta *pro* vindictam MS.

sine suo demerito hoc exigente; et ex hoc concludit, 8, supra, quod incredibile est hominem aute peccatum habuisse laborem penalem, ut patet 12; et hinc dicit, 76, quod non fieret semeia bestiarum in homines, nisi propter peccatum, ut dicit 12, "Nullum malum esset, si peccatum non esset". Et breviter, isto fundamento innititur Parysiensis in libello suo. "Cur deus homo", ad demonstrandum ex discrasia nature humane, ut a signo posteriori, quod fuit aliquod suppositum speciei humane delinquens, racione cuius posteritas tam miserabiliter est punita, scilicet in discrasia virium anime; ut puta potencie, qua plus appreciantur minora bona corporis quam bona anime, in rebellione sensualitatis ad racionem, in necessitate inordinandi, et obliquitate obnoxia in deum tendendi, que non possent inesse nisi precedente culpa. Ideo ipsam significant.

We cannot believe that man's work before the Fall was penal.

The frailties of the human mind are a sign of original sin.

Ex istis videtur maiorem previe assumptam esse veram, scilicet quod inpossibile sit dampnum precedere simpliciter demeritum, quia tunc deus, in cuius manu [est] omnis dampnificacio, eternaliter ordinaret (et per consequens primarie) tale dampnum infligere; quod est contradiccio, quia tunc tale dampnum esset non dampnum, cum nichil sit dampnum alicui quod non tollit privative primariam ordinacionem nature.

This proves the major premise; a privation, if eternally and essentially ordained, would not be a privation; but if there were no preceding demerit, it must be so ordained.

Qua supposita, probatur minor superius assumpta, scilicet, quod, posita adnichilacione particulari, dampnum infereretur sine demerito precedenti, quia nemo potest mereri in penam peccati propriam adnichilacionem, nec aliquid potest poni demereri, ut alia creatura, cui communicat, adnichilatur. Igitur nulla adnichilacio potest esse pena peccati. Maior patet ex eo quod nulla creatura quantitative indivisibilis, ut angelus, vel anima hominis, potest demereri propriam adnichilacionem. Set nemo potest mereri vel demereri, nisi mediante anima: igitur nemo potest demereri propriam adnichilacionem. Et cum soli alicui istarum creaturarum communicari potest meritum aut demeritum, patet quod nichil potest mereri eius adnichilacionem. De creatura racionali indivisibili patet ex hoc quod nulli tali foret adnichilacio penalis,

Now annihilation would be such a kind of privation.

For no one can deserve to be annihilated for his own sin, or for that of another.

Merit or demerit is in the soul, and neither an angel nor a human soul can deserve to be annihilated for sin.

It would be no punishment at all to be

1. igitur *pro* 8 MS. 2. super se MS. 7. cui MS. 17. probo *pro* previe MS. 20. est *deest* MS.

7. *Parysiensis.* William of Auvergne.

annihilated for one's own sin, since the subject would no longer exist; a revelation made of future annihilation is impossible; and if possible, would not explain how annihilation itself is a punishment.

et per consequens non infligenda in penam peccati. Antecedens patet, eo quod adnichilacio, si est, tollit suum subiectum, et per consequens tollit penam eius, cum omnis pena, ut huiusmodi, presupponit existenciam puniti. Nec valet dicere quod revelacio adnichilacionis potest punire delinquentem: tum quia hoc non servat quomodo adnichilacio creature posset esse sibi penalis, tum eciam quia deus non potest revelare creature suam dampnacionem; igitur multo magis, non suam adnichilacionem.

No one can be annihilated for another's sin; for any punishment thereof should have some proportion to damnation; which is not here the case. For then, the less anyone were guilty, the more heavily he would suffer by the loss of existence, which is worth more to the good than to the wicked, and therefore its loss more grievous.

Et quod nulla creatura potest mereri ut altera adnichiletur, patet sic. Deus non potest punire peccatum, nisi puniat proporcionali pena dampni; set adnichilacio unius pro peccato alterius non potest esse proporcionalis pena dampni: igitur non potest iuste [a] deo infligi. Minor patet, ex hoc quod pena tali dampni non potest | creatura peccatrix puniri coexistens, cum creatura iusta 137a
plus puniatur, et secundum concedentes omnem adnichilacionem esse penam, plus puniatur minus delinquens; quod deo non contingit, quia repugnat regalis iusticie distributive. Et consequencia patet ex dictis. Nam creature iuste est quelibet concreatura plus utilis quam creature iniuste eiusdem speciei, quia iustus habet verum dominium et usum rei, set iniustus nequaquam. Ex quo sequitur quod ablacio iusti dominii et usus esset magis mala iusto quam minus bonum iniusto, eo quod precise quam bonum est aliquod comodum accidentale, tam mala esset eius privacio.

The only reason left why annihilation should be possible, is either (1) to show God's power; (which cannot be, since no one can behold the fact of annihilation, and no proof of it could be given; besides, it cannot be an action of God,

Cum igitur adnichilacio potest inferri in penam peccati, ut patet ex dictis, non superest aliqua causa media unde fieri potuit, nisi vel ostensio divine potencie, vel resecacio rei superflue. Primum non potest dari, quia nulla adnichilacio est sensibilis, quia nec sensu exteriori perceptibilis, eo quod non potest locari. Ideo indubie nullo experimento potest convinci adnichilacio, et per consequens non potest esse signum naturale ad convincendum potenciam dei; ceterum patet diligenter advertenti quod deus non potest agendo adnichilare, cum adnichilancia non plus potest esse agencia quam adnichilacio passio. Ideo, ut ostendit dominus Armakanus, libro primo, capitulo 14° *De questionibus Armenorum*, adnichi-

6. serenat *pro* servat MS. 15. a *deest* MS.

lacio, si esset (per inpossibile) esset non accio, set subtraccio divine custodie, quod repugnat vero domino facere sive occasione. Data adnichilacio igitur, si poneretur, non ostendit potenciam set maliciam agentis, quia creberime in scriptura vocatur deus ideo dominus, quia protector et defensor est rei subdite suo dominio. Ideo, ut dicit doctor, sicut adnichilacio non potest attestari divine potencie vel suo dominio, patet igitur quod adnichilacio, si esset, foret non defectus nec subtraccio, nec forma aliqua, set *non esse* rei pro mensura in qua nata est esse, propter defectum gubernancie dei conservantis, et sic, cum adnichilacio ponit aptitudinem ad *esse* ex parte creature, et defectum conservancie domini capitalis, patet quod pocius redundaret in invidiam aut inpotenciam dei quam in eius potenciam declarandam.

rather a shortcoming in God's act of conservation, and consequently showing either God's spite or His weakness);

Evidentissima igitur causa media que posset dari de adnichilacione creature, foret resecacio superfluitatis creaturam, quod sic ostenditur. Deus non posset partem universalitatis adnichilacione perdere, nisi esset iustum et racionabile sic fieri, et per consequens nisi superflueret talem partem ulterius conservare. Omne namque quod creatura clare videt esse eternaliter ordinatum a deo ne duret ulterius, esset superfluum creaturam appetere durare ulterius, in tantum quod non posset licite cum illis paribus orare ut duret ulterius; ut patet per beatum Augustinum 21 *De civitate dei* c° 22°, quod manifeste implicat ex ordinacione dei sequi quod superflueret illam creaturam ulterius conservare. Si igitur tunc superfluum esset quod duret ulterius, quia contra ordinacionem dei eternam; et si aliquid sit superfluum, quia certum est quod, quacunque re signata, eo ipso quod placet deo illam esse, non est simpliciter superfluum illam esse; set superfluum esset quicquam esse quod deus ordinat non esse.

or (2) to remove a useless creature. For God could not destroy any part of the world, unless it was useless,

and *vice versa*, if it were so, God could not keep it in being to no purpose.

Yet no creature is useless if its existence but pleases God.

Et ex istis patet quod cuiuscunque effectus citra deum etc. adnichilacionis, si ponatur, est causa media danda. Unde non plene satisfaciunt qui dicunt ideo, quod deus adnichilat quia vult. Non enim esset possibile deum velle adnichilare, nisi racio hoc exigeret; et per consequens, nisi adnichilacio sonaret in bonum, quia nichil

Now as there must be a special reason for everything, it is not satisfactory to say; God annihilates because He chooses to do so. Annihilation must be required by

27. angl. *in marg.* MS. 30. qua *pro* quia MS. 41. michi *pro* in MS.

reason, for the creature, and good from the part of God. And it is neither.

potest contingere creature nisi sit quodammodo bonum. Multo magis igitur nichil potest inesse creatori nisi sit bonum. Et patet ex dictis quod non potest esse bonum creature quod aliquid adnichiletur, et deo non potest aliquid esse bonum utile, nec delectari potest deus in perdicione rei, nisi forte accidentaliter, racione vindicte.

Even as a penalty, it would be mere vindictiveness, unless required by the creature, which has been shown to be impossible.

Nam alienum et peregrinum est deo vindicari, vel quomodolibet malum facere, ut patet Ysa. 28, ut supra; quia boni est deus autor prima | rius; set mali, defectus (137 a[b]) creature. Si igitur deus non potest punire, nisi creatura punienda hoc exigat, multo magis non potest adnichilare (quod esset magis malum), nisi creatura hoc exigat. Set non est possibile creaturam hoc exigere, ut patet ex dictis: igitur non est possibile deum adnichilare.

To say that every penalty is less than we deserve is wrong, because annihilation is no penalty, and if it were, it would be the same for all, though differently guilty.

This is contrary to justice, as shown by Holy Writ.

Ideo incircumspecte introducti sunt modi loquendi quibus dicitur deum punire citra condignum, eo quod pena condigna esset adnichilacio; tum quia adnichilacio non potest esse pena, tum eciam quia, posito per inpossibile quod sit pena, non potest suscipere maius et minus; et per consequens non est digna pro quolibet mortali, cum tunc non forent correspondencie penarum ad peccata, set pro peccatis inequalibus infligerentur pene inequales. Quod repugnat regulis iusticie distributive, cum Ysa. 34°, dicitur, quod pena *extendetur* super culpam *mensura*, et liberabitur equali lance, *perpendiculum in desolacionem*. (Isa. XXXIV, 11.) Et ad hoc sonant quotlibet dicta scripture cum patenti racione, quod in eadem mensura qua mensa fuerit creatura, remecietur sibi, ut testatur. Unde, Gen. 18 dicit ille magnus philosophus et patriarcha Abraham; *Absit* hoc *a te ut .... occidas* (scilicet pari mensura) *iustum cum impio .... Non est hoc tuum qui iudicas omnem terram*. (Gen. XVIII, 25.) Revera deus non posset esse exemplar primum iusticie, si posset sine demerito sic punire.

Augustine, explaining why the evening of the seventh day of creation was not mentioned, comes to the same conclusion.

Unde Augustinus, 4to *Super Gen.* 24, exponens quomodo septima dies habuit mane, set non vespere, sic scribit, 11: "Inicium igitur creature in quiete creatoris illo mane signatum arbitror, quod factum est post vesperam sexte diei. Non enim posset in eo nisi perfecte requiescere, proinde consummatis sexto die omnibus.

11. punita *pro* punienda MS. 28. mensa *pro* mensura MS. 30. *no gap after* ut MS. 31. *no gap before* non MS. 35. angl. *in. marg.* MS. 36. alia *pro* septima MS. 40. provide (?) MS.

Factaque vespera, factum est mane quo inciperet creatura inicio a quo facta est requiescere; in quo inicio deum in seipsum requiescentem, et ipsa, ut requiescere posset, invenit tanto stabilius atque firmius, quanto ipsa illius, non ille, eguit ad quietem suam. Set quicquid erit universa creatura quibuslibet mutacionibus suis, non utique nichil erit. Ideo creatura universa in creatore suo semper manebit; et per hoc, post illud mane, nulla deinceps vespera fuit."

Ex istis patet Augustinum velle negare possibilitatem adnichilacionis, quia aliter universitas posset inperfectissime quiescere in deo, quia inperfecta foret quies momentanea, postquam adnichilaretur. Ipse tamen dicit quod non posset nisi perfecte sine vespera quiescere in deo; haberet tamen vesperam summe tenebrosam, si adnichilaretur. Secundo patet evidencia Augustini quare non adnichilabitur, quia deus ex bonitate et non indigencia sua creavit illam. Ideo, sicut bonitas sua non potest desinere vel ipse mutari, sic non potest desinere conservare illam. Et tercio patet confirmacio huius ex hoc quod nulla mutacione potest creatura adnichilari. Nec refert quod Augustinus loquitur de *inesse:* quia, si posset fieri adnichilacio, ipse temere assereret quod non fiet, potissime cum nec scriptura sacra nec fides negat adnichilacionem, nisi forte implicite, de quanto repugnat bonitati divine; et tunc est inpossibile. Sicut igitur post mane diei novissime non potest esse vespera temporis, sic nec occasus essencie create. Ideo.

He says that on the seventh day the creature rests in God without the darkness of evening, i. e. of annihilation,

because it needs God, and God does not need it.

That Augustine speaks of the creature as resting *in God,* does not matter; he certainly denies the possibility of annihilation, of which Revelation says nothing. This, were it not true, would be great presumption.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM.

Item, ex possibilitate adnichilacionis tolletur spes viatoris, certitudo beatorum, et sic sensus scripture; que omnia sunt inpossibilia. Patet quod adnichilacio sit inpossibilis.

If annihilation be possible, hope here and bliss above are destroyed, and Scripture becomes unmeaning.

Prima pars sic arguitur, iuxta hanc opinionem. Stat viatorem quantumlibet diligenter servire deo, nunquam pretereundo unum dei mandatum, cum hoc quod in fine vite adnichiletur pro labore, et alium gravissimum peccatorem in fine vite perpetuo premiari. Et cum hoc de

For if a man should serve God most faithfully, he may lose his reward, and the greatest sinner be rewarded.

5. q͡m quicquid MS. 22. qui MS. 29. Ca^m 14^m *in marg.: large initial I in blue ink* MS. 32. o͡i *pro* omnia MS.

This would surely tend to lead us astray. All our certitude in this world depends on the truth that God cannot lie.

When we believe, we must for this belief have sufficient evidence: either the nature of the truth itself, or the arguments which prove it, etc. But to affirm that the world will exist for ever has no such evidence.

Nor can we say that its perpetuity has been affirmed by one that is trustworthy: we must be absolutely sure that He speaks the truth, which He does, since He is the source of all truth, and He alone cannot lie, being truth itself.

Therefore, if God affirms anything, this thing is absolutely necessary.

They say that there is greater certitude in things of the Past than in those of the Future. Not so: for if God reveals

quolibet tali sit summe contingens, videtur quod creatura, hoc cognoscens, habet occasionem ambulandi de quolibet tali eventu. Probatur consequencia ex hoc quod omnis certitudo viatorum innititur alicui principio absolute necessario, cuiusmodi sunt veritates connecciorum, ut declaratum est superius de illis duabus rebus inmobilibus, *quibus inpossibile est mentiri deum*, ut dicit apostolus, Hebr. 6°, quas dicens adiecit: | ut spem firmissimam habeamus. Et constat necessario, si credulitas adhibetur, oportet dare causam proporcionabilem facientem evidenciam, quia aliter non crederet homo [magis] unum quod cogitat, quam quodcunque quod cogitat, nisi cuilibet adhesioni foret dare proporcionabilem causam; ut puta, naturam veritatis cui assentitur ex eius noscibilitate, vel locum argumenti, vel aliud proporcionaliter notum. Cum igitur non sit dare aliquod tale de perpetuitate mundi vel alicuius creature, sequitur quod de nullo tali est creature certitudo sufficiens. Antecedens declaratum est superius de quolibet loco pertinenti. Non enim credi posset isti argumento topico: "Iste fide dignus dicit hoc; igitur verum," nisi quia absolute necessarium est, si iste sic dicens servat simpliciter veritatem, tunc est vera. Et hoc habet reduci ad veritatem de deo; si ipse quicquam asserit, tunc est verum; quia omnis veritas nature create, que est per accidens, est reducibilis ad per se veritatem in deo. Creatura autem veridica potest esse subito falsidica, set deus non potest esse falsidicus, quia non est veridicus per formam sibi accidentalem, sicut racionales creature. Iugiter absolute necessario stat certitudo veritatis de futuro: "Si deus asserit hoc, igitur verum," et in noticia determinata antecedentis. Cum igitur, secundum communem opinionem sic opinancium, sequitur; "si deus asseruit quod hoc eternaliter erit, et antecedens sit absolute necessarium, sequitur quod et consequens"; cum sequitur formaliter ex antecedente.

Hebr. VI, 18.

137b[a]

Nec valet dicere quod est maior certitudo in pretericione alicuius absolute asserti a deo, vel quomodolibet aliter ordinati, ut patet superius; quia, posito quod deus revelet alicui suam ordinacionem, tunc tam certum

2. ambu[di] *pro* ambulandi MS. 7. deum mentiri MS. 8. opus *pro* apostolus MS.; *ib.* deus *pro* dicens MS; *ib.* ipse *pro* spem MS 12. magis *deest* MS. 16. motus *pro* notum MS. 27. subdita MS. 30. Jug' *pro* Iugiter MS.

est illam revelacionem fuisse quam certum est mundum fuisse; et stant difficultates. Tanta ergo est necessitas utrobique in veritate de preterito et de futuro; set secundum sic opinantes deus non potest facere quin hoc aliquando fuit; igitur per idem, quocunque sempiterno signato, deus non potest facere quin hoc erit.

His decree as to that future, the happening of a given thing is absolutely sure, both future and past carrying equal necessity with them.

Istud est argumentum ad hominem admittentem assumptum, set contra concedentem possibile esse quod nichil fuit, set faciens alias raciones. Nam, sic dicendo oportet concedere de multis creaturis [quod] si fuerunt, eternaliter erunt; et, si deus quicquam ordinavit, ipsum erit: et ita de ceteris. Set sicut potest esse quod deus non ordinavit ipsum, erit et ita de ceteris: set sicut potest esse quod deus non ordinavit hoc, sic potest esse quod hoc non erit. Unde dici posset quod adnichilacio, licet sit deo possibilis, repugnat tamen divine sciencie et quotlibet talibus contingentibus.

But this argument is *ad hominem*, against one who admits that God might possibly have created nothing; if He ordains anything, it must last eternally; so that annihilation is against God's wisdom, yet possible to His power.

Contra istud sic arguitur. Ordinancie dei repugnat quod creatura adnichiletur; set tanta est repugnancia inter existenciam creature et adnichilacionem, sicut ponatur inter ordinanciam dei et adnichilacionem; igitur per idem existencie creature repugnat quod ipsa adnichiletur. Minor probatur, non solum sophistice, ut arguitur corrupcionem rei naturalem repugnare sue existencie; set ad hunc sensum quod repugnat aliquam naturam creatam existere vel extitisse cum hoc quod adnichilabitur in futurum. Nam eo ipso quod creatura existit, deus ordinavit sibi legem quod appeteret, saltem quoad suam essenciam, semper esse: et eo ipso quod deus ordinavit creaturam sic appetere, ordinavit illam quoad essenciam suam semper esse. Igitur, quanto repugnat alieni ordinacioni divine quod creatura adnichiletur [etc.]

Here I say: Annihilation and God's ordinance are contrary; therefore, any creature's existence and its annihilation are likewise contrary, and annihilation is impossible. To exist or to have existed at any time is impossible for what is not to exist in the future. God, giving each creature the appetence of eternal being, ordains that it shall always exist.

Maior patet ex hoc quod repugnat corpus naturale vel spiritum esse, nisi appetat se esse: ut patet ex dictis de agencia naturali, et ex testimonio Augustini, 3° *De libero* [*arbitrio*] et alibi multis locis; ubi vult quamlibet naturam appetere se esse, et nullam posse appetere se non esse. Ex quo sequitur [quod] quelibet appetit esse sempiternum, quia aliter terminaretur appetitus suus usque ad non gradus: ita quod nature corruptibili esset

Every thing must have the appetence of being, and cannot tend to non-entity. Therefore it tends to eternal being; otherwise, in beings that decay, this

8. est *pro* esse MS. 9. facere *pro* faciens MS. 10. quod *deest* MS. 26. sine *pro* cum MS. 33. etc. *deest* MS. 37. arbitrio *deest* MS. 39. quod *deest* MS.

Tendency would diminish to zero, and therefore tend to non-entity: a sheer impossibility.

dare appetitum finitum quoad tempus; et per consequens, cum oportet quod alterum contradictoriorum appetat, consequens esset quod appetat amplius non esse, quod est inpossibile.

Any being can — if God wills it — exist indefinitely; but this could not be, unless it tend essentially to be everlastingly.

Confirmatur sic: ista data natura potest de dei potencia absoluta amplius esse, set non potest amplius | esse nisi (137 b[b]) posset amplius appetere se esse, igitur potest amplius appetere se esse; et cum hoc potest accidentaliter appetere, sequitur cum veris quod non potest esse, nisi appetat sempiterne esse, sicut appeteret in casu in quo sempiterne esset. Modo probatur minor, scilicet quod. si deus ordinavit creature legem sic appetendi, ordinavit sibi semper esse; quia aliter appetitus naturalissimus foret frustra, quod repugnat divine ordinancie.

Now, God having given this natural tendency, ordained that it should be fulfilled.

But it is objected that bodies subject to decay cannot always exist, v. g. after Doomsday. This is no real difficulty. The matter of which they are composed will exist eternally, and it is essentially the same as what they are. A brute will not exist for ever, but that which is the brute, will. No parts of the universe will be annihilated, all will be purified. The essence or nature of things may begin but cannot cease to exist.

Et si obicitur quod omnia corpora sublunaria non possunt semper esse, eo quod post diem iudicii non erunt vegetalia vel sensibilia, nec alia mixta inanimata, ut lapides et metalla: dicitur quod nichil obicit contra sensum recte prophetancium. Nam omne tale corpus est eadem essencia que materia prima, cum omnes forme substanciales aut accidentales [non] sint nisi modi contingentes eidem essencie; et sic, quamvis brutum non habebit *esse* bruti sempiternum, tamen illa essencia que est brutum manebit post diem iudicii. Et ita senciendum est de qualibet parte universi. Sic enim perficietur universitas per alteracionem et melioracionem, cum reciperit ultimatam innovacionem: et sicut nulla pars eius tunc creabitur, sic nec adnichilabitur, set purgabitur, quia dei est opus suum ad perfectum producere, et non peiorando retrocedere. Patet ista sentencia per beatum Augustinum, 4 *Super Gen. ad litteram*, 24. ut supra, ubi dicit quod, quicquid erit, universa creatura in creatore suo semper manebit, intelligens indubie per "quicquid", essenciam substancialem, vel naturam que potest incipere esse, set non desinere.

If it be said that many tendencies of creatures are frustrated, I answer that,

Et si secundo obicitur quod multi sunt appetitus accidentales creaturarum frustratorii, ut patet de hominibus et ceteris sublunaribus appetentibus multa que nunquam adquirunt, dicitur quod inpossibile est aliquem

5. primo *pro* potest MS. 21. non *deest* MS. 38. appetitivam *pro* appetentibus MS.

19. *Prophetancium* is either a mistake, or is meant to refer to the predictions about the state of matter after Doomsday.

deo producta propter certum finem, licet nobis in-appetitum esse simpliciter frustra, cum quelibet sit a cognitum, et quilibet sit secundum aliquid impletus, cum quelibet natura, sicut appetit bonum in communi, ita habet bonum in communi. Appetitus igitur naturalis [est] pure a deo creatus sine causa secunda errabili coefficiente, set quod habeat finem sue ordinacionis, qui non potest esse adnichilacio, nec aliquid particulariter si non *esse* sempiternum, ut dicit Augustinus; sicut patet querenti de fine quare universitas creata appetit semper esse.

no tendency can be absolutely in vain, though it may be given us for an end unknown; and that the natural tendency to everlasting existence would be quite frustrated, were annihilation possible.

Et si tercio obicitur quod multe substancie materiales non possunt semper esse, quia non in instanti precedente suam generacionem, ut patet ex dictis de individuacione talium: dicitur quod nichil appetit naturaliter esse, antequam sit de facto; et sic est conclusio logice vera quod multa appetunt sempiterne esse ab instanti sue generacionis, que non appetunt simpliciter semper esse. Et ad istum sensum conceditur conclusio. Sicut enim naturale est quod motus naturalis velocitetur in fine, et quod creature tendant ad perfectum, ut patet de augmentacione animalium et cremento hominis in virtutibus post crementum corporis; sic naturale est quod appetunt perpetuitatem futuram, et non precedentem suum *esse:* et tam naturale est quod deus meliorando continue usque ad terminum inclusivum faciat continue suam universitatem, ut patet ex ordine quo producit rem a possibili *esse* intelligibili ad existenciam. Et ab hinc procedit continue, succrescens usque ad perfeccionem ultimatam, licet alique partes imperficiantur gracia sui tocius perficiendi; ut corpora corruptibilia veterascunt, ut sua species (vel saltem universitas) pulcrificetur in ordine successionis suarum parcium. Et per hec patet racio quare deus providet homini interiori tempus proficiendi usque ad mortem, et non bestie; quia homo est incorruptibilis in suo supposito, et non bestia, quam . . . . . quod sit corpus inanimatum. Perfeccius tamen est quoad universitatem quod maneat sempiterne corpus inanimatum, ut erit post diem iudicii; quia aliter oporteret omnia animata resurgere, ut dixerunt quidam, errore de quiditate forme substancialis seducti.

"But material substances cannot tend towards being for ever, i. e. before they are produced." I agree to that in so far as it denies the tendency towards existence from all eternity. This tendency, like all others, bears upon the future, not the past. God's action bears likewise, and progressively, upon the future.

This shows us why man can perfect himself until death, while beasts cannot, the soul of man alone being immortal; that of the beasts is better than inanimate nature, but the perfection of the universe requires the latter to be everlasting, not the former.

5. est *deest* MS. 16. 17. ob iusti *(sic!) pro* ab instanti MS. 18. dicitur *pro* conceditur MS. 19. modus MS. 20 tenderat MS. 27. ponitur *pro* possibili MS. 36. *no gap after* quam MS. 38. inanimata MS.

Why then, since God can create, can He not annihilate? Because His nature forbids Him to harm His creature wantonly, and because the very existence of the creature makes annihilation impossible. Nothing that the First Cause is able to effect can be repugnant to nature; for it is either something natural, or something that is good for nature; but annihilation is neither, and therefore nature abhors it.

Patet tercio solucio ad questionem qua queritur cur deus non potest adnichilare | sicut potest creare. Deus 138a[a]
enim est illius nature quod non potest malum facere, dampnificando creaturam nisi occasione data, set scit benefacere ex seipso sine occasione data ex parte creature: ideo nescit adnichilare, licet sciat creare. Patet igitur quod repugnat existencie creature quod adnichiletur, cum repugnat legi sui appetitus ad *esse*, que lex formaliter consequitur essenciam; et quicquid repugnat converti, repugnat et averti. Confirmatur sic. Omne quod potest esse pure naturale potest esse appetitum a natura sine horrore; set omnis adnichilacio, si potest esse, potest [esse] pure naturalis, igitur potest appeti a natura sine horrore: et per consequens, cum nature prime non potest esse naturale, sequitur [quod] nulle creature potest esse naturale, et appetibile ab eadem. Maior patet, eo quod nichil potest esse naturale nisi quod posset esse bonum nature, et per consequens vel natura vel bonum ipsam consequens, et sic pure naturale. Si enim deus ordinaret eternaliter quod omne individuum speciei ignis adnichilaretur, tunc naturale esset igni adnichilari. Set hoc potest esse: igitur naturalitas adnichilacionis. Nam a natura prima ordinatum, sine repugnancia possibili nature secunde, non potest dici innaturale nec preternaturale; et si potest esse naturale, potest appeti, quod est notorie inpossibile, quia non potest habere racionem boni, et per consequens non racionem appetibilis, vel ordinem utilitatis inter creaturas dei. Cum tamen nihil potest fieri a deo nisi tamquam eius bona creatura, ut patet ex dictis.

It is of no use to reply that we know that nothing will be annihilated, yet that it is possible, or that Scripture does not contradict it; for if a thing can be annihilated and created again *ad infinitum*, the Saints' bliss will still remain.

Nec valet dicere quod homo est certus quod non erit adnichilacio; et ex alio latere certus quod potest esse, quia concludet de evidencia quod non erit. Videtur quod cum tota scriptura sacra de beatitudine sanctorum et eternitate mundi, stat eius adnichilacio; quia sicut aliquid potest adnichilari, ita potest infinicies recreari, et per consequens eternaliter manere beatum, cum hoc quod adnichiletur sine impedimento vel interrupcione

13. esse *deest* MS. 15. quod *deest* MS. 16. minor *pro* maior MS. 33. 9° = conclusio MS. 34. dum *pro* cum MS.

10. *Omne.* The text is so bad here that I can see no way to restore it. The argument, however, is simple enough.

sue beatitudinis. Nec credo quod homo, cui non est facta revelacio, habebit efficacius medium quod non erit adnichilacio, quam ex testimonio scripture. Quis igitur scit si deus in fine magni [anni] Platonis ordinavit adnichilare hunc mundum, et vel ipsum vel novum recreare, et sic infinicies? Quod si est ex prima ordinacione nature, est ita naturale sicut eclipsis solis, vel lune in tempore suo, que semper est quoad causam, secundum philosophiam Aristotelis.

There is no stronger authority against it than Scripture. Suppose that at the end of Plato's cycle God destroys the world and creates it again; it would be a natural happening, if only possible.

Modo probatur quod opinans possibilitatem adnichilacionis consequenter in effectu solvit scripturam tam veteris quam novi testamenti, quas pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum. Nam, Gen. 4°, dicit tota trinitas Chaim primo homicide: *Nonne, si bene egeris recipies [mercedem?] sin autem male, statim in foribus peccatum adherit?* Modo secundum opinantes: *mercedem* scilicet, naturaliter convertendo, *adnichilacionem!* Item, Levitici 26°, ortatur deus ad legis sue observanciam sub hac forma: *si in preceptis meis ambulaveritis, et mandata mea custodieritis, et feceritis ea, dabo vobis pluvias temporibus suis,* etc. 4 enim principaliter promittit illis in genere, scilicet, fructuum ubertatem, pacis securitatem in prole multiplici, et familiarem proteccionem, sicut patet legenti textum. Quo contra, dicit comminando: *Quod si non audieritis me . . . . . . si spreveritis leges meas et iudicia mea contempseritis, ut non faciatis ea que a me constituta sunt, et ad irritum perducatis pactum meum, ego quoque hec faciam vobis:* et recitat consequenter. Quatuor mala ex adverso correspondencia, et conformes condicionales promissiones, recitat deus Deuteronomie 4. 8. 11. 28. et alibi multis locis.

Gen. IV, 7. Lev. XXVI, 3. Lev. XXVI, 15, 16. Deut. IV, VIII, XI, XXVIII.

Thus this theory practically destroys the authority of all Scripture. Examples of rewards promised for virtue and punishment for sin.

Set quoad hec omnia est multiplex responsio. Prima dicit quod talia dicta non sunt vera de virtute sermonis, set ad bonum sensum auctoris. Secunda dicit quod *si* non tenetur condicionaliter, ut logici loquntur. Et tercia dicit quod in omnibus huiusmodi condicionalibus promissionibus supplendum est, "si deus voluerit", vel "stante ista ordinacione vel lege", et sic de quotlibet

To this argument there are many answers: that texts must not be understood literally; *If* does not here mean a condition; or if it does, there is always understood this other condition: *If God choose this to be so.*

4. anni *deest* MS. 15. mercedem *deest* MS.; *ib.* peccatum tuum MS. 16. set *pro* scilicet MS. 20. et feceritis *deest* MS. 21. eciam *pro* etc. MS. 25 *no gap after* me MS.; set *pro* si MS.

1. *Nec credo.* I think that a sentence or two should come before this, pointing out the falsity of the preceding *Videtur quod.*

Scripture is often not strictly logical in its expressions; and no doubt God might keep His promise of recompense otherwise than by temporal gifts. Then, if a man only observes God's law for a time, the promise cannot be fulfilled. And so on. It is neither seemly nor advantageous to cavil thus with Scripture. We must take the promises as they stand; *rain* may signify material rain or rain of grace; and the promises of children, victory and peace, are quite true in a spiritual sense. The promises are not made to backsliders; Scripture expressly warns us against backsliding. As to those who faithfully keep God's law, how could those promises be fulfilled in any way, if annihilation were possible?

gloriosis adinvenientibus. Quod autem oportet sic dicere, patet, quia multas consequencias facit scriptura que non sunt logice bone; ut nemo dubitat quin deus posset aliter | satisfacere observantibus legem suam, quam $138a^{b}$ dando illis pluviam, prolem, inimicorum victoriam — et sic de aliis que promittit. Stat eciam ad tempus hominem observare mandata dei, cum hoc quod residivando dampnetur, et careat promissis in via. Sic de quotlibet instanciis tam generalibus quam specialibus facta contra consequencias scripture.

Quoad quotlibet talia dicta, certum est quod nec decet nec expedit sophistice verbis contendere, set ob reverenciam auctoris ire ad sensum scripture, modo quo sancti doctores ex collacione diversorum parcium scripturarum ante nos fecerant. Et quoad instancias, patet quod deus non posset parcialiter satisfacere observantibus legem suam, nisi daret illis pluviam materialem, vel stillaret illis pluviam gracie continuandi et perficiendi: et sic vel prolem corporalem vel operum prolem, vel inimicorum corporalium vel spiritualium victoriam; et proporcionaliter de pace triplici; quoad eum, quoad seipsum, et quoad proximum. Et quoad quartam de residivacione, dicitur quod scriptura quandoque modificat ad completam observanciam, ut deuteronomia; facta enim promissione condicionata, subdit textus, *cavete ne forte decipiatur cor vestrum et recedatis a domino.* (Deut. XI, 16.) Et cum non stat quod homo observet mandata dei ad tempus, et nunquam recedat ab eo, cum hoc quod dampnetur vel adnichiletur, quam, queso, ipse daret hortacionem scripture de pace et premio habendo, manendo in deo, si homo posset per totum tempus vite sue manere in deo, nunquam recedendo moraliter, cum hoc quod in fine deus dissolvat pacem et tollat quodcunque premium per adnichilacionem oppositum? Sonat scriptura, Johannis 15°, ubi salvator dicit, "*manete in me;* (Io. XV, 4.) et tamquam formaliter sequens dicit, *et ego in vobis;* quia Zacharie primo dicitur, *Convertimini ad me ..... et convertar ad vos;* (Zach. I, 3.) et Jerem. 18, dicit dominus, "*si penitenciam egerit gens illa a malo suo quod locutus sum adversus eam,* (Ier. XVIII, 8.)

1. adīnīetibus *pro* adinvenientibus. 5. plura *pro* pluviam MS. 20. ut *pro* vel MS. 25. enim facta MS. 30. hortacio MS. 38. *no gap after* me MS.; *ib.* et ego MS. 40. propter quod MS.

agam et ego penitenciam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem".

Absit igitur a christiano Manicheorum et pelagiano [veneno] non seducto, ut fateatur aliquem esse deum suum, nisi qui ex gracia sua, eo ipso quod quis meretur, est pronior ad premiandum quam homo ad merendum. Unde consequenter sequitur in textu Johannis, *Si manseritis in me, et verba mea*, etc. Si enim homo posset, quantum in eo est, servare pacem cum deo, cum hoc quod illa pax ex parte dei summe contingenter deficiat, sequitur quod non securius esset confidendum de amicicia dei quam de amicicia regis Egipti, vel mundi; cum tamen, Ysa. 30, dicitur, "*Si revertamini et quiescatis, salvi eritis*", et Ier. 7°, 17° et 22°, plane patet respicienti quod homo non posset perfecte confidere in deo et decipi; set in homine hoc oportet, deo derelicto. Ideo Ier. 17 dicitur, *Maledictus homo qui confidit in homine, aut ponit carnem brachium suum;* et sequitur, *Benedictus vir qui confidit in domino.* Dicitur enim *homo* ab *humo*, et sonat in bestialitatem terrestrem; et *vir* in uxorem virtutum. Ideo maledicit tali homini, et benedicit viro sic speranti propter ordinem spei habende in deo, qui non potest deficere vel pacem initam ex parte sui dissolvere, sicut possunt mundialia. Unde, Io. 16°: *Hec locutus sum vobis ut in me pacem habeatis; in mundo pressuram.* Ideo consulit, ideo, propter fallaciam mundi, prima Io. 2: *Nolite diligere mundum neque ea que in mundo sunt* (suple, secundum raciones quibus mundus est in maligno positus). *Omne* namque tale est, formaliter vel causaliter, *concupiscencia carnis, concupiscencia oculorum*, vel *superbia vite*, ut ibi dicitur.

Io. XV, 7. — Isa. XXX, 15. — Ier. XVII, 5, 7. — Io. XVI. — I Io. II, 15, 16.

Our God is more inclined to reward than we are to deserve. If we are faithful to Him, He will surely be faithful to us; whereas, in our adversaries' doctrine, we could trust in Him no more than we can in men, in whom Scripture exhorts us to put no trust, but to trust in God only, and not to love the world.

Si igitur natura creata peccatrix, ut pater carnalis, ex instinctu nature non potest dampnificare propaginem suam nisi vel indisponatur innaturaliter ex parte sui, vel proles demereatur, quanto magis auctor nature, qui est amor vel caritas in abstracto, et pater tocius creature racionalis, non potest dampnificare creaturam suam, nisi ipsa previe demereatur! Istud patet ex argumento salvatoris, Luc. 11°, ubi postquam docuit orare, probat quod sperandum est de petito, si

Luc. XI, 11—13.

For if a human father will not hurt his son unless he deserve it, or himself be unnaturally changed, how much more will the Father of all, who is Love itself, not harm us unless we first do wrong? This is the doctrine taught

4. veneno *deest* MS. 24. 17 MS

by Christ Himself, when teaching us how to pray.

iustus pecierit instanter, prudenter, et benevole indesinenter, quod vocatur innoxie petere: scilicet quando non nocetur petenti contraveniendo in opere. Tunc enim petit in nomine Christi, et per consequens tocius trinitatis; ita quod instancia in petendo | corespondeat 138 b[a] eternitati que patri appropriatur, prudencia petendo necessarium ad salutem corespondeat dei filio cui sapiencia appropriatur; et indesinens benevolencia quoad deum qua non post oracionem ponitur obex forisfaciendo, correspondet spiritui sancto, cui appropriatur finalis benevolencia. Nam istis tribus habitis petit hoc in nomine Christi, et sic intelligenda est consequencia Christi, Io. 16, *Amen Amen dico vobis, si quid pecieritis,* Io. XVI, 23. etc. Et in ista lege inbutus est Johannes, prima Johannis 5°, *Hec est fiducia quam habemus ad eum, quia quodcunque pecierimus secundum voluntatem eius, audit nos.* I Io. V, 14. Similitudo autem in qua per locum *a simili* salvator probat istam absolutam necessitatem connectionis (Luc. 11) est ista: *Si ergo vos, cum sitis mali, nostis* Luc. XI, 13. *bona data,* etc. Spiritum bonum dat, qui dat bona spiritualia meliorancia spiritum, qui est plus quam corpus.

He concludes that we ought to have full confidence in God.

Of all the opinions brought forth to extol God's Omnipotence, this is the most dangerous,

Unde inter omnes opiniones absconditas, quas aliqui tamquam ypothetice provulgant ad honorem potencie dei proclamande, videtur michi quod ista sit periculosior, si consequenter concedatur scrutata sequencia; quia iuxta sic opinantes stat hominem inniti vel adherere deo quantumcunque debet ex precepto dei, cum hoc quod sine defectu pereat vel frustretur quantumlibet confusus. Et talis vocaretur pocius baculus arundineus quam fundamentum nature plenum gracie et veritatis; quia stat creaturam innitendo sibi deficere sine occasione defectus data ex parte sui, et per consequens ipsum totum vel partem sui adnichilari sine alico demerito. Et indubie magna confusio esset homini amanti deum continuo secundum omnes vires suas, quod mutiletur in membro per eius adnichilacionem.

since it would destroy all trust in God, who would be rather a staff of reed than the foundation of our hopes.

In Ecclesiasticus it is said that no one ever hoped in God and was confounded; such an assertion would be baseless, if annihilation were possible.

Oppositum istius sonat scriptura et sancti doctores concorditer; nam Ecclesiastici secundo, postquam sapiens ortatus est filium suum servire deo et sibi coniungi timore filiali, tollendo tribulaciones gracia mercedis de qua oportet deo credere subiungit; *Respicite, filii, naciones* Ecclus. II, 11, 12.

4. michi *pro* in MS. 15. ad deum MS. 16. dabit nobis *pro* audit nos MS. 19. nostis *twice* MS. 28. debet sine MS. 35. continere MS.

hominum, et scitote quia nullus speravit in domino, et confusus est . . . . permansit in mandatis eius, et derelictus est; aut quis invocavit illum, et despexit eum? quoniam pius et misericors est deus? Ista dicta indubie nimis temere asseret sapiens, si cum antecedenti contingeret deum adnichilare; quia tunc assereret sine evidencia satis ambiguum, in hortando ad servitutem dei et eius dileccionem: quod stultum esset sapientem facere. Ex hoc igitur quod deus est tam bonus, tam pius, et tam misericors, probat quod ex parte dei non potest defectus contingere creature, nisi ipsamet sit causa occasionalis.

Chrysostom proves that no one is harmed unless he first harms himself; and Anselm proves the immortality of the soul by showing that it was made to love God everlastingly.

Et huic consideracioni innititur beatus Johannes Crisostomus, probando quod nemo potest ledi, nisi ledatur a seipso. Isti eciam consideracioni innititur venerabilis Anselmus in suo *monologion*, ca° 69, ubi [ad] probandam animam esse sempiternam, capit quod nephas est estimare deum ordinare animam racionalem, ut aliquando amet deum et aliquando post non amet eum: et per consequens, ordinat ipsam semper amare eum (saltem ex debito); et per consequens est ordinata ut semper vivat. Unde subdit iste doctor: "Inconveniens maius est summe bono sicut sapienti et omnipotenti creatori, ut quod fecit esse ad se amandum, id faciat nisi esse [tam] diu quamdiu vere amaverit; et quod sponte dedit non amanti ut semper amaret, id auferat vel auferri permittat amanti, ut ex necessitate non amet; presertim cum dubitari nullatenus debeat quod ipse omnem naturam se vere amantem amet." Et isti eidem principio innititur lincolniensis, dicto 66°, probans quod nec diabolus, nec mundus, nec caro, vel angelus bonus, eciam ipse deus, non potest deicere animam innitentem deo, nisi forte ipsa gratis abcesserit. Et de tali inpossibilitate dei ad nocendum sine causa substrata loquitur scriptura copiose, et doctores concorditer. Iob IV, 7. *Recordare, obsecro,* inquid textus Job 4°, *quis umquam innocens periit, aut quando recti deleti sunt.* Quamvis autem istud sit dictum Eliphaz themanitis, tamen esset verissimum, ut exponit beatus Gregorius, et alii exponentes.

Grosseteste, Gregory and other doctors hold that not God Himself can without cause harm a soul that is united to Him.

Nec valet dicere quod omnes iste raciones vere concludunt, scilicet quod deus non potest adnichilare aliquem

Nor can it be said that this is true of the

2. *no gap after* est MS. 6. assireret (sic!) MS. 15. ad *deest* MS. 18. alias *pro* aliquando MS. 19. cum ordinat MS. 22. unius *pro* maius MS. 24. tam *deest* MS. 26. permittit MS. 37. Eliphat MS.

21

Blessed, but God may punish sinners in this world with annihilation; there are in this world many predestined to bliss; and besides, it has been shown that annihilation is no punishment for sin; if it be possible, it is equally possible for all creatures. This is generally admitted by the partisans of this theory.

vere innocentem, cuiusmodi sunt beati et alie creature; verumptamen pro tempore vie stat deum | punire pec- 138b[b]
catores adnichilacione. Istud est insipide dictum, non solum quia quotlibet beati sunt in tempore suo viantes, et econtra, ut sophiste arguunt, set quia iuxta probata superius, adnichilacio non potest esse pena peccati. Nemo igitur, in quantum peccator, habet racionem possibilitatis adnichilacionis sue; set eque potest in quocunque statu absoluto adnichilari, si adnichilacio sit possibilis. Aliter enim non posset homo adnichilari, nisi mereretur suam adnichilacionem. Set iuxta dicta superius illa pena esset nimis severa. Ideo omnes probabiliter loquentes dicunt, quod concedendo adnichilacionem, eque potest deus adnichilare non merentem suam adnichilacionem, sicut et merentem: quia capto iniquissimo peccatore, si ipse adnichilaretur, quotlibet partes eius materiales adnichilarentur que non possunt mereri suam adnichilacionem.

They say: It God is almighty, He can annihilate, I reply: If He is All-Just and All-Good, He cannot. He could indeed if He would; and therefore He is almighty, and none can gainsay Him.

Sicut igitur moderni dicunt formaliter sequi: "si deus est omnipotens, tunc est adnichilativus," quia aliter subtraheretur de sua omnipotencia; ita audenter assero: si deus sit bonus et iustus, tunc non est adnichilativus, quia adnichilacio est [in] compossibilis illi. Set satis est pro omnipotencia sua, ut exponit dominus Armakanus, quod potest adnichilare, si voluerit; et sic intelligendum est illud dictum Sophar, Job 11, *Si subverteret* Iob
omnia vel in unum coartaverit, quis contradicet, ei ..... XI, 10.
aut quis dicere potest, Cur ita facis? Quasi diceret: Iob
nemo potest eum racionabiliter increpare quicquid IX, 12.
fecerit. Verumptamen ordinavit leges et consequencias eternas cum quibus non potest despensare, cum ex eius inmensitate bonitatis, et sapiencie sint incorrigibiles. Unde, Augustinus 8 *Super Gen. ad litteram* 21, "cum multa sit utilitas homini quod deo servit, deus iubendo utile facit quicquid iubere voluerit. De quo metuendum non est ne iubere non possit quod inutile est". Unde infra, capitulo 22° sic scribit: "Quid enim tam iniqum, quam ut bene sit desertori boni? neque enim ullo modo fieri potest, ut ita sit; set aliquando amissi superioris boni non sentitur malum, cum habetur, quod amatum

But He, having laid down eternal and indispensable laws, cannot have the will to break them.

These laws, according to Augustine, never command anything useless, because to obey God is in itself useful to man,

22. sic *pro* si MS.; *ib.* n[t] = nisi (?) *pro* non MS. 23. in *deest* MS.; *ib.* illis MS. 27. quies MS.; *ib. no gap after* ei MS. 28. poterit *pro* potest MS.

est inferius bonum. Set divina iusticia est, ut qui voluntate amisit quod amare debuit, amittat cum dolore quod amavit, ut sic creator ubique laudetur. Adhuc enim est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum; nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in pena."

Et isti legi nature, cum qua deus non potest dispensare, innititur Avicenna, 9° me^{ce} sue, capitulo 9°, ad declarandum quomodo dediti bestialitati erunt gravissime puniti, postquam anima separata a corpore non invenerit bonum sensus, in quo poterit delectari, ut vel sic mitigetur dolor quem haberent ex privacione boni naturaliter debiti.

Sic enim experimur mitigari dolorem unius potencie propter delectacionem alterius. Subtilitas igitur prophecie theologice stat in noticia legum talium, vel consequenciarum quarum pars magna exprimitur in scriptura. Ideo dicit psalmista, psalmo 118, quod super magistros suos, eciam senes, intellexit, quia studendo vel meditando legem dei dilexit. Ideo etc.

Ps. CXVIII, 100.

and it is just that disobedience should be punished by suffering, as well as by the loss of the pleasure for which God's laws have been set aside. Avicenna too admits as a law of nature that men addicted to beastly vices should be necessarily and most severely punished in the next world. These laws and their consequences, as expressed in Scripture, should be well known to theologians.

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